Words as social tools: Flexibility, situatedness, language and sociality in abstract concepts

Articulatory suppression delays processing of abstract words: The role of inner speech

Compared to concrete concepts, like "book," abstract concepts expressed by words like "justice" are more detached from sensorial experiences, even though they are also grounded in sensorial modalities. Abstract concepts lack a single object as referent and are characterised by higher variability both within and across participants. According to the Word as Social Tool (WAT) proposal, owing to their complexity, abstract concepts need to be processed with the help of inner language. Inner language can namely help participants to re-explain to themselves the meaning of the word, to keep information active in working memory, and to prepare themselves to ask information from more competent people. While previous studies have demonstrated that the mouth is involved during abstract concepts' processing, both the functional role and the mechanisms underlying this involvement still need to be clarified. We report an experiment in which participants were required to evaluate whether 78 words were abstract or concrete by pressing two different pedals. During the judgement task, they were submitted, in different blocks, to a baseline, an articulatory suppression, and a manipulation condition. In the last two conditions, they had to repeat a syllable continually and to manipulate a softball with their dominant hand. Results showed that articulatory suppression slowed down the processing of abstract more than that of concrete words. Overall results confirm the WAT proposal's hypothesis that abstract concepts processing involves the mouth motor system and specifically inner speech. We discuss the implications for current theories of conceptual representation.

Sensorimotor and interoceptive dimensions in concrete and abstract concepts

Recent theories propose that abstract concepts, compared to concrete ones, might activate to a larger extent interoceptive, social and linguistic experiences. At the same time, recent research has underlined the importance of investigating how different sub-kinds of abstract concepts are represented. We report a pre-registered experiment, preceded by a pilot study, in which we asked participants to evaluate the difficulty of 3 kinds of concrete concepts (natural objects, tools, and food concepts) and abstract concepts (Philosophical and Spiritual concepts, PS, Physical Space Time and Quantity concepts, PSTQ, and Emotional, Mental State and Social concepts, EMSS). While rating the words, participants were assigned to different conditions designed to interfere with conceptual processing: they were required to squeeze a ball (hand motor system activation), to chew gum (mouth motor system activation), to self-estimate their heartbeats (interoception), and to perform a motor articulatory task (inner speech involvement). In a control condition they simply rated the difficulty of words. A possible interference should result in the increase of the difficulty ratings. Bayesian analyses reveal that, compared to concrete ones, abstract concepts are more grounded in interoceptive experience and concrete concepts less in linguistic experience (mouth motor system involvement), and that the experience on which different kinds of abstract and concrete concepts differs widely. For example, within abstract concepts interoception plays a major role for EMSS and PS concepts, while the ball squeezing condition interferes more for PSTQ concepts, confirming that PSTQ are the most concrete among abstract concepts, and tap into sensorimotor manual experience. Implications of the results for current theories of conceptual representation are discussed.

A computational model of language functions in flexible goal-directed behaviour

The function of language in high-order goal-directed human cognition is an important topic at the centre of current debates. Experimental evidence shows that inner speech, representing a self-directed form of language, empowers cognitive processes such as working memory, perception, categorization, and executive functions. Here we study the relations between inner speech and processes like feedback processing and cognitive flexibility. To this aim we propose a computational model that controls an artificial agent who uses inner speech to internally manipulate its representations. The agent is able to reproduce human behavioural data collected during the solution of the Wisconsin Card Sorting test, a neuropsychological test measuring cognitive flexibility, both in the basic condition and when a verbal shadowing protocol is used. The components of the model were systematically lesioned to clarify the specific impact of inner speech on the agent’s behaviour. The results indicate that inner speech improves the efficiency of internal representation manipulation. Specifically, it makes the representations linked to specific visual features more disentangled, thus improving the agent’s capacity to engage/disengage attention on stimulus features after positive/negative action outcomes. Overall, the model shows how inner speech could improve goal-directed internal manipulation of representations and enhance behavioural flexibility.

Abstraction still holds its feet on the ground

In view of current scientific knowledge, it seems premature to hypothesize a qualitative distinction between processes, networks, and structures involved in abstract processes from those based on perception, episodic, or procedural memories. Predictive thought and mental travel strongly rely, at different levels of consciousness, on past and ongoing sensory input, bodily information (e.g., interoception), and the results of perceptual elaboration.

Touch me if you can: The intangible but grounded nature of abstract concepts

Thinking about what the senses cannot grasp is one of the hallmarks of human cognition. We argue that "intangible abstracta" are represented differently from other products of abstraction, that goal-derived categorization supports their learning, and that they are grounded also in internalized linguistic and social interaction. We conclude by suggesting different ways in which abstractness contributes to cement group cohesion.