Putting congeniality effects into context: Investigating the role of context in attitude memory using multiple paradigms

Neural basis underlying the association between thought control ability and happiness: The moderating role of the amygdala

Thought control ability (TCA) plays an important role in individuals' health and happiness. Previous studies demonstrated that TCA was closely conceptually associated with happiness. However, empirical research supporting this relationship was limited. In addition, the neural basis underlying TCA and how this neural basis influences the relationship between TCA and happiness remain unexplored. In the present study, the voxel-based morphometry (VBM) method was adopted to investigate the neuroanatomical basis of TCA in 314 healthy subjects. The behavioral results revealed a significant positive association between TCA and happiness. On the neural level, there was a significant negative correlation between TCA and the gray matter density (GMD) of the bilateral amygdala. Split-half validation analysis revealed similar results, further confirming the stability of the VBM analysis findings. Furthermore, gray matter covariance network and graph theoretical analyses showed positive association between TCA and both the node degree and node strength of the amygdala. Moderation analysis revealed that the GMD of the amygdala moderated the relationship between TCA and happiness. Specifically, the positive association between TCA and self-perceived happiness was stronger in subjects with a lower GMD of the amygdala. The present study indicated the neural basis underlying the association between TCA and happiness and offered a method of improving individual well-being.

Can People Intentionally and Selectively Forget Prose Material?

List-method directed forgetting (LMDF) is the demonstration that people can intentionally forget previously studied information when they are asked to forget what they have previously learned and remember new information instead. In addition, recent research demonstrated that people can selectively forget when cued to forget only a subset of the previously studied information. Both forms of forgetting are typically observed in recall tests, in which the to-be-forgotten and to-be-remembered information is tested independent of original cuing. Thereby, both LMDF and selective directed forgetting (SDF) have been studied mostly with unrelated item materials (e.g., word lists). The present study examined whether LMDF and SDF generalize to prose material. Participants learned three prose passages, which they were cued to remember or forget after the study of each passage. At the time of testing, participants were asked to recall the three prose passages regardless of original cuing. The results showed no significant differences in recall of the three lists as a function of cuing condition. The findings suggest that LMDF and SDF do not occur with prose material. Future research is needed to replicate and extend these findings with (other) complex and meaningful materials before drawing firm conclusions. If the null effect proves to be robust, this would have implications regarding the ecological validity and generalizability of current LMDF and SDF findings.

Can intentional forgetting reduce the cross-race effect in memory?

Across three studies, we utilized an item-method directed forgetting (DF) procedure with faces of different races to investigate the magnitude of intentional forgetting of own-race versus other-race faces. All three experiments shared the same procedure but differed in the number of faces presented. Participants were presented with own-race and other-race faces, each followed by a remember or forget memory instruction, and subsequently received a recognition test for all studied faces. We obtained a robust cross-race effect (CRE) but did not find a DF effect in Experiment 1. Experiments 2 and 3 used shorter study and test lists and obtained a significant DF effect along with significant CRE, but no interaction between face type and memory instruction. The results suggest that own-race and other-race faces are equally susceptible to DF. The results are discussed in terms of the theoretical explanations for CRE and their implications for DF.

Explanation can cause Forgetting: Memory Dynamics in the Generation of New Arguments

Retrieval-induced forgetting is observed when the retrieval of target information causes the forgetting of nontarget information. The present study investigated whether similar dynamics occur in the context of generating arguments in the process of explanation. Participants studied arguments associated with several issues before attempting to think of new arguments pertaining to a subset of those issues. When given a later memory test, participants were less likely to recall the studied arguments if they had attempted to think of new arguments than if they had not. This argument-induced forgetting effect was observed regardless of whether participants attempted to generate arguments that either agreed or disagreed with the position of the arguments they studied. The effect was significantly reduced, however, and even numerically reversed, when participants generated arguments that were highly related to the studied arguments. This finding fits well with previous research on retrieval-induced forgetting, which has shown that the retrieval or generation of new information fails to cause the forgetting of old information when the two types of information are well integrated or semantically associated.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

How people can become persuaded by weak messages presented by credible communicators: Not all sleeper effects are created equal

The sleeper effect has been proposed to describe temporal changes in persuasion for messages associated with noncredible sources. The present research introduces a new kind of sleeper effect denoting increases in persuasion for weak messages associated with credible sources. This effect of the source was hypothesized to derive from attending to the message source rather than the message arguments and reconstructing delayed attitudes primarily on the basis of the source information. Findings from three experiments revealed that when the focus of attention was the communicator, there was a sleeper effect for the source. Specifically, during the time between an immediate follow up and a delayed follow up, persuasion increased when credible sources presented weak arguments. In contrast, when the focus of attention was the message arguments, a traditional sleeper effect emerged. That is, persuasion increased when strong arguments were presented by a noncredible communicator. These effects were mediated by relative recall of arguments versus source attributes and replicated with different message topics and lengths of delay.

Neural mechanisms of motivated forgetting

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Motivated forgetting of unwanted memories shapes what we retain of our personal past.

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Motivated forgetting is achieved in part by inhibitory control over encoding or retrieval.

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Prefrontal cortex reduces hippocampal and cortical activity to suppress memories.

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Electrophysiological activity during motivated forgetting implicates active inhibition.

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A neurobiological model of memory control can inform disordered control over memory.

Not all memories are equally welcome in awareness. People limit the time they spend thinking about unpleasant experiences, a process that begins during encoding, but that continues when cues later remind someone of the memory. Here, we review the emerging behavioural and neuroimaging evidence that suppressing awareness of an unwelcome memory, at encoding or retrieval, is achieved by inhibitory control processes mediated by the lateral prefrontal cortex. These mechanisms interact with neural structures that represent experiences in memory, disrupting traces that support retention. Thus, mechanisms engaged to regulate momentary awareness introduce lasting biases in which experiences remain accessible. We argue that theories of forgetting that neglect the motivated control of awareness omit a powerful force shaping the retention of our past.