The 'who' and 'when' of context memory: different patterns of association with auditory hallucinations

Episodic Memory Precision and Reality Monitoring Following Stimulation of Angular Gyrus

The qualities of remembered experiences are often used to inform "reality monitoring" judgments, our ability to distinguish real and imagined events [Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88, 67-85, 1981]. Previous experiments have tended to investigate only whether reality monitoring decisions are accurate or not, providing little insight into the extent to which reality monitoring may be affected by qualities of the underlying mnemonic representations. We used a continuous-response memory precision task to measure the quality of remembered experiences that underlie two different types of reality monitoring decisions: self/experimenter decisions that distinguish actions performed by participants and the experimenter and imagined/perceived decisions that distinguish imagined and perceived experiences. The data revealed memory precision to be associated with higher accuracy in both self/experimenter and imagined/perceived reality monitoring decisions, with lower precision linked with a tendency to misattribute self-generated experiences to external sources. We then sought to investigate the possible neurocognitive basis of these observed associations by applying brain stimulation to a region that has been implicated in precise recollection of personal events, the left angular gyrus. Stimulation of angular gyrus selectively reduced the association between memory precision and self-referential reality monitoring decisions, relative to control site stimulation. The angular gyrus may, therefore, be important for the mnemonic processes involved in representing remembered experiences that give rise to a sense of self-agency, a key component of "autonoetic consciousness" that characterizes episodic memory [Tulving, E. Elements of episodic memory. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1985].

Impaired action self-monitoring and cognitive confidence among ultra-high risk for psychosis and first-episode psychosis patients

Background

Self-monitoring biases and overconfidence in incorrect judgments have been suggested as playing a role in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Little is known about whether self-monitoring biases may contribute to early risk factors for psychosis. In this study, action self-monitoring (i.e., discrimination between imagined and performed actions) was investigated, along with confidence in judgments among ultra-high risk (UHR) for psychosis individuals and first-episode psychosis (FEP) patients.

Methods

Thirty-six UHR for psychosis individuals, 25 FEP patients and 33 healthy controls (CON) participated in the study. Participants were assessed with the Action memory task. Simple actions were presented to participants verbally or non-verbally. Some actions were required to be physically performed and others were imagined. Participants were asked whether the action was presented verbally or non-verbally (action presentation type discrimination), and whether the action was performed or imagined (self-monitoring). Confidence self-ratings related to self-monitoring responses were obtained.

Results

The analysis of self-monitoring revealed that both UHR and FEP groups misattributed imagined actions as being performed (i.e., self-monitoring errors) significantly more often than the CON group. There were no differences regarding performed actions as being imagined. UHR and FEP groups made their false responses with higher confidence in their judgments than the CON group. There were no group differences regarding discrimination between the types of actions presented (verbal vs non-verbal).

Conclusions

A specific type of self-monitoring bias (i.e., misattributing imagined actions with performed actions), accompanied by high confidence in this judgment, may be a risk factor for the subsequent development of a psychotic disorder.

The Self, Agency and Spatial Externalizations of Inner Verbal Thoughts, and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations

Aim: Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVH) are experienced as the "voices" of others (O-AVH) or self (S-AVH) in internal space/inside the head (IS-AVH) or external space (ES-AVH), and are considered to result from agency and spatial externalizations of inner speech. Both types of externalizations are conflated, and the relationship between these externalizations and AVH experiences is unclear. In this paper, I investigate the relationship between cognitive agency and spatial externalizations and between these externalizations and the types of AVH experience. Method: Twenty-five patients with history of AVH and 24 matched healthy controls performed agency and spatial distinction tasks: distinction between self-generated (read) (S) sentences and other-generated (O) sentences, and between sentences read silently (experienced in internal space, IS) and sentences read aloud (experienced in external space, ES). Regression analyses between misattribution biases (S-O vs. IS-ES, and O-S vs. ES-IS) were obtained. t tests were used to compare misattribution biases between AVH subtypes (S-AVH vs. O-AVH, and IS-AVH vs. ES-AVH). Results: Regressions suggest that agency distinction is independent from spatial distinction in both groups. O-AVH and S-AVH subgroups differed only with respect to S-O bias, and IS-AVH and ES-AVH subgroups differed only with respect to IS-ES bias. Conclusion: These results suggest that agency and spatial externalizations of inner speech are independent at phenomenological and cognitive and levels; and that these externalizations are co-related across levels. I discuss the implications of these findings in the wider context of research on AVH and on the experience of self.

Brain Mechanisms of Reality Monitoring

Reality monitoring processes are necessary for discriminating between internally generated information and information that originated in the outside world. They help us to identify our thoughts, feelings, and imaginations, and to distinguish them from events we may have experienced or have been told about by someone else. Reality monitoring errors range from confusions between real and imagined experiences, that are byproducts of normal cognition, to symptoms of mental illness such as hallucinations. Recent advances support an emerging neurocognitive characterization of reality monitoring that provides insights into its underlying operating principles and neural mechanisms, the differing ways in which impairment may occur in health and disease, and the potential for rehabilitation strategies to be devised that might help those who experience clinically significant reality monitoring disruption.

Monitoring what is real: The effects of modality and action on accuracy and type of reality monitoring error

Reality monitoring refers to processes involved in distinguishing internally generated information from information presented in the external world, an activity thought to be based, in part, on assessment of activated features such as the amount and type of cognitive operations and perceptual content. Impairment in reality monitoring has been implicated in symptoms of mental illness and associated more widely with the occurrence of anomalous perceptions as well as false memories and beliefs. In the present experiment, the cognitive mechanisms of reality monitoring were probed in healthy individuals using a task that investigated the effects of stimulus modality (auditory vs visual) and the type of action undertaken during encoding (thought vs speech) on subsequent source memory. There was reduced source accuracy for auditory stimuli compared with visual, and when encoding was accompanied by thought as opposed to speech, and a greater rate of externalization than internalization errors that was stable across factors. Interpreted within the source monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), the results are consistent with the greater prevalence of clinically observed auditory than visual reality discrimination failures. The significance of these findings is discussed in light of theories of hallucinations, delusions and confabulation.

Auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress disorder: common phenomenology, common cause, common interventions?

Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH: ‘hearing voices’) are found in both schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In this paper we first demonstrate that AVH in these two diagnoses share a qualitatively similar phenomenology. We then show that the presence of AVH in schizophrenia is often associated with earlier exposure to traumatic/emotionally overwhelming events, as it is by definition in PTSD. We next argue that the content of AVH relates to earlier traumatic events in a similar way in both PTSD and schizophrenia, most commonly having direct or indirect thematic links to emotionally overwhelming events, rather than being direct re-experiencing. We then propose, following cognitive models of PTSD, that the reconstructive nature of memory may be able to account for the nature of these associations between trauma and AVH content, as may threat-hypervigilance and the individual’s personal goals. We conclude that a notable subset of people diagnosed with schizophrenia with AVH are having phenomenologically and aetiologically identical experiences to PTSD patients who hear voices. As such we propose that the iron curtain between AVH in PTSD (often termed ‘dissociative AVH’) and AVH in schizophrenia (so-called ‘psychotic AVH’) needs to be torn down, as these are often the same experience. One implication of this is that these trauma-related AVH require a common trans-diagnostic treatment strategy. Whilst antipsychotics are already increasingly being used to treat AVH in PTSD, we argue for the centrality of trauma-based interventions for trauma-based AVH in both PTSD and in people diagnosed with schizophrenia.

Persistent auditory hallucinations and treatment challenges

Despite improved neurotransmitter identification and emergence of novel antipsychotics, treatment of auditory hallucinatory experiences is frustrating. Interest has developed in non-pharmacological approaches to this problem – these do not eliminate the voices but reduce the distress associated with the experience.

Stop, look, listen: the need for philosophical phenomenological perspectives on auditory verbal hallucinations

One of the leading cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) proposes such experiences result from a disturbance in the process by which inner speech is attributed to the self. Research in this area has, however, proceeded in the absence of thorough cognitive and phenomenological investigations of the nature of inner speech, against which AVHs are implicitly or explicitly defined. In this paper we begin by introducing philosophical phenomenology and highlighting its relevance to AVHs, before briefly examining the evolving literature on the relation between inner experiences and AVHs. We then argue for the need for philosophical phenomenology (Phenomenology) and the traditional empirical methods of psychology for studying inner experience (phenomenology) to mutually inform each other to provide a richer and more nuanced picture of both inner experience and AVHs than either could on its own. A critical examination is undertaken of the leading model of AVHs derived from phenomenological philosophy, the ipseity disturbance model. From this we suggest issues that future work in this vein will need to consider, and examine how interdisciplinary methodologies may contribute to advances in our understanding of AVHs. Detailed suggestions are made for the direction and methodology of future work into AVHs, which we suggest should be undertaken in a context where phenomenology and physiology are both necessary, but neither sufficient.

Self-recognition deficits in schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations: a meta-analysis of the literature

Theories about auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia suggest that these experiences occur because patients fail to recognize thoughts and mental events as self-generated. Different theoretical models have been proposed about the cognitive mechanisms underlying auditory hallucinations. Regardless of the cognitive model being tested, however, experimental designs are almost identical in that they require a judgment regarding whether an action was self-originated or not. The aim of the current study was to integrate all available literature for a meta-analysis on this topic and reach conclusions about self-recognition performance in (1) patients with schizophrenia compared with healthy controls and (2) patients with auditory hallucinations compared with patients without these symptoms. A comprehensive literature review identified 23 studies that contrasted the performance of schizophrenia patients with healthy controls (1370 participants) and 9 studies that directly compared patients with and without auditory hallucinations (315 participants). We found significantly reduced self-recognition performance in schizophrenia patients, which was more pronounced in patients with auditory hallucinations compared with patients without. In patients with hallucinations, this pattern of performance was specific to self-recognition processes and not to the recognition of new external information. A striking finding was the homogeneity in results across studies regardless of the action modality, timing delay, and design used to measure self-recognition. In summary, this review of studies from the last 30 years substantiates the view that self-recognition is impaired in patients with schizophrenia and particularly those with auditory hallucinations. This suggests an association, perhaps a causal one, between such deficit and hallucinatory experiences in schizophrenia.

Cognitive mechanisms of auditory verbal hallucinations in psychotic and non-psychotic groups

The continuum model of psychosis has been extremely influential. It assumes that psychotic symptoms, such as auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), are not limited to patients with psychosis but also occur in healthy, non-clinical individuals - suggesting similar mechanisms of origin. Recent debate surrounding this model has highlighted certain differences, as well as similarities, in the phenomenology of AVH in clinical and non-clinical populations. These findings imply that there may, in fact, be only partial overlap of the mechanism(s) involved in generating AVH in these groups. We review evidence of continuity or similarity, and dissimilarity, in cognitive, and related neural processes, underlying AVH in clinical and non-clinical samples. The results reveal some shared (intrusive cognitions, inhibitory deficits) and some distinct (aspects of source memory and cerebral lateralization) mechanisms in these groups. The evidence, therefore, supports both continuous and categorical models of positive psychotic symptoms. The review considers potential risks of uncritical acceptance of the continuum model and highlights some important methodological issues for future research.

Visual memory errors in Parkinson's disease patient with visual hallucinations

The occurrences of visual hallucinations seem to be more prevalent in low light and hallucinators tend to be more prone to false positive type errors in memory tasks. Here we investigated whether the richness of stimuli does indeed affect recognition differently in hallucinating and nonhallucinating participants, and if so whether this difference extends to identifying spatial context. We compared 36 Parkinson's disease (PD) patients with visual hallucinations, 32 Parkinson's patients without hallucinations, and 36 age-matched controls, on a visual memory task where color and black and white pictures were presented at different locations. Participants had to recognize the pictures among distracters along with the location of the stimulus. Findings revealed clear differences in performance between the groups. Both PD groups had impaired recognition compared to the controls, but those with hallucinations were significantly more impaired on black and white than on color stimuli. In addition, the group with hallucinations was significantly impaired compared to the other two groups on spatial memory. We suggest that not only do PD patients have poorer recognition of pictorial stimuli than controls, those who present with visual hallucinations appear to be more heavily reliant on bottom up sensory input and impaired on spatial ability.

The cognitive neuropsychology of auditory hallucinations: a parallel auditory pathways framework

Auditory hallucinations are generally defined as false perceptions. Recent developments in auditory neuroscience have rapidly increased our understanding of normal auditory perception revealing (partially) separate pathways for the identification ("what") and localization ("where") of auditory objects. The current review offers a reexamination of the nature of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia using this object-based framework. First, the structural and functional organization of auditory what and where pathways is briefly described. Then, using recent functional neuroimaging data from healthy subjects and patients with schizophrenia, key phenomenological features of hallucinations are linked to abnormal processing both within and between these pathways. Finally, current cognitive explanations of hallucinations, based on intrusive cognitions and impaired source memory, are briefly outlined and set within this framework to provide an integrated cognitive neuropsychological model of auditory hallucinations.

Familiarity and recollection processes in patients with recent-onset schizophrenia and their unaffected parents

Episodic memory deficits are present in patients with schizophrenia (SZ) and their unaffected relatives and could be considered as a cognitive indicator of genetic vulnerability to SZ. The present study, involving patients with SZ as well as their parents, used experimental tasks specifically designed to disentangle the contribution of familiarity and recollection processes to episodic memory. The performance of patients with SZ (n=26) and their unaffected parents (n=35) was compared with that of healthy control groups matched on socio-demographic variables (controls of patients, n=26; controls of parents, n=35) on two memory tasks assessing recollection and familiarity. The first task was designed to investigate item recognition and memory for item-spatial context associations whereas the second targeted item-item associations. The results revealed an overall episodic memory deficit in patients with SZ, encompassing both familiarity and recollection, while unaffected parents showed a dysfunction restricted to the recollection process. Our study highlights differences and similarities in the source of the episodic memory deficit found in patients with SZ and their unaffected parents, and it suggests that recollection could act as a cognitive endophenotype of SZ. The results also suggest that use of experimental tasks represents a promising method in the search of cognitive endophenotypes in SZ.