Sinking In: The Peripheral Baldwinisation of Human Cognition

The behavioral origins of phylogenic responses and ontogenic habits

An examination of innate behavior and its possible origins suggests parallels with the formation of habitual behavior. Inflexible but adaptive responses-innate reflexive behavior, Pavlovian conditioned responses, and operant habits-may have evolved from variable behavior in phylogeny and ontogeny. This form of "plasticity-first" scientific narrative was unpopular post-Darwin but has recently gained credibility in evolutionary biology. The present article seeks to identify originating events and contingencies contributing to such inflexible but adaptive behavior at both phylogenic and ontogenic levels of selection. In ontogeny, the development of inflexible performance (i.e., habit) from variable operant behavior is reminiscent of the genetic accommodation of initially variable phylogenic traits. The effects characteristic of habit (e.g., unresponsiveness to reinforcer devaluation) are explicable as the result of a conflict between behaviors at distinct levels of selection. The present interpretation validates the practice of seeking hard analogies between evolutionary biology and operant behavior. Finding such parallels implies the validity of a claim that organismal behavior, both innate and learned, is a product of selection by consequences. A complete and coherent account of organismal behavior may ultimately focus on functional selective histories in much the same way evolutionary biology does with its subject matter.

Social overshadowing: Revisiting cue-competition in social interactions

In a large variety of contexts, it is essential to use the available information to extract patterns and behave accordingly. When it comes to social interactions for instance, the information gathered about interaction partners across multiple encounters (e.g., trustworthiness) is crucial in guiding one's own behavior (e.g., approach the trustworthy and avoid the untrustworthy), a process akin to trial-by-trial learning. Building on associative learning and social cognition literatures, the present research adopts a domain-general approach to learning and explores whether the principles underlying associative learning also govern learning in social contexts. In particular, we examined whether overshadowing, a well-established cue-competition phenomenon, impacts learning of the cooperative behaviors of unfamiliar interaction partners. Across three experiments using an adaptation of the iterated Trust Game, we consistently observed a 'social overshadowing' effect, that is, a better learning about the cooperative tendencies of partners presented alone compared to those presented in a pair. This robust effect was not modulated by gender stereotypes or beliefs about the internal communication dynamics within a pair of partners. Drawing on these results, we argue that examining domain-general learning processes in social contexts is a useful approach to understanding human social cognition.

Fearfulness: An important addition to the starter kit for distinctively human minds

Grossmann's impressive article indicates that - along with attentional biases, expansion of domain-general processes of learning and memory, and other temperamental tweaks - heightened fearfulness is part of the genetic starter kit for distinctively human minds. The learned matching account of emotional contagion explains how heightened fearfulness could have promoted the development of caring and cooperation in our species.

Quantum Leaps in Human Biocultural Evolution and the Relationship to Cranial Capacity

The evolution of the genus Homo can only be understood by considering both of the inheritance systems that interact to shape human nature: biology and culture. While growing intellectual abilities are a key factor of human evolution, they are rarely contrasted with cultural progress. Cranial capacity data of 193 hominin fossils from the last seven million years and artefacts of increasing number and complexity in the archaeological record are used to demonstrate the concordant progression of brain-size increase and cultural development, starting approximately two million years ago. Our biocultural evolution shows a number of quantum leaps along the time axis applying to both domains. At first, humans left the canonical evolutionary pathway, which pertains to all other organisms, by enhancing their fitness using sophisticated tools and fire; secondly, they turned into a symbolic species; and finally, humanity now faces a new challenge: "intentional evolution". Chronologically, these quantum leaps correspond to cranial capacity data used here as a proxy for cognitive performance. This contribution tries to demonstrate this parallel development and argues for a simple and generalized model of human biocultural evolution. An extrapolation of the model into the future shows that humans, as biological entities, will not necessarily persist.

When are puppies receptive to emotion-induced human chemosignals? The cases of fear and happiness

We report an observational, double-blind, experimental study that examines the effects of human emotional odors on puppies between 3 and 6 months and adult dogs (one year and upwards). Both groups were exposed to control, human fear, and happiness odors in a between subjects' design. The duration of all behaviors directed to the apparatus, the door, the owner, a stranger, and stress behaviors was recorded. A discriminant analysis showed that the fear odor activates consistent behavior patterns for both puppies and adult dogs. However, no behavioral differences between the control and happiness odor conditions were found in the case of puppies. In contrast, adult dogs reveal distinctive patterns for all three odor conditions. We argue that responses to human fear chemosignals systematically influence the behaviors displayed by puppies and adult dogs, which could be genetically prefigured. In contrast, the effects of happiness odors constitute cues that require learning during early socialization processes, which yield consistent patterns only in adulthood.

Faces and Voices Processing in Human and Primate Brains: Rhythmic and Multimodal Mechanisms Underlying the Evolution and Development of Speech

While influential works since the 1970s have widely assumed that imitation is an innate skill in both human and non-human primate neonates, recent empirical studies and meta-analyses have challenged this view, indicating other forms of reward-based learning as relevant factors in the development of social behavior. The visual input translation into matching motor output that underlies imitation abilities instead seems to develop along with social interactions and sensorimotor experience during infancy and childhood. Recently, a new visual stream has been identified in both human and non-human primate brains, updating the dual visual stream model. This third pathway is thought to be specialized for dynamics aspects of social perceptions such as eye-gaze, facial expression and crucially for audio-visual integration of speech. Here, we review empirical studies addressing an understudied but crucial aspect of speech and communication, namely the processing of visual orofacial cues (i.e., the perception of a speaker's lips and tongue movements) and its integration with vocal auditory cues. Along this review, we offer new insights from our understanding of speech as the product of evolution and development of a rhythmic and multimodal organization of sensorimotor brain networks, supporting volitional motor control of the upper vocal tract and audio-visual voices-faces integration.

The cultural evolution of cultural evolution

What makes fast, cumulative cultural evolution work? Where did it come from? Why is it the sole preserve of humans? We set out a self-assembly hypothesis: cultural evolution evolved culturally. We present an evolutionary account that shows this hypothesis to be coherent, plausible, and worthy of further investigation. It has the following steps: (0) in common with other animals, early hominins had significant capacity for social learning; (1) knowledge and skills learned by offspring from their parents began to spread because bearers had more offspring, a process we call CS1 (or Cultural Selection 1); (2) CS1 shaped attentional learning biases; (3) these attentional biases were augmented by explicit learning biases (judgements about what should be copied from whom). Explicit learning biases enabled (4) the high-fidelity, exclusive copying required for fast cultural accumulation of knowledge and skills by a process we call CS2 (or Cultural Selection 2) and (5) the emergence of cognitive processes such as imitation, mindreading and metacognition-'cognitive gadgets' specialized for cultural learning. This self-assembly hypothesis is consistent with archaeological evidence that the stone tools used by early hominins were not dependent on fast, cumulative cultural evolution, and suggests new priorities for research on 'animal culture'. This article is part of the theme issue 'Foundations of cultural evolution'.

Nothing in Cognitive Neuroscience Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution

Evolutionary theory should be a fundamental guide for neuroscientists. This would seem a trivial statement, but I believe that taking it seriously is more complicated than it appears to be, as I argue in this article. Elsewhere, I proposed the notion of “bounded functionality” As a way to describe the constraints that should be considered when trying to understand the evolution of the brain. There are two bounded-functionality constraints that are essential to any evolution-minded approach to cognitive neuroscience. The first constraint, the bricoleur constraint, describes the evolutionary pressure for any adaptive solution to re-use any relevant resources available to the system before the selection situation appeared. The second constraint, the satisficing constraint, describes the fact that a trait only needs to behave more advantageously than its competitors in order to be selected. In this paper I describe how bounded-functionality can inform an evolutionary-minded approach to cognitive neuroscience. In order to do so, I resort to Nikolaas Tinbergen’s four questions about how to understand behavior, namely: function, causation, development and evolution. The bottom line of assuming Tinbergen’s questions is that any approach to cognitive neuroscience is intrinsically tentative, slow, and messy.