The Family-Resemblances Framework for Mind-Wandering Remains Well Clad

Positively framing mind wandering does not increase mind wandering in older adults

Age-related differences in mind wandering are robust, with older adults reporting less mind wandering compared to younger adults. While several theories have been put forth to explain this difference, one view has received less attention than others. Specifically, age-related differences in mind wandering might occur because older adults are reluctant to report on their mind wandering. The aim of the current study was to explicitly test this hypothesis. Older and younger adults completed a go/no-go task with intermittent thought probes to assess mind wandering. In one condition, participants were provided with standard instructions about how to respond to questions about their thoughts. In a second condition, participants were provided with a positive framing of mind wandering. Mind wandering was assessed both subjectively (i.e., via thought probes) and objectively (i.e., using different behavioral measures from the go/no-go task). The results of the study suggest that positively framing mind wandering did not impact rates of mind wandering or objective indicators of mind wandering for older or younger adults. Older adults reported less mind wandering, regardless of condition, compared to younger adults. Older adults also had generally better performance on the go/no-go task compared to younger adults. Bayesian analyses suggested that the main effect of framing condition, although not significant in Frequentist terms, did provide moderate evidence of an overall effect on mind wandering rates. We interpret the results as evidence against the reluctance hypothesis, consistent with previous work.

Elucidating the difference between mind-wandering and day-dreaming terms

Self-generated thoughts have been widely investigated in recent years, while the terms "mind-wandering" and "day-dreaming" are usually used interchangeably. But are these terms equivalent? To test this, online study participants were presented with situations of a protagonist engaged in self-generated thoughts. The scenarios differed with regard to type of situation, the activity in which the protagonist was engaged in, and the properties of the self-generated thoughts. Two different groups evaluated the same situations; one group evaluated the extent to which the protagonist mind-wandered and another the extent to which the protagonist day-dreamt. Our key findings were that the situations were perceived differently with regard to mind-wandering and day-dreaming, depending on whether self-generated thoughts occurred when the protagonist was busy with another activity and the type of self-generated thoughts. In particular, while planning, worrying, and ruminating thoughts were perceived more as mind-wandering in situations involving another activity/task, the situations without another activity/task involving recalling past events and fantasizing thoughts were perceived more as day-dreaming. In the additional experiment, we investigated laypeople's reasons for classifying the situation as mind-wandering or day-dreaming. Our results altogether indicate that mind-wandering and day-dreaming might not be fully equivalent terms.

The benefits of mind wandering on a naturalistic prospective memory task

Mind wandering (MW) occurs when our attention spontaneously shifts from the task at hand to inner thoughts. MW is often future-oriented and may help people remember to carry out their planned actions (Prospective Memory, PM). Past-oriented MW might also play a critical role in boosting PM performance. Sixty participants learned 24 PM items and recalled them during an immersive virtual walk in a town. The items were divided into event-based-EB and time-based-TB. During the PM retention phase, participants were randomly assigned to a high or a low cognitive load condition, in order to manipulate MW frequency. Some PM items were encoded before this MW manipulation (pre-PM) and some during the virtual walk (post-PM). A high MW frequency was linked with better global PM performances. Spontaneous past-oriented MW predicted better pre-EB retrospective PM retrieval, while spontaneous future-oriented MW predicted better Pre-EB prospective PM retrieval. Voluntary future-oriented MW predicted better post-EB retrospective retrieval. We highlighted, for the first time, a differential impact of spontaneous MW content depending on the PM component (retrospective or prospective). Past-oriented MW is crucial for (re)consolidating PM intentions, and episodic future thinking MW for the execution of PM intentions. We discuss the twofold functional role of MW, namely, to consolidate an already programmed intention and to plan future actions.

A highly replicable decline in mood during rest and simple tasks

Does our mood change as time passes? This question is central to behavioural and affective science, yet it remains largely unexamined. To investigate, we intermixed subjective momentary mood ratings into repetitive psychology paradigms. Here we demonstrate that task and rest periods lowered participants' mood, an effect we call 'Mood Drift Over Time'. This finding was replicated in 19 cohorts totalling 28,482 adult and adolescent participants. The drift was relatively large (-13.8% after 7.3 min of rest, Cohen's d = 0.574) and was consistent across cohorts. Behaviour was also impacted: participants were less likely to gamble in a task that followed a rest period. Importantly, the drift slope was inversely related to reward sensitivity. We show that accounting for time using a linear term significantly improves the fit of a computational model of mood. Our work provides conceptual and methodological reasons for researchers to account for time's effects when studying mood and behaviour.

Mind wandering in reading: An embodied approach

In the last 20 years, the study of mind wandering has attracted the attention of a growing number of researchers from fields like psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. Mind wandering has been characterized in multiple ways: as task-unrelated, unintentional, stimulus-independent, or unguided thought processes. Those accounts have mostly focused on the identification of neurocognitive mechanisms that enable the emergence of mind-wandering episodes. Reading is one activity in which mind wandering frequently occurs, and it is widely accepted that mind wandering is detrimental for reading flow, comprehension and the capacity to make inferences based on the text. This mind wandering scepsis in reading is based on two unchallenged views: (i) that reading is a disembodied, mental activity of information processing, and (ii) that mind wandering is essentially characterized as a task-unrelated and involuntary thought process that disrupts all kinds of goal-oriented behavior. However, recent developments within cognitive science treat the mind as embodied and thus challenge both ontological and epistemological assumptions about what mind wandering is, where it is located, and how it is being studied empirically during reading. In this article we integrate embodied accounts of mind wandering and reading to show how reading benefits from nested mind wandering processes. Empirically, we investigate how a reader can move successfully in and out of different embodied processes and mesh different cognitive strategies over time, including some forms of mind wandering. While such changes in reading are frequently deemed dysfunctional, we suggest an alternative interpretation: Rather than seeking constant flow and fluency, we propose that reading is multi-actional and benefits from drawing on different cognitive strategies spanning mind wandering processes and goal-oriented behavior. In that sense, we suggest that mind wandering has a potential for enriching cognitive processes underlying reading, such as imagining and reflection. We exemplify these insights through analyses of data obtained in ethnographic and semi-experimental studies of reading practices. We conclude that to capture cognitive phenomena within an embodied framework, a richer methodology must be developed. Such a methodology must not only be capable of accounting for brains, bodies, and contexts in isolation, but must consider an overall brain-body-environment system.

Where Is My Mind…? The Link between Mind Wandering and Prospective Memory

Mind wandering (MW) is a common feature of the human experience occurring when our attention shifts from the task at hand to inner thoughts. MW seems to be often future-oriented and could be used to help people to carry out their planned actions (Prospective Memory PM). Here, we tested the link between MW and the ability to perform PM intentions. We assessed MW and PM over 15 days using experience-sampling probes via mobile phone (226 participants) associated with a naturalistic PM task. We confirmed that MW occupies a significant proportion of our mental activity (40%). This time seems to be mainly used to project ourselves into the future (64%), whether to anticipate and imagine the long term (20%) or to plan daily obligations (44%). Intriguingly, only past-oriented thoughts (9%) predict the PM performance. We discuss the possible functional role played by MW in maintaining intentions in mind.

A wandering mind is a forgetful mind: A systematic review on the influence of mind wandering on episodic memory encoding

In the last two decades, mind wandering has received increased interest in the field of cognitive neuroscience. Despite the strong links between attention and memory, its effect on episodic memory encoding has only been recently investigated. To date, there is no systematic synthesis on this link. Following the PRISMA guidelines, a systematic review of the literature on mind wandering and episodic memory was conducted. Five online bibliographic databases (PsycNET, Pubmed, ScienceDirect, Web of Science and Taylor & Francis) were searched. Twenty-four studies were eligible for the current review and were compared based on their methodologies and results. Overall, stimulus-independent mind wandering appeared to be a reliable negative factor influencing the encoding of both words and audio-visual stimuli. However, a few studies pointed out a potential positive effect of stimulus-dependent mind wandering on episodic memory encoding. Theoretical explanations of these results, the limits of existing investigations and avenues for potential future research are discussed.

Individual differences in dimensions of mind wandering: the mediating role of emotional valence and intentionality

Individual differences in executive control ability reliably show that those with greater executive control report fewer instances of mind wandering during moderately demanding tasks. However, these findings have been limited in that they often treated mind wandering as a variable that collapsed across a variety of thought categories or dimensions. We suggest that two dimensions of mind wandering, intentionality and emotional valence, may be differential related to individual difference in executive control ability. The present study examined this using multiple measures of working memory capacity and attentional control while measuring emotional valence and intentionality of mind wandering during a single sustained attention task. Non-cognitive predictors of mind wandering were also measured. Overall, the results suggest that both working memory capacity and attention control are significant predictors of mind wandering propensity, replicating previous findings. However, the dimensions of emotional valence and intentionality suggested that this finding was not consistent across all types of thought reports. The current findings provide support for the view that it is critical to consider these two dimensions, among other important dimensions, of mind wandering to have a more complete understanding of individual differences in mind wandering.

The dynamic framework of mind wandering revisited: How mindful meta-awareness affects mental states' constraints

The dynamic framework of mind wandering (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016) is reviewed and modified through integrating the construct of mindful meta-awareness. The dynamic framework maintains that mind wandering belongs to a family of spontaneous thought phenomena. The key defining feature of mind wandering is 'spontaneity' which characterizes the dynamic nature of thoughts in the framework. The argument is made that incorporating the mindful meta-awareness construct modifies the dynamic framework as follows: (1) the framework's criteria for mind wandering do not hold anymore as meta-awareness changes the relationship between thoughts and constraints, and (2) lucid dreaming can be categorized as unguided thought while at the same time being dependent on deliberate constraints. Finally, the application of this modified framework will be discussed in terms of the treatment of mental disorders related to spontaneous thought alterations, in particular depression and nightmares.

Mind-Wandering Across the Age Gap: Age-Related Differences in Mind-Wandering Are Partially Attributable to Age-Related Differences in Motivation

OBJECTIVES

A common finding in the mind-wandering literature is that older adults (OAs) tend to mind-wander less frequently than young adults (YAs). Here, we sought to determine whether this age-related difference in mind-wandering is attributable to age-related differences in motivation.

METHOD

YAs and OAs completed an attention task during which they responded to thought probes that assessed rates of mind-wandering, and they provided self-reports of task-based motivation before and after completion of the attention task.

RESULTS

Age-related differences in mind-wandering are partially explained by differences in motivation, and motivating YAs via incentive diminishes mind-wandering differences across these groups.

DISCUSSION

We consider these results in the context of theories on age-related differences in mind wandering, with a specific focus on their relevance to the recently proposed motivational account of such age-related differences.

Episodic-semantic interactions in spontaneous thought

The distinction between a semantic memory system, encompassing conceptual knowledge, and an episodic memory system, characterized by specific episodes, is one of the most important theoretical proposals in cognitive science. However, the distinction between systems has rarely been discussed in relation to spontaneous thought that comes to mind with reduced cognitive effort and intentionality. In this review, we propose that the growing research on spontaneous thought can contribute to current discussions on the interaction between the episodic and semantic systems. Firstly, we review research that shows that, as in deliberate retrieval, spontaneous thoughts are influenced by both episodic and semantic memory, as reflected by the mix of semantic and episodic elements in descriptions of spontaneous thoughts, as well as semantic priming effects in spontaneous thoughts. We integrate the current evidence based on the interplay between cues and semantic activation. Namely, we suggest that cues are key to access episodic memory and modulate the frequency of spontaneous thought, while semantic activation modulates the content of spontaneous thought. Secondly, we propose that spontaneous retrieval is a privileged area to explore the question of functional independence between systems, because it provides direct access to the episodic system. We review the evidence for spontaneous thought in semantic dementia, which suggests that episodic and semantic systems are functionally independent. We acknowledge the scarcity of evidence and suggest that future studies examine the contents of spontaneous thought descriptions and their neural correlates to test the functional relationship and inform the interaction between episodic and semantic systems.

More than off-task: Increased freely-moving thought in ADHD

Off-task thought has been found to occur at high rates and is related to impairment in ADHD. However, off-task thought is heterogenous and it remains unclear which specific dimensions of off-task thought are more prevalent in this disorder. It is therefore important to dissociate different aspects of off-task thought in order to better understand the mechanisms underlying impairment. The current study focused on the dimension of constrained (focused) to freely moving off-task thought. Self-report and neurophysiological measures during a computerized attention tasks provided convergent evidence that individuals with ADHD not only have more off-task thought than those without, but also engaged in a greater proportion of freely moving off-task thought than non-ADHD controls. Overall, this work demonstrated differences in both the quantity and type of off-task thought in adults with ADHD. It provides novel insight into both the phenomenology of off-task thought, as well as potential mechanisms underlying impairment in ADHD.

Testing the construct validity of competing measurement approaches to probed mind-wandering reports

Psychology faces a measurement crisis, and mind-wandering research is not immune. The present study explored the construct validity of probed mind-wandering reports (i.e., reports of task-unrelated thought [TUT]) with a combined experimental and individual-differences approach. We examined laboratory data from over 1000 undergraduates at two U.S. institutions, who responded to one of four different thought-probe types across two cognitive tasks. We asked a fundamental measurement question: Do different probe types yield different results, either in terms of average reports (average TUT rates, TUT-report confidence ratings), or in terms of TUT-report associations, such as TUT rate or confidence stability across tasks, or between TUT reports and other consciousness-related constructs (retrospective mind-wandering ratings, executive-control performance, and broad questionnaire trait assessments of distractibility–restlessness and positive-constructive daydreaming)? Our primary analyses compared probes that asked subjects to report on different dimensions of experience: TUT-content probes asked about what they’d been mind-wandering about, TUT-intentionality probes asked about why they were mind-wandering, and TUT-depth probes asked about the extent (on a rating scale) of their mind-wandering. Our secondary analyses compared thought-content probes that did versus didn’t offer an option to report performance-evaluative thoughts. Our findings provide some “good news”—that some mind-wandering findings are robust across probing methods—and some “bad news”—that some findings are not robust across methods and that some commonly used probing methods may not tell us what we think they do. Our results lead us to provisionally recommend content-report probes rather than intentionality- or depth-report probes for most mind-wandering research.

Manual motor reaction while being absorbed into popular music

In three experiments, we investigated the behavioral consequences of being absorbed into music on performance in a concurrent task. We tested two competing hypotheses: Based on a cognitive load account, captivation of attention by the music and state absorption might slow down reactions in the decisional task. Alternatively, music could induce spontaneous motor activity, and being absorbed in music might result in a more autonomous, flow-driven behavior with quicker motor reactions. Participants performed a simple, visual, two-alternative forced-choice task while listening to popular musical excerpts. Subsequently, they rated their subjective experience using a short questionnaire. We presented music in four tempo categories (between 80 and 140 BPM) to account for a potential effect of tempo and an interaction between tempo and absorption. In Experiment 1, absorption was related to decreased reaction times (RTs) in the visual task. This effect was small, as expected in this setting, but replicable in Experiment 2. There was no effect of the music's tempo on RTs but a tendency of mind wandering to relate to task performance. After slightly changing the study setting in Experiment 3, flow predicted decreased RTs, but absorption alone - as part of the flow construct - did not predict RTs. To sum up, we demonstrated that being absorbed in music can have the behavioral consequence of speeded manual reactions in specific task contexts, and people seem to integrate the music into an active, flow-driven and therefore enhanced performance. However, shown relations depend on task settings, and a systematic study of context is necessary to understand how induced states and their measurement contribute to the findings.

Re-examining the effect of motivation on intentional and unintentional task-unrelated thought: accounting for thought constraint produces novel results

It has been proposed that motivating participants to perform well on a cognitive task ought to lead to decreases in rates of intentional, but not unintentional, task-unrelated thought (TUT; a commonly studied variety of mind wandering). However, at odds with this prediction, research has found that increasing motivation results in decreases in both intentional and unintentional TUTs. One possible explanation for this surprising finding is that standard assessments of TUT may inadvertently conflate TUTs with another variety of mind wandering: unconstrained thought. If so, then deconfounding task-unrelated and unconstrained varieties of mind wandering might produce the predicted effect of a decrease in intentional, but not unintentional, TUT when motivation is increased. To explore this possibility, in the present study, participants completed a sustained-attention task after receiving standard instructions (normal-motivation condition) or instructions informing them that they could leave the study early if they achieved a certain level of performance (motivated condition). Throughout the task, we assessed rates of TUT (both intentional and unintentional) and unconstrained thoughts. Consistent with prior work, the results indicated that motivated participants reported being on-task significantly more frequently than non-motivated participants. However, unlike previous work, we found that when deconfounding TUTs and unconstrained thoughts, participants in the motivation condition reported significantly fewer bouts of intentional TUT than those in the non-motivation condition, but no differences in rates of unintentional TUT were observed between groups. These results suggest that (a) motivation specifically targets intentional TUT and (b) standard assessments of TUT conflate task-relatedness and thought constraint.

How to Interpret Resting-State fMRI: Ask Your Participants

Resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) reveals brain dynamics in a task-unconstrained environment as subjects let their minds wander freely. Consequently, resting subjects navigate a rich space of cognitive and perceptual states (i.e., ongoing experience). How this ongoing experience shapes rsfMRI summary metrics (e.g., functional connectivity) is unknown, yet likely to contribute uniquely to within- and between-subject differences. Here we argue that understanding the role of ongoing experience in rsfMRI requires access to standardized, temporally resolved, scientifically validated first-person descriptions of those experiences. We suggest best practices for obtaining those descriptions via introspective methods appropriately adapted for use in fMRI research. We conclude with a set of guidelines for fusing these two data types to answer pressing questions about the etiology of rsfMRI.

Quantifying streams of thought during cognitive task performance using sequence analysis

Streams of thought vary in content from one moment to the next, and these temporal patterns have been argued to be critical to understanding the wandering mind. But few analytic methods have been proposed that can account for both the content and temporal ordering of categorical experience sampling thought probes over time. In the present study, I apply sequence analytic methods to quantify the dynamics of thought from time series sequences of categorical experience sampling thought probes delivered across five different cognitive tasks in the same individuals (N = 545). Analyses revealed some patterns of consistency in streams of thought within individuals, but also demonstrated considerable variability within and between task sessions. Hierarchical clustering of sequence dissimilarities further revealed common typologies of mind wandering across individuals. These findings demonstrate the application of sequence analytic methods for quantifying the dynamics of thought over the course of task performance and show that contextual task constraints are associated with how streams of thought unfold over time. More broadly, sequence analysis provides a valuable framework for investigation of time ordered cognitive and behavioral processes across psychological domains.

Lesion network mapping demonstrates that mind-wandering is associated with the default mode network

Functional neuroimaging research has consistently associated brain structures within the default mode network (DMN) and frontoparietal network (FPN) with mind-wandering. Targeted lesion research has documented impairments in mind-wandering after damage to the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and hippocampal regions associated with the DMN. However, no lesion studies to date have applied lesion network mapping to identify common networks associated with deficits in mind-wandering. In lesion network mapping, resting-state functional connectivity data from healthy participants are used to infer which brain regions are functionally connected to each lesion location from a sample with brain injury. In the current study, we conducted a lesion network mapping analysis to test the hypothesis that lesions affecting the DMN and FPN would be associated with diminished mind-wandering. We assessed mind-wandering frequency on the Imaginal Processes Inventory (IPI) in participants with brain injury (n = 29) and healthy comparison participants without brain injury (n = 19). Lesion network mapping analyses showed the strongest association of reduced mind-wandering with the left inferior parietal lobule within the DMN. In addition, traditional lesion symptom mapping results revealed that reduced mind-wandering was associated with lesions of the dorsal, ventral, and anterior sectors of mPFC, parietal lobule, and inferior frontal gyrus in the DMN (p < 0.05 uncorrected). These findings provide novel lesion support for the role of the DMN in mind-wandering and contribute to a burgeoning literature on the neural correlates of spontaneous cognition.

Out of the blue: understanding abrupt and wayward transitions in thought using probability and predictive processing

Thoughts that appear to come to us ‘out of the blue’ or ‘out of nowhere’ are a familiar aspect of mental experience. Such thoughts tend to elicit feelings of surprise and spontaneity. Although we are beginning to understand the neural processes that underlie the arising of such thoughts, little is known about what accounts for their peculiar phenomenology. Here, we focus on one central aspect of this phenomenology—the experience of surprise at their occurrence, as it relates to internal probabilistic predictions regarding mental states. We introduce a distinction between two phenomenologically different types of transitions in thought content: (i) abrupt transitions, which occur at surprising times but lead to unsurprising thought content, and (ii) wayward transitions, which occur at surprising times and also lead to surprising thought content. We examine these two types of transitions using a novel approach that combines probabilistic and predictive processing concepts and principles. We employ two different probability metrics—transition and occurrence probability—to characterize and differentiate between abrupt and wayward transitions. We close by discussing some potentially beneficial ways in which these two kinds of transitions in thought content may contribute to mental function, and how they may be implemented at the neural level.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

Validity of attention self-reports in younger and older adults

Human attention is subject to fluctuations. Mind-wandering (MW) - attending to thoughts unrelated to the current task demands - is considered a ubiquitous experience. According to the Control Failure x Concerns view (McVay & Kane, 2010), MW is curbed by executive control, and task-irrelevant thoughts enter consciousness due to attentional control lapses. The generation of off-task thoughts is assumed to increase with higher number of personal concerns. Challenging this view, older adults report less MW than younger adults. Here, we addressed the hypothesis that older adults report less MW due to a lower ability to notice attention lapses and to appraise their current on-task focus. In an age-comparative study (N = 40 younger and N = 44 older adults) using a battery of three tasks spanning working memory, reading comprehension, and sustained attention, we assessed the correlation between the degree of self-reported on-task focus and task performance on a trial-by-trial basis. Younger and older adults' degree of on-task attention measured through thought probes was correlated equally strongly with performance across trials in all tasks, indicating preserved ability to monitor attentional fluctuations in healthy aging. Self-reported current concerns' number and importance did not differ across age, and they did not predict self-reported attention across tasks. Our study shows that lower rates of MW in aging do not reflect lower validity of older adults' attentional appraisal or lower levels of current concerns.

What Does "Mind-Wandering" Mean to the Folk? An Empirical Investigation

Although mind-wandering research is rapidly progressing, stark disagreements are emerging about what the term "mind-wandering" means. Four prominent views define mind-wandering as (a) task-unrelated thought, (b) stimulus-independent thought, (c) unintentional thought, or (d) dynamically unguided thought. Although theorists claim to capture the ordinary understanding of mind-wandering, no systematic studies have assessed these claims. Two large factorial studies present participants (N = 545) with vignettes that describe someone's thoughts and ask whether her mind was wandering, while systematically manipulating features relevant to the four major accounts of mind-wandering. Dynamics explains between four and 40 times more variance in participants' mind-wandering judgments than other features. Our third study (N = 153) tests and supports a unique prediction of the dynamic framework-obsessive rumination contrasts with mind-wandering. Our final study (N = 277) used vignettes that resemble mind-wandering experiments. Dynamics had significant and large effects, while task-unrelatedness was nonsignificant. These results strongly suggest that the central feature of mind-wandering is its dynamics.

Dissociating the freely-moving thought dimension of mind-wandering from the intentionality and task-unrelated thought dimensions

The recently forwarded family-resemblances framework of mind-wandering argues that mind-wandering is a multidimensional construct consisting of a variety of exemplars. On this view, membership in the mind-wandering family is graded along various dimensions that define more or less prototypical instances of mind-wandering. In recent work, three dimensions that have played a prominent role in defining prototypicality within the mind-wandering family include: (a) task-relatedness (i.e., how related the content of a thought is to an ongoing task), (b) intentionality (i.e., whether thought is deliberately or spontaneously engaged), and (c) thought constraint (i.e., how much attention constrains thought dynamics). One concern, however, is that these dimensions may be redundant with each other. The utility of distinguishing among these different dimensions of mind-wandering rests upon a demonstration that they are dissociable. To shed light on this issue, we indexed the task-relatedness, intentionality, and constraint dimensions of thought during the completion of a laboratory task to evaluate how these dimensions relate to each other. We found that 56% of unconstrained thoughts were "on-task" and that 23% of constrained thoughts were "off-task." Moreover, we found that rates of off-task thought, but not "freely-moving" (i.e., unconstrained) thought, varied as a function of expected changes in task demands, confirming that task-relatedness and thought constraint are separable dimensions. Participants also reported 21% of intentional off-task thoughts that were freely moving and 9% of unintentional off-task thoughts that were constrained. Finally, off-task thoughts were more likely to be freely-moving than unintentional. Taken together, the results suggest that these three dimensions of mind-wandering are not redundant with one another.

Where the eyes wander: The relationship between mind wandering and fixation allocation to visually salient and semantically informative static scene content

Vision is crucial for many everyday activities, but the mind is not always focused on what the eyes see. Mind wandering occurs frequently and is associated with attenuated visual and cognitive processing of external information. Corresponding changes in gaze behavior—namely, fewer, longer, and more dispersed fixations—suggest a shift in how the visual system samples external information. Using three computational models of visual salience and two innovative approaches for measuring semantic informativeness, the current work assessed whether these changes reflect how the visual system prioritizes visually salient and semantically informative scene content, two major determinants in most theoretical frameworks and computational models of gaze control. Findings showed that, in a static scene viewing task, fixations were allocated to scene content that was more visually salient 10 seconds prior to probe-caught, self-reported mind wandering compared to self-reported attentive viewing. The relationship between mind wandering and semantic content was more equivocal, with weaker evidence that fixations are more likely to fall on locally informative scene regions. This indicates that the visual system is still able to discriminate visually salient and semantically informative scene content during mind wandering and may fixate on such information more frequently than during attentive viewing. Theoretical implications are discussed in light of these findings.

In Medio Stat Virtus: intermediate levels of mind wandering improve episodic memory encoding in a virtual environment

Episodic memory encoding is highly influenced by the availability of attentional resources. Mind wandering corresponds to a shift of attention toward task-unrelated thoughts. Few studies, however, have tested this link between memory encoding and mind wandering. The goal of the present work was to systematically investigate the influence of mind wandering during encoding on episodic memory performances in an ecological setting. Fifty-two participants were asked to navigate in a virtual urban environment. During the walk, they encountered different scenes that, unbeknownst to the participants, were target items presented in a subsequent recognition task associated with a Remember-Know-Guess paradigm. Each item triggered, after a random interval, a thought probe assessing current mind wandering. We found a significant linear positive relationship between the ratio of correctly recognized items and the overall mind wandering reported after the task. Moreover, we found a quadratic reversed U-shaped relationship between the probability of giving a 'Remember' response and both on-line and mind wandering reported a posteriori. The nearer to the medium value the level of mind wandering was, the higher was the probability to have a recollection-based recognition. Our results indicate that in a complex environment, the highest probability of actually remembering a scene would be when participants present a medium attentional level: neither distracted by inner thoughts nor too focused on the environment. This open attentional state would allow a better global processing of the environment by preventing one's attention from being captured by internal thoughts or narrowed by an over-focusing on the environment.

A closer look at the timecourse of mind wandering: Pupillary responses and behaviour

Mind wandering (MW) refers to the shift of attention away from a primary task and/or external environment towards thoughts unrelated to the task. Recent evidence has shown that pupillometry can be used as an objective marker of the onset and maintenance of externally-driven MW episodes. In the present study we aimed to further investigate pupillary changes associated with the onset and duration of self-reported MW episodes. We used a modified version of the joint behavioural-pupillometry paradigm we recently introduced. Participants were asked to perform a monotonous vigilance task which was intermixed with task-irrelevant cue-phrases (visually presented verbal cues); they were instructed to interrupt the task whenever a thought came to mind (self-caught method) and to indicate the trigger of their thought, if any. We found systematic pupil dilation after the presentation of verbal cues reported to have triggered MW, compared with other verbal cues presented during a supposedly on-task period (i.e., the period immediately following the resuming of the task after a self-caught interruption and MW report). These results confirm that pupil diameter is sensitive to the changes associated with the onset of MW and its unfolding over time. Moreover, by computing the latency between the trigger presentation and the task interruption (self-catch), we could also estimate the duration of MW episodes triggered by verbal cues. However, a high variability was found, implying very large inter-event variability, which could not be explained by any of the MW properties we acquired (including: temporal focus, specificity, emotional valence). Our behavioural and pupillometry findings stress the need for objective measures about the temporal unfolding of MW (while most studies focus on arbitrary time-window preceding self-reports of MW).

What's in a Task? Complications in the Study of the Task-Unrelated-Thought Variety of Mind Wandering

In recent years, the number of studies examining mind wandering has increased considerably, and research on the topic has spread widely across various domains of psychological research. Athough the term mind wandering has been used to refer to various cognitive states, researchers typically operationalize mind wandering in terms of task-unrelated thought (TUT). Research on TUT has shed light on the various task features that require people's attention and on the consequences of task inattention. Important methodological and conceptual complications do persist, however, in current investigations of TUT. We argue that these complications may be dampening the development of a more nuanced scientific account of TUT. In this article, we outline three of the more prominent methodological and conceptual complications in the literature on TUT and discuss potential directions for researchers to take as they move forward in their investigations of TUT.

Mind-wandering content differentially translates from lab to daily life and relates to subjective stress experience

Experience and thoughts that are unrelated to the external surroundings are pervasive features of human cognition. Research under the rubric of mind-wandering suggests that such internal experience is context-dependent, and that the content of ongoing thought differentially influences a range of associated outcomes. However, evidence on how the extent of mind-wandering and its content translate from the laboratory to daily life settings is scarce. Furthermore, the relationship between such patterns of thought with markers of stress in daily life remains underexplored. In the current study, we examined multiple aspects of mind-wandering of ninety-three healthy participants (47 women, 25.4 ± 3.9 years) in both the laboratory and daily life and explored two questions: (a) how are mind-wandering extent and content correlated across both settings, and (b) what are their relationships with subjective stress and salivary cortisol levels in daily life? Our results suggest that the extent of off-task thinking is not correlated across contexts, while features of content—i.e., social, future-directed and negative thought content—robustly translate. We also found that daily life subjective stress was linked to more on-task, negative, and future-directed thinking, suggesting stress was linked with the need to act on personally relevant goals. Based on these results we speculate that differences in the links between stress and ongoing thought in daily life may be one reason why patterns of thinking vary from lab to everyday life. More generally, these findings underline the need to consider both context and content in investigating mind-wandering and associated features of subjective experience, and call for caution in generalizing laboratory findings to participants’ daily lives.

Spontaneous future cognition: the past, present and future of an emerging topic

In this Editorial, we discuss the past, present and future of an emerging and fast-developing field-spontaneous future cognition. In tracking the past of this research, the trajectories of research on mind-wandering, episodic future thinking and prospective memory are briefly examined, and their relation with spontaneous future cognition demarcated. Three broad methodological approaches (questionnaire, naturalistic and laboratory) used to study spontaneous future thoughts are described, providing an overview of the field. The present state of this research is represented by a themed analysis of the articles included in this Special Issue. The breadth of studies (covering cognitive mechanisms, developmental stages and psychopathology) have already led to important insights, especially concerning the conditions in which spontaneous future thoughts most commonly arise and who may be predisposed to experiencing them. In the future, greater effort should focus on developing a theoretical account of spontaneous future cognition-this may increase our understanding of how and why spontaneous future thoughts occur. If future research in this area reflects the diversity and depth within this Special Issue, a flourishing of research on spontaneous future cognition will be on the horizon in years or perhaps decades to come.

Spontaneous future cognitions: an integrative review

Spontaneous future cognitions refer to mental representations about the future that enter consciousness with no immediately preceding attempt of bringing them to mind. They are studied under different terms in several areas of psychology, but with little interdisciplinary exchange of findings and theoretical developments. Different conceptions of spontaneous future cognition derive from separate literatures and are rarely considered together, leaving their potential conceptual overlaps as well as their unique features unclarified. In this article, I review research on spontaneous future cognitions in relation to mind wandering, involuntary episodic future thoughts, and intrusive future imagery in cravings and clinical disorders. I conclude that more research is needed to clarify the potential functions served by spontaneous future cognitions in everyday life, under which conditions they may become dysfunctional, how they are triggered by situational cues, and how their content may be constrained by motivational factors and beliefs. The burgeoning field of spontaneous future cognitions forms a promising novel approach to the cognitive and motivational regulation of behavior in everyday life.