The impact of introducing a new hospital financing system (DRGs) in Poland on hospitalisations for atherosclerosis: An interrupted time series analysis (2004–2012)

Does an innovative case-based payment scheme promote the hierarchical medical system? A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

BACKGROUND

China is striving to promote a hierarchical medical system (HMS) to improve the efficiency of health resource utilization and ensure health equity. An innovative payment scheme named the "Diagnosis-Intervention Package" (DIP) has been developed recently and implemented in 71 pilot cities nationwide. Although the impact of payment reform on medical expenditure and provider behavior has been demonstrated, there is little evidence on whether the reform promotes the HMS.

METHODS

This study uses evolutionary game theory to formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government (LG), superior medical institutions (SMI), and patients in implementing DIP payment reform. We also analyze the stability of each participant's strategy and the sensitivity of parameters.

RESULTS

The results show that for LG, the additional social benefits created for other regions are crucial in influencing the evolution of the game system. SMI are more inclined to support the HMS when the proportion of patient reduction under the DIP payment scheme is low. For patients, the perceived medical quality of primary medical institutions (PMI) is the decisive factor in their strategies.

CONCLUSION

The DIP payment scheme is more likely to promote the HMS in regions with an advanced policy framework, abundant medical resources, and high-quality primary medical services. Policymakers need to create effective incentives to boost support for the HMS from each participant. This study provides a feasible methodology for analyzing the impact of payment reforms that can be used in future research.

DRGKB: a knowledgebase of worldwide diagnosis-related groups' practices for comparison, evaluation and knowledge-guided application

As a prospective payment method, diagnosis-related groups (DRGs)'s implementation has varying effects on different regions and adopt different case classification systems. Our goal is to build a structured public online knowledgebase describing the worldwide practice of DRGs, which includes systematic indicators for DRGs' performance assessment. Therefore, we manually collected the qualified literature from PUBMED and constructed DRGKB website. We divided the evaluation indicators into four categories, including (i) medical service quality; (ii) medical service efficiency; (iii) profitability and sustainability; (iv) case grouping ability. Then we carried out descriptive analysis and comprehensive scoring on outcome measurements performance, improvement strategy and specialty performance. At last, the DRGKB finally contains 297 entries. It was found that DRGs generally have a considerable impact on hospital operations, including average length of stay, medical quality and use of medical resources. At the same time, the current DRGs also have many deficiencies, including insufficient reimbursement rates and the ability to classify complex cases. We analyzed these underperforming parts by domain. In conclusion, this research innovatively constructed a knowledgebase to quantify the practice effects of DRGs, analyzed and visualized the development trends and area performance from a comprehensive perspective. This study provides a data-driven research paradigm for following DRGs-related work along with a proposed DRGs evolution model. Availability and implementation: DRGKB is freely available at http://www.sysbio.org.cn/drgkb/. Database URL: http://www.sysbio.org.cn/drgkb/.

Comparison of the market share of public and private hospitals under different Medical Alliances: an interrupted time-series analysis in rural China

BACKGROUND

China initiated the Medical Alliances (MAs) reform to enhance resource allocation efficiency and ensure equitable healthcare. In response to challenges posed by the predominance of public hospitals, the reform explores public-private partnerships within the MAs. Notably, private hospitals can now participate as either leading or member institutions. This study aims to evaluate the dynamic shifts in market share between public and private hospitals across diverse MAs models.

METHODS

Data spanning April 2017 to March 2019 for Dangyang County's MA and January 2018 to December 2019 for Qianjiang County's MA were analyzed. Interrupted periods occurred in April 2018 and January 2019. Using independent sample t-tests, chi-square tests, and interrupted time series analysis (ITSA), we compared the proportion of hospital revenue, the proportion of visits for treatment, and the average hospitalization days of discharged patients between leading public hospitals and leading private hospitals, as well as between member public hospitals and member private hospitals before and after the reform.

RESULTS

After the MAs reform, the revenue proportion decreased for leading public and private hospitals, while member hospitals saw an increase. However, ITSA revealed a notable rise trend in revenue proportion for leading private hospitals (p < 0.001), with a slope of 0.279% per month. Member public and private hospitals experienced decreasing revenue proportions, with outpatient visits proportions declining in member public hospitals by 0.089% per month (p < 0.05) and inpatient admissions proportions dropping in member private hospitals by 0.752% per month (p < 0.001). The average length of stay in member private hospitals increased by 0.321 days per month after the reform (p < 0.01).

CONCLUSIONS

This study underscores the imperative to reinforce oversight and constraints on leading hospitals, especially private leading hospitals, to curb the trend of diverting patients from member hospitals. At the same time, for private hospitals that are at a disadvantage in competition and may lead to unreasonable prolongation of hospital stay, this kind of behavior can be avoided by strengthening supervision or granting leadership.

Factors Influencing Health Care Providers Payment Reforms in Central and Eastern European Countries

Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have recently implemented reforms to health care provider payment systems, which include changing payment methods and related systems such as contracting, management information systems, and accountability mechanisms. This study examines factors influencing provider payment reforms implemented since 2010 in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. A four-stage mixed methods approach was used: developing a theoretical framework and data collection form using existing literature, mapping payment reforms, consulting with national health policy experts, and conducting a comparative analysis. Qualitative analysis included inductive thematic analysis and deductive approaches based on an existing health policy model, distinguishing context, content, process, and actors. We analyzed 27 payment reforms that focus mainly on hospitals and primary health care. We identified 14 major factor themes influencing those reforms. These factors primarily related to the policy process (pilot study, coordination of implementation systems, availability of funds, IT systems, training for providers, reform management) and content (availability of performance indicators, use of clinical guidelines, favorability of the payment system for providers, tariff valuation). Two factors concerned the reform context (political willingness or support, regulatory framework, and bureaucracy) and two were in the actors' dimension (engagement of stakeholders, capacity of stakeholders). This study highlights that the content and manner of implementation (process) of a reform are crucial. Stakeholder involvement and their capacities could influence every dimension of the reform cycle. The nine countries analyzed share similarities in barriers and facilitators, suggesting the potential for cross-country learning.

The impact of DRG on resource consumption of inpatient with ischemic stroke

Background

Diagnosis-related group (DRG) payments were gradually introduced and used in 12 public hospitals in L city. Given the high incidence and burden of ischemic stroke, the study aimed to assess the impact of DRG payment reform on inpatient medical resource utilization.

Methods

Data were obtained from the DRG local database of the new Chinese cooperative medical program in L city. The study used interrupted time series analysis to examine changes in length of stay and medical costs before and after the reform, and also assessed changes in different subgroups.

Results

There were 763 and 4,731 ischemic stroke patients in tertiary hospitals and 1953 and 10,439 patients in secondary hospitals before and after the DRG payment reform, respectively. After the reform, LOS was reduced 0.047 and 0.47 days in tertiary and secondary hospitals, respectively. Medical expenses decreased by 30.189 yuan in tertiary hospitals, but those increased by 44.918 yuan in secondary hospitals monthly. For gender, the average LOS reduced by 0.462 and 0.471 days for male and female in secondary hospitals. The change in medical expenses for male patients in tertiary hospitals and female in secondary hospitals were more significant, with a decrease of 65.396 yuan and increase of 56.257 yuan. The most pronounced change in resource consumption was seen for patients aged 85 years and older, with an increase in average LOS and medical expenses by 0.394 days and 382.422 yuan in tertiary hospitals. They showed a reduction in the average LOS by 1.480 days, and increase in the average medical expenses by 133.485 yuan in secondary hospitals monthly. Regarding disease severity, the most significant changes were seen in MCC patients. The average LOS decreased by 0.197 and 0.928 days and the average medical expenses decreased by 131.526 and 21.631 yuan in tertiary and secondary hospitals, respectively.

Conclusion

The implementation of DRG payment system has led to a reduction in the LOS in various levels of hospitals, which would save in bed resources. However, DRG payment reform can help to control medical expenses for ultra-high cases, but it may not be useful to control the overall increase in medical expenses.

Variations in the impact of the new case-based payment reform on medical costs, length of stay, and quality across different hospitals in China: an interrupted time series analysis

BACKGROUND

In 2018, an innovative case-based payment scheme called Diagnosis-Intervention Packet (DIP) was piloted in a large developed city in southern China. This study aimed to investigate the impact of the new payment method on total medical expenditure per case, length of stay (LOS), and in-hospital mortality rate across different hospitals.

METHODS

We used the de-identified patient-level discharge data of hospitalized patients from 2016 to 2019 in our study city. The interrupted time series model was used to examine the impact of the DIP payment reform on inflation-adjusted total expenditure per case, LOS, and in-hospital mortality rate across different hospitals, which were stratified into different hospital ownerships (public and private) and hospital levels (tertiary, secondary, and primary).

RESULTS

We included 2.08 million and 2.98 million discharge cases of insured patients before and after the DIP payment reform, respectively. The DIP payment reform resulted in a significant increase of the monthly trend of adjusted total expenditure per case in public (1.1%, P = 0.000), tertiary (0.6%, P = 0.000), secondary (0.4%, P = 0.047) and primary hospitals (0.9%, P = 0.039). The monthly trend of LOS increased significantly in public (0.022 days, P = 0.041) and primary (0.235 days, P = 0.032) hospitals. The monthly trend of in-hospital mortality rate decreased significantly in private (0.083 percentage points, P = 0.002) and secondary (0.037 percentage points, P = 0.002) hospitals.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that implementing the DIP payment reform yields inconsistent consequences across different hospitals. DIP reform encouraged public hospitals and high-level hospitals to treat patients with higher illness severities and requiring high treatment intensity, resulting in a significant increase in total expenditure per case. The inconsistencies between public and private hospitals may be attributed to their different baseline levels prior to the reform and their different responses to the incentives created by the reform.

Can case-based payment contain healthcare costs? - A curious case from China

We adopted a difference-in-difference (DID) design to evaluate the impact of a case-based payment pilot in Tianjin, China on hospital admission, utilization of varied therapeutic regimes, and the associated costs. We used claim data of all admissions of angina and acute myocardial infarction during July 2015 to June 2018, 18 months before and after the program. Our analyses were supported by convincing common trends tests and a couple of sensitivity analyses. As intended, for patients who received percutaneous coronary stenting (PCS) and were counted in the case-based payment system, we showed that the program decreased length-of-stay, per-admission spending, and out-of-pocket spending by 20.8%, 14.2%, and 95.5%, respectively, but did not increase readmissions. However, when considering all patients who suffered from the two types of coronary heart diseases, we found that the program otherwise increased per-admission spending by nearly 11%. As a result, the program took a perverse effect in increasing monthly spending for the health insurance scheme and the society by 1005.6 thousand USD (47·5%) and 1095·7 thousand USD (34·7%), respectively. Increases in hospital admissions, and proportion of performing PCS accounted for 66·7% and 39·2% of the rise, respectively. In addition, our analysis provided evidence of health providers' cream-skimming behaviors, including selecting younger patients with lower CCI in the case-based system, up-coding complications, and keeping higher cost patients in the fee-for-service payment system. We draw lessons that case-based payment may make an unintended impact that increases healthcare costs when incentives are not properly designed.

Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)-Based Prospective Hospital Payment System can be well adopted for Acute Care Surgery: Taiwanese Experience with Acute Cholecystitis

BACKGROUND

Laparoscopic cholecystectomy (LC) is a common procedure for cholelithiasis paid by diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) systems. However, acute cholecystitis (AC) patients usually have heterogeneous conditions that compromise the successful implementation of DRGs. We evaluated the quality/efficiency of treating AC patients under the DRG system in Taiwan.

METHODS

All AC patients who underwent LC between October 2015 and December 2016 were included. Patient demographics, treatment outcomes, and financial results were analyzed. Patients were reimbursed by one of the two DRG schemes based on their comorbidities/complications (CC): DRG-1, LC without CC; and DRG-2, LC with CC. Hospitals were reimbursed the costs incurred if they were below the lower threshold (balanced sector); with the outlier threshold if costs were between the lower and outlier thresholds (profitable sector); and with the outlier threshold plus 80% of the exceeding cost if costs were higher than the outlier threshold (profit-losing sector).

RESULTS

Among 246 patients, 114 were paid by DRG-1, and 132 were by DRG-2. In total, 195 of 246 patients underwent LC within 1 day after admission, and patients with mild AC had shorter hospital stays than those with moderate or severe AC. The complication rate was 7.3% with only one mortality. In total, 92.1% of patients in DRG-1 and 90.9% of patients in DRG-2 were profitable. The average margin per patient was 11,032 TWD for DRG-1 and 24,993 TWD for DRG-2.

CONCLUSIONS

DRGs can be well adopted for acute care surgery, and hospitals can still provide satisfactory services without losing profit.

Is There a Difference in the Utilisation of Inpatient Services Between Two Typical Payment Methods of Health Insurance? Evidence from the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme in China

This study aimed to evaluate the effects of the differences between two typical payment methods for the new rural cooperative medical scheme (NRCMS) in China on the utilisation of inpatient services. Interrupted time-series analysis (ITSA) and propensity score matching (PSM) were used to measure the difference between two typical payment methods for the NRCMS with regard to the utilisation of inpatient services. After the reform was formally implemented, the level and slope difference after reform compared with pre-intervention (distribution of inpatients in county hospitals (DIC), distribution of inpatients in township hospitals (DIT) and the actual compensation ratio of inpatients (ARCI)) were not statistically significant. Kernel matching obtained better results in reducing the mean and median of the absolute standardised bias of covariates of appropriateness of admission (AA), appropriateness of disease (AD). The difference in AA and AD of the matched inpatients between two groups was −0.03 (p-value = 0.042, 95% CI: −0.08 to 0.02) and 0.21 (p-value < 0.001, 95% CI: −0.17 to 0.25), respectively. The differences in the utilisation of inpatient services may arise owing to the system designs of different payment methods for NRCMS in China. The causes of these differences can be used to guide inpatients to better use medical services, through the transformation and integration of payment systems.