Crisis Containment: Tools for Harm Mitigation in Surgery

How Does Surgeons' Autonomic Physiology Vary Intraoperatively?: A Real-time Study of Cardiac Reactivity

OBJECTIVE

To measure the physiological responses of surgical team members under varying levels of intraoperative risk.

BACKGROUND

Measurement of intraoperative physiological responses provides insight into how operation complexity, phase of surgery, and surgeon seniority impact stress.

METHODS

Autonomic nervous system responses (interbeat intervals, IBIs) were measured continuously during different surgical operations of various complexity. The study investigated whether professional role (eg attending surgeon), operative risk (high vs. low), and type of primary operator (attending surgeon vs. resident) impacted IBI reactivity. Physiological synchrony captured the degree of correspondence between individuals' physiological responses at any given time point.

RESULTS

A total of 10,005 observations of IBI reactivity were recorded in 26 participants during 16 high-risk (renal transplant and laparoscopic donor nephrectomy) and low-risk (arteriovenous fistula formation) operations. Attending surgeons showed greater IBI reactivity (faster heart rate) than residents and nurses during high-risk operations and while actively operating (Ps<0.001). Residents showed lower reactivity during high-risk (relative to low-risk) operations (P<0.001) and similar reactivity regardless of whether they or the attending surgeon was operating (P=0.10). Nurses responded similarly during low-risk and high-risk operations (P=0.102) but were more reactive when the resident was operating compared to when the attending surgeon was the primary operator (P<0.001). In high-risk operations, attending surgeons had negative physiological covariation with residents and nurses (P<0.001). In low-risk operations, only attending surgeons and nurses were synchronized (P<0.001).

CONCLUSION

Attending surgeons' physiological responses were well-calibrated to operative demands. Residents' and nurses' responses were not callibrated to the same extent. This suggests that risk sensitivity is an adaptive response to stress that surgeons acquire.

Non-technical skills and teamwork in trauma: from the emergency department to the operating room

Management of a trauma patient is a challenging process. Swift and accurate clinical assessment is required and time-sensitive decisions and life-saving procedures must be performed in an unstable patient. This requires a coordinated response by both the emergency room (ER) and operating room (OR) teams. However, a team of experts does not necessarily make an expert team. Root cause analysis of adverse events in surgery has shown that failures in coordination, planning, task management and particularly communication are the main causes for medical errors. While most research is focused on the ER trauma team, the trauma OR team also deserves attention. In fact, OR team dynamics may resemble more the ER team than the elective OR team. ER and OR trauma teams assemble on short notice, and their members, who are from different specialties and backgrounds, may not train regularly together or even know each other beforehand. And yet, they have to perform high-risk procedures and make high stake decisions, in a time-sensitive manner. The airline industry has long recognized the role of team training and non-technical skills (NTS) in reducing hazards. The implementation of the so called crew resource management or crisis resource management (CRM) has significantly made airline travel safer and the transposition to the medical context, with specific training in non-technical skills, has also brought great benefits. In fact, it is clear that adoption of non-technical skills (NTS) in healthcare has led to an increase in patient safety. In this narrative review we recapitulate some of the key non-technical skills and their relevance in trauma, with a focus on both the emergency department (ER) and the operating room (OR) teams, as well as on the transition of care from one to the other. Also, we explore the use of debriefing the team, as well as the roles of NTS training in both undergraduate and postgraduate settings. We review some of the existing trauma training courses and their roles in developing NTS. Finally, we briefly address the challenges posed by the development of trauma hybrid operating rooms.

Crisis Preparedness: A Systems-Based Framework for Avoiding Harm in Surgery

BACKGROUND

Highly performing healthcare organizations benefit from robust failure management systems. This involves the ability to respond and recover from critical events, as well avoiding harm in the first place (crisis preparedness). Currently, the surgical community may lack an integrated toolbox for crisis readiness. The study aims to create a practical framework for crisis preparedness in surgery.

STUDY DESIGN

A multimethod qualitative study was designed to identify and translate crisis preparedness interventions from high-reliability industries to clinical practice. The tools and strategies identified were subsequently developed and clinically adapted for healthcare use. The study used (1) observational fieldwork in commercial aviation; (2) semi-structured interviews with senior airline pilots, and (3) mixed focus groups with healthcare and aviation safety experts. A crisis preparedness framework was derived by thematic analysis using the framework method. Clinical adaptation was achieved using expert consensus methodology.

RESULTS

Twenty-two aviation and healthcare experts participated in 17 interviews and 3 focus groups. A framework for crisis preparedness was derived, consisting of 6 behavioral interventions: (1) anticipate threats and errors by building situational awareness using cognitive tools; (2) brief teams about goals, deviations, operational risks, and contingency plans; (3) implement standard operating procedures using checklists; (4) rehearse emergency drills before critical phases of work; (5) set the tone for a positive working environment by establishing cultural norms and empowering individuals to speak up about safety issues; and (6) debrief performance outcomes to derive learning lessons.

CONCLUSIONS

Surgical crisis preparedness requires integrated systems rather than isolated safety interventions. This study provides a framework and the tools to achieve this.

How crises work: A model of error cause and effect in surgical practice

INTRODUCTION

Surgical crises have major consequences for patients, staff and healthcare institutions. Nevertheless, their aetiology and evolution are poorly understood outside the remit of root-cause analyses.

AIMS

To develop a crisis model in surgery in order to aid the reporting and management of safety critical events.

METHODS

A narrative review surveyed the safety literature on failure causes, mechanisms and effects in the context of surgical crises. Sources were identified using non-probability sampling, with selection and inclusion being determined by author panel consensus. The data underwent thematic analysis and reporting followed the recommendation of the SALSA framework.

RESULTS

Data from 133 sources derived five principal themes. Analysis suggested that surgical care processes become destabilized in a step-wise manner. This crisis chain is initiated by four categories of threat or risk: (i) the systems in which surgeons operate; (ii) surgeons' technical, cognitive and behavioural skills; (iii) surgeons' physiological and psychological state (operational condition); and (iv) professional culture. Once triggered, the crisis chain is driven by only three types of errors: Type I. Performance errors consist of failures to diagnose, plan or execute tasks; Type II. Awareness errors are failures to recognise, comprehend or extrapolate the impact of performance failures; Type III. Rescue errors represent failures to correct faulty performance. The co-occurrence of all three error types gives rise to harm, which can lead to a crisis in the absence of mitigating actions.

CONCLUSION

Surgical crises may be triggered by four categories of threat and driven by only three types of error. These may represent universal targets for safety interventions that create new opportunities for crisis management.

Crisis recovery in surgery: Error management and problem solving in safety-critical situations

BACKGROUND

Surgical crises, both clinical and executive, carry risk of harm to patients, staff, and organizations. Once stabilized and contained, crisis recovery requires complex decision-making and problem-solving to address primary failures (errors) and their consequences. In contrast to other safety-critical professions, surgeons may lack access to crisis recovery strategies and tools that go beyond the technical aspects of clinical practice. This study aims to develop a framework for surgical crisis recovery based on problem-solving interventions used by pilots in commercial aviation.

METHODS

This study undertook observational fieldwork, semistructured interviews, and focus groups with senior airline pilots and health care safety experts. Thematic analysis using the framework method identified key interventions applicable to surgical crisis recovery. Subsequently, expert group consensus adapted and content validated this model for clinical use.

RESULTS

Qualitative data from 22 aviation and health care safety experts informed surgical crisis resolution. This consisted of 3 strategies: (1) building cognitive capacity by improving situational awareness and workload management; (2) using checklists in abnormal situations to implement emergency operating procedures; (3) undertaking structured decision-making using analysis-based problem-solving cycles (eg, T-DODAR framework). Twelve tools were validated and adapted to aid implementation of these strategies.

CONCLUSION

Once stabilized, surgical crises may be resolved using 3 sequential strategies derived from commercial aviation.