The computational challenge of social learning

Mechanisms of mistrust: A Bayesian account of misinformation learning

From the intimate realm of personal interactions to the sprawling arena of political discourse, discerning the trustworthy from the dubious is crucial. Here, we present a novel behavioral task and accompanying Bayesian models that allow us to study key aspects of this learning process in a tightly controlled setting. In our task, participants are confronted with several different types of (mis-)information sources, ranging from ones that lie to ones with biased reporting, and have to learn these attributes under varying degrees of feedback. We formalize inference in this setting as a doubly Bayesian learning process where agents simultaneously learn about the ground truth as well as the qualities of an information source reporting on this ground truth. Our model and detailed analyses reveal how participants can generally follow Bayesian learning dynamics, highlighting a basic human ability to learn about diverse information sources. This learning is also reflected in explicit trust reports about the sources. We additionally show how participants approached the inference problem with priors that held sources to be helpful. Finally, when outside feedback was noisier, participants still learned along Bayesian lines but struggled to pick up on biases in information. Our work pins down computationally the generally impressive human ability to learn the trustworthiness of information sources while revealing minor fault lines when it comes to noisier environments and news sources with a slant.

Self-utility distance as a computational approach to understanding self-concept clarity

Self-concept stability and cohesion are crucial for psychological functioning and well-being, yet the mechanisms that underpin this fundamental aspect of human cognition remain underexplored. Integrating insights from cognitive and personality psychology with reinforcement learning, we introduce Self-Utility Distance (SUD)-a metric quantifying the dissimilarities between individuals' self-concept attributes and their expected utility value. In Study 1 (n = 155), participants provided self- and expected utility ratings using a set of predefined adjectives. SUD showed a significant negative relationship with Self-Concept Clarity that persisted after accounting for individuals' Self-Esteem. In Study 2 (n = 323), we found that SUD provides incremental predictive accuracy over Ideal-Self and Ought-Self discrepancies in the prediction of Self-Concept Clarity. In Study 3 (n = 85), we investigated the mechanistic principles underlying Self-Utility Distance. Participants conducted a social learning task where they learned about trait utilities from a reference group. We formalized different computational models to investigate the strategies individuals use to adjust trait utility estimates in response to environmental feedback. Through Hierarchical Bayesian Inference, we found evidence that participants utilized their self-concept to modulate trait utility learning, effectively avoiding the maximization of Self-Utility Distance. Our findings provide insights into self-concept dynamics that might help understand the maintenance of adaptive and maladaptive traits.

Understanding learning through uncertainty and bias

Learning allows humans and other animals to make predictions about the environment that facilitate adaptive behavior. Casting learning as predictive inference can shed light on normative cognitive mechanisms that improve predictions under uncertainty. Drawing on normative learning models, we illustrate how learning should be adjusted to different sources of uncertainty, including perceptual uncertainty, risk, and uncertainty due to environmental changes. Such models explain many hallmarks of human learning in terms of specific statistical considerations that come into play when updating predictions under uncertainty. However, humans also display systematic learning biases that deviate from normative models, as studied in computational psychiatry. Some biases can be explained as normative inference conditioned on inaccurate prior assumptions about the environment, while others reflect approximations to Bayesian inference aimed at reducing cognitive demands. These biases offer insights into cognitive mechanisms underlying learning and how they might go awry in psychiatric illness.

Distinct neural computations scale the violation of expected reward and emotion in social transgressions

Traditional decision-making models conceptualize humans as adaptive learners utilizing the differences between expected and actual rewards (prediction errors, PEs) to maximize outcomes, but rarely consider the influence of violations of emotional expectations (emotional PEs) and how it differs from reward PEs. Here, we conducted a fMRI experiment (n = 43) using a modified Ultimatum Game to examine how reward and emotional PEs affect punishment decisions in terms of rejecting unfair offers. Our results revealed that reward relative to emotional PEs exerted a stronger prediction to punishment decisions. On the neural level, the left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) was strongly activated during reward receipt whereas the emotions engaged the bilateral anterior insula. Reward and emotional PEs were also encoded differently in brain-wide multivariate patterns, with a more sensitive neural signature observed within fronto-insular circuits for reward PE. We further identified a fronto-insular network encompassing the left anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral insula, left dmPFC and inferior frontal gyrus that encoded punishment decisions. In addition, a stronger fronto-insular pattern expression under reward PE predicted more punishment decisions. These findings underscore that reward and emotional violations interact to shape decisions in complex social interactions, while the underlying neurofunctional PEs computations are distinguishable.

When to stop social learning from a predecessor in an information-foraging task

Striking a balance between individual and social learning is one of the key capabilities that support adaptation under uncertainty. Although intergenerational transmission of information is ubiquitous, little is known about when and how newcomers switch from learning loyally from preceding models to exploring independently. Using a behavioural experiment, we investigated how social information available from a preceding demonstrator affects the timing of becoming independent and individual performance thereafter. Participants worked on a 30-armed bandit task for 100 trials. For the first 15 trials, participants simply observed the choices of a demonstrator who had accumulated more knowledge about the environment and passively received rewards from the demonstrator's choices. Thereafter, participants could switch to making independent choices at any time. We had three conditions differing in the social information available from the demonstrator: choice only, reward only or both. Results showed that both participants' strategies about when to stop observational learning and their behavioural patterns after independence depended on the available social information. Participants generally failed to make the best use of previously observed social information in their subsequent independent choices, suggesting the importance of direct communication beyond passive observation for better intergenerational transmission under uncertainty. Implications for cultural evolution are discussed.

Transmission of societal stereotypes to individual-level prejudice through instrumental learning

How are societal stereotypes transmitted to individual-level group preferences? We propose that exposure to a stereotype, regardless of whether one agrees with it, can shape how one experiences and learns from interactions with members of the stereotyped group, such that it induces individual-level prejudice-a process involving the interplay of semantic knowledge and instrumental learning. In a series of experiments, participants interacted with players from two groups, described with either positive or negative stereotypes, in a reinforcement learning (RL) task presented as a money-sharing game. Although players' actual sharing rates were equated between groups, participants formed more positive reward associations with players from positively stereotyped than negatively stereotyped groups. This effect persisted even when stereotypes were described as unreliable and participants were instructed to ignore them. Computational modeling revealed that this preference was due to stereotype effects on priors regarding group members' behavior as well as the learning rates through which reward associations were updated in response to player feedback. We then show that these stereotype-induced preferences, once formed, spread unwittingly to others who observe these interactions, illustrating a pathway through which stereotypes may be transmitted and propagated between society and individuals. By identifying a mechanism through which stereotype knowledge can bypass explicit beliefs to induce prejudice, via the interplay of semantic and instrumental learning processes, these findings illuminate the impact of stereotype messages on the formation and propagation of individual-level prejudice.

An Active-Inference Approach to Second-Person Neuroscience

Social neuroscience has often been criticized for approaching the investigation of the neural processes that enable social interaction and cognition from a passive, detached, third-person perspective, without involving any real-time social interaction. With the emergence of second-person neuroscience, investigators have uncovered the unique complexity of neural-activation patterns in actual, real-time interaction. Social cognition that occurs during social interaction is fundamentally different from that unfolding during social observation. However, it remains unclear how the neural correlates of social interaction are to be interpreted. Here, we leverage the active-inference framework to shed light on the mechanisms at play during social interaction in second-person neuroscience studies. Specifically, we show how counterfactually rich mutual predictions, real-time bodily adaptation, and policy selection explain activation in components of the default mode, salience, and frontoparietal networks of the brain, as well as in the basal ganglia. We further argue that these processes constitute the crucial neural processes that underwrite bona fide social interaction. By placing the experimental approach of second-person neuroscience on the theoretical foundation of the active-inference framework, we inform the field of social neuroscience about the mechanisms of real-life interactions. We thereby contribute to the theoretical foundations of empirical second-person neuroscience.

Keeping an Eye Out for Change: Anxiety Disrupts Adaptive Resolution of Policy Uncertainty

BACKGROUND

Human learning unfolds under uncertainty. Uncertainty is heterogeneous with different forms exerting distinct influences on learning. While one can be uncertain about what to do to maximize rewarding outcomes, known as policy uncertainty, one can also be uncertain about general world knowledge, known as epistemic uncertainty (EU). In complex and naturalistic environments such as the social world, adaptive learning may hinge on striking a balance between attending to and resolving each type of uncertainty. Prior work illustrates that people with anxiety-those with increased threat and uncertainty sensitivity-learn less from aversive outcomes, particularly as outcomes become more uncertain. How does a learner adaptively trade-off between attending to these distinct sources of uncertainty to successfully learn about their social environment?

METHODS

We developed a novel eye-tracking method to capture highly granular estimates of policy uncertainty and EU based on gaze patterns and pupil diameter (a physiological estimate of arousal).

RESULTS

These empirically derived uncertainty measures revealed that humans (N = 94) flexibly switched between resolving policy uncertainty and EU to adaptively learn about which individuals can be trusted and which should be avoided. However, those with increased anxiety (n = 49) did not flexibly switch between resolving policy uncertainty and EU and instead expressed less uncertainty overall.

CONCLUSIONS

Combining modeling and eye-tracking techniques, we show that altered learning in people with anxiety emerged from an insensitivity to policy uncertainty and rigid choice policies, leading to maladaptive behaviors with untrustworthy people.

Computational processes of simultaneous learning of stochasticity and volatility in humans

Making adaptive decisions requires predicting outcomes, and this in turn requires adapting to uncertain environments. This study explores computational challenges in distinguishing two types of noise influencing predictions: volatility and stochasticity. Volatility refers to diffusion noise in latent causes, requiring a higher learning rate, while stochasticity introduces moment-to-moment observation noise and reduces learning rate. Dissociating these effects is challenging as both increase the variance of observations. Previous research examined these factors mostly separately, but it remains unclear whether and how humans dissociate them when they are played off against one another. In two large-scale experiments, through a behavioral prediction task and computational modeling, we report evidence of humans dissociating volatility and stochasticity solely based on their observations. We observed contrasting effects of volatility and stochasticity on learning rates, consistent with statistical principles. These results are consistent with a computational model that estimates volatility and stochasticity by balancing their dueling effects.

Thalamocortical architectures for flexible cognition and efficient learning

The brain exhibits a remarkable ability to learn and execute context-appropriate behaviors. How it achieves such flexibility, without sacrificing learning efficiency, is an important open question. Neuroscience, psychology, and engineering suggest that reusing and repurposing computations are part of the answer. Here, we review evidence that thalamocortical architectures may have evolved to facilitate these objectives of flexibility and efficiency by coordinating distributed computations. Recent work suggests that distributed prefrontal cortical networks compute with flexible codes, and that the mediodorsal thalamus provides regularization to promote efficient reuse. Thalamocortical interactions resemble hierarchical Bayesian computations, and their network implementation can be related to existing gating, synchronization, and hub theories of thalamic function. By reviewing recent findings and providing a novel synthesis, we highlight key research horizons integrating computation, cognition, and systems neuroscience.

Simplifying social learning

Social learning is complex, but people often seem to navigate social environments with ease. This ability creates a puzzle for traditional accounts of reinforcement learning (RL) that assume people negotiate a tradeoff between easy-but-simple behavior (model-free learning) and complex-but-difficult behavior (e.g., model-based learning). We offer a theoretical framework for resolving this puzzle: although social environments are complex, people have social expertise that helps them behave flexibly with low cognitive cost. Specifically, by using familiar concepts instead of focusing on novel details, people can turn hard learning problems into simpler ones. This ability highlights social learning as a prototype for studying cognitive simplicity in the face of environmental complexity and identifies a role for conceptual knowledge in everyday reward learning.

D2/D3 dopamine supports the precision of mental state inferences and self-relevance of joint social outcomes

Striatal dopamine is important in paranoid attributions, although its computational role in social inference remains elusive. We employed a simple game-theoretic paradigm and computational model of intentional attributions to investigate the effects of dopamine D2/D3 antagonism on ongoing mental state inference following social outcomes. Haloperidol, compared with the placebo, enhanced the impact of partner behaviour on beliefs about the harmful intent of partners, and increased learning from recent encounters. These alterations caused substantial changes to model covariation and negative correlations between self-interest and harmful intent attributions. Our findings suggest that haloperidol improves belief flexibility about others and simultaneously reduces the self-relevance of social observations. Our results may reflect the role of D2/D3 dopamine in supporting self-relevant mentalising. Our data and model bridge theory between general and social accounts of value representation. We demonstrate initial evidence for the sensitivity of our model and short social paradigm to drug intervention and clinical dimensions, allowing distinctions between mechanisms that operate across traits and states.

From Tripping and Falling to Ruminating and Worrying: A Meta-Control Account of Repetitive Negative Thinking

Repetitive negative thinking (RNT) is a transdiagnostic construct that encompasses rumination and worry, yet what precisely is shared between rumination and worry is unclear. To clarify this, we develop a meta-control account of RNT. Meta-control refers to the reinforcement and control of mental behavior via similar computations as reinforce and control motor behavior. We propose rumination and worry are coarse terms for failure in meta-control, just as tripping and falling are coarse terms for failure in motor control. We delineate four meta-control stages and risk factors increasing the chance of failure at each, including open-ended thoughts (stage 1), individual differences influencing subgoal execution (stage 2) and switching (stage 3), and challenges inherent to learning adaptive mental behavior (stage 4). Distinguishing these stages therefore elucidates diverse processes that lead to the same behavior of excessive RNT. Our account also subsumes prominent clinical accounts of RNT into a computational cognitive neuroscience framework.

Political reinforcement learners

Politics can seem home to the most calculating and yet least rational elements of humanity. How might we systematically characterize this spectrum of political cognition? Here, we propose reinforcement learning (RL) as a unified framework to dissect the political mind. RL describes how agents algorithmically navigate complex and uncertain domains like politics. Through this computational lens, we outline three routes to political differences, stemming from variability in agents' conceptions of a problem, the cognitive operations applied to solve the problem, or the backdrop of information available from the environment. A computational vantage on maladies of the political mind offers enhanced precision in assessing their causes, consequences, and cures.

Dynamic mutual predictions during social learning: A computational and interbrain model

During social interactions, we constantly learn about the thoughts, feelings, and personality traits of our interaction partners. Learning in social interactions is critical for bond formation and acquiring knowledge. Importantly, this type of learning is typically bi-directional, as both partners learn about each other simultaneously. Here we review the literature on social learning and propose a new computational and neural model characterizing mutual predictions that take place within and between interactions. According to our model, each partner in the interaction attempts to minimize the prediction error of the self and the interaction partner. In most cases, these inferential models become similar over time, thus enabling mutual understanding to develop. At the neural level, this type of social learning may be supported by interbrain plasticity, defined as a change in interbrain coupling over time in neural networks associated with social learning, among them the mentalizing network, the observation-execution system, and the hippocampus. The mutual prediction model constitutes a promising means of providing empirically verifiable accounts of how relationships develop over time.

The utilitarian brain: Moving beyond the Free Energy Principle

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) is a normative computational framework for iterative reduction of prediction error and uncertainty through perception-intervention cycles that has been presented as a potential unifying theory of all brain functions (Friston, 2006). Any theory hoping to unify the brain sciences must be able to explain the mechanisms of decision-making, an important cognitive faculty, without the addition of independent, irreducible notions. This challenge has been accepted by several proponents of the FEP (Friston, 2010; Gershman, 2019). We evaluate attempts to reduce decision-making to the FEP, using Lucas' (2005) meta-theory of the brain's contextual constraints as a guidepost. We find reductive variants of the FEP for decision-making unable to explain behavior in certain types of diagnostic, predictive, and multi-armed bandit tasks. We trace the shortcomings to the core theory's lack of an adequate notion of subjective preference or "utility", a concept central to decision-making and grounded in the brain's biological reality. We argue that any attempts to fully reduce utility to the FEP would require unrealistic assumptions, making the principle an unlikely candidate for unifying brain science. We suggest that researchers instead attempt to identify contexts in which either informational or independent reward constraints predominate, delimiting the FEP's area of applicability. To encourage this type of research, we propose a two-factor formal framework that can subsume any FEP model and allows experimenters to compare the contributions of informational versus reward constraints to behavior.

Social Concepts Simplify Complex Reinforcement Learning

Humans often generalize rewarding experiences across abstract social roles. Theories of reward learning suggest that people generalize through model-based learning, but such learning is cognitively costly. Why do people seem to generalize across social roles with ease? Humans are social experts who easily recognize social roles that reflect familiar semantic concepts (e.g., "helper" or "teacher"). People may associate these roles with model-free reward (e.g., learning that helpers are rewarding), allowing them to generalize easily (e.g., interacting with novel individuals identified as helpers). In four online experiments with U.S. adults (N = 577), we found evidence that social concepts ease complex learning (people generalize more and at faster speed) and that people attach reward directly to abstract roles (they generalize even when roles are unrelated to task structure). These results demonstrate how familiar concepts allow complex behavior to emerge from simple strategies, highlighting social interaction as a prototype for studying cognitive ease in the face of environmental complexity.

A (Dis-)information Theory of Revealed and Unrevealed Preferences: Emerging Deception and Skepticism via Theory of Mind

In complex situations involving communication, agents might attempt to mask their intentions, exploiting Shannon's theory of information as a theory of misinformation. Here, we introduce and analyze a simple multiagent reinforcement learning task where a buyer sends signals to a seller via its actions, and in which both agents are endowed with a recursive theory of mind. We show that this theory of mind, coupled with pure reward-maximization, gives rise to agents that selectively distort messages and become skeptical towards one another. Using information theory to analyze these interactions, we show how savvy buyers reduce mutual information between their preferences and actions, and how suspicious sellers learn to reinterpret or discard buyers' signals in a strategic manner.

Formalising social representation to explain psychiatric symptoms

Recent work in social cognition has moved beyond a focus on how people process social rewards to examine how healthy people represent other agents and how this is altered in psychiatric disorders. However, formal modelling of social representation has not kept pace with these changes, impeding our understanding of how core aspects of social cognition function, and fail, in psychopathology. Here, we suggest that belief-based computational models provide a basis for an integrated sociocognitive approach to psychiatry, with the potential to address important but unexamined pathologies of social representation, such as maladaptive schemas and illusory social agents.

Computational models of subjective feelings in psychiatry

Research in computational psychiatry is dominated by models of behavior. Subjective experience during behavioral tasks is not well understood, even though it should be relevant to understanding the symptoms of psychiatric disorders. Here, we bridge this gap and review recent progress in computational models for subjective feelings. For example, happiness reflects not how well people are doing, but whether they are doing better than expected. This dependence on recent reward prediction errors is intact in major depression, although depressive symptoms lower happiness during tasks. Uncertainty predicts subjective feelings of stress in volatile environments. Social prediction errors influence feelings of self-worth more in individuals with low self-esteem despite a reduced willingness to change beliefs due to social feedback. Measuring affective state during behavioral tasks provides a tool for understanding psychiatric symptoms that can be dissociable from behavior. When smartphone tasks are collected longitudinally, subjective feelings provide a potential means to bridge the gap between lab-based behavioral tasks and real-life behavior, emotion, and psychiatric symptoms.

The (un)learning of social functions and its significance for mental health

Social interactions are dynamic, context-dependent, and reciprocal events that influence prospective strategies and require constant practice and adaptation. This complexity of social interactions creates several research challenges. We propose a new framework encouraging future research to investigate not only individual differences in capacities relevant for social functioning and their underlying mechanisms, but also the flexibility to adapt or update one's social abilities. We suggest three key capacities relevant for social functioning: (1) social perception, (2) sharing emotions or empathizing, and (3) mentalizing. We elaborate on how adaptations in these capacities may be investigated on behavioral and neural levels. Research on these flexible adaptations of one's social behavior is needed to specify how humans actually "learn to be social". Learning to adapt implies plasticity of the relevant brain networks involved in the underlying social processes, indicating that social abilities are malleable for different contexts. To quantify such measures, researchers need to find ways to investigate learning through dynamic changes in adaptable social paradigms and examine several factors influencing social functioning within the three aformentioned social key capacities. This framework furthers insight concerning individual differences, provides a holistic approach to social functioning, and may improve interventions for ameliorating social abilities in patients.

Planning with Theory of Mind

Understanding Theory of Mind should begin with an analysis of the problems it solves. The traditional answer is that Theory of Mind is used for predicting others' thoughts and actions. However, the same Theory of Mind is also used for planning to change others' thoughts and actions. Planning requires that Theory of Mind consists of abstract structured causal representations and supports efficient search and selection from innumerable possible actions. Theory of Mind contrasts with less cognitively demanding alternatives: statistical predictive models of other people's actions, or model-free reinforcement of actions by their effects on other people. Theory of Mind is likely used to plan novel interventions and predict their effects, for example, in pedagogy, emotion regulation, and impression management.

Social learning across adolescence: A Bayesian neurocognitive perspective

Adolescence is a period of social re-orientation in which we are generally more prone to peer influence and the updating of our beliefs based on social information, also called social learning, than in any other stage of our life. However, how do we know when to use social information and whose information to use and how does this ability develop across adolescence? Here, we review the social learning literature from a behavioral, neural and computational viewpoint, focusing on the development of brain systems related to executive functioning, value-based decision-making and social cognition. We put forward a Bayesian reinforcement learning framework that incorporates social learning about value associated with particular behavior and uncertainty in our environment and experiences. We discuss how this framework can inform us about developmental changes in social learning, including how the assessment of uncertainty and the ability to adaptively discriminate between information from different social sources change across adolescence. By combining reward-based decision-making in the domains of both informational and normative influence, this framework explains both negative and positive social peer influence in adolescence.

Neurocomputations of strategic behavior: From iterated to novel interactions

Strategic interactions, where an individual's payoff depends on the decisions of multiple intelligent agents, are ubiquitous among social animals. They span a variety of important social behaviors such as competition, cooperation, coordination, and communication, and often involve complex, intertwining cognitive operations ranging from basic reward processing to higher‐order mentalization. Here, we review the progress and challenges in probing the neural and cognitive mechanisms of strategic behavior of interacting individuals, drawing an analogy to recent developments in studies of reward‐seeking behavior, in particular, how research focuses in the field of strategic behavior have been expanded from adaptive behavior based on trial‐and‐error to flexible decisions based on limited prior experience. We highlight two important research questions in the field of strategic behavior: (i) How does the brain exploit past experience for learning to behave strategically? and (ii) How does the brain decide what to do in novel strategic situations in the absence of direct experience? For the former, we discuss the utility of learning models that have effectively connected various types of neural data with strategic learning behavior and helped elucidate the interplay among multiple learning processes. For the latter, we review the recent evidence and propose a neural generative mechanism by which the brain makes novel strategic choices through simulating others' goal‐directed actions according to rational or bounded‐rational principles obtained through indirect social knowledge.

This article is categorized under:

Economics > Interactive Decision‐Making

Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making

Neuroscience > Cognition

The computational relationship between reinforcement learning, social inference, and paranoia

Theoretical accounts suggest heightened uncertainty about the state of the world underpin aberrant belief updates, which in turn increase the risk of developing a persecutory delusion. However, this raises the question as to how an agent's uncertainty may relate to the precise phenomenology of paranoia, as opposed to other qualitatively different forms of belief. We tested whether the same population (n = 693) responded similarly to non-social and social contingency changes in a probabilistic reversal learning task and a modified repeated reversal Dictator game, and the impact of paranoia on both. We fitted computational models that included closely related parameters that quantified the rigidity across contingency reversals and the uncertainty about the environment/partner. Consistent with prior work we show that paranoia was associated with uncertainty around a partner's behavioural policy and rigidity in harmful intent attributions in the social task. In the non-social task we found that pre-existing paranoia was associated with larger decision temperatures and commitment to suboptimal cards. We show relationships between decision temperature in the non-social task and priors over harmful intent attributions and uncertainty over beliefs about partners in the social task. Our results converge across both classes of model, suggesting paranoia is associated with a general uncertainty over the state of the world (and agents within it) that takes longer to resolve, although we demonstrate that this uncertainty is expressed asymmetrically in social contexts. Our model and data allow the representation of sociocognitive mechanisms that explain persecutory delusions and provide testable, phenomenologically relevant predictions for causal experiments.

A Model of Trust

Trust is central to a large variety of social interactions. Different research fields have empirically and theoretically investigated trust, observing trusting behaviors in different situations and pinpointing their different components and constituents. However, a unifying, computational formalization of those diverse components and constituents of trust is still lacking. Previous work has mainly used computational models borrowed from other fields and developed for other purposes to explain trusting behaviors in empirical paradigms. Here, I computationally formalize verbal models of trust in a simple model (i.e., vulnerability model) that combines current and prospective action values with beliefs and expectancies about a partner’s behavior. By using the classic investment game (IG)—an economic game thought to capture some important features of trusting behaviors in social interactions—I show how variations of a single parameter of the vulnerability model generates behaviors that can be interpreted as different “trust attitudes”. I then show how these behavioral patterns change as a function of an individual’s loss aversion and expectations of the partner’s behavior. I finally show how the vulnerability model can be easily extended in a novel IG paradigm to investigate inferences on different traits of a partner. In particular, I will focus on benevolence and competence—two character traits that have previously been described as determinants of trustworthiness impressions central to trust. The vulnerability model can be employed as is or as a utility function within more complex Bayesian frameworks to fit participants’ behavior in different social environments where actions are associated with subjective values and weighted by individual beliefs about others’ behaviors. Hence, the vulnerability model provides an important building block for future theoretical and empirical work across a variety of research fields.

Transforming Social Perspectives with Cognitive Maps

Growing evidence suggests that cognitive maps represent relations between social knowledge similar to how spatial locations are represented in an environment. Notably, the extant human medial temporal lobe literature assumes associations between social stimuli follow a linear associative mapping from an egocentric viewpoint to a cognitive map. Yet, this form of associative social memory doesn't account for a core phenomenon of social interactions in which social knowledge learned via comparisons to the self, other individuals, or social networks are assimilated within a single frame of reference. We argue that hippocampal-entorhinal coordinate transformations, known to integrate egocentric and allocentric spatial cues, inform social perspective switching between the self and others. We present evidence that the hippocampal formation helps inform social interactions by relating self versus other social attribute comparisons to society in general, which can afford rapid and flexible assimilation of knowledge about the relationship between the self and social networks of varying proximities. We conclude by discussing the ramifications of cognitive maps in aiding this social perspective transformation process in states of health and disease.