Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness

A dynamic bifurcation mechanism explains cortex-wide neural correlates of conscious access

Conscious access is suggested to involve "ignition," an all-or-none activation across cortical areas. To elucidate this phenomenon, we carry out computer simulations of a detection task using a mesoscale connectome-based model for the multiregional macaque cortex. The model uncovers a dynamic bifurcation mechanism that gives rise to ignition in a network of associative regions. A hierarchical N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA)/α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid (AMPA) receptor gradient plays a critical role: fast AMPA receptors drive feedforward signal propagation, while slow NMDA receptors in feedback pathways shape and sustain the ignited network. Intriguingly, the model suggests higher NMDA-to-AMPA receptor ratios in sensory areas compared to association areas, a prediction supported by in vitro autoradiography data. Furthermore, the model accounts for diverse behavioral and physiological phenomena linked to consciousness. This work sheds light on how receptor gradients along the cortical hierarchy enable distributed cognitive functions and provides a biologically constrained computational framework for investigating the neurophysiological basis of conscious access.

Unpacking the complexities of consciousness: Theories and reflections

As the field of consciousness science matures, the research agenda has expanded from an initial focus on the neural correlates of consciousness, to developing and testing theories of consciousness. Several theories have been put forward, each aiming to elucidate the relationship between consciousness and brain function. However, there is an ongoing, intense debate regarding whether these theories examine the same phenomenon. And, despite ongoing research efforts, it seems like the field has so far failed to converge around any single theory, and instead exhibits significant polarization. To advance this discussion, proponents of five prominent theories of consciousness-Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT), Higher-Order Theories (HOT), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), and Predictive Processing (PP)-engaged in a public debate in 2022, as part of the annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC). They were invited to clarify the explananda of their theories, articulate the core mechanisms underpinning the corresponding explanations, and outline their foundational premises. This was followed by an open discussion that delved into the testability of these theories, potential evidence that could refute them, and areas of consensus and disagreement. Most importantly, the debate demonstrated that at this stage, there is more controversy than agreement between the theories, pertaining to the most basic questions of what consciousness is, how to identify conscious states, and what is required from any theory of consciousness. Addressing these core questions is crucial for advancing the field towards a deeper understanding and comparison of competing theories.

Spontaneous slow cortical potentials and brain oscillations independently influence conscious visual perception

Perceptual awareness results from an intricate interaction between external sensory input and the brain's spontaneous activity. Pre-stimulus ongoing activity influencing conscious perception includes both brain oscillations in the alpha (7 to 14 Hz) and beta (14 to 30 Hz) frequency ranges and aperiodic activity in the slow cortical potential (SCP, <5 Hz) range. However, whether brain oscillations and SCPs independently influence conscious perception or do so through shared mechanisms remains unknown. Here, we addressed this question in 2 independent magnetoencephalography (MEG) data sets involving near-threshold visual perception tasks in humans using low-level (Gabor patches) and high-level (objects, faces, houses, animals) stimuli, respectively. We found that oscillatory power and large-scale SCP activity influence conscious perception through independent mechanisms that do not have shared variance. In addition, through mediation analysis, we show that pre-stimulus oscillatory power and SCP activity have different relations to pupil size-an index of arousal-in their influences on conscious perception. Together, these findings suggest that oscillatory power and SCPs independently contribute to perceptual awareness, with distinct relations to pupil-linked arousal.

Neuroimaging biomarkers for the diagnosis and prognosis of patients with disorders of consciousness

The progress in neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques has shown substantial promise in improving the clinical assessment of disorders of consciousness (DOC). Through the examination of both stimulus-induced and spontaneous brain activity, numerous comprehensive investigations have explored variations in brain activity patterns among patients with DOC, yielding valuable insights for clinical diagnosis and prognostic purposes. Nonetheless, reaching a consensus on precise neuroimaging biomarkers for patients with DOC remains a challenge. Therefore, in this review, we begin by summarizing the empirical evidence related to neuroimaging biomarkers for DOC using various paradigms, including active, passive, and resting-state approaches, by employing task-based fMRI, resting-state fMRI (rs-fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and positron emission tomography (PET) techniques. Subsequently, we conducted a review of studies examining the neural correlates of consciousness in patients with DOC, with the findings holding potential value for the clinical application of DOC. Notably, previous research indicates that neuroimaging techniques have the potential to unveil covert awareness that conventional behavioral assessments might overlook. Furthermore, when integrated with various task paradigms or analytical approaches, this combination has the potential to significantly enhance the accuracy of both diagnosis and prognosis in DOC patients. Nonetheless, the stability of these neural biomarkers still needs additional validation, and future directions may entail integrating diagnostic and prognostic methods with big data and deep learning approaches.

Network mechanisms of ongoing brain activity's influence on conscious visual perception

Sensory inputs enter a constantly active brain, whose state is always changing from one moment to the next. Currently, little is known about how ongoing, spontaneous brain activity participates in online task processing. We employed 7 Tesla fMRI and a threshold-level visual perception task to probe the effects of prestimulus ongoing brain activity on perceptual decision-making and conscious recognition. Prestimulus activity originating from distributed brain regions, including visual cortices and regions of the default-mode and cingulo-opercular networks, exerted a diverse set of effects on the sensitivity and criterion of conscious recognition, and categorization performance. We further elucidate the mechanisms underlying these behavioral effects, revealing how prestimulus activity modulates multiple aspects of stimulus processing in highly specific and network-dependent manners. These findings reveal heretofore unknown network mechanisms underlying ongoing brain activity's influence on conscious perception, and may hold implications for understanding the precise roles of spontaneous activity in other brain functions.

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

Thalamic contributions to the state and contents of consciousness

Consciousness can be conceptualized as varying along at least two dimensions: the global state of consciousness and the content of conscious experience. Here, we highlight the cellular and systems-level contributions of the thalamus to conscious state and then argue for thalamic contributions to conscious content, including the integrated, segregated, and continuous nature of our experience. We underscore vital, yet distinct roles for core- and matrix-type thalamic neurons. Through reciprocal interactions with deep-layer cortical neurons, matrix neurons support wakefulness and determine perceptual thresholds, whereas the cortical interactions of core neurons maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. We further propose that conscious integration, segregation, and continuity depend on the convergent nature of corticothalamic projections enabling dimensionality reduction, a thalamic reticular nucleus-mediated divisive normalization-like process, and sustained coherent activity in thalamocortical loops, respectively. Overall, we conclude that the thalamus plays a central topological role in brain structures controlling conscious experience.

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or "distant" to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision-such as those related to being an object, background or detail-constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans.

A construct-first approach to consciousness science

We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.

When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions

In this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal structure theories assert that consciousness depends on a particular causal structure of the brain. Our claim is that some of the assumptions fueling the UA are not warranted, and therefore we should reject the methodology for consciousness science that the UA prescribes. First, we briefly survey the most popular philosophical positions in consciousness science, namely physicalism and functionalism. We discuss the relations between these positions and the behaviorist methodology that the UA assumptions express, despite the contrary claim of its proponents. Second, we argue that the same reasoning that the UA applies against causal structure theories can be applied to functionalist approaches, thus proving too much and deeming as unscientific a whole range of (non-causal structure) theories. Since this is overly restrictive and fits poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience, we suggest that the reasoning of the UA must be flawed. Third, we assess its philosophical assumptions, which express a restrictive methodology, and conclude that there are reasons to reject them. Finally, we propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science, that includes neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence (provided by the first-person perspective) without which consciousness science could not even start. Then, we extend this discussion to the scope of consciousness science, and conclude that theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, and not on systems considerably different from us. Rather than restricting the methodology of consciousness science, we should, at this point, restrict the range of systems upon which it is supposed to be built.

Next frontiers in consciousness research

Consciousness science has matured over the past three decades and is currently on the cusp of explosive growth, with the potential to transform medicine and technology. The global community recently met to synthesize the current state of knowledge and define the most exciting approaches to advance the field.