Executive control and task-switching in monkeys

On the psychometric evaluation of cognitive control tasks: An Investigation with the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMCC) battery

The domain of cognitive control has been a major focus of experimental, neuroscience, and individual differences research. Currently, however, no theory of cognitive control successfully unifies both experimental and individual differences findings. Some perspectives deny that there even exists a unified psychometric cognitive control construct to be measured at all. These shortcomings of the current literature may reflect the fact that current cognitive control paradigms are optimized for the detection of within-subject experimental effects rather than individual differences. In the current study, we examine the psychometric properties of the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMCC) task battery, which was designed in accordance with a theoretical framework that postulates common sources of within-subject and individual differences variation. We evaluated both internal consistency and test-retest reliability, and for the latter, utilized both classical test theory measures (i.e., split-half methods, intraclass correlation) and newer hierarchical Bayesian estimation of generative models. Although traditional psychometric measures suggested poor reliability, the hierarchical Bayesian models indicated a different pattern, with good to excellent test-retest reliability in almost all tasks and conditions examined. Moreover, within-task, between-condition correlations were generally increased when using the Bayesian model-derived estimates, and these higher correlations appeared to be directly linked to the higher reliability of the measures. In contrast, between-task correlations remained low regardless of theoretical manipulations or estimation approach. Together, these findings highlight the advantages of Bayesian estimation methods, while also pointing to the important role of reliability in the search for a unified theory of cognitive control.

Mapping causal links between prefrontal cortical regions and intra-individual behavioral variability

Intra-individual behavioral variability is significantly heightened by aging or neuropsychological disorders, however it is unknown which brain regions are causally linked to such variabilities. We examine response time (RT) variability in 21 macaque monkeys performing a rule-guided decision-making task. In monkeys with selective-bilateral lesions in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) or in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, cognitive flexibility is impaired, but the RT variability is significantly diminished. Bilateral lesions within the frontopolar cortex or within the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, has no significant effect on cognitive flexibility or RT variability. In monkeys with lesions in the posterior cingulate cortex, the RT variability significantly increases without any deficit in cognitive flexibility. The effect of lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is unique in that it leads to deficits in cognitive flexibility and a significant increase in RT variability. Our findings indicate remarkable dissociations in contribution of frontal cortical regions to behavioral variability. They suggest that the altered variability in OFC-lesioned monkeys is related to deficits in assessing and accumulating evidence to inform a rule-guided decision, whereas in ACC-lesioned monkeys it results from a non-adaptive decrease in decision threshold and consequently immature impulsive responses.

Using Nonhuman Primate Models to Reverse-Engineer Prefrontal Circuit Failure Underlying Cognitive Deficits in Schizophrenia

In this chapter, I review studies in nonhuman primates that emulate the circuit failure in prefrontal cortex responsible for working memory and cognitive control deficits in schizophrenia. These studies have characterized how synaptic malfunction, typically induced by blockade of NMDAR, disrupts neural function and computation in prefrontal networks to explain errors in cognitive tasks that are seen in schizophrenia. This work is finding causal relationships between pathogenic events of relevance to schizophrenia at vastly different levels of scale, from synapses, to neurons, local, circuits, distributed networks, computation, and behavior. Pharmacological manipulation, the dominant approach in primate models, has limited construct validity for schizophrenia pathogenesis, as the disease results from a complex interplay between environmental, developmental, and genetic factors. Genetic manipulation replicating schizophrenia risk is more advanced in rodent models. Nonetheless, gene manipulation in nonhuman primates is rapidly advancing, and primate developmental models have been established. Integration of large scale neural recording, genetic manipulation, and computational modeling in nonhuman primates holds considerable potential to provide a crucial schizophrenia model moving forward. Data generated by this approach is likely to fill several crucial gaps in our understanding of the causal sequence leading to schizophrenia in humans. This causal chain presents a vexing problem largely because it requires understanding how events at very different levels of scale relate to one another, from genes to circuits to cognition to social interactions. Nonhuman primate models excel here. They optimally enable discovery of causal relationships across levels of scale in the brain that are relevant to cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. The mechanistic understanding of prefrontal circuit failure they promise to provide may point the way to more effective therapeutic interventions to restore function to prefrontal networks in the disease.

The NMDA receptor antagonist ketamine impairs and delays context-dependent decision making in the parietal cortex

Flexible decision making is an indispensable ability for humans. A subanesthetic dose of ketamine, an N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor antagonist, impairs this flexibility in a manner that is similar to patients with schizophrenia; however how it affects neural processes related to decision making remains unclear. Here, we report that ketamine administration impairs neural processing related to context-dependent decision making, and delays the onset of decision making. We recorded single unit activity in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) while monkeys switched between a direction-discrimination task and a depth-discrimination task. Ketamine impaired choice accuracy for incongruent stimuli that required different decisions depending on the task, for the direction-discrimination task. Neural sensitivity to irrelevant depth information increased with ketamine during direction discrimination in LIP, indicating impaired processing of irrelevant information. Furthermore, the onset of decision-related neural activity was delayed in conjunction with an increased reaction time irrespective of task and stimulus congruency. Neural sensitivity and response onset of the middle temporal area (MT) were not modulated by ketamine, indicating that ketamine worked on neural decision processes downstream of MT. These results suggest that ketamine administration may impair what information to process and when to process it for the purpose of achieving flexible decision making.

Sound Localization of World and Head-Centered Space in Ferrets

The location of sounds can be described in multiple coordinate systems that are defined relative to ourselves, or the world around us. Evidence from neural recordings in animals point toward the existence of both head-centered and world-centered representations of sound location in the brain; however, it is unclear whether such neural representations have perceptual correlates in the sound localization abilities of nonhuman listeners. Here, we establish novel behavioral tests to determine the coordinate systems in which ferrets can localize sounds. We found that ferrets could learn to discriminate between sound locations that were fixed in either world-centered or head-centered space, across wide variations in sound location in the alternative coordinate system. Using probe sounds to assess broader generalization of spatial hearing, we demonstrated that in both head and world-centered tasks, animals used continuous maps of auditory space to guide behavior. Single trial responses of individual animals were sufficiently informative that we could then model sound localization using speaker position in specific coordinate systems and accurately predict ferrets' actions in held-out data. Our results demonstrate that ferrets, an animal model in which neurons are known to be tuned to sound location in egocentric and allocentric reference frames, can also localize sounds in multiple head and world-centered spaces.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Humans can describe the location of sounds either relative to themselves, or in the world, independent of their momentary position. These different spaces are also represented in the activity of neurons in animals, but it is not clear whether nonhuman listeners also perceive both head and world-centered sound location. Here, we designed behavioral tasks in which ferrets discriminated between sounds using their position in the world, or relative to the head. Subjects learnt to solve both problems and generalized sound location in each space when presented with infrequent probe sounds. These findings reveal a perceptual correlate of neural sensitivity previously observed in the ferret brain and establish that, like humans, ferrets can access an auditory map of their local environment.

Executive Functions in Birds

Executive functions comprise of top-down cognitive processes that exert control over information processing, from acquiring information to issuing a behavioral response. These cognitive processes of inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility underpin complex cognitive skills, such as episodic memory and planning, which have been repeatedly investigated in several bird species in recent decades. Until recently, avian executive functions were studied in relatively few bird species but have gained traction in comparative cognitive research following MacLean and colleagues’ large-scale study from 2014. Therefore, in this review paper, the relevant previous findings are collected and organized to facilitate further investigations of these core cognitive processes in birds. This review can assist in integrating findings from avian and mammalian cognitive research and further the current understanding of executive functions’ significance and evolution.

Overcoming cognitive set bias requires more than seeing an alternative strategy

Determining when to switch from one strategy to another is at the heart of adaptive decision-making. Previous research shows that humans exhibit a 'cognitive set' bias, which occurs when a familiar strategy occludes-even much better-alternatives. Here we examined the mechanisms underlying cognitive set by investigating whether better solutions are visually overlooked, or fixated on but disregarded. We analyzed gaze data from 67 American undergraduates (91% female) while they completed the learned strategy-direct strategy (LS-DS) task, which measures their ability to switch from a learned strategy (LS) to a more efficient direct strategy (DS or shortcut). We found that, in the first trial block, participants fixated on the location of the shortcut more when it was available but most (89.6%) did not adopt it. Next, participants watched a video demonstrating either the DS (N = 34 Informed participants) or the familiar LS (N = 33 Controls). In post-video trials, Informed participants used the DS more than pre-video trials and compared to Controls. Notably, 29.4% of Informed participants continued to use the LS despite watching the DS video. We suggest that cognitive set in the LS-DS task does not stem from an inability to see the shortcut but rather a failure to try it.

Focusing and shifting attention in pigeon category learning

Adaptively and flexibly modifying one's behavior depending on the current demands of the situation is a hallmark of executive function. Here, we examined whether pigeons could flexibly shift their attention from one set of features that were relevant in one categorization task to another set of features that were relevant in a second categorization task. Critically, members of both sets of features were available on every training trial, thereby requiring that attention be adaptively deployed on a trial-by-trial basis based on contextual information. The pigeons not only learned to correctly categorize the stimuli but, as training progressed, they concentrated their pecks to the training stimuli (a proxy measure for attention) on those features that were relevant in a specific context. The pigeons selectively tracked the features that were relevant in Context 1-but were irrelevant in Context 2-and they selectively tracked the features that were relevant in Context 2-but were irrelevant in Context 1. This adept feature tracking requires disengaging attention from a previously relevant feature and shifting attention to a previously ignored feature on a trial-by-trial basis. Pigeons' adaptive and flexible performance provides strong empirical support for the involvement of focusing and shifting attention under exceptionally challenging training conditions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Great apes selectively retrieve relevant memories to guide action

Memory allows us to draw on past experiences to inform behaviour in the present. However, memories rarely match the situation at hand exactly, and new situations regularly trigger multiple related memories where only some are relevant to act upon. The flexibility of human memory systems is largely attributed to the ability to disregard irrelevant, but salient, memories in favour of relevant ones. This is considered an expression of an executive function responsible for suppressing irrelevant memories, associated with the prefrontal cortex. It is unclear to what extent animals have access to this ability. Here, we demonstrate, in a series of tool-use tasks designed to evoke conflicting memories, that chimpanzees and an orangutan suffer from this conflict but overcome it in favour of a more relevant memory. Such mnemonic flexibility is among the most advanced expressions of executive function shown in animals to date and might explain several behaviours related to tool-use, innovation, planning and more.

The Effect of Breath Pacing on Task Switching and Working Memory

The cortical and subcortical circuit regulating both cognition and cardiac autonomic interactions are already well established. This circuit has mainly been analyzed from cortex to heart. Thus, the heart rate variability (HRV) is usually considered a reflection of cortical activity. In this paper, we investigate whether HRV changes affect cortical activity. Short-term local autonomic changes were induced by three breathing strategies: spontaneous (Control), normal (NB) and slow paced breathing (SB). We measured the performance in two cognition domains: executive functions and processing speed. Breathing maneuvres produced three clearly differentiated autonomic states, which preconditioned the cognitive tasks. We found that the SB significantly increased the HRV low frequency (LF) power and lowered the power spectral density (PSD) peak to 0.1[Formula: see text]Hz. Meanwhile, executive function was assessed by the working memory test, whose accuracy significantly improved after SB, with no significant changes in the response times. Processing speed was assessed by a multitasking test. Consistently, the proportion of correct answers (success rate) was the only dependent variable affected by short-term and long-term breath pacing. These findings suggest that accuracy, and not timing of these two cognitive domains would benefit from short-term SB in this study population.

Neural Correlates of Strategy Switching in the Macaque Orbital Prefrontal Cortex

We can adapt flexibly to environment changes and search for the most appropriate rule to a context. The orbital prefrontal cortex (PFo) has been associated with decision making, rule generation and maintenance, and more generally has been considered important for behavioral flexibility. To better understand the neural mechanisms underlying the flexible behavior, we studied the ability to generate a switching signal in monkey PFo when a strategy is changed. In the strategy task, we used a visual cue to instruct two male rhesus monkeys either to repeat their most recent choice (i.e., stay strategy) or to change it (i.e., shift strategy). To identify the strategy switching-related signal, we compared nonswitch and switch trials, which cued the same or a different strategy from the previous trial, respectively. We found that the switching-related signal emerged during the cue presentation and it was combined with the strategy signal in a subpopulation of cells. Moreover, the error analysis showed that the activity of the switch-related cells reflected whether the monkeys erroneously switched or not the strategy, rather than what was required for that trial. The function of the switching signal could be to prompt the use of different strategies when older strategies are no longer appropriate, conferring the ability to adapt flexibly to environmental changes. In our task, the switching signal might contribute to the implementation of the strategy cued, overcoming potential interference effects from the strategy previously cued. Our results support the idea that ascribes to PFo an important role for behavioral flexibility.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT We can flexibly adapt our behavior to a changing environment. One of the prefrontal areas traditionally associated with the ability to adapt to new contingencies is the orbital prefrontal cortex (PFo). We analyzed the switching related activity using a strategy task in which two rhesus monkeys were instructed by a visual cue either to repeat or change their most recent choice, respectively using a stay or a shift strategy. We found that PFo neurons were modulated by the strategy switching signal, pointing to the importance of PFo in behavioral flexibility by generating control over the switching of strategies.

Capuchin and rhesus monkeys but not humans show cognitive flexibility in an optional-switch task

Learned rules help us accurately solve many problems, but by blindly following a strategy, we sometimes fail to find more efficient alternatives. Previous research found that humans are more susceptible to this "cognitive set" bias than other primates in a nonverbal computer task. We modified the task to test one hypothesis for this difference, that working memory influences the advantage of taking a shortcut. During training, 60 humans, 7 rhesus macaques, and 22 capuchin monkeys learned to select three icons in sequence. They then completed 96 baseline trials, in which only this learned rule could be used, and 96 probe trials, in which they could also immediately select the final icon. Rhesus and capuchin monkeys took this shortcut significantly more often than humans. Humans used the shortcut more in this new, easier task than in previous work, but started using it significantly later than the monkeys. Some participants of each species also used an intermediate strategy; they began the learned rule but switched to the shortcut after selecting the first item in the sequence. We suggest that these species differences arise from differences in rule encoding and in the relative efficiency of exploiting a familiar strategy versus exploring alternatives.

Exploring individual differences in task switching

Previous research has shown that there are significant task-switching costs even when participants have time to prepare for task switching after cueing. We investigated individual differences in task switching by monitoring errors and response times of individual participants. In Experiment 1A, 58 participants were encouraged to finish the session early by completing 200 consecutive trials without making an error. In case of a mistake, they had to repeat their effort until the experimental session expired. Using this demanding procedure, 16 participants managed to complete early. Among these 16 we identified 9 best performers who showed no significant switch costs. We conducted follow-up Experiment 1B on these best performers by systematically varying cue-stimulus intervals and inter-trial intervals. The results confirmed that these participants had no significant RT and ER switch costs when they had time to prepare the task between cue and target onset. However, significant switch costs emerged when cue and target stimulus were presented simultaneously. In Experiment 1C, using three classical task-switching paradigms, we compared the best performers with 9 controls who had made frequent errors in Experiment 1A. Although the best performers responded faster and made fewer errors, they only showed reduced switch costs in a pre-cued paradigm that had been extensively practiced. In two other paradigms with simultaneous presentation of cue and target stimulus, best performers had switch costs and showed considerable individual differences similar to the controls. We conclude that there are considerable individual differences in task switching and that smaller individual switch costs are mainly related to efficient task preparation. We speculate that efficient task preparation may be linked to better executive control and general intelligence.

Spatial and Temporal Organization of the Individual Human Cerebellum

The cerebellum contains the majority of neurons in the human brain and is unique for its uniform cytoarchitecture, absence of aerobic glycolysis, and role in adaptive plasticity. Despite anatomical and physiological differences between the cerebellum and cerebral cortex, group-average functional connectivity studies have identified networks related to specific functions in both structures. Recently, precision functional mapping of individuals revealed that functional networks in the cerebral cortex exhibit measurable individual specificity. Using the highly sampled Midnight Scan Club (MSC) dataset, we found the cerebellum contains reliable, individual-specific network organization that is significantly more variable than the cerebral cortex. The frontoparietal network, thought to support adaptive control, was the only network overrepresented in the cerebellum compared to the cerebral cortex (2.3-fold). Temporally, all cerebellar resting state signals lagged behind the cerebral cortex (125-380 ms), supporting the hypothesis that the cerebellum engages in a domain-general function in the adaptive control of all cortical processes.

Functional MRI in Macaque Monkeys during Task Switching

Nonhuman primates have proven to be a valuable animal model for exploring neuronal mechanisms of cognitive control. One important aspect of executive control is the ability to switch from one task to another, and task-switching paradigms have often been used in human volunteers to uncover the underlying neuronal processes. To date, however, no study has investigated task-switching paradigms in nonhuman primates during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We trained two rhesus macaques to switch between arm movement, eye movement, and passive fixation tasks during fMRI. Similar to results obtained in human volunteers, task switching elicits increased fMRI activations in prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and caudate nucleus. Our results indicate that the macaque monkey is a reliable model with which to investigate higher-order cognitive functioning such as task switching. As such, these results can pave the way for a detailed investigation of the neural basis of complex human behavior.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Task switching is an important aspect of cognitive control, and task-switching paradigms have often been used to investigate higher-order executive functioning in human volunteers. We used a task-switching paradigm in the nonhuman primate during fMRI and found increased activation mainly in prefrontal areas (46, 45, frontal eye field, and anterior cingulate), in orbitofrontal area 12, and in the caudate nucleus. These data fit surprisingly well with previous human imaging data, proving that the monkey is an excellent model to study task switching with high spatiotemporal resolution tools that are currently not applicable in humans. As such, our results pave the way for a detailed interrogation of regions performing similar executive functions in humans and monkeys.

Enhanced Cognitive Flexibility in the Seminomadic Himba

Through codified rule-use, humans can accurately solve many problems. Yet, mechanized strategies can also be costly. After adopting a solution strategy, humans often become blind to alternatives, even when those alternatives are more efficient. Termed cognitive set, this failure to switch from a familiar strategy to a better alternative has been considered universally human. Yet, our understanding of this phenomenon is derived almost exclusively from Western subjects. In this study, we used the nonverbal Learned Strategy–Direct Strategy (LS-DS) touchscreen task in which subjects are presented with an opportunity to use either a learned strategy or a more efficient, but novel, shortcut. We found that the remote, seminomadic Himba of northern Namibia exhibited enhanced shortcut-use on the LS-DS task, challenging the claim that cognitive set affects humans universally. In addition, we found that altering subjects’ conceptualization of the shortcut as a viable option significantly enhanced its subsequent use in Western but not Himba participants. We discuss how other aspects of cultural variation, namely, environmental uncertainty and educational background, might contribute to the observed cross-cultural differences in flexible strategy-use.

Neuronal Correlates of Serial Decision-Making in the Supplementary Eye Field

Human behavior is influenced by serial decision-making: past decisions affect choices that set the context for selecting future options. A primate brain region that may be involved in linking decisions across time is the supplementary eye field (SEF), which, in addition to its well known visual responses and saccade-related activity, also signals the rules that govern flexible decisions and the outcomes of those decisions. Our hypotheses were that SEF neurons encode events during serial decision-making and link the sequential decisions with sustained activity. We recorded from neurons in the SEF of two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta, one male, one female) that performed a serial decision-making task. The monkeys used saccades to select a rule that had to be applied later in the same trial to discriminate between visual stimuli. We found, first, that SEF neurons encoded the spatial parameters of saccades during rule selection but not during visual discrimination, suggesting a malleability to their movement-related tuning. Second, SEF activity linked the sequential decisions of rule selection and visual discrimination, but not continuously. Instead, rule-encoding activity appeared in a "just-in-time" manner before the visual discrimination. Third, SEF neurons encoded trial outcomes both prospectively, before decisions within a trial, and retrospectively, across multiple trials. The results thus identify neuronal correlates of rule selection and application in the SEF, including transient signals that link these sequential decisions. Its activity patterns suggest that the SEF participates in serial decision-making in a contextually dependent manner as part of a broader network.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Much research has gone into studying the neurobiological basis of single, isolated decisions. An important next step is to understand how the brain links multiple decisions to generate a coherent stream of thought and behavior. We studied neural activity related to serial decision-making in an area of frontal cortex known as the supplementary eye field (SEF). Neural recordings were conducted in monkeys that performed a serial decision-making task in which they selected and applied rules. We found that SEF neurons convey signals for serial decision-making, including transient encoding of one decision at the time it is needed for the next one and longer-term representations of trial outcomes, suggesting that the region plays a role in continuity of cognition and behavior.

Task switching in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) during computerized categorization tasks

The present experiments extended to monkeys a previously used abstract categorization procedure (Castro & Wasserman, 2016) where pigeons had categorized arrays of clipart icons based upon two task rules: the number of clipart objects in the array or the variability of objects in the array. Experiment 1 replicated Castro and Wasserman by using capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys and reported that monkeys' performances were similar to pigeons' in terms of acquisition, pattern of errors, and the absence of switch costs. Furthermore, monkeys' insensitivity to the added irrelevant information suggested that an associative (rather than rule-based) categorization mechanism was dominant. Experiment 2 was conducted to include categorization cue reversals to determine (a) whether the monkeys would quickly adapt to the reversals and inhibit interference from a prereversal task rule (consistent with a rule-based mechanism) and (b) whether the latency to make a response prior to a correct or incorrect outcome was informative about the presence of a cognitive mechanism. The cue reassignment produced profound and long-lasting performance deficits, and a long reacquisition phase suggested the involvement of associative learning processes; however, monkeys also displayed longer latencies to choose prior to correct responses on challenging trials, suggesting the involvement of nonassociative processes. Together these performances suggest a mix of associative and cognitive-control processes governing monkey categorization judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record

Contrasting effects of pre-training on acquisition of operant and radial arm maze tasks in rats

Performing multiple tasks either simultaneously, in rapid alternation or in succession, is routine in daily life. Further, testing rodents in a battery of tests is common both in drug discovery and behavioral phenotyping research. However, learning of new tasks can be influenced by prior experience(s). There has been some research on 'switching cost' involved in the transition from one behavior to another. However, there has been no specific assessment of the effect of learning an operant paradigm on performance in a spatial memory task and vice versa. Accordingly, we evaluated task switching between two forms of learning paradigms, operant conditioning and radial arm maze (RAM) tasks. In experiment 1, rats were trained for operant conditioning with food reward followed by a partially baited RAM task. In experiment 2, rats were trained first on a RAM task followed by operant learning. Pre-training on the operant task, impaired the acquisition of the RAM. On the contrary, pre-training on the RAM enhanced operant performance. Our study reveals significant effects of the test order on task-switching in rats. This knowledge can be useful when framing test sequences in test batteries for drug discovery research and screening genetically modified mice.

Neural correlates for task switching in the macaque superior colliculus

Successful task switching requires a network of brain areas to select, maintain, implement, and execute the appropriate task. Although frontoparietal brain areas are thought to play a critical role in task switching by selecting and encoding task rules and exerting top-down control, how brain areas closer to the execution of tasks participate in task switching is unclear. The superior colliculus (SC) integrates information from various brain areas to generate saccades and is likely influenced by task switching. Here, we investigated switch costs in nonhuman primates and their neural correlates in the activity of SC saccade-related neurons in monkeys performing cued, randomly interleaved pro- and anti-saccade trials. We predicted that behavioral switch costs would be associated with differential modulations of SC activity in trials on which the task was switched vs. repeated, with activity on the current trial resembling that associated with the task set of the previous trial when a switch occurred. We observed both error rate and reaction time switch costs and changes in the discharge rate and timing of activity in SC neurons between switch and repeat trials. These changes were present later in the task only after fixation on the cue stimuli but before saccade onset. These results further establish switch costs in macaque monkeys and suggest that SC activity is modulated by task-switching processes in a manner inconsistent with the concept of task set inertia.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Task-switching behavior and superior colliculus (SC) activity were investigated in nonhuman primates performing randomly interleaved pro- and anti-saccade tasks. Here, we report error rate and reaction time switch costs in macaque monkeys and associated differences in stimulus-related activity of saccade-related neurons in the SC. These results provide a neural correlate for task switching and suggest that the SC is modulated by task-switching processes and may reflect the completion of task set reconfiguration.

Perceptual category learning of photographic and painterly stimuli in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans

Humans are highly adept at categorizing visual stimuli, but studies of human categorization are typically validated by verbal reports. This makes it difficult to perform comparative studies of categorization using non-human animals. Interpretation of comparative studies is further complicated by the possibility that animal performance may merely reflect reinforcement learning, whereby discrete features act as discriminative cues for categorization. To assess and compare how humans and monkeys classified visual stimuli, we trained 7 rhesus macaques and 41 human volunteers to respond, in a specific order, to four simultaneously presented stimuli at a time, each belonging to a different perceptual category. These exemplars were drawn at random from large banks of images, such that the stimuli presented changed on every trial. Subjects nevertheless identified and ordered these changing stimuli correctly. Three monkeys learned to order naturalistic photographs; four others, close-up sections of paintings with distinctive styles. Humans learned to order both types of stimuli. All subjects classified stimuli at levels substantially greater than that predicted by chance or by feature-driven learning alone, even when stimuli changed on every trial. However, humans more closely resembled monkeys when classifying the more abstract painting stimuli than the photographic stimuli. This points to a common classification strategy in both species, one that humans can rely on in the absence of linguistic labels for categories.

Transitive inference in humans (Homo sapiens) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) after massed training of the last two list items

Transitive inference (TI) is a classic learning paradigm for which the relative contributions of experienced rewards and representation-driven inference have been vigorously debated, particularly with regard to the notion that animals are capable of logic and reasoning. Rhesus macaque subjects and human participants performed a TI task in which, prior to learning a seven-item list ABCDEFG, a block of trials presented exclusively the pair FG. Contrary to the expectation of associative models, the high prior rate of reward for F did not disrupt learning of the entire list. Monkeys (who each completed many sessions) learned to anticipate that novel stimuli should be preferred over F. We interpret this as evidence of a task representation of TI that generalizes beyond learning about specific stimuli. Humans (who were task-naïve) showed a transitory bias to F when it was paired with novel stimuli, but very rapidly unlearned that bias. Performance with respect to the remaining stimuli was consistent with past reports of TI in both species. These results are difficult to reconcile with any account that seeks to assign the strength of association between individual stimuli and rewards. Instead, they support both sophisticated cognitive processes in both species, albeit with some species differences.

Monkeys head-gaze following is fast, precise and not fully suppressible

Human eye-gaze is a powerful stimulus, drawing the observer's attention to places and objects of interest to someone else ('eye-gaze following'). The largely homogeneous eyes of monkeys, compromising the assessment of eye-gaze by conspecifics from larger distances, explain the absence of comparable eye-gaze following in these animals. Yet, monkeys are able to use peer head orientation to shift attention ('head-gaze following'). How similar are monkeys' head-gaze and human eye-gaze following? To address this question, we trained rhesus monkeys to make saccades to targets, either identified by the head-gaze of demonstrator monkeys or, alternatively, identified by learned associations between the demonstrators' facial identities and the targets (gaze versus identity following). In a variant of this task that occurred at random, the instruction to follow head-gaze or identity was replaced in the course of a trial by the new rule to detect a change of luminance of one of the saccade targets. Although this change-of-rule rendered the demonstrator portraits irrelevant, they nevertheless influenced performance, reflecting a precise redistribution of spatial attention. The specific features depended on whether the initial rule was head-gaze or identity following: head-gaze caused an insuppressible shift of attention to the target gazed at by the demonstrator, whereas identity matching prompted much later shifts of attention, however, only if the initial rule had been identity following. Furthermore, shifts of attention prompted by head-gaze were spatially precise. Automaticity and swiftness, spatial precision and limited executive control characterizing monkeys' head-gaze following are key features of human eye-gaze following. This similarity supports the notion that both may rely on the same conserved neural circuitry.

Preclinical Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Spectroscopy Studies of Memory, Aging, and Cognitive Decline

Neuroimaging provides for non-invasive evaluation of brain structure and activity and has been employed to suggest possible mechanisms for cognitive aging in humans. However, these imaging procedures have limits in terms of defining cellular and molecular mechanisms. In contrast, investigations of cognitive aging in animal models have mostly utilized techniques that have offered insight on synaptic, cellular, genetic, and epigenetic mechanisms affecting memory. Studies employing magnetic resonance imaging and spectroscopy (MRI and MRS, respectively) in animal models have emerged as an integrative set of techniques bridging localized cellular/molecular phenomenon and broader in vivo neural network alterations. MRI methods are remarkably suited to longitudinal tracking of cognitive function over extended periods permitting examination of the trajectory of structural or activity related changes. Combined with molecular and electrophysiological tools to selectively drive activity within specific brain regions, recent studies have begun to unlock the meaning of fMRI signals in terms of the role of neural plasticity and types of neural activity that generate the signals. The techniques provide a unique opportunity to causally determine how memory-relevant synaptic activity is processed and how memories may be distributed or reconsolidated over time. The present review summarizes research employing animal MRI and MRS in the study of brain function, structure, and biochemistry, with a particular focus on age-related cognitive decline.

The Monitoring and Control of Task Sequences in Human and Non-Human Primates

Our ability to plan and execute a series of tasks leading to a desired goal requires remarkable coordination between sensory, motor, and decision-related systems. Prefrontal cortex (PFC) is thought to play a central role in this coordination, especially when actions must be assembled extemporaneously and cannot be programmed as a rote series of movements. A central component of this flexible behavior is the moment-by-moment allocation of working memory and attention. The ubiquity of sequence planning in our everyday lives belies the neural complexity that supports this capacity, and little is known about how frontal cortical regions orchestrate the monitoring and control of sequential behaviors. For example, it remains unclear if and how sensory cortical areas, which provide essential driving inputs for behavior, are modulated by the frontal cortex during these tasks. Here, we review what is known about moment-to-moment monitoring as it relates to visually guided, rule-driven behaviors that change over time. We highlight recent human work that shows how the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC) participates in monitoring during task sequences. Neurophysiological data from monkeys suggests that monitoring may be accomplished by neurons that respond to items within the sequence and may in turn influence the tuning properties of neurons in posterior sensory areas. Understanding the interplay between proceduralized or habitual acts and supervised control of sequences is key to our understanding of sequential task execution. A crucial bridge will be the use of experimental protocols that allow for the examination of the functional homology between monkeys and humans. We illustrate how task sequences may be parceled into components and examined experimentally, thereby opening future avenues of investigation into the neural basis of sequential monitoring and control.

Baboons (Papio papio), but not humans, break cognitive set in a visuomotor task

Cognitive set can be both helpful and harmful in problem solving. A large set of similar problems may be solved mechanically by applying a single-solution method. However, efficiency might be sacrificed if a better solution exists and is overlooked. Despite half a century of research on cognitive set, there have been no attempts to investigate whether it occurs in nonhuman species. The current study utilized a nonverbal, computer task to compare cognitive set between 104 humans and 15 baboons (Papio papio). A substantial difference was found between humans' and baboons' abilities to break cognitive set. Consistent with previous studies, the majority of humans were highly impaired by set, yet baboons were almost completely unaffected. Analysis of the human data revealed that children (aged 7-10) were significantly better able to break set than adolescents (11-18) and adults (19-68). Both the evolutionary and developmental implications of these findings are discussed.

Response-Conflict Moderates the Cognitive Control of Episodic and Contextual Load in Older Adults

OBJECTIVES

Decline in cognitive control is one of the primary cognitive changes in normal aging. Reaching a consensus regarding the nature of these age-related changes, however, is complicated by the complexity of cognitive control as a construct.

METHODS

Healthy older and younger adults participated in a multifactorial test of cognitive control. Within participants, the procedure varied as a function of the amount contextual load, episodic load, and response-conflict load present.

RESULTS

We found that older adults showed impaired performance relative to younger adults. We also found, however, that the response selection process underlying the response-conflict manipulation was a major moderator of age-related differences in both the contextual and episodic load conditions-suggesting a hierarchical organization.

DISCUSSION

These findings are consistent with previous findings, suggesting that deficits in cognitive control in older adults are directly related to the resolution of response-conflict and that other apparent deficits may be derivative upon the more basic response-conflict related deficit.

The long and the short of it: rule-based relative length discrimination in carrion crows, Corvus corone

Birds and other nonhuman animals can choose the larger of two discrete or continuous quantities. However, whether birds possess the conceptual grasp and cognitive control to flexibly switch between relative more-or-less-than judgments remains elusive. We therefore tested carrion crows in a rule-based line-length discrimination task to flexibly select lines presented on a touchscreen according to their relative length. In the first experiment, the crows needed to discriminate a shorter from a longer line, and vice versa. In the second experiment, the crows were required to choose a medium long line among three lines of different length (intermediate-size task). The crows switched effortlessly between "longer than/shorter than" rules, showing no signs of trial history affecting switching performance. They reliably chose the relatively longer and shorter line length, thus demonstrating a concept of greater than/less than with a continuous magnitude. However, both crows failed to discriminate a line of 'medium' length embedded in longer and shorter lines. These results indicate that relational discrimination exhibits different cognitive demands. While a greater than/less than concept requires only one relational comparison (with the respectively greater or smaller magnitude), the discrimination of a 'medium' magnitude demands to relate two or more comparisons, which might overburden crows and maybe animals in general.

Task switching among two or four tasks: effects of a short-term variation of the number of candidate tasks

In two experiments, using a modified task-cueing paradigm, participants switched among a set of four tasks that was on some trials reduced to two by a pre-cue preceding the task cue. A pre-cue temporarily restricting the options to two candidate tasks facilitated performance on switch trials to a much larger extent than on repeat trials. This observation is interpreted as an indication of a short-term restructuring of a global task representation by implementing antagonistic constraints among the representations of the two remaining candidate tasks.

Dopaminergic control of cognitive flexibility in humans and animals

Striatal dopamine (DA) is thought to code for learned associations between cues and reinforcers and to mediate approach behavior toward a reward. Less is known about the contribution of DA to cognitive flexibility—the ability to adapt behavior in response to changes in the environment. Altered reward processing and impairments in cognitive flexibility are observed in psychiatric disorders such as obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). Patients with this disorder show a disruption of functioning in the frontostriatal circuit and alterations in DA signaling. In this review we summarize findings from animal and human studies that have investigated the involvement of striatal DA in cognitive flexibility. These findings may provide a better understanding of the role of dopaminergic dysfunction in cognitive inflexibility in psychiatric disorders, such as OCD.

Rapid cognitive flexibility of rhesus macaques performing psychophysical task-switching

Three rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) performed a simultaneous chaining task in which stimuli had to be sorted according to their visual properties. Each stimulus could vary independently along two dimensions (luminosity and radius), and a cue indicating which dimension to sort by was random trial to trial. These rapid and unpredictable changes constitute a task-switching paradigm, in which subjects must encode task demands and shift to whichever task-set is presently activated. In contrast to the widely reported task-switching delay observed in human studies, our subjects show no appreciable reduction in reaction times following a switch in the task requirements. Also, in contrast to the results of studies on human subjects, monkeys experienced enduring interference from trial-irrelevant stimulus features, even after exhaustive training. These results are consistent with a small but growing body of evidence that task-switching in rhesus macaques differs in basic ways from the pattern of behavior reported in studies of human cognition. Given the importance of task-switching paradigms in cognitive and clinical assessment, and the frequency with which corresponding animal models rely on non-human primates, understanding these differences in behavior is essential to the comparative study of cognitive impairment.

The role of executive control in tool use

Comparing cognitive functions between humans and nonhuman primates is helpful for understanding human tool use. We comment on the latest insights from comparative research on executive control functions. Based on our own work, we discuss how even a mental function in which non-human primates outperform humans might have played a key role in the development of tool use.

Does the macaque monkey provide a good model for studying human executive control? A comparative behavioral study of task switching

The ability to swiftly and smoothly switch from one task set to another is central to intelligent behavior, because it allows an organism to flexibly adapt to ever changing environmental conditions and internal needs. For this reason, researchers interested in executive control processes have often relied on task-switching paradigms as powerful tools to uncover the underlying cognitive and brain architecture. In order to gather fundamental information at the single-cell level, it would be greatly helpful to demonstrate that non-human primates, especially the macaque monkey, share with us similar behavioral manifestations of task-switching and therefore, in all likelihood, similar underlying brain mechanisms. Unfortunately, prior attempts have provided negative results (e.g., Stoet & Snyder, 2003b), in that it was reported that macaques do not show the typical signature of task-switching operations at the behavioral level, represented by switch costs. If confirmed, this would indicate that the macaque cannot be used as a model approach to explore human executive control mechanisms by means of task-switching paradigms. We have therefore decided to re-explore this issue, by conducting a comparative experiment on a group of human participants and two macaque monkeys, whereby we measured and compared performance costs linked to task switching and resistance to interference across the two species. Contrary to what previously reported, we found that both species display robust task switching costs, thus supporting the claim that macaque monkeys provide an exquisitely suitable model to study the brain mechanisms responsible for maintaining and switching task sets.

Cognitive control: easy to identify but hard to define

Cognitive control is easy to identify in its effects, but difficult to grasp conceptually. This creates somewhat of a puzzle: Is cognitive control a bona fide process or an epiphenomenon that merely exists in the mind of the observer? The topiCS special edition on cognitive control presents a broad set of perspectives on this issue and helps to clarify central conceptual and empirical challenges confronting the field. Our commentary provides a summary of and critical response to each of the papers.

Neuronal signal dynamics during preparation and execution for behavioral shifting in macaque posterior parietal cortex

Cognitive flexibility arises from our ability to shift behaviors depending on demand changes. Behavioral shifting recruits both a preparatory process for an upcoming behavior and an execution process for the actual behavior. Although neuroimaging studies have shown that several brain regions, including posterior parietal cortex (PPC) participated in each component process, it remains unresolved how such processes are implemented at the single-cell level or even whether these processes are distinctively carried out across microstructures in such regions. By recording single-unit activity from PPC of two monkeys performing an analog of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, we found that, in the execution process, two types of neurons exhibited activity modulation depending on whether shift was (shift trial) or was not required (nonshift trial): one type showing larger activity and the other showing smaller activity in the shift trial than in the nonshift trial. In the preparatory process, in contrast, the population activity of both types became larger in the shift trial than in the nonshift trial. The majority of both types exhibited shift-related activity modulation in both processes, whereas the remaining was specialized in the execution process. The former and the latter neurons were spatially intermingled within PPC. Significantly, when the animals performed set shifting spontaneously in prospect of a demand change, the shift-related activity modulation still emerged in both processes. We suggest that both execution and preparation signals are represented within PPC, and that these signals reflect behavioral shifting mechanisms that can be driven by either internal or external triggers.

Syntactic sequencing in Hebbian cell assemblies

Hebbian cell assemblies provide a theoretical framework for the modeling of cognitive processes that grounds them in the underlying physiological neural circuits. Recently we have presented an extension of cell assemblies by operational components which allows to model aspects of language, rules, and complex behaviour. In the present work we study the generation of syntactic sequences using operational cell assemblies timed by unspecific trigger signals. Syntactic patterns are implemented in terms of hetero-associative transition graphs in attractor networks which cause a directed flow of activity through the neural state space. We provide regimes for parameters that enable an unspecific excitatory control signal to switch reliably between attractors in accordance with the implemented syntactic rules. If several target attractors are possible in a given state, noise in the system in conjunction with a winner-takes-all mechanism can randomly choose a target. Disambiguation can also be guided by context signals or specific additional external signals. Given a permanently elevated level of external excitation the model can enter an autonomous mode, where it generates temporal grammatical patterns continuously.

Comparing the bird in the hand with the ones in the bush

In this issue of Neuron, Boorman and colleagues shed new light on the roles of lateral frontopolar and ventromedial prefrontal cortices in task switching and decision making.

Cognitive set reconfiguration signaled by macaque posterior parietal neurons

When faced with problems, we can flexibly change our ways of thinking or our point of view. Our cognitive flexibility arises from this ability of shifting cognitive sets. To elucidate how this dynamic process is implemented in the primate brain, single-unit activity was recorded from the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) of two monkeys performing analogs of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which is most commonly used to test cognitive flexibility in humans. We successfully trained the monkeys to promptly perform set shifting, mostly within a single trial, and found shift-related activity: PPC neurons were transiently activated when the monkeys shifted from one cognitive set to another, but not when they shifted in the opposite direction. This shift-related activity emerged about 4 s before the actual behavioral responses, and it well predicted whether the cognitive set would be successfully shifted. These results provide insights into single-unit level mechanisms of cognitive flexibility.

Neural correlates of executive control functions in the monkey

Executive control functions (ECFs) have become an important topic in the cognitive sciences in the past 40 years. The number of publications has steadily increased, and in the last decade, studies have been conducted in one of the best models of human cognition: the old-world macaque monkey. Here, we review recent studies in the monkey that have contributed to our understanding of the neuronal implementation of ECFs, with a focus on task-switching paradigms. These paradigms have revealed that ECFs are distributed across both the parietal and frontal lobes.

Conflict-induced behavioural adjustment: a clue to the executive functions of the prefrontal cortex

The behavioural adjustment that follows the experience of conflict has been extensively studied in humans, leading to influential models of executive-control adjustment. Recent studies have revealed striking similarities in conflict-induced behavioural adjustment between humans and monkeys, indicating that monkeys can provide a model to study the underlying neural substrates and mechanisms of such behaviour. These studies have advanced our knowledge about the role of different prefrontal brain regions, including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), in executive-control adjustment and suggest a pivotal role for the DLPFC in the dynamic tuning of executive control and, consequently, in behavioural adaptation to changing environments.

A dual-networks architecture of top-down control

Complex systems ensure resilience through multiple controllers acting at rapid and slower timescales. The need for efficient information flow through complex systems encourages small-world network structures. On the basis of these principles, a group of regions associated with top-down control was examined. Functional magnetic resonance imaging showed that each region had a specific combination of control signals; resting-state functional connectivity grouped the regions into distinct 'fronto-parietal' and 'cingulo-opercular' components. The fronto-parietal component seems to initiate and adjust control; the cingulo-opercular component provides stable 'set-maintenance' over entire task epochs. Graph analysis showed dense local connections within components and weaker 'long-range' connections between components, suggesting a small-world architecture. The control systems of the brain seem to embody the principles of complex systems, encouraging resilient performance.

The Cerebellum Mediates Conflict Resolution

Regions within the frontal and parietal cortex have been implicated as important neural correlates for cognitive control during conflict resolution. Despite the extensive reciprocal connectivity between the cerebellum and these putatively critical cortical areas, a role for the cerebellum in conflict resolution has never been identified. We used a task-switching paradigm that separates processes related to task-set switching and the management of response conflict independent of motor processing. Eleven patients with chronic, focal lesions to the cerebellum and 11 healthy controls were compared. Patients were slower and less accurate in conditions involving conflict resolution. In the absence of response conflict, however, tasks-witching abilities were not impaired in our patients. The cerebellum may play an important role in coordinating with other areas of cortex to modulate active response states. These results are the first demonstration of impaired conflict resolution following cerebellar lesions in the presence of an intact prefrontal cortex.