Demystifying “free will”: The role of contextual information and evidence accumulation for predictive brain activity

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.

Ethics and Meditation: A New Educational Combination to Boost Verbal Creativity and Sense of Responsibility

Both creativity and responsibility are important higher-order skills to develop to meet the challenges of the Anthropocene, and both are related to attentional states of consciousness and to ethics. Meditation is a set of practices that trains attentional and emotional regulation. A few studies have shown that different kinds of meditation can foster different kinds of creative thinking, and others have begun to investigate the effect of the combination of meditation and ethics on ethical characteristics (but not yet on creativity or precisely on responsibility, so far). Here, we present a nonrandomized trial with an active control group among second-year science university students (n = 84) to test the effect of the secular Meditation-Based Ethics of Responsibility (MBER) program on creative potential, self-reported awareness, and sense of one's own responsibility. The results show a large effect of the program on sense of one's own responsibility and convergent and divergent creative writing tasks, both in conceptual-semantic and engineering-like verbal ideation. They also suggest that convergent conceptual-semantic thinking might moderate the effect of the MBER program on the awareness and sense of one's own responsibility. This work opens up new research and educational perspectives linked to necessary behavioral changes in the Anthropocene.

Neural mechanisms of background and velocity effects in smooth pursuit eye movements

Smooth pursuit eye movements (SPEM) are essential to guide behaviour in complex visual environments. SPEM accuracy is known to be degraded by the presence of a structured visual background and at higher target velocities. The aim of this preregistered study was to investigate the neural mechanisms of these robust behavioural effects. N = 33 participants performed a SPEM task with two background conditions (present and absent) at two target velocities (0.4 and 0.6 Hz). Eye movement and BOLD data were collected simultaneously. Both the presence of a structured background and faster target velocity decreased pursuit gain and increased catch-up saccade rate. Faster targets additionally increased position error. Higher BOLD response with background was found in extensive clusters in visual, parietal, and frontal areas (including the medial frontal eye fields; FEF) partially overlapping with the known SPEM network. Faster targets were associated with higher BOLD response in visual cortex and left lateral FEF. Task-based functional connectivity analyses (psychophysiological interactions; PPI) largely replicated previous results in the basic SPEM network but did not yield additional information regarding the neural underpinnings of the background and velocity effects. The results show that the presentation of visual background stimuli during SPEM induces activity in a widespread visuo-parieto-frontal network including areas contributing to cognitive aspects of oculomotor control such as medial FEF, whereas the response to higher target velocity involves visual and motor areas such as lateral FEF. Therefore, we were able to propose for the first time different functions of the medial and lateral FEF during SPEM.

Feeling free: External influences on endogenous behaviour

When we are presented with two equally appealing options, how does the brain break the symmetry between them and make a choice? Recent research has proposed that when no clear information can guide decisions, we use irrelevant noise to tip the scale in favour of one alternative and decide how to act. In the present study, we investigated this issue exploring how human decisions were influenced by noise in a visual signal that cued instructed or free choice. Participants were presented with random-dot kinematograms, moving unidirectionally either upwards or downwards (in instructed trials) or both upwards and downwards simultaneously (free-choice trials). By varying the coherence of dot motion, we were able to test how moment-to-moment fluctuations in motion energy could influence action selection processes. We also measured participants' awareness of such influence. Our results revealed three novel findings: Participants' choices tended to follow fluctuations in dot motion, showing that sensory noise biased "free" selection between actions, irrespective of the clarity of the free cue. However, participants appeared to remain unaware of that influence, because subjective ratings of freedom did not correlate with the degree of sensory biasing. In one exception to this general rule, we found that, when participants resisted the bias and made a choice opposite to the one suggested by the stimulus, they reported strong subjective sense of having chosen independently of the stimulation. This result suggests that inhibitory control is tightly linked to the sense of freedom of choice.

Thirst for Intention? Grasping a Glass Is a Thirst-Controlled Action

Every day and every hour, we feel we perform numerous voluntary actions, i.e., actions under the control of our will. Individual’s ability to initiate goal-directed movement is classically described as a hierarchical motor organization, from an intentional module, mostly considered as a black box, to muscular activity supporting action execution. The general focus is usually set on the triggering of action by intention, which is assumed to be the only entry to the action cascade, rather than on the preceding formation of intentions. If intentions play a key role in the specification of movement kinematic parameters, it remains largely unknown whether unconscious cognitive processes may also affect action preparation and unfolding. Recently, a seemingly irrelevant variable, thirst, was shown to modulate a simple arbitrary action such as key-pressing. Thirsty individuals were shown to produce stronger motor inhibition in no-go trials when a glass of water was present. In the present experiment, we intended to explore whether motor inhibition operates not only upstream from the action cascade but may also affect the unfolding of reaching movements, i.e., at a lower-level control. Thirsty vs. non-thirsty control subjects were asked to reach and grasp green (go trial) or red glasses (no-go trial) filled with either water or transparent gel wax with a central candlewick. Thirsty subjects were faster to initiate actions toward the water glasses. They also exhibited an earlier maximal grip aperture and a global reduction of movement time which was mostly explained by a shortening of deceleration time. The deceleration phase was correlated with individual’s thirst rating. In addition, no-go trial toward a glass of water tended to inhibit the next movement toward a glass filled with gel wax. Thus, our results show that an unintentional influence of an internal state can reorganize voluntary action structure not only at the decision-making level but also at the level of motor control. Although subjects explicitly paid more attention and were more cautious to glasses filled with water, they reported no explicit sensation of an increased urge to grasp it, further suggesting that these effects are controlled by covert mechanisms.

Why neuroscience does not disprove free will

While the question whether free will exists or not has concerned philosophers for centuries, empirical research on this question is relatively young. About 35 years ago Benjamin Libet designed an experiment that challenged the common intuition of free will, namely that conscious intentions are causally efficacious. Libet demonstrated that conscious intentions are preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation, suggesting that unconscious processes determine our decisions and we are only retrospectively informed about these decisions. Libet-style experiments have ever since dominated the discourse about the existence of free will and have found their way into the public media. Here we review the most important challenges to the common interpretation of Libet-style tasks and argue that the common interpretation is questionable. Brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome. Furthermore, the decision process is configured by conditional intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment. We conclude that Libet-style tasks do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.

Freely chosen and instructed actions are terminated by different neural mechanisms revealed by kinematics-informed EEG

Neurophysiological accounts of human volition are dominated by debates on the origin of voluntary choices but the neural consequences that follow such choices remain poorly understood. For instance, could one predict whether or not an action was chosen voluntarily based only on how that action is motorically executed? We investigated this possibility by integrating scalp electroencephalograms and index-finger accelerometer recordings acquired while people chose between pressing a left or right button either freely or as instructed by a visual cue. Even though freely selected and instructed actions were executed with equal vigor, the timing of the movement to release the button was comparatively delayed for freely selected actions. This chronometric difference was six-times larger for the β-oscillations over the sensorimotor cortex that characteristically accompany an action's termination. This surprising modulation of an action's termination by volition was traceable to volition-modulated differences in how the competing yet non-selected action was represented and regulated.

Proactive Recruitment of Frontoparietal and Salience Networks for Voluntary Decisions

There is evidence that neural patterns are predictive of voluntary decisions, but findings come from paradigms that have typically required participants to make arbitrary choices decisions in highly abstract experimental tasks. It remains to be seen whether proactive neural activity reflects upcoming choices for individuals performing decisions in more complex, dynamic, scenarios. In this functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study, we investigated proactive neural activity for voluntary decisions compared with instructed decisions in a virtual environment, which more closely mimicked a real-world decision. Using partial least squares (PLS) analysis, we found that the frontoparietal and salience networks were associated with voluntary choice selection from a time at which decisions were abstract and preceded external stimuli. Using multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), we showed that participants’ choices, which were decodable from motor and visual cortices, could be predicted with lower accuracy for voluntary decisions than for instructed decisions. This corresponded to eye-tracking data showing that participants made a greater number of fixations to alternative options during voluntary choices, which might have resulted in less stable choice representations. These findings suggest that voluntary decisions engage proactive choice selection, and that upcoming choices are encoded in neural representations even while individuals continue to consider their options in the environment.

Slow Accumulations of Neural Activities in Multiple Cortical Regions Precede Self-Initiation of Movement: An Event-Related fMRI Study

The neural processes underlying self-initiated behavior (behavior that is initiated without an external stimulus trigger) are not well understood. This event-related fMRI study investigated the neural origins of self-initiated behaviors in humans, by identifying brain regions that increased in neural activities several seconds prior to self-initiated movements. Subjects performed a hand grasping task under two conditions: a free-timing and cued timing condition. The supplementary motor area (SMA) began to activate several seconds prior to self-initiated movement (accounting for hemodynamic delay), representing a potential blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal correlate of the readiness potential (RP) on electroencephalogram (EEG), referred to here as "readiness BOLD signals." Significant readiness BOLD signals were also observed in the right frontoparietal areas, precuneus, and insula, all of which are known to contribute to internally-generated behaviors, but with no prior evidence for such early and slow accumulation of neural activities. Moreover, visual and auditory cortices also exhibited clear readiness BOLD signals with similar early onsets, even absent external stimulation. Slow accumulation of neural activities throughout distributed cortical areas, including sensory, association, and motor cortices, underlies the generation of self-initiated behaviors. These findings warrant reconsideration of the prevailing view that the SMA or some other specific locus in frontoparietal cortex serves as the ultimate neural origin of self-initiated movement.

Emergence of qualia from brain activity or from an interaction of proto-consciousness with the brain: which one is the weirder? Available evidence and a research agenda

Abstract This contribution to the science of consciousness aims at comparing how two different theories can explain the emergence of different qualia experiences: meta-awareness, meta-cognition, the placebo effect, out-of-body experiences, cognitive therapy, meditation-induced brain changes, etc. The first theory postulates that qualia experiences derive from specific neural patterns, and the second one that qualia experiences derive from the interaction of a proto-consciousness with the brain’s neural activity. From this comparison, it will be possible to judge which one seems to better explain the different qualia experiences and to offer a more promising research agenda.

Predict or classify: The deceptive role of time-locking in brain signal classification

Several experimental studies claim to be able to predict the outcome of simple decisions from brain signals measured before subjects are aware of their decision. Often, these studies use multivariate pattern recognition methods with the underlying assumption that the ability to classify the brain signal is equivalent to predict the decision itself. Here we show instead that it is possible to correctly classify a signal even if it does not contain any predictive information about the decision. We first define a simple stochastic model that mimics the random decision process between two equivalent alternatives, and generate a large number of independent trials that contain no choice-predictive information. The trials are first time-locked to the time point of the final event and then classified using standard machine-learning techniques. The resulting classification accuracy is above chance level long before the time point of time-locking. We then analyze the same trials using information theory. We demonstrate that the high classification accuracy is a consequence of time-locking and that its time behavior is simply related to the large relaxation time of the process. We conclude that when time-locking is a crucial step in the analysis of neural activity patterns, both the emergence and the timing of the classification accuracy are affected by structural properties of the network that generates the signal.

'Catching the waves' - slow cortical potentials as moderator of voluntary action

The readiness potential is an ongoing negativity in the EEG preceding a self-initiated movement by approximately 1.5s. So far it has predominantly been interpreted as a preparatory signal with a causal link to the upcoming movement. Here a different hypothesis is suggested which we call the selective slow cortical potential sampling hypothesis. In this review of recent research results we argue that the initiation of a voluntary action is more likely during negative fluctuations of the slow cortical potential and that the sampling and averaging of many trials leads to the observed negativity. That is, empirical evidence indicates that the early readiness potential is not a neural correlate of preconscious motor preparation and thus a determinant of action. Our hypothesis thereafter challenges the classic interpretation of the Libet experiment which is often taken as proof that there is no free will. We furthermore suggest that slow cortical potentials are related to an urge to act but are not a neural indicator of the decision process of action initiation.

Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It

The concept of free will is hard to define, but crucial to both individual and social life. For centuries people have wondered how freedom is possible in a world ruled by physical determinism; however, reflections on free will have been confined to philosophy until half a century ago, when the topic was also addressed by neuroscience. The first relevant, and now well-known, strand of research on the brain correlates of free will was that pioneered by Libet et al. (1983), which focused on the allegedly unconscious intentions taking place in decisions regarded as free and voluntary. Libet’s interpretation of the so-called readiness potential (RP) seems to favor a sort of deflation of freedom (Soon et al., 2008). However, recent studies seem to point to a different interpretation of the RP, namely that the apparent build-up of the brain activity preceding subjectively spontaneous voluntary movements (SVM) may reflect the ebb and flow of the background neuronal noise, which is triggered by many factors (Schurger et al., 2016). This interpretation seems to bridge the gap between the neuroscientific perspective on free will and the intuitive, commonsensical view of it (Roskies, 2010b), but many problems remain to be solved and other theoretical paths can be hypothesized. The article therefore, proposes to start from an operationalizable concept of free will (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015) to find a connection between higher order descriptions (useful for practical life) and neural bases. This new way to conceptualize free will should be linked to the idea of “capacity”: that is, the availability of a repertoire of general skills that can be manifested and used without moment by moment conscious control. The capacity index, which is also able to take into account the differences of time scales in decisions, includes reasons-responsiveness and is related to internal control, understood as the agent’s ownership of the mechanisms that trigger the relevant behavior. Cognitive abilities, needed for one to have capacity, might be firstly operationalized as a set of neuropsychological tests, which can be used to operationalize and measure specific executive functions, as they are strongly linked to the concept of control. Subsequently, a free will index would allow for the search of the underlying neural correlates of the capacity exhibited by people and the limits in capacity exhibited by each individual.

Limits of Executive Control: Sequential Effects in Predictable Environments

Cognitive-control theories attribute action control to executive processes that modulate behavior on the basis of expectancy or task rules. In the current study, we examined corticospinal excitability and behavioral performance in a go/no-go task. Go and no-go trials were presented in runs of five, and go and no-go runs alternated predictably. At the beginning of each trial, subjects indicated whether they expected a go trial or a no-go trial. Analyses revealed that subjects immediately adjusted their expectancy ratings when a new run started. However, motor excitability was primarily associated with the properties of the previous trial, rather than the predicted properties of the current trial. We also observed a large latency cost at the beginning of a go run (i.e., reaction times were longer for the first trial in a go run than for the second trial). These findings indicate that actions in predictable environments are substantially influenced by previous events, even if this influence conflicts with conscious expectancies about upcoming events.

Bad is freer than good: Positive-negative asymmetry in attributions of free will

Recent findings support the idea that the belief in free will serves as the basis for moral responsibility, thus promoting the punishment of immoral agents. We theorized that free will extends beyond morality to serve as the basis for accountability and the capacity for change more broadly, not only for others but also for the self. Five experiments showed that people attributed higher freedom of will to negative than to positive valence, regardless of morality or intent, for both self and others. In recalling everyday life situations and in classical decision making paradigms, negative actions, negatives outcomes, and negative framing were attributed higher free will than positive ones. Free will attributions were mainly driven by action or outcome valence, but not intent. These findings show consistent support for the idea that free will underlies laypersons' sense-making for accountability and change under negative circumstances.