Community rating in health insurance and different benefit packages

Can risk rating increase the ability of voluntary deductibles to reduce moral hazard?

Several regulated health insurance markets include the option for consumers to choose a voluntary deductible. An important motive for this option is to reduce moral hazard. In return for a voluntary deductible, consumers receive a premium rebate, which is typically community rated. Under community rating, voluntary deductibles are particularly attractive for low-risk consumers. Since these people use relatively little medical care, the total moral hazard reduction might be relatively small compared to the total healthcare spending. This paper examines the potential moral hazard reduction under risk-rated premiums. We use Chile as a case study due to institutional features that make it a valid benchmark for other countries. Our simulations show that in the presence of self-selection and under a uniform percentage moral hazard reduction across risk types, the absolute moral hazard reduction from a voluntary deductible is indeed expected to be larger in a system with risk-rated premiums than in a system with community-rated premiums. Nevertheless, sensitivity checks show that this conclusion might no longer hold as the percentage moral hazard reduction is lower for high-risk individuals compared to low-risk individuals.

Voluntary private health insurance among the over 50s in Europe

Using data from Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), we investigate the determinants of voluntary private health insurance (VPHI) among the over 50s in 11 European countries and their effects on healthcare spending. First, we find that the main determinants of VPHI are different in each country, reflecting differences in the underlying healthcare systems, but in most countries, education levels and cognitive abilities have a strong positive effect on holding a VPHI policy. We also analyse the effect of holding a voluntary additional health insurance policy on out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare spending. We adopt a simultaneous equations approach to control for self-selection into VPHI policy holding and find that, only in the Netherlands, VPHI policyholders have lower OOP spending than the rest of the population, whereas in some countries (Italy, Spain, Denmark and Austria), they spend significantly more. This could be due to not only increased utilisation but also cost-sharing measures adopted by the insurers to counter the effects of moral hazard and to keep adverse selection under control.

Risk selection and complementary health insurance: the Swiss approach

To avoid risk selection, the market for complementary health insurance is usually completely separate from the market for basic health insurance. In Switzerland, however, the basic benefit package and complementary insurance are offered by the same insurer. Risk-based premiums are allowed with respect to complementary insurance. This paper compares the Swiss integration approach to the separation approach. It is shown that under the integration approach insurers cream-skim by selling complementary insurance to low risks at a discount. Nevertheless, the integration approach can be Pareto-superior if the cost savings due to the integration of basic and complementary insurance are sufficiently large.

Risk selection in the German public health insurance system

The German statutory health insurance market was exposed to competition in 1996. To limit direct risk selection the regulator required open enrollment. As the risk compensation scheme, introduced in 1994, is highly incomplete, substantial incentives for risk selection exist. Due to their low premiums, company-based sickness funds have been able to attract a lot of new members. We analyze, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, the determinants of switching behavior from 1995 to 2000. There is no evidence for selection by funds. The success of the company-based sickness funds originates in incomplete risk adjustment together with the negative correlation between health status and switching costs.