Trying to recollect past events: confidence, beliefs, and memories

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Using a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and confidence in memory, we review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inflation, false feedback and memory implantation. Imagination inflation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution against accepting investigator‐based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants' self‐reports. Recommendations are made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

The Consequences of False Memories for Food Preferences and Choices

False memories, or memories for events that never occurred, have been documented in the real world and in the laboratory. In the real world, false memories involving trauma and abuse have resulted in real-life consequences. In the laboratory, researchers have just begun to study the consequences of false memories. We review this laboratory-based work and show how false memories for food-related experiences (e.g., becoming ill after eating egg salad) can lead to attitudinal and behavioral consequences (e.g., lowered self-reported preference for and decreased consumption of egg salad).

What if you went to the police and accused your uncle of abuse? Misunderstandings concerning the benefits of memory distortion: A commentary on Fernández (2015)

In a recent paper, Fernández (2015) argues that memory distortion can have beneficial outcomes. Although we agree with this, we find his reasoning and examples flawed to such degree that they will lead to misunderstandings rather than clarification in the field of memory (distortion). In his paper, Fernández uses the terms belief and memory incorrectly, creating a conceptual blur. Also, Fernández tries to make the case that under certain circumstances, false memories of abuse are beneficial. We argue against this idea as the reasoning behind this claim is based on controversial assumptions such as repression. Although it is true that memory distortions can be beneficial, the examples sketched by Fernández are not in line with recent documentation in this area.

Flashbacks, intrusions, mind-wandering - Instances of an involuntary memory spectrum: A commentary on Takarangi, Strange, and Lindsay (2014)

In their paper, Takarangi, Strange, and Lindsay (2014) showed in two experiments that participants who had witnessed a shocking film frequently "mind-wandered without awareness" about the content of the film. More importantly, they equated this effect with the occurrence of traumatic intrusions. In this commentary, we argue that the authors adhered to conceptually ambiguous terms, and thereby unintentionally contribute to an already existing conceptual blur in the trauma-memory field. We postulate that clear definitions are urgently needed for phenomena such as intrusions, flashbacks, and mind-wandering, when using them in the context of trauma memory. Furthermore, our proposal is that these phenomena can fall under a spectrum of different involuntary memory instances. We propose that by adopting stricter definitions and viewing them as separate, but interrelated phenomena, different lines of trauma-memory research can be reconciled, which would considerably advance the field.

On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be 'persuaded' to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude-change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events - compatible with a source monitoring approach - would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.

Creating non-believed memories for recent autobiographical events

A recent study showed that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of events that they do not believe to have occurred [1]. In the present experiment we tested for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been created, debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 1 participants imitated simple actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed additional (fake) actions. As in earlier studies, this procedure created powerful false memories. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and told that specific actions in the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical actions were tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined participants' beliefs in fake actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false memories which are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that the memory of an event can be experimentally dissociated from the belief in the event's occurrence. These results also confirm that belief in and memory for an event can be independently-occurring constructs.

The origin of children's implanted false memories: memory traces or compliance?

A longstanding question in false memory research is whether children's implanted false memories represent actual memory traces or merely result from compliance. The current study examined this question using a response latency based deception task. Forty-five 8-year-old children received narratives about a true (first day at school) and false event (hot air balloon ride). Across two interviews, 58/32% of the participants developed a partial/full false memory. Interestingly, these children also showed higher false recall on an unrelated DRM paradigm compared to children without a false memory. The crucial finding, however, was that the results of the deception task revealed that children with partial and full false memories were faster to confirm than to deny statements relating to the false event. This indicates that children's implanted false memories reflect actual memory traces, and are unlikely to be explained by mere compliance.

Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N=122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior.

Do people's motives influence their susceptibility to imagination inflation?

People are motivated to remember past autobiographical experiences related to their current goals; we investigated whether people are also motivated to remember false past experiences related to those goals. In Session 1, we measured subjects' implicit and explicit achievement and affiliation motives. Subjects then rated their confidence about, and memory for, childhood events containing achievement and affiliation themes. Two weeks later in Session 2, subjects received a "computer-generated profile" based on their Session 1 ratings. This profile suggested that one false achievement event and one false affiliation event had happened in childhood. After imagining and describing the suggested false events, subjects made confidence and memory ratings a second time. For achievement events, subjects' explicit motives predicted their false beliefs and memories. The results are explained using source monitoring and a motivational model of autobiographical memory.

Skin conductance and memory fragmentation after exposure to an emotional film clip in depersonalization disorder

It is often assumed that when confronted with an emotional event, patients with DPD inhibit information processing. It is also thought that this fosters memory fragmentation. This hypothesis has not been tested in chronic depersonalization. The aim of this study was to investigate the temporal pattern of autonomic responding to emotional material in depersonalization disorder, along with concomitant deficits in subjective and objective memory formation (i.e., difficulties to form a coherent narrative consisting of an ordered sequence of events). Participants with depersonalization disorder (n=14) and healthy control participants (n=14) viewed an emotional video clip while their skin conductance (SC) levels were measured. Peritraumatic dissociation was measured before and after the clip, and memory performance was measured 35 min after viewing. Compared to controls, depersonalized participants exhibited a distinctly different temporal pattern of autonomic responding, characterized by an earlier peak and subsequent flattening of SCLs. Maximum SCLs did not differ between the two groups. Moreover, unlike the control group, depersonalized participants showed no SC recovery after clip offset. In terms of memory performance, patients exhibited objective memory fragmentation, which they also reported subjectively. However, they did not differ from controls in free recall performance. Apparently, emotional responding in DPD is characterized by a shortened latency to peak with subsequent flattening and is accompanied by memory fragmentation in the light of otherwise unremarkable memory functioning.

Script knowledge enhances the development of children's false memories

We examined whether script knowledge contributes to the development of children's false memories. Sixty 7-year-old and 60 11-year-old children listened to false narratives describing either a high-knowledge event (i.e., fingers being caught in a mousetrap) or a low-knowledge event (i.e., receiving a rectal enema) that were similar in terms of plausibility and pleasantness. Moreover, half of the children in each condition received additional suggestive details about the false events. Across two interviews, children had to report everything they remembered about the events. Script knowledge affected children's false memories in that both younger and older children developed more false memories for the high-knowledge event than for the low-knowledge event. Moreover, at the first interview, additional suggestive details inhibited the development of children's images into false memories.

Imagining nice and nasty events in childhood or adulthood: recent positive events show the most imagination inflation

We explored whether event recency and valence affect people's susceptibility to imagination inflation. Using a three-stage procedure, subjects imagined positive and negative events happening in their distant or recent past. First, subjects rated how confident they were that they had experienced particular positive and negative events in childhood or adulthood using a Life Events Inventory (LEI). Two weeks later, they imagined two positive and two negative events from the LEI. Finally, they rated their confidence on the LEI a second time. For positive events, subjects showed more imagination inflation for adulthood than childhood events. For negative events, they showed no difference in imagination inflation for adulthood and childhood events. We discuss factors that may influence source confusions for memories of the past and highlight directions for future research.

Familiarity breeds distortion: the effects of media exposure on false reports concerning media coverage of the terrorist attacks in london on 7 July 2005

The present experiment investigated whether increased media exposure could lead to an increase in memory distortions regarding a traumatic public event: the explosion of the No. 30 bus in Tavistock Square, London on 7 July 2005. A total of 150 Swedish and 150 UK participants completed a series of questionnaires about their memory of either (i) the aftermath of the explosion, (ii) a non-existent computerised reconstruction of the moment of the explosion, or (iii) non-existent closed circuit television footage of the moment of the explosion. In line with the availability heuristic, U.K. participants were more likely than Swedish participants to claim to have seen all three types of footage. Furthermore, a subsample of U.K. participants who appeared to have developed false "memories" of seeing the No. 30 bus explode scored significantly higher on measures of dissociation and fantasy proneness than participants who did not develop false "memories". This experiment provides further support for the role of imaginative processes in the development of false memories.

Suggesting childhood food illness results in reduced eating behavior

Previous studies have shown that suggesting childhood events can influence current self-reported attitudes towards future behavior. This study shows that suggesting a false past event (i.e. becoming sick on a specific food during childhood) can modify present behavior (i.e. reduce eating of the food). Participants screened to be normal eaters received or did not receive a suggestion that they likely became sick on spoiled peach yogurt as a child. One week later they took part in an allegedly separate marketing taste-test study, during which they rated preferences for a variety of crackers and yogurts. After completing ratings, participants were invited to freely eat the remaining food while completing questionnaires. Results revealed that the participants receiving the suggestion expressed lower preference specifically for peach yogurt, and ate less yogurt of all the types, while not differing in eating of crackers. These results demonstrate that suggesting false past events influences subsequent behavior.

So that's why I don't remember: normalizing forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalizing the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the "forgetting rationale" substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.

Did you witness demonic possession? A response time analysis of the relationship between event plausibility and autobiographical beliefs

This study tested the hypothesis that the search for information pertinent to answering the question "Did event x happen to you?" is preceded by a preliminary plausibility assessment, the outcome of which affects the amount of effort invested in the search. Undergraduate students were asked to assess the plausibility of six events and subsequently to rate their belief that each event had happened to them before the age of 6. Unknown to them, response times (RTs) for answering the belief questions were also recorded. RTs for making belief judgments were more highly correlated with plausibility than with belief, and were significantly associated with plausibility even when belief ratings were controlled. As predicted, RTs were very short when the event was deemed highly implausible and increased sharply if the event was deemed at least somewhat plausible; significant but less pronounced increases in RTs followed as plausibility increased further.

False claims about false memory research

Pezdek and Lam [Pezdek, K. & Lam, S. (2007). What research paradigms have cognitive psychologists used to study "False memory," and what are the implications of these choices? Consciousness and Cognition] claim that the majority of research into false memories has been misguided. Specifically, they charge that false memory scientists have been (1) misusing the term "false memory," (2) relying on the wrong methodologies to study false memories, and (3) misapplying false memory research to real world situations. We review each of these claims and highlight the problems with them. We conclude that several types of false memory research have advanced our knowledge of autobiographical and recovered memories, and that future research will continue to make significant contributions to how we understand memory and memory errors.

The false fame illusion in people with memories about a previous life

The present study examined whether individuals with full-blown memories of highly implausible events are prone to commit source monitoring errors. Participants reporting previous-life memories and those without such memories completed a false fame task. This task provides an index of source monitoring errors (i.e., misclassifying familiar non-famous names as famous names). Participants with previous-life memories had a greater tendency to judge the names of previously presented non-famous people as famous than control participants. The two groups did not differ in terms of correct recognition of new non-famous names and famous names. Although dissociation, cognitive failures, sleep-related experiences, depressive symptoms, and signs of psychological distress were all significantly higher in participants with previous-life memories than in controls, these variables did not predict the false fame illusion.

False Memories

Abstract. In recent years, there has been an explosion of research on false memories: The subjective experience of remembering something if that something did apparently not happen in reality. We review a range of findings concerning this phenomenon: False memories of details and of whole events by adults and children, as well as false memories of words in laboratory experiments (in the DRM paradigm). We also briefly discuss the converse phenomenon: Evidence of forgetting or repression of significant events, and evidence of recovered memories. Knowledge of both phenomena is needed for judging whether “new” memories are false, recovered, or whether both options are possible. More general as well as specific theories explaining false memories are discussed, and we close with implications for practice.