Do monkeys have a theory of mind? How to answer the question?

Is self-awareness necessary to have a theory of mind?

Forty years ago, Gallup proposed that theory of mind presupposes self-awareness. Following Humphrey, his hypothesis was that individuals can infer the mental states of others thanks to the ability to monitor their own mental states in similar circumstances. Since then, advances in several disciplines, such as comparative and developmental psychology, have provided empirical evidence to test Gallup's hypothesis. Herein, we review and discuss this evidence.

Reading minds or reading scripts? De-intellectualising theory of mind

Understanding the origins of human social cognition is a central challenge in contemporary science. In recent decades, the idea of a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) has emerged as the most popular way of explaining unique features of human social cognition. This default view has been progressively undermined by research on 'implicit' ToM, which suggests that relevant precursor abilities may already be present in preverbal human infants and great apes. However, this area of research suffers from conceptual difficulties and empirical limitations, including explanatory circularity, over-intellectualisation, and inconsistent empirical replication. Our article breaks new ground by adapting 'script theory' for application to both linguistic and non-linguistic agents. It thereby provides a new theoretical framework able to resolve the aforementioned issues, generate novel predictions, and provide a plausible account of how individuals make sense of the behaviour of others. Script theory is based on the premise that pre-verbal infants and great apes are capable of basic forms of agency-detection and non-mentalistic goal understanding, allowing individuals to form event-schemata that are then used to make sense of the behaviour of others. We show how script theory circumvents fundamental problems created by ToM-based frameworks, explains patterns of inconsistent replication, and offers important novel predictions regarding how humans and other animals understand and predict the behaviour of others.

Is this worth the trouble? Strategic conflict management in Tonkean macaques

Conflict management entails preventing and repairing damages resulting from social conflicts. While previous research has emphasized post-conflict actions like reconciliation, the understanding of how primates weigh the costs and benefits of conflict remains limited. Uncovering this hidden but fundamental aspect of conflict management requires addressing actively avoided social conflicts. In a study involving semi-free ranging Tonkean macaques, individuals were presented with social dilemmas: displacing a peer to access a preferred juice reward or opting for a peer-free but less preferred one to avoid conflict. The results showed that subjects attributed a cost to the social conflict and did not demonstrate a systematic drive to dominate. Decision modeling revealed integration of peer hierarchy and reward subjective value, with subjects' own social rank impacting the balance between these social and economic dimensions. Overall, this research highlights how primates strategically address group cohesion and peacekeeping, sometimes at the expense of personal preferences.

Canine perspective-taking

An important question in the study of canine cognition is how dogs understand humans, given that they show impressive abilities for interacting and communicating with us. In this review, we describe and discuss studies that have investigated dogs' perspective-taking abilities. There is solid evidence that dogs are not only sensitive to the gaze of others, but also their attention. We specifically address the question whether dogs have the ability to take the perspective of others and thus come to understand what others can or cannot perceive. From the latter, they may then infer what others know and use this representation to anticipate what others do next. Still, dogs might simply rely on directly observable cues and on what they themselves can perceive when they assess what others can perceive. And instead of making inferences from representations of others' mental states, they may have just learned that certain behaviours of ours lead to certain outcomes. However, recent research seems to challenge this low-level explanation. Dogs have solved several perspective-taking tasks instantly and reliably across a large number of variations, including geometrical gaze-following, stealing in the dark, concealing information from others, and Guesser/Knower differentiation. In the latter studies, dogs' choices between two human informants were strongly influenced by cues related to the humans' visual access to the food, even when the two informants behaved identically. And finally, we review a recent study that found dogs reacting differently to misleading suggestions of human informants that have either a true or false belief about the location of food. We discuss this surprising result in terms of the comprehension of reality-incongruent mental states, which is considered as a hallmark of Theory of Mind acquisition in human development. Especially on the basis of the latter findings, we conclude that pet dogs might be sensitive to what others see, know, intend, and believe. Therefore, this ability seems to have evolved not just in the corvid and primate lineages, but also in dogs.

Social prediction modulates activity of macaque superior temporal cortex

The ability to attribute thoughts to others, also called theory of mind (TOM), has been extensively studied in humans; however, its evolutionary origins have been challenged. Computationally, the basis of TOM has been interpreted within the predictive coding framework and associated with activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Here, we revealed, using a nonlinguistic task and functional magnetic resonance imaging, that activity in a region of the macaque middle superior temporal cortex was specifically modulated by the predictability of social situations. As in human TPJ, this region could be distinguished from other temporal regions involved in face processing. Our result suggests the existence of a precursor for the TOM ability in the last common ancestor of human and Old World monkeys.

Dedicated Representation of Others in the Macaque Frontal Cortex: From Action Monitoring and Prediction to Outcome Evaluation

Social neurophysiology has increasingly addressed how several aspects of self and other are distinctly represented in the brain. In social interactions, the self–other distinction is fundamental for discriminating one’s own actions, intentions, and outcomes from those that originate in the external world. In this paper, we review neurophysiological experiments using nonhuman primates that shed light on the importance of the self–other distinction, focusing mainly on the frontal cortex. We start by examining how the findings are impacted by the experimental paradigms that are used, such as the type of social partner or whether a passive or active interaction is required. Next, we describe the 2 sociocognitive systems: mirror and mentalizing. Finally, we discuss how the self–other distinction can occur in different domains to process different aspects of social information: the observation and prediction of others’ actions and the monitoring of others’ rewards.

Macaques Exhibit Implicit Gaze Bias Anticipating Others' False-Belief-Driven Actions via Medial Prefrontal Cortex

The ability to infer others' mental states is essential to social interactions. This ability, critically evaluated by testing whether one attributes false beliefs (FBs) to others, has been considered to be uniquely hominid and to accompany the activation of a distributed brain network. We challenge the taxon specificity of this ability and identify the causal brain locus by introducing an anticipatory-looking FB paradigm combined with chemogenetic neuronal manipulation in macaque monkeys. We find spontaneous gaze bias of macaques implicitly anticipating others' FB-driven actions. Silencing of the medial prefrontal neuronal activity with inhibitory designer receptor exclusively activated by designer drugs (DREADDs) specifically eliminates the implicit gaze bias while leaving the animals' visually guided and memory-guided tracking abilities intact. Thus, neuronal activity in the medial prefrontal cortex could have a causal role in FB-attribution-like behaviors in the primate lineage, emphasizing the importance of probing the neuronal mechanisms underlying theory of mind with relevant macaque animal models.

Balancing costs and benefits in primates: ecological and palaeoanthropological views

Maintaining the balance between costs and benefits is challenging for species living in complex and dynamic socio-ecological environments, such as primates, but also crucial for shaping life history, reproductive and feeding strategies. Indeed, individuals must decide to invest time and energy to obtain food, services and partners, with little direct feedback on the success of their investments. Whereas decision-making relies heavily upon cognition in humans, the extent to which it also involves cognition in other species, based on their environmental constraints, has remained a challenging question. Building mental representations relating behaviours and their long-term outcome could be critical for other primates, but there are actually very little data relating cognition to real socio-ecological challenges in extant and extinct primates. Here, we review available data illustrating how specific cognitive processes enable(d) modern primates and extinct hominins to manage multiple resources (e.g. food, partners) and to organize their behaviour in space and time, both at the individual and at the group level. We particularly focus on how they overcome fluctuating and competing demands, and select courses of action corresponding to the best possible packages of potential costs and benefits in reproductive and foraging contexts. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

An understanding of third-party friendships in a tolerant macaque

Complex societies are shaped by social relationships between multiple individuals. The pressure to track these relationships has driven the evolution of social cognition in primates. Importantly, it can be adaptive to track not only personal relationships, but also those established between third-parties. Primates have knowledge about others’ dominance hierarchies and kinship, but we do not know to what extent they also understand friendships. In a playback experiment, Tonkean macaques were presented with simulated conflicts involving third-party female dyads who were established friends or non-friends. Hearing a conflict between friends elicited a stronger behavioural response in listeners (i.e. an increase in looking time) compared to hearing a conflict between non-friends. Conflicts between friends are likely to represent a greater disruption of the social group and structure of the network, and therefore this difference in response may represent an adaptive strategy employed by the macaques to selectively monitor important social interactions in the group. These findings provide evidence that Tonkean macaques (and potentially other primates) can classify the relationships of others based on their degree of friendship and additionally, confirms the important role friendships have within the societies of social primates.

Anomalous Perception of Biological Motion in Autism: A Conceptual Review and Meta-Analysis

Despite its popularity, the construct of biological motion (BM) and its putative anomalies in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are not completely clarified. In this article, we present a meta-analysis investigating the putative anomalies of BM perception in ASD. Through a systematic literature search, we found 30 studies that investigated BM perception in both ASD and typical developing peers by using point-light display stimuli. A general meta-analysis including all these studies showed a moderate deficit of individuals with ASD in BM processing, but also a high heterogeneity. This heterogeneity was explored in different additional meta-analyses where studies were grouped according to levels of complexity of the BM task employed (first-order, direct and instrumental), and according to the manipulation of low-level perceptual features (spatial vs. temporal) of the control stimuli. Results suggest that the most severe deficit in ASD is evident when perception of BM is serving a secondary purpose (e.g., inferring intentionality/action/emotion) and, interestingly, that temporal dynamics of stimuli are an important factor in determining BM processing anomalies in ASD. Our results question the traditional understanding of BM anomalies in ASD as a monolithic deficit and suggest a paradigm shift that deconstructs BM into distinct levels of processing and specific spatio-temporal subcomponents.

Are monkeys able to discriminate appearance from reality?

The understanding that the perceptual appearance of the environment can differ in several ways from the reality underlies the ability to discriminate appearance from reality. Being able to realize when a misperception can lead us to behave in inappropriate ways confers an evolutionary advantage and may be a prerequisite to develop a Theory of Mind. Understanding that our own perception can differ from reality seems indeed necessary to attribute to others perceptions or beliefs different than ours. This appearance-reality discrimination ability has recently been demonstrated in great apes but no information is currently available regarding this ability in other nonhuman species. In a comparative study, we tested Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana), an Old World primate species, and brown capuchins (Sapajus apella), a New World primate species. We provided monkeys with two experiments using visual illusions of size and quantity to test their ability to discriminate appearance from reality, with an experimental setup similar to the one developed by Krachun et al. (2016) on chimpanzees. A large number of brown capuchins, from different ages and both sexes, as well as two Tonkean macaques succeeded in the two experiments. By ruling out all alternative explanations (i.e. visual tracking or associative learning), our study brings the first evidence that some Old World and New World monkeys are able to discriminate appearance from reality. Our results suggest moving the evolutionary apparition of this cognitive ability earlier in time. Finally, it suggests that humans could share more Theory of Mind components with more nonhuman species than we previously thought.

Horses prefer to solicit a person who previously observed a food-hiding process to access this food: A possible indication of attentional state attribution

Inferring what others witnessed provides important benefits in social contexts, but evidence remains scarce in nonhuman animals. We investigated this ability in domestic horses by testing whether they could discriminate between two experimenters who differed in what they previously witnessed and decide whom to solicit when confronted with an unreachable food source based on that information. First, horses saw food being hidden in a closed bucket (impossible for them to open) in the presence of two experimenters who behaved identically but differed in their attention to the baiting process (the "witness" experimenter faced the bucket, the "non-witness" faced away). Horses were then let free with both experimenters, and their interest towards each (gaze and touch) was measured. They gazed at and touched the witness significantly more than the non-witness (n = 15, gaze: p = 0.004; touch: p = 0.003). These results might suggest that horses inferred the attentional state of the experimenters during the baiting process and used this information to adapt their later behavior. Although further study would be necessary to conclude, our study provides new insight into attentional state attribution in horses and might hint to the existence of precursors of a Theory of Mind in horses.

Origin and evolution of human cognition

We investigate which of the higher cognitive abilities or types of intelligence characteristic of humans are found, even in preliminary form, in non-human animals, predominantly primates, or whether qualitatively different ("unique") human abilities exist. This concerns (1) tool use and fabrication, (2) problem solving, (3) gaze following, (4) mirror self-recognition, (5) imitation, (6) metacognition, (7) theory of mind, (8) consciousness, (9) prosociality, and (10) language. We found that none of these abilities can be regarded as unique to humans without precursors in non-human primates. The observed differences in cognitive functions, underlying brain mechanisms and resulting behaviors correlate best with differences in the information processing capacity as an equivalent of general intelligence based on the number of cortical neurons, packing density and axonal conduction velocity plus long-range cortical fascicles. The biggest quantitative change appears to concern the origin of syntactical language, but this was preceded by an increased mental ability to manipulate sequential events within working memory.

How attention gates social interactions

Social interactions are at the core of social life. However, humans selectively choose their exchange partners and do not engage in all available opportunities for social encounters. In this review, we argue that attentional systems play an important role in guiding the selection of social interactions. Supported by both classic and emerging literature, we identify and characterize the three core processes-perception, interpretation, and evaluation-that interact with attentional systems to modulate selective responses to social environments. Perceptual processes facilitate attentional prioritization of social cues. Interpretative processes link attention with understanding of cues' social meanings and agents' mental states. Evaluative processes determine the perceived value of the source of social information. The interplay between attention and these three routes of processing places attention in a powerful role to manage the selection of the vast amount of social information that individuals encounter on a daily basis and, in turn, gate the selection of social interactions.

The Pertinence of Studying Neuroethology in Nonhuman Primates for Human Behavior in Groups and Organizations

Are we the only living beings endowed with a complex communicative system and sharp sociocognitive skills? How did these remarkable abilities develop? Even raised several centuries ago, those questions are still nourishing the current research and debates. A relevant approach for identifying the dynamics in the evolution of humans’ social and communicative abilities appears to study our closest living relatives, the nonhuman primates. In this article I focus on two abilities that drove the building of our unique sociality and are still playing a crucial role in daily human behaviors in groups and organizations: (a) the origins of human language, through the study of nonhuman primates gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions and (b) the precursors and underpinning neural mechanisms of our ability to assess others’ mental states, that is, theory of mind. In each part, examples illustrate the advantages and limitations of the different methodological approaches used in research on nonhuman primates’ communication and social abilities and discuss the results in light of the current hypotheses and still open debates on what make the singularity of our species.

'Unwilling' versus 'unable': Tonkean macaques' understanding of human goal-directed actions

The present study investigated the understanding of goal-directed actions in Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) using the unwilling versus unable paradigm, previously used in several species. Subjects were tested in three experimental conditions that varied according to the goal-directed actions of a human actor. In the "unwilling" condition, the actor was capable of giving the subject food but unwilling to do it; in the "unable" condition, she was willing to give food but was unable to do it because of a physical barrier; and in the "distracted" condition, she was occupied by manipulating a pebble instead of food. We report for the first time that Tonkean macaques, like capuchins, chimpanzees and human infants, behaved differently across these experimental conditions. They attempted to grasp food in the actor's hand significantly more and displayed more threats in the presence of an unwilling actor rather than an unable or a distracted one. Inversely, they begged significantly more and displayed more frustration behaviors facing a distracted and unable experimenter rather than an unwilling one. These results suggest that Tonkean macaques understand human goal-directed actions by predicting whether they were likely to obtain food merely based on movements, cue and motor intentions reading and understanding of physical constraints.