Counterfactual thinking and confidence in blackjack: A test of the counterfactual inflation hypothesis

The Spontaneous Counterfactual Inference Task: Misremembering What Might Have Been

Counterfactuals, thoughts about "what might have been," play an important role in causal judgment, emotion, and motivation, and spontaneously arise during daily life. However, current methods to measure spontaneous counterfactual thinking are cumbersome and subjective. The current research adapts a paradigm from the Spontaneous Trait Inference literature to develop the Spontaneous Counterfactual Inference measure (SCFI), which uses false recognition of counterfactual statements as a measure of spontaneous counterfactual thought. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the SCFI is sensitive to precursors of counterfactual thinking: norm violation and counterfactual closeness. Study 2 demonstrates that the SCFI converges with the generation of counterfactual statements in an open-ended writing task. The SCFI also predicts two important consequences of counterfactual thought, blame (Study 3), and intention endorsement (Study 4). The SCFI thus offers a new tool for researchers interested in counterfactual thinking.

"Should've known better": Counterfactual processing in disordered gambling

Counterfactual thinking is a component of human decision-making that entails "if only" thinking about unselected choices and outcomes. It is associated with strong emotional responses of regret (when the obtained outcome is inferior to the counterfactual) and relief (vice versa). Counterfactual thinking may play a role in various cognitive phenomena in disordered gambling, such as the effects of near-misses. This study compared individuals with gambling disorder (n = 46) and healthy controls (n = 25) on a behavioural economic choice task that entailed choosing between two gambles, designed to measure counterfactual thinking. Participants provided affect ratings following both the obtained and the non-obtained outcomes. Choices were analyzed using a computational model that derived parameters reflecting sensitivity to expected value, risk variance, and anticipated regret. In the computational choice model, the group with gambling disorder showed increased sensitivity to anticipated regret, reduced sensitivity to expected value, and increased preference for high risk-variance gambles. On the affect ratings, the group with gambling disorder displayed blunted emotional sensitivity to obtained and counterfactual outcomes. Effect sizes of the group differences were modest. Participants with gambling disorder show wide-ranging alterations in decision-making processes and emotional reactivity to choice outcomes. Altered sensitivity to anticipatory regret in gambling disorder may contribute to the development of gambling-related cognitive distortions, and the influences of gambling marketing.

The Sin of Prediction

Experiential and associative learning are essential to optimal decision making. However, research shows that, even when exposed to repeated trials, people often fail to learn probabilities and cause/effect covariations. Consistent with the counterfactual inflation hypothesis, it is proposed that counterfactuals can interfere with memory of repeated exposures and therefore inhibit learning. Five experimental studies tested counterfactual thinking as a potential mechanism underlying this learning deficit using a simple, biased coin flipping paradigm. Participants were instructed to either simply observe or to predict and observe outcomes of a biased coin being flipped in multiple trials (Experiments 1-4). In all four experiments, counterfactual thought frequency mediated the relationship between task instructions and the extent of bias detection (i.e., learning). Experiment 5 showed that mental simulations of alternative outcomes were especially deleterious to learning and decision making. Findings are discussed in light of experiential learning theory and applied implications.

The Regret Elements Scale: Distinguishing the affective and cognitive components of regret

Regret is one of the most common emotions, but researchers generally measure it in an ad-hoc, unvalidated fashion. Three studies outline the construction and validation of the Regret Elements Scale (RES), which distinguishes between an affective component of regret, associated with maladaptive affective outcomes, and a cognitive component of regret, associated with functional preparatory outcomes. The present research demonstrates the RES’s relationship with distress (Study 1), appraisals of emotions (Study 2), and existing measures of regret (Study 3). We further demonstrate the RES’s ability to differentiate regret from other negative emotions (Study 2) and related traits (Study 3). The scale provides both a new theoretical perspective on regret, and a tool for researchers interested in measuring post-decisional regret.

The effects of belief in good luck and counterfactual thinking on gambling behavior

BACKGROUND AND AIMS

One's belief in good luck, and belief that it is a personal trait, could play a crucial role in gambling behavior, and can lead gamblers to have an irrational anticipation to win and to over-generalize their subjective sense of control. And upward counterfactual thinking has been considered to be a factor that offsets those irrational beliefs. This study examined the effects of belief in good luck and of upward counterfactual thinking on gambling behavior.

METHODS

The subjects of the study were 52 college students who had been classified as non-problematic and non-pathological gamblers. They were assigned into one of two groups, distinguished by having either high (n = 25) or low (n = 27) levels of self-perception of luck, as determined by their scores on the Belief in Good Luck (BIGL) Scale. The subjects were assigned to different groups according to their reported experience of upward counterfactual thinking.

RESULTS

We found that those who had high BIGL scores spent more money on gambling than those who had low BIGL scores. Moreover, after taking into account the upward counterfactual thinking, the subjects with high BIGL scores showed a dramatic decrease in their expectations of winning.

DISCUSSION

The results indicate that to perceive luck as a personal and internal trait could affect gambling, which is one of the cognitive errors for gambling addiction. On the other hand, given that upward counterfactual thinking plays an important role in reducing cognitive errors, it could act as a protective factor against gambling addiction.

Pitfalls of counterfactual thinking in medical practice: preventing errors by using more functional reference points

Background

Counterfactual thinking involves mentally simulating alternatives to reality. The current article reviews literature pertaining to the relevance counterfactual thinking has for the quality of medical decision making. Although earlier counterfactual thought research concluded that counterfactuals have important benefits for the individual, there are reasons to believe that counterfactual thinking is also associated with dysfunctional consequences. Of particular focus is whether or not medical experience, and its influence on counterfactual thinking, actually informs or improves medical practice. It is hypothesized that relatively more probable decision alternatives, followed by undesirable outcomes and counterfactual thought responses, can be abandoned for relatively less probable decision alternatives.

Design and Methods

Building on earlier research demonstrating that counterfactual thinking can impede memory and learning in a decision paradigm with undergraduate students, the current study examines the extent to which earlier findings can be generalized to practicing physicians (N=10). Participants were asked to complete 60 trials of a computerized Monty Hall Problem simulation. Learning by experience was operationalized as the frequency of switch-decisions.

Results

Although some learning was evidenced by a general increase in switch-decision frequency across block trials, the extent of learning demonstrated was not ideal, nor practical.

Conclusions

A simple, multiple-trial, decision paradigm demonstrated that doctors fail to learn basic decision-outcome associations through experience. An agenda for future research, which tests the functionality of reference points (other than counterfactual alternatives) for the purposes of medical decision making, is proposed.

Adaptive constructive processes and memory accuracy: consequences of counterfactual simulations in young and older adults

People frequently engage in counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of alternative outcomes to past events. Like simulations of future events, counterfactual simulations serve adaptive functions. However, future simulation can also result in various kinds of distortions and has thus been characterised as an adaptive constructive process. Here we approach counterfactual thinking as such and examine whether it can distort memory for actual events. In Experiments 1a/b young and older adults imagined themselves experiencing different scenarios. Participants then imagined the same scenario again, engaged in no further simulation of a scenario, or imagined a counterfactual outcome. On a subsequent recognition test participants were more likely to make false alarms to counterfactual lures than novel scenarios. Older adults were more prone to these memory errors than younger adults. In Experiment 2 younger and older participants selected and performed different actions, then recalled performing some of those actions, imagined performing alternative actions to some of the selected actions, and did not imagine others. Participants, especially older adults, were more likely to falsely remember counterfactual actions than novel actions as previously performed. The findings suggest that counterfactual thinking can cause source confusion based on internally generated misinformation, consistent with its characterisation as an adaptive constructive process.

Prefactual Potency

Prefactual thoughts typically take the form of implied or explicit if–then statements that represent mental simulations of alternatives to what is expected to occur in the future. The authors propose that the multiplicative combination of “if likelihood” (the degree to which the antecedent condition of the prefactual is perceived to be likely) and “then likelihood” (the perceived conditional likelihood of the outcome of the prefactual, given the antecedent condition) determine the influence of prefactuals. This construct, termed prefactual potency, is a reliable predictor of the degree of influence of prefactual thinking on judgments of anticipated negative affect. Through three experiments, the authors demonstrate the predictive power of this construct and show that it plays a causal role in determining the strength of the effects of prefactual thought. Implications of prefactual potency as a central factor of prefactual influence are discussed.

Learning Inhibition in the Monty Hall Problem

Despite repeated trials, people consistently fail to learn the solution to the Monty Hall problem (MHP). This research examines the links between learning, counterfactual thinking, and memory for decision/outcome frequencies. Study 1 participants completed 60 MHP trials and listed their thoughts following losses. Results showed that participants tended to counterfactualize switch losses more than stick losses, adhered to the prescriptions of their counterfactuals more frequently following switch losses than any other decisions/outcomes, and were less likely to learn the solution as counterfactuals increased. Furthermore, memory for switch losses was significantly overestimated, and the relationship between counterfactuals and learning was mediated by misestimation of decision/outcome frequencies. In Study 2, counterfactual salience was manipulated. Learning was less likely to occur when counterfactual salience was high than when it was low, a relationship that was again mediated by memory of decision/outcome frequencies. Findings are discussed in light of their theoretical and applied implications.