Adaptation and natural selection: A new look at some old ideas

Haplotypes Phased from Population Transcriptomes Detecting Selection in the Initial Adaptation of Miscanthus lutarioriparius to Stressful Environments

Adaptation is a characteristic that enhances the survival or reproduction of organisms; selection is the critical process leading to adaptive evolution. Therefore, detecting selection is important in studying evolutionary biology. Changes in allele frequency are fundamental to adaptive evolution. The allele frequency of entire genes at the genomic scale is more intensive and precise for analyzing selection effects, compared with simple sequence repeat and single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) alleles from nuclear gene fragments. Here, we analyzed 29,094 SNPs derived from 80 individuals of 14 L. Liou ex S.L. Chen & Renvoize populations planted near their native habitat (Jiangxia, Hubei Province, JH) and a stressful environment (Qingyang, Gansu Province, QG) to detect selection during initial adaptation. The nucleotide diversity of over 60% of genes was decreased in QG compared with JH, suggesting that most genes were undergoing selection in the stressful environment. We explored a new approach based on haplotype data inferred from RNA-seq data to analyze the change in frequency between two sites and to detect selection signals. In total, 402 and 51 genes were found to be targets of positive and negative selection, respectively. Among these candidate genes, the enrichment of abiotic stress-response genes and photosynthesis-related genes might have been responsible for establishment in the stressful environment. This is the first study assessing the change in allele frequency at the genomic level during adaptation. The method in which allele frequency detects selection during initial adaptation using population RNA-seq data would be useful for developing evolutionary biology.

What is selected in group selection?

Misunderstandings often develop when scientists from different backgrounds use the same words (e.g., “selection”) when they mean different things by them. Theorists must therefore choose and define their terms carefully. In addition, proponents of “new” theories need to demonstrate empirically that theirs are more powerful than the existing theories they wish to supplant. Wilson & Sober have not yet done this.

Group selection or categorical perception?

Humans appear to be possible candidates for group selection because they are often said to live in bands, clans, and tribes. These terms, however, are only names for conceptual categories of people. They do not designate enduring bounded gatherings of people that might be “vehicles of selection.” Hence, group selection has probably not been a major force in human evolution.

Genier than thou

Many neo-Darwinists treat natural selection of genes and individual organisms as broadly equivalent. This enables Wilson & Sober (W&S) to propose a multilevel group selection model by drawing parallels between individuals and groups. The notion of gene/individual equivalence is a profound misconception. Its elimination negates W&S's current approach but offers the best way forward for both life and behavioural sciences.

More on group selection and human behavior

The six commentaries raise five issues about multi-level selection theory that we attempt to address: (1) replicators without vehicles, (2) group selection and movement between groups, (3) absolute versus relative fitness, (4) group-level psychological adaptions, and (5) multi-level selection as a predictive theory.

Group selection and “the pious gene”

If selection at the group level is to be considered more than a mere possibility, it is important to find phenomena that are best explained at this level of selection. I argue that human religious phenomena provide evidence for the selection of a “pious gene” at the group level, which results in a human tendency to believe in a transcendental reality that encourages behavioral conformity to collective as opposed to individual interest.

Does a prosocial-selfish distinction help explain the biological affects? Comment on Buck (1999)

R. Buck (1999) argued that a conceptual distinction between prosocial and selfish motivation is necessary to understand the biological affects (consciously experienced feelings and desires having an innate neurochemical basis). However, at a biological level of analysis, a prosocial-selfish distinction is doubtful empirically and conceptually. For this reason, Buck's proposed typology of biological affects is unclear. Moreover, a prosocial-selfish distinction is not necessary to explain hemispheric differences in brain activity associated with affect. In contrast, an approach-withdrawal distinction explains some data uniquely well, although numerous exceptions imply that simple models are inadequate. To extend hemispheric models of experienced emotion, a prosocial-selfish distinction is unlikely to be explanatory, whereas an alternative account based on a distinction between verbal and nonverbal working memory may be useful.

Authoritarianism as a group-level adaptation in humans

Wilson & Sober's discussion of group selection is marred by the absence of plausible examples of human group-level behavioral adaptation. The trait of authoritarianism is one possible example of such an adaptation. It reduces within-group variance in reproductive success, manifests itself more strongly in response to group-level threat, and is found in a variety of cultures.

Varieties of group selection

Group selection may be defined either broadly or narrowly. Narrowly defined group selection may involve either selection for altruism or group selection between alternative evolutionarily stable states. The last variety of group selection is likely to have been particularly important in human evolution.