Endogenous visuospatial attention increases visual awareness independent of visual discrimination sensitivity

The cost of attentional reorienting on conscious visual perception: an MEG study

How do attentional networks influence conscious perception? To answer this question, we used magnetoencephalography in human participants and assessed the effects of spatially nonpredictive or predictive supra-threshold peripheral cues on the conscious perception of near-threshold Gabors. Three main results emerged. (i) As compared with invalid cues, both nonpredictive and predictive valid cues increased conscious detection. Yet, only predictive cues shifted the response criterion toward a more liberal decision (i.e. willingness to report the presence of a target under conditions of greater perceptual uncertainty) and affected target contrast leading to 50% detections. (ii) Conscious perception following valid predictive cues was associated to enhanced activity in frontoparietal networks. These responses were lateralized to the left hemisphere during attentional orienting and to the right hemisphere during target processing. The involvement of frontoparietal networks occurred earlier in valid than in invalid trials, a possible neural marker of the cost of re-orienting attention. (iii) When detected targets were preceded by invalid predictive cues, and thus reorienting to the target was required, neural responses occurred in left hemisphere temporo-occipital regions during attentional orienting, and in right hemisphere anterior insular and temporo-occipital regions during target processing. These results confirm and specify the role of frontoparietal networks in modulating conscious processing and detail how invalid orienting of spatial attention disrupts conscious processing.

Conscious interpretation: A distinct aspect for the neural markers of the contents of consciousness

Progress in the science of consciousness depends on the experimental paradigms and varieties of contrastive analysis available to researchers. Here we highlight paradigms where the object is represented in consciousness as a set of its features but the interpretation of this set alternates in consciousness. We group experimental paradigms with this property under the label "conscious interpretation". We compare the paradigms studying conscious interpretation of the already consciously perceived objects with other types of experimental paradigms. We review previous and recent studies investigating this interpretative aspect of consciousness and propose future directions. We put forward the hypothesis that there are types of stimuli with a hierarchy of interpretations for which the rule applies: conscious experience is drawn towards higher-level interpretation and reverting back to the lower level of interpretation is impossible. We discuss how theories of consciousness might incorporate knowledge and constraints arising from the characteristics of conscious interpretation.

Temporo-parietal cortex involved in modeling one's own and others' attention

In a traditional view, in social cognition, attention is equated with gaze and people track other people's attention by tracking their gaze. Here, we used fMRI to test whether the brain represents attention in a richer manner. People read stories describing an agent (either oneself or someone else) directing attention to an object in one of two ways: either internally directed (endogenous) or externally induced (exogenous). We used multivoxel pattern analysis to examine how brain areas within the theory-of-mind network encoded attention type and agent type. Brain activity patterns in the left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) showed significant decoding of information about endogenous versus exogenous attention. The left TPJ, left superior temporal sulcus (STS), precuneus, and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) significantly decoded agent type (self versus other). These findings show that the brain constructs a rich model of one's own and others' attentional state, possibly aiding theory of mind.

Consciousness and the attention schema: Why it has to be right

This article describes some aspects of the underlying logic of the attention schema theory (AST) of subjective consciousness. It is a theory that distinguishes between what the brain actually, physically has, what is represented by information models constructed in the brain, what higher cognition thinks based on access to those models and what speech machinery claims based on the information within higher cognition. It is a theory of how we claim to have an essentially magical, subjective mind, based on the impoverishment and reduction of information along that pathway. While the article can stand on its own as a brief account of some critical aspects of AST, it specifically addresses questions and concerns raised by a set of commentaries on a target article.

Flexible top-down modulation in human ventral temporal cortex

Visual neuroscientists have long characterized attention as inducing a scaling or additive effect on fixed parametric functions describing neural responses (e.g., contrast response functions). Here, we instead propose that top-down effects are more complex and manifest in ways that depend not only on attention but also other cognitive processes involved in executing a task. To substantiate this theory, we analyze fMRI responses in human ventral temporal cortex (VTC) in a study where stimulus eccentricity and cognitive task are varied. We find that as stimuli are presented farther into the periphery, bottom-up stimulus-driven responses decline but top-down attentional enhancement increases substantially. This disproportionate enhancement of weak responses cannot be easily explained by conventional models of attention. Furthermore, we find that attentional effects depend on the specific cognitive task performed by the subject, indicating the influence of additional cognitive processes other than attention (e.g., decision-making). The effects we observe replicate in an independent experiment from the same study, and also generalize to a separate study involving different stimulus manipulations (contrast and phase coherence). Our results suggest that a quantitative understanding of top-down modulation requires more nuanced characterization of the multiple cognitive factors involved in completing a perceptual task.

Entrainment of local synchrony reveals a causal role for high-beta right frontal oscillations in human visual consciousness

Prior evidence supports a critical role of oscillatory activity in visual cognition, but are cerebral oscillations simply correlated or causally linked to our ability to consciously acknowledge the presence of a target in our visual field? Here, EEG signals were recorded on humans performing a visual detection task, while they received brief patterns of rhythmic or random transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) delivered to the right Frontal Eye Field (FEF) prior to the onset of a lateralized target. TMS entrained oscillations, i.e., increased high-beta power and phase alignment (the latter to a higher extent for rhythmic high-beta patterns than random patterns) while also boosting visual detection sensitivity. Considering post-hoc only those participants in which rhythmic stimulation enhanced visual detection, the magnitude of high-beta entrainment correlated with left visual performance increases. Our study provides evidence in favor of a causal link between high-beta oscillatory activity in the Frontal Eye Field and visual detection. Furthermore, it supports future applications of brain stimulation to manipulate local synchrony and improve or restore impaired visual behaviors.

Recent evidence that attention is necessary, but not sufficient, for conscious perception

Early descriptions of attention in the psychological literature highlighted its interdependence with conscious awareness. As the study of attention developed, consciousness and attention began to be considered separable phenomena, experimentally and theoretically. In recent years, an energetic debate has developed concerning the extent to which the two phenomena are related. One school of thought considers the two to be doubly dissociable, whereas the other considers them to be necessarily linked. In this review, we highlight experimental findings from the last 5 years that contribute to the leading consensus view: attention is necessary, but not sufficient, for conscious perception. We review studies that show attention operating in conjunction with unconscious information, and other evidence linking attention necessarily to conscious perception. By drawing upon evidence that attention comprises many cognitive and neural processes, we argue that by studying how different forms of attention are related to conscious perception, it is possible to gain new insights about the neural states or processes that are necessary for conscious perception to occur.