Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Interconnectedness and (in)coherence as a signature of conspiracy worldviews

Conspiracy theories may arise out of an overarching conspiracy worldview that identifies common elements of subterfuge across unrelated or even contradictory explanations, leading to networks of self-reinforcing beliefs. We test this conjecture by analyzing a large natural language database of conspiracy and nonconspiracy texts for the same events, thus linking theory-driven psychological research with data-driven computational approaches. We find that, relative to nonconspiracy texts, conspiracy texts are more interconnected, more topically heterogeneous, and more similar to one another, revealing lower cohesion within texts but higher cohesion between texts and providing strong empirical support for an overarching conspiracy worldview. Our results provide inroads for classification algorithms and further exploration into individual differences in belief structures.

A Computational Analysis of Abnormal Belief Updating Processes and Their Association With Psychotic Experiences and Childhood Trauma in a UK Birth Cohort

BACKGROUND

Psychotic experiences emerge from abnormalities in perception and belief formation and occur more commonly in those experiencing childhood trauma. However, which precise aspects of belief formation are atypical in psychosis is not well understood. We used a computational modeling approach to characterize belief updating in young adults in the general population, examine their relationship with psychotic outcomes and trauma, and determine the extent to which they mediate the trauma-psychosis relationship.

METHODS

We used data from 3360 individuals from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children birth cohort who completed assessments for psychotic outcomes, depression, anxiety, and two belief updating tasks at age 24 and had data available on traumatic events assessed from birth to late adolescence. Unadjusted and adjusted regression and counterfactual mediation methods were used for the analyses.

RESULTS

Basic behavioral measures of belief updating (draws-to-decision and disconfirmatory updating) were not associated with psychotic experiences. However, computational modeling revealed an association between increased decision noise with both psychotic experiences and trauma exposure, although <3% of the trauma-psychotic experience association was mediated by decision noise. Belief updating measures were also associated with intelligence and sociodemographic characteristics, confounding most of the associations with psychotic experiences. There was little evidence that belief updating parameters were differentially associated with delusions compared with hallucinations or that they were differentially associated with psychotic outcomes compared with depression or anxiety.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings challenge the hypothesis that atypical belief updating mechanisms (as indexed by the computational models and behavioral measures we used) underlie the development of psychotic phenomena.

Attentional focus moderates the relationship between attention to threat bias and delusion-like experiences in healthy adults

Background

The role of cognitive biases in delusion and delusion-like experiences has been widely investigated in recent years. However, little is known about individual differences, which may influence association between cognitive biases and formation of delusional beliefs. The aim of this study was to examine the moderating effect of self-reported attentional control on the relationship between attention to threat bias (ATB) and delusion-like experiences (DLEs) in healthy adults.

Methods

Participants (n = 138) completed the Davos Assessment of the Cognitive Biases Scale (DACOBS), the Attentional Control Scale (ACS) and the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI). The moderation analysis was performed to check the influence of different components of attentional control (i.e. general ability to allocate attention, focusing, shifting and divide attention) on the interplay between ATB and DLEs.

Results

The results supported the moderation model. Specifically, we found that a higher level of ability to focus attention is associated with a stronger effect of attention to threat bias on the overall frequency of DLEs. Our results indicate that ATB contributes to the number of DLEs only in individuals with high and moderate capacity to focus attention, whereas in those who scored low on the ACS focusing attention subscale, the presence of attentional bias does not influence the frequency of DLEs.

Conclusions

Our findings show that the individual difference variable, such as ability to voluntarily focus attention, may moderate the relationship between attention to threat bias and delusion-like experiences in healthy adults.

Examining associations between two different jumping to conclusions scores with positive schizotypy and recent distress

Introduction: Jumping to conclusions is associated with delusions. It is unclear whether positive schizotypy, which refers to delusion-like and hallucination-like symptoms, is associated with jumping to conclusions. Relatedly, the relative validity of two jumping to conclusions scores, extreme responding and draws to decision, is unclear, particularly whether extreme responding (responding after one or two draws) reflects the same bias as decreased draws to decision on non-extreme responding trials.Methods: Extreme positive schizotypy individuals with increased psychosis risk (n = 69) and controls (n = 95) completed the Probabilistic Reasoning Task and reported on recent distress, which was previously associated with jumping to conclusions. We calculated extreme responding, draws to decision (number of draws), and draws to decision/non-extreme responding (number of draws on trials with three or more draws).Results: Positive schizotypy was associated with extreme responding, but not draws to decision/non-extreme responding. Furthermore, draws to decision and draws to decision/non-extreme responding were associated with recent distress, whereas extreme responding was not.Conclusion: Positive schizotypy was specifically associated with extreme responding and not draws to decision/non-extreme responding, which suggests that the nature of extreme responding and of draws to decision might be different. This could have relevance for assessing and treating jumping to conclusions.

Correlation Between Levels of Delusional Beliefs and Perfusion of the Hippocampus and an Associated Network in a Non-Help-Seeking Population

BACKGROUND

Delusions are a defining and common symptom of psychotic disorders. Recent evidence suggests that subclinical and clinical delusions may represent distinct stages on a phenomenological and biological continuum. However, few studies have tested whether subclinical psychotic experiences are associated with neural changes that are similar to those observed in clinical psychosis. For example, it is unclear if overactivity of the hippocampus, a replicated finding of neuroimaging studies of schizophrenia, is also present in individuals with subclinical psychotic symptoms.

METHODS

To investigate this question, structural and pulsed arterial spin labeling scans were collected in 77 adult participants with no psychiatric history. An anatomical region of interest approach was used to extract resting perfusion of the hippocampus, and 15 other regions, from each individual. A self-report measure of delusional ideation was collected on the day of scanning.

RESULTS

The level of delusional thinking (number of beliefs [r = .27, p = .02]), as well as the associated level of distress (r = .29, p = .02), was significantly correlated with hippocampal perfusion (averaged over right and left hemispheres). The correlations remained significant after controlling for age, hippocampal volume, symptoms of depression and anxiety, and image signal-to-noise ratio, and they were confirmed in a voxelwise regression analysis. The same association was observed in the thalamus and parahippocampal, lateral temporal, and cingulate cortices.

CONCLUSIONS

Similar to patients with schizophrenia, non-help-seeking individuals show elevated perfusion of a network of limbic regions in association with delusional beliefs.

Jumping to Conclusions About the Beads Task? A Meta-analysis of Delusional Ideation and Data-Gathering

It has been claimed that delusional and delusion-prone individuals have a tendency to gather less data before forming beliefs. Most of the evidence for this "jumping to conclusions" (JTC) bias comes from studies using the "beads task" data-gathering paradigm. However, the evidence for the JTC bias is mixed. We conducted a random-effects meta-analysis of individual participant data from 38 clinical and nonclinical samples (n = 2,237) to investigate the relationship between data gathering in the beads task (using the "draws to decision" measure) and delusional ideation (as indexed by the "Peters et al Delusions Inventory"; PDI). We found that delusional ideation is negatively associated with data gathering (r(s) = -0.10, 95% CI [-0.17, -0.03]) and that there is heterogeneity in the estimated effect sizes (Q-stat P = .03, I(2) = 33). Subgroup analysis revealed that the negative association is present when considering the 23 samples (n = 1,754) from the large general population subgroup alone (r(s) = -0.10, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.02]) but not when considering the 8 samples (n = 262) from the small current delusions subgroup alone (r(s) = -0.12, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.07]). These results provide some provisional support for continuum theories of psychosis and cognitive models that implicate the JTC bias in the formation and maintenance of delusions.

Jumping to conclusions style along the continuum of delusions: delusion-prone individuals are not hastier in decision making than healthy individuals

Literature comparing 'jumping to conclusions' (JTC) between patients and healthy controls has demonstrated the importance of the reasoning bias in the development of delusions. When groups that vary along the entire delusional continuum are included, the relationship between JTC and delusionality is less clear. This study compared JTC and delusional dimensions between 28 patients with delusions, 35 delusion-prone individuals and 32 non-delusion-prone individuals. Delusion proneness was defined by an established threshold based on the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory. Two versions of the beads task (85:15 and 60:40) were used to measure JTC. As hypothesized, patients manifested hastier data gathering than the two non-clinical groups on both beads tasks. However, delusion-prone individuals did not manifest a hastier decision making style than non-delusion prone individuals. Instead, non-delusion-prone participants showed more JTC bias than delusion-prone individuals on the easier beads task. There was no evidence for a dose-response relationship between JTC and delusional dimensions, with correlations between JTC and PDI scores found in the non-delusion-prone group only. The present finding confirms the link between an extreme JTC bias and the presence of clinical delusions, and argues against a linear relationship between JTC and delusionality along the symptomatic continuum.

Over-adjustment or miscomprehension? A re-examination of the jumping to conclusions bias

OBJECTIVE

Previous research has consistently shown that individuals with delusions typically exhibit a jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias when administered the probabilistic reasoning 'beads task' (i.e. decisions made with limited evidence or 'premature decisions' and decisions over-adjusted in light of disconfirming evidence or 'over-adjustment'). More recent work, however, also suggests that these effects may also be influenced by miscomprehension of the task. The current paper is an investigation into the contributing effects of miscomprehension on the JTC bias.

METHOD

A total of 75 participants (25 diagnosed with schizophrenia with a history of delusions; 25 non-clinical delusion-prone; 25 non-delusion-prone controls) completed two identical versions of the beads task, distinct only by the inclusion of an extra instructional set designed to increase comprehension.

RESULTS

Qualitative data confirmed that miscomprehension is a valid construct, and the results showed that the addition of an instructional set to the second version of the task led to greater comprehension and a statistically significant drop in 'over-adjustment'. Nevertheless, both tasks showed that 'premature decisions' were significantly more prevalent in the schizophrenia group and were unaffected by the intervention.

CONCLUSIONS

It was concluded that the 'premature decisions' component of the JTC bias remains a feature of decision-making in schizophrenia, but that previously reported 'over-adjustment' effects are likely to be influenced by miscomprehension of the beads task instructional set. These findings are discussed in light of the recently proposed 'hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis matches' account of the JTC bias.