Social anxiety and sensitivity to social-rank features in male faces

Vulnerabilities in social anxiety: Integrating intra- and interpersonal perspectives

What are the major vulnerabilities in people with social anxiety? What are the most promising directions for translational research pertaining to this condition? The present paper provides an integrative summary of basic and applied translational research on social anxiety, emphasizing vulnerability factors. It is divided into two subsections: intrapersonal and interpersonal. The intrapersonal section synthesizes research relating to (a) self-representations and self-referential processes; (b) emotions and their regulation; and (c) cognitive biases: attention, interpretation and judgment, and memory. The interpersonal section summarizes findings regarding the systems of (a) approach and avoidance, (b) affiliation and social rank, and their implications for interpersonal impairments. Our review suggests that the science of social anxiety and, more generally, psychopathology may be advanced by examining processes and their underlying content within broad psychological systems. Increased interaction between basic and applied researchers to diversify and elaborate different perspectives on social anxiety is necessary for progress.

The scarring impact of status loss in social anxiety: An evolutionary perspective

Evolutionary models suggest that social anxiety (SA) is associated with sensitivity to status loss. These models make several additional predictions concerning the strength as well as the specificity of the association between post-event distress (PED) following status losses and SA. First, the strength of this association is postulated to be enhanced in men, especially following status losses inflicted by other men (intra-male status losses). Second, given the evolutionary postulated relationship between social status and physical fitness, sensitivity to status loss in SA is expected to extend to physically threatening events. We examined these predictions in four online samples (total N = 1123; 59% females, 27% above the cutoff for clinically elevated SA). In all studies, participants recalled social status-loss events and rated the emotional and distressing impact of these experiences. In two samples, participants also identified and recalled physically threatening events. Our findings were consistent with evolutionary predictions. SA was associated with PED following social status-loss events (β = 0.27). This association was stronger in men than in women (β = 0.40, β = 0.16, respectively). Moreover, the SA-PED association was especially enhanced following intra-male, compared to intra-female and inter-gender, status losses (β = 0.47, β = 0.26, and β = 0.17, respectively). Furthermore, SA was uniquely associated with PED following physically threatening events, over and above PED following social status-loss events (β = 0.21). Our data highlights the significant impact of socially and physically threatening events and delineates the scarring signature of such events in SA.

Advice weighting as a novel measure for belief flexibility in people with psychotic-like experiences

Jumping to conclusions and bias against disconfirmatory evidence are two cognitive biases common in people with psychotic-like experiences and psychosis. However, many participants show comprehension problems doing traditional tasks; new paradigms with additional applied scenarios are thus needed. A large MTurk community sample (N = 1422) was recruited and subdivided into participants with high levels of psychotic-like experiences (at least 2 SD above the mean, n = 79) and participants with low levels of psychotic-like experiences (maximum 0.5 SD above the mean, n = 1110), based on the positive subscale of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE). In the context of a judge-advisor system, participants made an initial estimate and then received advice that was either confirmatory or disconfirmatory. Participants then gave a new, possibly revised estimate and were allowed to seek additional advice. Participants with high levels of psychotic-like experiences gave their final assessment after receiving significantly less advice and were significantly more confident in their decision than participants with low psychotic-like experiences, in line with previous studies on jumping to conclusions and overconfidence. Contrary to the hypothesis and earlier studies, however, no deficit in belief revision was found. In fact, participants with high psychotic-like experiences weighted advice significantly higher in the condition with disconfirmatory advice, but only for the first advice they received. The increased weighting of a single piece of disconfirmatory advice can be explained by the hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis matches theory, according to which more weight is attached to the most recently available information.