Contralesional spatial bias in chronic hemianopia: the role of (ec)centric fixation, spatial cueing and visual search

Prognostic Factors for Long-Term Recovery of Homonymous Visual Field Defects After Posterior Circulation Ischemic Stroke

OBJECTIVES

Ischemic stroke (IS) is the main cause of homonymous visual field defects (HVFDs) in adults. Some reports suggest recovery even in late-phase strokes, but data is sparse. This study examines the frequency of long-term recovery from HVFDs in patients with posterior circulation infarction (POCI) and evaluates whether demographic or clinical characteristics are prognostic factors of perimetric recovery.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Our study included patients with HVFDS due to POCI who had undergone 2 or more kinetic perimetric evaluations at least 6 months after the index IS. Clinical and imaging data were systematically reviewed and we performed univariate and multivariate logistic regression analyses to determine whether demographic, stroke etiology (TOAST classification), and initial perimetric patterns were prognostic factors of visual recovery occurring 6 months and beyond from POCI.

RESULTS

One hundred one patients with POCI were included. Median subject age was 60 years and 54.4% were female. After a median perimetric follow-up time of 13.5 months, spontaneous visual improvement was observed in 15.8% of patients. Prognostic factors for visual improvement were age < 50 years (OR 4.6; P = 0.093), POCI associated with hypercoagulable states (OR 12.3; P = 0.048), and vertebral artery dissection (OR 12.6; P = 0.048), while the presence of complete homonymous hemianopia was a negative predictor of recovery (OR 0.2; P = 0.048).

CONCLUSION

Partial visual recovery in HVFDs is observed even 6 months and beyond POCI. Age < 50 years and stroke etiology were predictors of recovery.

Spatial distortions in localization and midline estimation in hemianopia and normal vision

Studies have shown that individuals with hemianopia tend to bisect a line toward their blind, contralesional visual field, termed the hemianopic line bisection error (HLBE). One theory proposes that the HLBE is a perceptual distortion resulting from expansion of the central region of visual space. If true, perceptual expansions of the central regions in the intact hemifield should also be present and observable across different tasks. We tested this hypothesis using a peripheral localization task to assess localization and midpoint estimation along the horizontal axis of the visual field. In this task, participants judged the location of a target dot presented inside a Goldmann perimeter relative to their perceived visual field boundary. In Experiment 1, we tested neurologically healthy participants on the peripheral localization task as well as a novel midpoint assessment task in which participants reported their perceived midpoint along the horizontal axis of their left and right visual fields. The results revealed consistency in individual biases across the two tasks. We then used the peripheral localization task to test whether two patients with hemianopia showed a selective expansion of central visual space. For these patients, three axes were tested: the spared temporal horizontal axis and the upper and lower vertical axes. The results support the notion that the HLBE is due to expansion of perceived space along the spared temporal axis. Together, the results of both experiments validate the use of these novel paradigms for exploring perceptual asymmetries in both healthy individuals and patients with visual field loss.

How cognitive neuroscience could be more biological-and what it might learn from clinical neuropsychology

Three widespread assumptions of Cognitive-affective Neuroscience are discussed: first, mental functions are assumed to be localized in circumscribed brain areas which can be exactly determined, at least in principle (localizationism). Second, this assumption is associated with the more general claim that these functions (and dysfunctions, such as in neurological or mental diseases) are somehow generated inside the brain (internalism). Third, these functions are seen to be “biological” in the sense that they can be decomposed and finally explained on the basis of elementary biological causes (i.e., genetic, molecular, neurophysiological etc.), causes that can be identified by experimental methods as the gold standard (isolationism). Clinical neuropsychology is widely assumed to support these tenets. However, by making reference to the ideas of Kurt Goldstein (1878–1965), one of its most important founders, I argue that none of these assumptions is sufficiently supported. From the perspective of a clinical-neuropsychological practitioner, assessing and treating brain damage sequelae reveals a quite different picture of the brain as well as of us “brain carriers”, making the organism (or person) in its specific environment the crucial reference point. This conclusion can be further elaborated: all experimental and clinical research on humans presupposes the notion of a situated, reflecting, and interacting subject, which precedes all kinds of scientific decomposition, however useful. These implications support the core assumptions of the embodiment approach to brain and mind, and, as I argue, Goldstein and his clinical-neuropsychological observations are part of its very origin, for both theoretical and historical reasons.