Marketing of sugar-sweetened beverages to youth through U.S. university pouring rights contracts

Hepatic steatosis induced by nicotine plus Coca-Cola™ is prevented by nicotinamide riboside (NR)

Introduction

Cigarettes containing nicotine (Nic) are a risk factor for the development of cardiovascular and metabolic diseases. We reported that Nic delivered via injections or e-cigarette vapor led to hepatic steatosis in mice fed with a high-fat diet. High-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) is the main sweetener in sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) in the US. Increased consumption of SSBs with HFCS is associated with increased risks of non-alcoholic fatty liver disease (NAFLD). Nicotinamide riboside (NR) increases mitochondrial nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide (NAD+) and protects mice against hepatic steatosis. This study evaluated if Nic plus Coca-Cola™ (Coke) with HFCS can cause hepatic steatosis and that can be protected by NR.

Methods

C57BL/6J mice received twice daily intraperitoneal (IP) injections of Nic or saline and were given Coke (HFCS), or Coke with sugar, and NR supplementation for 10 weeks.

Results

Our results show that Nic+Coke caused increased caloric intake and induced hepatic steatosis, and the addition of NR prevented these changes. Western blot analysis showed lipogenesis markers were activated (increased cleavage of the sterol regulatory element-binding protein 1 [SREBP1c] and reduction of phospho-Acetyl-CoA Carboxylase [p-ACC]) in the Nic+Coke compared to the Sal+Water group. The hepatic detrimental effects of Nic+Coke were mediated by decreased NAD+ signaling, increased oxidative stress, and mitochondrial damage. NR reduced oxidative stress and prevented mitochondrial damage by restoring protein levels of Sirtuin1 (Sirt1) and peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor coactivator 1-alpha (PGC1) signaling.

Conclusion

We conclude that Nic+Coke has an additive effect on producing hepatic steatosis, and NR is protective. This study suggests concern for the development of NAFLD in subjects who consume nicotine and drink SSBs with HFCS.

Student Opposition to University Pouring Rights Contracts

Introduction

The majority of large public universities have exclusive pouring rights contracts with beverage companies that produce and market sugar-sweetened beverages. Pouring rights contracts contain provisions that conflict with recommendations from major public health organizations that institutions reduce sugar-sweetened beverage availability, marketing, and consumption. This study assessed the following among students at 3 public universities: student perception of pouring rights contracts (the extent to which they favored or opposed pouring rights contracts), the association between student socioeconomic characteristics and perception of pouring rights contracts, student estimates of pouring rights contract revenue, and the association between student pouring rights contract revenue estimates and perception of pouring rights contracts. To contextualize results, actual pouring rights contract revenue as a percentage of total revenues was estimated.

Methods

A cross-sectional exploratory study was conducted among a convenience sample of 1,311 undergraduate sugar-sweetened beverages-consuming students recruited from 3 large and diverse public universities in Northern California. On an online questionnaire, undergraduate students indicated the extent to which they favored or opposed pouring rights contracts on a 10-point scale (oppose=1-5, favor=6-10) and provided a numeric estimate of the percentage of total university revenue they thought their university's pouring rights contract generated. Regression models were used to analyze differences in perception of pouring rights contracts by student socioeconomic characteristics and estimates of university revenues generated by pouring rights contracts. In addition, pouring rights contracts and financial reports were obtained from the 3 universities to estimate actual pouring rights contract revenue as a percentage of total revenues. Survey data were collected between August and November 2018 and analyzed in August 2022.

Results

A large majority of students (81%) opposed pouring rights contracts, and the opposition did not significantly differ by student socioeconomic characteristics, including by levels of food security, need-based financial aid, participation in federal food assistance or healthcare programs, parental education, or parental income (all ps>0.14). The median student estimate for pouring rights contract revenue as a percentage of total university revenue was 10%. In contrast, the estimated actual annual revenue generated from the pouring rights contracts ranged from 0.01% to 0.04% at these schools. Revenue estimates were not significantly associated with participants' opposition or favoring of pouring rights contracts (p=0.65).

Conclusions

A large majority of students opposed pouring rights contracts, and this opposition was similar regardless of student socioeconomic characteristics or student estimates of pouring rights contract revenues. Students markedly overestimated (by >100-1,000-fold) the percentage of university revenue that came from pouring rights contracts. University administration should consider student views on pouring rights contracts when deciding whether to exit or continue with pouring rights contracts.

Are Students Paid to Market Sugar-Sweetened Beverages to Peers? A Review of University Pouring Rights Contracts

Background: Many university students regularly consume sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs), which are associated with obesity and related chronic diseases. Moreover, students are strongly influenced by both their peers and product marketing. Our exploratory study examined pouring rights contracts between universities and beverage companies, focusing on provisions establishing campus/brand ambassador positions and marketing/merchandising manager positions whose jobs are to market SSBs on campus. Methods: For this cross-sectional study conducted in late 2020, two independent coders reviewed 131 pouring rights contracts between Coca-Cola or Pepsi and 124 unique public universities with 20,000 or more students enrolled. Contracts were active in 2018 or 2019. Results: Twenty-six contracts (20%) contained provisions specifically establishing either campus/brand ambassador positions (n = 16), marketing/merchandising manager positions (n = 7), both (n = 1), or unclear language related to these positions (n = 2). Thirteen contracts (10%) required that the position be filled by a current student. The objectives for both types of positions included increasing revenue and driving beverage sales. When stated in the contracts (n = 5), the payments allocated for these positions ranged between $5,000 and $10,000 per year. Conclusions: Given the association between SSBs and obesity and other related health outcomes, combined with the influence that peers and product marketing may have on adolescents' and young adults' attitudes toward consumption of these beverages, universities should be more transparent when these provisions are included in their pouring rights contracts and should carefully consider whether it is appropriate for these contracts to include funding for students to market SSBs.

Pouring rights contracts between universities and beverage companies: Provisions related to scientific research

Pouring rights contracts between universities and beverage companies are common and grant companies the exclusive right to serve, sell, and market specific beverages on campuses. In exchange, universities receive financial payments and other incentives. At the same time, beverage industry-sponsored research at universities has increased. Pouring rights contracts may include provisions that allocate funds for or place limitations on scientific research. In this cross-sectional study, we assessed whether pouring rights contracts contained provisions that allocated funds for or placed limitations on scientific research. From 2019 to 2020, we obtained contracts through requests under public records laws from US universities (public, 4-year, ≥ 20,000 students) with contracts active 2018–2019. Of the 143 requests, 6 did not have contracts and 9 declined to provide contracts. Our final sample included 131 contracts from 124 universities in 38 states. Thirty contracts (22.9%) referenced research (18 Coke; 12 Pepsi). Three contracts (2.3%) included provisions that made direct grants or gifts of research funding, 3 (2.3%) permitted the university to acknowledge funding from competitors, and 26 (19.8%) allowed for research using beverages from competing companies. Given increases in industry-sponsored research, the absence of provisions that made direct grants or gifts of research funding suggests that sponsorship of research is occurring through other mechanisms. Additionally, universities must be able to acknowledge funding and conduct research on any beverage and should not need permission via contract provisions to do so. Future studies should consider practical implications of these provisions in pouring rights contracts and assess whether they facilitate or hinder research.