Holding on to false beliefs: The bias against disconfirmatory evidence over the course of psychosis

Predictors of paranoia in the daily lives of people with non-affective psychosis and non-clinical controls: A systematic review of intensive longitudinal studies

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Worrying, self-esteem, sleep problems, anomalous internal experiences, reasoning biases, and interpersonal sensitivity are associated with paranoia. However, no review has examined whether these variables function as predictors of paranoia in everyday life. The present systematic review of intensive longitudinal studies (e.g., experience sampling) examined contemporaneous and time-lagged associations between paranoia and each candidate mechanism in individuals with non-affective psychosis and controls (pre-registration: https://osf.io/uwr9d).

METHODS

We searched electronic databases, PsyArXiv, and reference lists for studies published since 1994.

RESULTS

Of n = 5,918 results, n = 54 fulfilled inclusion criteria (n = 43 datasets). Most studies examined individuals with non-affective psychosis (n = 34). Strong evidence emerged for negative affect (subsumed under 'anomalous internal experiences') and sleep problems. For self-esteem, results suggest contemporaneous and lagged effects on paranoia but associations are likely driven by between-person variance. The low number of studies (n = 2 studies each) allowed no conclusions regarding worrying and reasoning biases. Findings on interpersonal sensitivity, which should be interpreted with caution because of the predictor's conceptual overlap with paranoia, indicate contemporaneous effects whereas time-lagged and within-person associations could not be judged due to insufficient data.

LIMITATIONS

The present review used a narrative data-synthetization and it did not cover outcomes such as hallucinations.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite convincing evidence for affect and sleep problems, it remains unclear whether affective states are precursors or also consequences of paranoia (vicious circle), and which of the actigraphy measures (sleep time, -efficiency, -fragmentation, etc.) best predicts paranoia.

Resolving the Delusion Paradox

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

The neurocomputational framework of predictive processing (PP) provides a promising approach to explaining delusions, a key symptom of psychotic disorders. According to PP, the brain makes inferences about the world by weighing prior beliefs against the available sensory data. Mismatches between prior beliefs and sensory data result in prediction errors that may update the brain's model of the world. Psychosis has been associated with reduced weighting of priors relative to the sensory data. However, delusional beliefs are highly resistant to change, suggesting increased rather than decreased weighting of priors. We propose that this "delusion paradox" can be resolved within a hierarchical PP model: Reduced weighting of prior beliefs at low hierarchical levels may be compensated by an increased influence of higher-order beliefs represented at high hierarchical levels, including delusional beliefs. This may sculpt perceptual processing into conformity with delusions and foster their resistance to contradictory evidence.

STUDY DESIGN

We review several lines of experimental evidence on low- and high-level processes, and their neurocognitive underpinnings in delusion-related phenotypes and link them to predicted processing.

STUDY RESULTS

The reviewed evidence supports the notion of decreased weighting of low-level priors and increased weighting of high-level priors, in both delusional and delusion-prone individuals. Moreover, we highlight the role of prefrontal cortex as a neural basis for the increased weighting of high-level prior beliefs and discuss possible clinical implications of the proposed hierarchical predictive-processing model.

CONCLUSIONS

Our review suggests the delusion paradox can be resolved within a hierarchical PP model.

Hasty decision making and belief inflexibility in the more delusion prone? A modified disambiguating-scenarios paradigm assessing cognitive biases implicated in delusions

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary models of psychosis imply that cognitive biases such as the jumping to conclusions (JTC), the bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and the liberal acceptance (LA) bias play a role in the pathogenesis of delusions. Most of the studies investigating the role of cognitive biases, however, have been conducted with socially neutral or abstract stimuli and have assessed patients with established psychoses. For the present study, we aimed to concurrently investigate multiple biases (i.e., the JTC, BADE, and LA biases) in a community sample with a new paradigm using more socially engaging stimuli.

METHODS

A large sample of participants (N = 874) recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk was subdivided into two groups based on the frequency of their psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) according to the positive subscale score of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE) and matched based on major demographics variables, resulting in two equally sized groups called High-PLE (at least 2 SD above the mean) and Low-PLE (maximum 0.5 above the mean; n = 46 for each group). Using a modified version of the written-scenarios BADE task, which emphasized social interactions between agents embedded in the scenario, participants rated the plausibility of response options in the face of new information.

RESULTS

In line with previous findings, the High-PLE group demonstrated the JTC, BADE, and LA biases. That is, the members of this group made more decisions after the initial piece of information, were less likely to revise their beliefs in light of new information, and provided higher plausibility ratings for implausible response options compared to the Low-PLE group.

CONCLUSIONS

Results corroborate prior findings suggesting that the JTC, BADE, and LA biases may be contributing factors in delusional ideation and that metacognitive biases extend to social situations.

Towards a neurocomputational account of social controllability: From models to mental health

Controllability, or the influence one has over their surroundings, is crucial for decision-making and mental health. Traditionally, controllability is operationalized in sensorimotor terms as one's ability to exercise their actions to achieve an intended outcome (also termed "agency"). However, recent social neuroscience research suggests that humans also assess if and how they can exert influence over other people (i.e., their actions, outcomes, beliefs) to achieve desired outcomes ("social controllability"). In this review, we will synthesize empirical findings and neurocomputational frameworks related to social controllability. We first introduce the concepts of contextual and perceived controllability and their respective relevance for decision-making. Then, we outline neurocomputational frameworks that can be used to model social controllability, with a focus on behavioral economic paradigms and reinforcement learning approaches. Finally, we discuss the implications of social controllability for computational psychiatry research, using delusion and obsession-compulsion as examples. Taken together, we propose that social controllability could be a key area of investigation in future social neuroscience and computational psychiatry research.

Aberrant adapting of beliefs under stress: a mechanism relevant to the formation of paranoia?

BACKGROUND

Difficulties in the ability to adapt beliefs in the face of new information are associated with psychosis and its central symptom - paranoia. As cognitive processes and psychotic symptoms are both known to be sensitive to stress, the present study investigated the exact associations between stress, adapting of beliefs [reversal learning (RL), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and jumping to conclusions (JTC)] and paranoia. We hypothesized that paranoia would increase under stress and that difficulties in adapting of beliefs would mediate or moderate the link between stress and paranoia. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the investigated effects would be strongest in the group of individuals diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.

METHODS

We exposed 155 participants (38 diagnosed with a psychotic disorder, 40 individuals with attenuated psychotic symptoms, 39 clinical controls diagnosed with an obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 38 healthy controls) to a control condition and a stress condition, in which we assessed their levels of paranoia and their ability to adapt beliefs. We applied multilevel models to analyze the data.

RESULTS

Paranoia was higher in the stress condition than in the control condition, b = 1.142, s.e. = 0.338, t(150) = 3.381, p < 0.001. RL, BADE, and JTC did not differ between conditions and did not mediate or moderate the association between stress and paranoia (all p_s > 0.05).

CONCLUSIONS

The results support the assumption that stress triggers paranoia. However, the link between stress and paranoia does not seem to be affected by the ability to adapt beliefs.

Reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population: A longitudinal study

BACKGROUND

Reasoning biases have been suggested as risk factors for delusional ideation in both patients and non-clinical individuals. Still, it is unclear how these biases are longitudinally related to delusions in the general population. We hence aimed to investigate longitudinal associations between reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population.

METHODS

We conducted an online cohort study with 1184 adults from the German and Swiss general population. Participants completed measures on reasoning biases (jumping-to-conclusion bias [JTC], liberal acceptance bias [LA], bias against disconfirmatory evidence [BADE], possibility of being mistaken [PM]) and delusional ideation at baseline, and delusional ideation 7 to 8 months later.

RESULTS

A greater JTC bias was associated with a greater increase in delusional ideation over the following months. This association was better described by a positive quadratic relationship. Neither BADE, LA nor PM were associated with subsequent changes in delusional ideation.

CONCLUSIONS

This study suggests that jumping-to-conclusions predicts delusional ideation in the general population but that this association may follow a quadratic trajectory. While no other associations turned significant, future studies with shorter temporal distances may shed further light on the role of reasoning biases as risk factors for delusional ideation in non-clinical samples.

Computational mechanisms underlying illusion of control in delusional individuals

Humans navigate complex situations that require the accurate estimation of the controllability of the environment. Aberrant controllability computation might lead to maladaptive behaviors and poor mental health outcomes. Illusion of control, which refers to a heightened sense of control while the environment is uncontrollable, is one such manifestation and has been conceptually associated with delusional ideation. Nevertheless, this association has not yet been formally characterized in a computational framework. To address this, we used a computational psychiatry approach to quantify illusion of control in human participants with high (n = 125) or low (n = 126) trait delusion. Participants played a two-party exchange game in which their choices either did ("Controllable condition") or did not ("Uncontrollable condition") influence the future monetary offers made by simulated partners. We found that the two groups behaved similarly in model-agnostic measures (i.e., offer size, rejection rate). However, computational modeling revealed that compared to the low trait delusion group, the high delusion group overestimated their influence ("expected influence" parameter) over the offers made by their partners under the Uncontrollable condition. Highly delusional individuals also reported a stronger sense of control than those with low trait delusion in the Uncontrollable condition. Furthermore, the expected influence parameter and self-reported beliefs about controllability were significantly correlated in the Controllable condition in individuals with low trait delusion, whereas this relationship was diminished in those with high trait delusion. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that delusional ideation is associated with aberrant computation of and belief about environmental controllability, as well as a belief-behavior disconnect.

COVID-19 conspiracy ideation is associated with the delusion proneness trait and resistance to update of beliefs

The rapid spread of conspiracy ideas associated with the recent COVID-19 pandemic represents a major threat to the ongoing and coming vaccination programs. Yet, the cognitive factors underlying the pandemic-related conspiracy beliefs are not well described. We hypothesized that such cognitive style is driven by delusion proneness, a trait phenotype associated with formation of delusion-like beliefs that exists on a continuum in the normal population. To probe this hypothesis, we developed a COVID-19 conspiracy questionnaire (CCQ) and assessed 577 subjects online. Their responses clustered into three factors that included Conspiracy, Distrust and Fear/Action as identified using principal component analysis. We then showed that CCQ (in particular the Conspiracy and Distrust factors) related both to general delusion proneness assessed with Peter's Delusion Inventory (PDI) as well as resistance to belief update using a Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) task. Further, linear regression and pathway analyses suggested a specific contribution of BADE to CCQ not directly explained by PDI. Importantly, the main results remained significant when using a truncated version of the PDI where questions on paranoia were removed (in order to avoid circular evidence), and when adjusting for ADHD- and autistic traits (that are known to be substantially related to delusion proneness). Altogether, our results strongly suggest that pandemic-related conspiracy ideation is associated with delusion proneness trait phenotype.

Association Between Failures in Perceptual Updating and the Severity of Psychosis in Schizophrenia

IMPORTANCE

Recent accounts suggest that delusions and hallucinations may result from alterations in how prior knowledge is integrated with new information, but experimental evidence supporting this idea has been complex and inconsistent. Evidence from a simpler perceptual task would make clear whether psychotic symptoms are associated with overreliance on prior information and impaired updating.

OBJECTIVE

To investigate whether individuals with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (PSZ) and healthy control individuals (HCs) differ in the ability to update their beliefs based on evidence in a relatively simple perceptual paradigm.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

This case-control study included individuals who met DSM-IV criteria for PSZ and matched HC participants in 2 independent samples. The PSZ group was recruited from the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, Yale University, and community clinics, and the HC group was recruited from the community. To test perceptual updating, a random dot kinematogram paradigm was implemented in which dots moving coherently in a single direction were mixed with randomly moving dots. On 50% of trials, the direction of coherent motion changed by 90° midway through the trial. Participants were asked to report the direction perceived at the end of the trial. The Peters Delusions Inventory and Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) were used to quantify the severity of positive symptoms. Data were collected from September 2018 to March 2020 and were analyzed from approximately March 2020 to March 2021.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Critical measures included the proportion of responses centered around the initial direction vs the subsequent changed direction and the overall precision of motion perception and reaction times.

RESULTS

A total of 48 participants were included in the PSZ group (31 [65%] male; mean [SD] age, 36.56 [9.76] years) and 36 in the HC group (22 [61%] male; mean [SD] age, 35.67 [10.74] years) in the original sample. An independent replication sample included 42 participants in the PSZ group (29 [69%] male; mean [SD] age, 33.98 [11.03] years) and 34 in the HC group (20 [59%] male; mean [SD] age, 34.29 [10.44] years). In line with previous research, patients with PSZ were less precise and had slower reaction times overall. The key finding was that patients with PSZ were significantly more likely (original sample: mean, 27.88 [95% CI, 24.19-31.57]; replication sample: mean, 26.70 [95% CI, 23.53-29.87]) than HC participants (original sample: mean, 18.86 [95% CI, 16.56-21.16]; replication sample: mean, 15.67 [95% CI, 12.61-18.73]) to report the initial motion direction rather than the final one. Moreover, the tendency to report the direction of initial motion correlated with the degree of conviction on the Peters Delusions Inventory (original sample: r = 0.32 [P = .05]; replication sample: r = 0.30 [P = .05]) and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale Reality Distortion score (original sample: r = 0.55 [P = .001]; replication sample: r = 0.35 [P = .03]) and severity of hallucinations (original sample: r = 0.39 [P = .02]; replication sample: r = 0.30 [P = .05]).

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

The findings of this case-control study suggest that the severity of psychotic symptoms is associated with a tendency to overweight initial information over incoming sensory evidence. These results are consistent with predictive coding accounts of the origins of positive symptoms and suggest that deficits in very elementary perceptual updating may be a critical mechanism in psychosis.

Do you like cliff-hangers? Objective versus subjective need for closure in the schizophrenia spectrum

Need for closure (NFC) is a cognitive bias that has been implicated in the pathogenesis of delusions. A general population sample (N = 1465) was dichotomized into high versus low schizotypal participants and matched based on core social demographic characteristics (each n = 98). For the first time, we aimed at capturing NFC subjectively (with the NFC Scale) and objectively with a new experimental paradigm, the Ambiguous Movie Scene Task. In this task, participants viewed video scenes with either open or closed endings (i.e., high or low ambiguity) and rated their (emotional) reactions to the clips. Open endings were expected to lead to more frustration (i.e., due to increased need for closure) and to induce greater eagerness to learn about the possible resolution among those high on positive schizotypy. High schizotypal individuals displayed higher scores on the NFC Scale than low schizotypal individuals. Contrary to our expectations, high schizotypal participants did not recognize video scenes with open endings as ambiguous and were less eager to learn about a possible resolution than low schizotypal individuals. In the Ambiguous Movie Scene Task, high schizotypal individuals showed evidence of a jumping to conclusions bias rather than frustration over unresolved storylines. We found an overall stronger emotional response in schizotypal participants and overconfidence in their judgments. The NFC Scale and selected scores of the new task correlated moderately. The study corroborates earlier evidence for a dissociation between objective and subjective biases in the psychosis spectrum.

Predictive waves in the autism-schizophrenia continuum: A novel biobehavioral model

The brain is a predictive machine. Converging data suggests a diametric predictive strategy from autism spectrum disorders (ASD) to schizophrenic spectrum disorders (SSD). Whereas perceptual inference in ASD is rigidly shaped by incoming sensory information, the SSD population is prone to overestimate the precision of their priors' models. Growing evidence considers brain oscillations pivotal biomarkers to understand how top-down predictions integrate bottom-up input. Starting from the conceptualization of ASD and SSD as oscillopathies, we introduce an integrated perspective that ascribes the maladjustments of the predictive mechanism to dysregulation of neural synchronization. According to this proposal, disturbances in the oscillatory profile do not allow the appropriate trade-off between descending predictive signal, overweighted in SSD, and ascending prediction errors, overweighted in ASD. These opposing imbalances both result in an ill-adapted reaction to external challenges. This approach offers a neuro-computational model capable of linking predictive coding theories with electrophysiological findings, aiming to increase knowledge on the neuronal foundations of the two spectra features and stimulate hypothesis-driven rehabilitation/research perspectives.

Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief

INTRODUCTION

In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies ([2021]. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. Consciousness and Cognition, 87, 103037. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037) attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce.

METHODS

In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief.

RESULTS

We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from (delusional) hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence.

CONCLUSIONS

In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.

Inflexibility in Reasoning: Comparisons of Cognitive Flexibility, Explanatory Flexibility, and Belief Flexibility Between Schizophrenia and Major Depressive Disorder

Introduction: Inflexibility in reasoning has been suggested to contribute to psychiatric disorders, such as explanatory flexibility in depression and belief flexibility in schizophrenia. However, studies tended to examine only one of the flexibility constructs, which could be related to each other, within a single group of patients. As enhancing flexibility in thinking has become one of the psychological treatment goals across disorders, this study aimed to examine three constructs of flexibility (cognitive flexibility, explanatory flexibility, and belief flexibility) in two psychiatric groups. Methods: We compared three groups of participants: (i) 56 outpatients with a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder and active delusions, (ii) 57 outpatients with major depressive disorder and at least a moderate level of depression, and (iii) 30 healthy controls. Participants were assessed on symptom severity and flexibility, using the Trail-Making Task, the Attributional Style Questionnaire, the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale (MADS) and the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) Task. Results: Cognitive flexibility was reduced in the two clinical groups compared to controls. Explanatory flexibility was comparable across groups. The three groups differed in belief flexibility measured by MADS but not by the BADE task. Response to hypothetical contradiction was reduced in the delusion group than the other two groups, and the ability to generate alternative explanations was reduced in the delusion group than healthy controls. Discussion: We found an effect of diagnosis on cognitive flexibility, which might be confounded by differences in intellectual functioning. Reduced belief flexibility tended to be specific to delusions.

Probing the Hypersalience Hypothesis-An Adapted Judge-Advisor System Tested in Individuals With Psychotic-Like Experiences

Individuals with psychotic-like experiences and psychosis gather and use information differently than controls; in particular they seek and rely on less information or over-weight currently available information. A new paradigm, the judge-advisor system, has previously been used to investigate these processes. Results showed that psychosis-prone individuals tend to seek less advice but at the same time use the available advice more. Some theoretical models, like the hypersalience of evidence-matching hypothesis, predict that psychosis-prone individuals weight recently available information to a greater extent and thus provide an explanation for increased advice-weighting scores in psychosis-prone individuals. To test this model, we adapted the previously used judge-advisor system by letting participants receive consecutively multiple pieces of advice. To meet this aim, we recruited a large MTurk community sample (N = 1,396), which we split in a group with high levels of psychotic-like experiences (at least 2 SD above the mean, n = 80) and a group with low levels of psychotic-like experiences (maximum 0.5 SD above the mean, n = 1,107), using the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences' positive subscale. First, participants estimated five people's age based on photographs. Then, they received consecutive advice in the form of manipulated age estimates by allegedly previous participants, with outliers in some trials. After each advice, participants could adjust their estimate. This procedure allowed us to investigate how participants weighted each currently presented advice. In addition to being more confident in their final estimates and in line with our preregistered hypothesis, participants with more frequent psychotic-like experiences did weight currently available advice more than participants with less frequent psychotic-like experiences. This effect was especially pronounced in response to outliers, as fine-grained post-hoc analysis suggested. Result thus support models predicting an overcorrection in response to new incoming information and challenges an assumed general belief inflexibility in people with psychotic experiences.

Moderators of treatment efficacy in individualized metacognitive training for psychosis (MCT+)

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Individualized Metacognitive Training (MCT+) is a manualized intervention designed to improve delusional severity by reducing delusion-associated cognitive biases such as jumping-to-conclusions. Increased interest in personalized medicine stipulates the identification of patients who are more likely to benefit from specialized interventions. The present study aimed to explore baseline moderators of MCT+ efficacy on delusions and overall positive symptoms in psychosis.

METHODS

We analyzed data from a randomized rater-blind controlled trial, in which 92 patients with psychotic disorders and current or past delusions were randomly assigned to either MCT+ or CogPack®, a cognitive remediation software. Baseline moderator variables consisted of jumping-to-conclusions, cognitive insight, quality of life, self-esteem, selective attention, and patients' attitudes towards their symptoms. Linear mixed-effects models were applied to investigate specific moderators of MCT+ efficacy.

RESULTS

In MCT+ relative to CogPack, presence of a jumping-to-conclusions bias, a lowered decision threshold, and low self-esteem were associated with larger improvements in delusional severity and/or overall positive symptoms over time. Subjective reasoning style and insight, as well as subjective attitudes towards psychosis, did not moderate the treatment efficacy of MCT+ relative to CogPack.

LIMITATIONS

Participation of both treatment groups in group MCT as a part of standard care, possibly leading to additional effects on delusional severity.

CONCLUSIONS

Patients with low self-esteem and those who are prone to jumping-to-conclusions seem to particularly benefit from MCT+. Our results can help inform clinical practice as they provide specific criteria for selecting patients for whom MCT+ is most appropriate.

Advice weighting as a novel measure for belief flexibility in people with psychotic-like experiences

Jumping to conclusions and bias against disconfirmatory evidence are two cognitive biases common in people with psychotic-like experiences and psychosis. However, many participants show comprehension problems doing traditional tasks; new paradigms with additional applied scenarios are thus needed. A large MTurk community sample (N = 1422) was recruited and subdivided into participants with high levels of psychotic-like experiences (at least 2 SD above the mean, n = 79) and participants with low levels of psychotic-like experiences (maximum 0.5 SD above the mean, n = 1110), based on the positive subscale of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE). In the context of a judge-advisor system, participants made an initial estimate and then received advice that was either confirmatory or disconfirmatory. Participants then gave a new, possibly revised estimate and were allowed to seek additional advice. Participants with high levels of psychotic-like experiences gave their final assessment after receiving significantly less advice and were significantly more confident in their decision than participants with low psychotic-like experiences, in line with previous studies on jumping to conclusions and overconfidence. Contrary to the hypothesis and earlier studies, however, no deficit in belief revision was found. In fact, participants with high psychotic-like experiences weighted advice significantly higher in the condition with disconfirmatory advice, but only for the first advice they received. The increased weighting of a single piece of disconfirmatory advice can be explained by the hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis matches theory, according to which more weight is attached to the most recently available information.

Functional brain networks underlying evidence integration and delusional ideation

Cognitive biases affecting evidence integration contribute to delusions and delusional ideation in the psychosis continuum. In previously published work we observed hyperactivity in a visual attention network (VsAN) during confirmatory evidence integration, and hypoactivity in a cognitive evaluation network (CEN) during disconfirmatory evidence integration in schizophrenia patients with delusions, suggesting that a task-specific imbalance of these networks may contribute to delusion maintenance. In the current study, we investigated whether patterns of aberrant functional connectivity observed in past work were associated with delusional ideation in 41 healthy individuals by examining associations between cognitive biases, subclinical schizotypal traits, and functional brain activity during evidence integration. Behaviourally, we replicated positive associations between schizotypal traits and cognitive biases and further showed that this association was driven by delusional ideation specifically. Constrained principal component analysis for fMRI (fMRI-CPCA) revealed recruitment of the brain networks observed in our previous clinical and non-clinical evidence integration studies: default-mode network (DMN); cognitive evaluation network (CEN); and visual attention (VsAN) network. Moreover, as with clinically-significant delusions, delusional ideation was associated with decreased CEN activity during the processing of disconfirmatory evidence and increased VsAN activity during the processing of confirmatory evidence. These findings suggest that this altered pattern of activation across networks during evidence integration may underlie delusional ideation and delusions in the psychosis continuum.

Functional Brain Networks Underlying Evidence Integration and Delusions in Schizophrenia

Integrating evidence that contradicts a belief is a fundamental aspect of belief revision and is closely linked to delusions in schizophrenia. In a previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study on healthy individuals, we identified functional brain networks underlying evidence integration as visual attention network (VsAN; dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, insula, occipital regions), default-mode network (DMN), and cognitive evaluation network (CEN; orbitofrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, parietal cortex). In the current clinical fMRI study, we compared network-based activity during evidence integration between healthy controls (n = 41), nondelusional (n = 37), and delusional (n = 33) patients with schizophrenia, and related this activity to cognitive processing involved in evidence integration measured outside the scanner. Task-induced coordinated activation was measured using group-constrained principal component analysis for fMRI. Increased VsAN activation, reduced DMN deactivation, and reduced CEN activation were observed for schizophrenia, with this pattern being most pronounced for the delusional group. Importantly, poor evidence integration comprehensively measured outside the scanner was significantly associated with increased VsAN activation and reduced DMN deactivation when processing confirmatory evidence, and with reduced CEN activation when processing disconfirmatory evidence. This is the first comprehensive study of the functional brain networks associated with evidence integration in schizophrenia and highlights how an imbalance of functional brain networks responding to confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence may underlie delusions in schizophrenia.

Dual-process theory, conflict processing, and delusional belief

Many reasoning biases that may contribute to delusion formation and/or maintenance are common in healthy individuals. Research indicating that reasoning in the general population proceeds via analytic processes (which depend upon working memory and support hypothetical thought) and intuitive processes (which are autonomous and independent of working memory) may therefore help uncover the source of these biases. Consistent with this possibility, recent studies imply that impaired conflict processing might reduce engagement in analytic reasoning, thereby producing reasoning biases and promoting delusions in individuals with schizophrenia. Progress toward understanding this potential pathway to delusions is currently impeded by ambiguity about whether any of these deficits or biases is necessary or sufficient for the formation and maintenance of delusions. Resolving this ambiguity requires consideration of whether particular cognitive deficits or biases in this putative pathway have causal primacy over other processes that may also participate in the causation of delusions. Accordingly, the present manuscript critically evaluates whether impaired conflict processing is the primary initiating deficit in the generation of reasoning biases that may promote the development and/or maintenance of delusions. Suggestions for future research that may elucidate mechanistic pathways by which reasoning deficits might engender and maintain delusions are subsequently offered.

The impact of social and sensory stress on cognitive biases and delusions in schizophrenia

INTRODUCTION

Stress aggravates delusional symptoms, but the exact underlying mechanisms are still not fully understood. One of the routes may be via exacerbation of information processing distortions frequently observed in psychosis. The aim of the present study was thus to investigate the impact of social and sensory stress on specific cognitive processes along with different dimensions of delusional thinking.

METHODS

Nineteen individuals affected by schizophrenia and 15 healthy controls were assessed under 3 experimental conditions (social stress, neutral, noise stress), with counter-balanced presentation of stress conditions across participants of both groups. Under each condition participants performed parallel versions of experimental tasks and had to report their level of paranoid thinking and subjective distress.

RESULTS

Irrespective of condition, patients showed significant impairments in metacognitive accuracy compared with controls. When social stress was applied first, mentalising accuracy decreased significantly in the subsequent condition among patients only. Following exposure to either social or sensory stress, patients reported significantly higher conviction in their paranoid ideas in the subsequent condition.

CONCLUSIONS

Only limited evidence was found for the negative impact of stress on cognitive processes in schizophrenia patients. However, this may not be true for those with more severe information processing abnormalities and/or delusions.

Thinking dispositions and cognitive reflection performance in schizotypy

Schizotypy refers to the continuum of normal variability of psychosis-like characteristics and experiences, often classified as positive schizotypy (‘unusual experiences’; UE) and negative schizotypy (‘introvertive anhedonia’; IA). Here, we investigated the link between schizotypy and cognitive processing style and performance. A particular focus was on whether schizotypy is associated more with Type 1 (automatic/heuristic) than Type 2 (reflective/effortful) processes, as may be expected from findings of impaired top-down control in schizophrenia. A large sample (n = 1,512) completed online measures pertaining to schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences; O-LIFE), thinking style (Rational Experiential Inventory-10, Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale), and reasoning performance (Cognitive Reflection Test). Higher positive (UE) and negative (IA) schizotypy were associated with more pronounced Type 1 processing, i.e. greater self-reported Faith in Intuition (FI), lower Need for Cognition (NFC), lower Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT), and lower cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores. Canonical correlation analysis confirmed a significant association between UE and increased FI, lower AOT and lower CRT performance, accounting for 12.38% of the shared variance between schizotypy and thinking dispositions. IA was more highly associated with reduced NFC. These findings suggest that schizotypy may be associated with similar thinking dispositions to those reported in psychosis, with different patterns of associations for positive and negative schizotypy. This result informs research on reasoning processes in psychosis and has clinical implications, including potential treatment targets and refinements for cognitive therapies.

Contradiction processing in schizophrenia

INTRODUCTION

Patients with schizophrenia present clinically with difficulties in manipulating contradictory information in the form of loose associations, surface contradictions and delusional beliefs. It is to date unclear whether patients can detect and process information that contradicts their beliefs and prior knowledge and whether this capacity is related to their symptoms and the nature of contradictory stimuli (e.g., personally significant information, emotional information).

METHODS

We probed contradiction processing in patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls using sentence verification tasks that involve self-referential judgements (Experiment 1) and general knowledge (Experiment 2), while manipulating the emotional content of the stimuli.

RESULTS

We found no differences between patients and controls either on reaction time (Experiment 1 & 2) or accuracy measures (Experiment 1).

CONCLUSIONS

Our results show no general impairment in contradiction processing in schizophrenia. Rather, failures to detect and correct contradictions in symptoms such as formal though disorder or delusions could arise through a complex interplay between executive dysfunctions, stress and the emotional content of the information.

Measuring bias against disconfirmatory evidence: An evaluation of BADE task scoring methods and the case for a novel method

Research suggests that bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) may help maintain delusions in the face of overwhelming evidence against them. Much of this research has employed Woodward and colleagues' BADE task. Different methods of scoring this task, many of which have significant drawbacks, are currently used by researchers, making it difficult to compare results across studies of BADE. Continued advancement of BADE research demands a scoring method with more favorable psychometric properties that is used more consistently by researchers. Here, we take a data-driven but theory-informed approach to the development of a new method for scoring the BADE task. This new scoring procedure is more parsimonious than previous metrics of BADE but captures the vast majority of their predictive variance in relation to delusions. This new method may therefore be capable of inspiring consensus use among BADE researchers. If so, it could significantly increase the ease of comparing future studies of BADE.