Are involuntary autobiographical memory and déjà vu natural products of memory retrieval?

The Multiple Dimensions of Familiarity: From Representations to Phenomenology

This article focuses on familiarity, the form of memory allowing humans to recognize stimuli that have been encountered before. We aim to emphasize its complex nature which includes representational and phenomenological dimensions. The former implies that its neural correlates depend on the type and complexity of the cue stimulus, as different classes of stimuli are represented in distributed ventral visual and medial temporal regions. The second dimension relates to the subjective feeling of familiarity, which results from a fluency signal that is attributed to past encounters with the stimulus. We review mnemonic and non-mnemonic sources of fluency that can induce a sense of familiarity, as well as cases where fluency is not attributed to memory, among which the phenomenological experience of déjà-vu. Across these two dimensions, we highlight key questions to be answered by future studies to improve our understanding of the underpinnings of this form of memory and contribute to building an integrative neurocognitive model of familiarity. Essential to this aim is the clarification of the computational, cognitive, and neural mechanisms involved, namely global matching, fluency attribution, and sharpening. Furthermore, future research is needed to unravel the relationships between these mechanisms. We argue that to achieve these goals, researchers must use appropriate behavioral paradigms and clearly define which dimension of familiarity they investigate.

Semantic-to-autobiographical memory priming occurs when stimuli are presented below the threshold of awareness

A number of studies have now shown that general information processing causes the activation of memories in the autobiographical memory system. These studies have shown that general processing of words, sounds, objects, or pictures primes autobiographical memories on voluntary and involuntary autobiographical memory tasks (the Crovitz cue-word task and the vigilance task). Deemed semantic-to-autobiographical memory priming, our goal in the current study was to demonstrate that this form of priming causes the unconscious activation of autobiographical memories (autobiographical automaticity) at the point of priming. Participants named words under subliminal and supraliminal conditions and then received a test of priming (the vigilance task). The results showed that words that were processed below the threshold of awareness were equally likely as words processed above the threshold of awareness to prime the production of involuntary autobiographical memories on the vigilance task. The results support the idea that autobiographical memory activations in semantic-to-autobiographical priming is both unintentional and unconscious.

Metacognitive processes accompanying the first stages of autobiographical retrieval in the self-memory system

According to Conway's view, Autobiographical memory (AM) construction is accompanied by control processes. These processes range from filtering out relevant memories according to the current context, to generating or elaborating appropriate retrieval cues. These processes can be conceptualised as metacognition, the ability to control and monitor cognitive processes. Experimentally, little has been carried out to support the idea that metacognition is involved in AM. To assess this, we designed a task, the Feeling of Retrieval. Participants had to predict whether cue words would facilitate AM access (i.e., fluent access cues) or not (i.e., limited access cues) in a limited time (either 1 (Exp. 2) or 2 (Exp. 1) s). Later, they retrieved memories in response to both types of cues. Results show that cues judged as fluent access led to better AM generation, as illustrated by AM retrieval latency and a subjective measure of the ease with which the AMs were retrieved. These rapid predictions may rely on epistemic feelings and / or other mnemonic cues such as a partial retrieval of information. This metacognitive access to the earliest stages of AM retrieval illustrates the ability to monitor AM processes as proposed by Conway (2005).

How to Become a Memory: The Individual and Collective Aspects of Mnemicity

Human adults distinguish their mental event simulations along various dimensions-most prominently according to their "mnemicity": we track whether these simulations are outcomes of past personal experiences or not (i.e., whether we are "remembering" or "imagining"). This distinction between memory and imagination is commonly thought to reflect a deep architectural distinction in the mind. Against this idea, I argue that mnemicity is not based on a fundamentalstructural difference between memories and imaginations but is instead the result of metacognitive attribution and social construction. On this attributional view, mnemicity is likely a uniquely human capacity that both serves collective functions and has been shaped by collective norms. First, on the individual level, mnemicity attribution is an outcome of metacognitive learning: it relies on acquired interpretations of the phenomenal features of mental event simulations. Such interpretations are in part acquired through interactive reminiscing with other community members. Further, how the distinction between memory and imagination is drawn is likely sensitive to cultural norms about what remembering is, when it is appropriate to claim to remember, what can be remembered, and what remembering entails. As a result, how individuals determine whether they remember or imagine is bound to be deeply enculturated. Second, mnemicity attribution solves an important collective challenge: who to grant epistemic authority about the past. Solving this challenge is important because-for humans-the past represents not just an opportunity to learn about the future but to coordinate present social realities. How a community determines such social realities both draws on individuals' remembering and in turn shapes when, what, and how individuals remember.

Proust and involuntary retrieval

Proust was undoubtedly a pioneer in exploring cognitive processes engaged in memory. The analysis of the episode of the madeleine, as well as the study of Proust's statements on the goals of his work, clearly reveal the visionary side of this author. Long before several concepts entered into mainstream scientific thought, Proust proposed, among other things, that recall was a reconstruction, that a sensory cue could provoke a memory recall, and that we should distinguish between voluntary and involuntary memory. Through numerous episodes of "involuntary reminiscence" scattered throughout his work, Proust illustrates a particular form of autobiographic memory recall: a recall that does not involve consciousness and whose starting point is an emotion provoked by a specific cue. This recall, which leads, according to Proust, to a more intense revival of the memory than voluntary recall, has only reached prominence in cognitive science more than 80 years later. Additionaly, Proust underlined the determinant role that emotion may have in this particular form of recall. On the other hand, studies on animals have shown that the presentation of a retrieval cue could induce emotional reactions followed by a facilitation of the memory retrieval associated with the cue. The existence of these data, which support Proust's proposals, should encourage the neuroscience community to further explore, in humans and animals, this form of cue elicited emotion that initiated involuntary recall of autobiographical memory.

The Subjective Experience of Autobiographical Remembering: Conceptual and Methodological Advances and Challenges

The investigation of the phenomenology of autobiographical memories (i.e., how a memory is subjectively experienced and its meaning) has provided an important contribution to our understanding of autobiographical remembering. Over the last two decades, the study of phenomenology has received widespread scientific attention, and the field has undergone quite relevant conceptual and methodological changes. In the present work, we (1) review some basic and well-established research findings and methodological achievements; (2) discuss new theoretical and methodological challenges, with a special focus on the issue of the phenomenological experience of the retrieval process and its relationship with the phenomenology of the products of retrieval; and (3) propose an alternative way of conceptualizing and understanding it in the framework of experimental phenomenology.

Recovered memories of trauma as a special (or not so special) form of involuntary autobiographical memories

Recovered memories of trauma are memories of traumatic events experienced generally during childhood, but of which the persons were unaware until they retrieved it. Legal decisions are sometimes based on such recovered memories, the validity of which is often questioned. Yet, people can recover genuine traumatic memories of childhood abuse. In this paper, we present and further discuss the idea that recovered traumatic memories can be interpreted in the context of the autobiographical memory framework. Specifically, we argue that recovered memories may be accessed after exposure to incidental cues that initiate unexpected spontaneous memory retrieval. Thus, we relate the recovered memory phenomenon to involuntary autobiographical memories and argue that it is an example of highly stressful, emotionally negative, and intense involuntary memories that were yet never recalled. This novel, evidence-based perspective leads us to reconsider the examination of the validity of eyewitness testimony as a continuum ranging from the least valid form (i.e., memories recovered in highly suggestive context facilitating its factitious reconstruction) to the most valid form (i.e., memories that were triggered by cues without any person's voluntary engagement), and this in relation with how internal (e.g., age and internal cue) or external (e.g., suggestion in therapy, suggestion during investigative interview, and contextual cue) factors may influence memory retrieval. Finally, we propose several recommendations for experts that may be useful in assessing the validity of a testimony based on recovered memories.

Investigating the appraisal structure of spontaneous thoughts: evidence for differences among unexpected thought, involuntary autobiographical memories, and ruminative thought

Involuntary thinking occurs when mental states arise without intention. Such thoughts can take different forms, such as involuntary autobiographical memories (IAM), ruminative thoughts, and unexpected thoughts-all of which are popular areas of study, albeit in somewhat disparate literatures. Despite these mental states sharing a common thread of feeling involuntary in nature, it is nevertheless unclear what separates them phenomenologically. We conducted a set of exploratory and confirmatory experiments to elucidate the appraisal dimensions behind these forms of involuntary thought, with a particular interest in understanding the phenomenology behind unexpected thoughts that are predicted to violate expectations of both timing and content. Across two experiments, we found that unexpected thoughts had unique appraisal structures compared to the other two forms of involuntary thought: they were less identifiably cued, more surprising in content and timing, and offered new information (i.e., insight). We discuss how these distinctions support recent theories regarding the nature of unexpected thought and its relation to other forms of involuntary thinking, namely IAM and ruminative thought, which are the more commonly studied forms of involuntary thinking.

Unraveling the complexity of associations between a history of childhood trauma, psychotic-like experiences, depression and non-suicidal self-injury: A network analysis

BACKGROUND

Several studies have reported the association of psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) with non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI). It has been hypothesized that both constructs might share overlapping backgrounds. This study aimed to investigate the relationships between childhood trauma, depression, PLEs and lifetime characteristics of NSSI.

METHODS

Participants included individuals aged 18-35 years who had a negative history of psychiatric treatment. They were surveyed through the computer-assisted web interview. A network analysis was performed.

RESULTS

A total of 4203 non-clinical adults (63.8 % females) were enrolled. The characteristics of NSSI and a history of childhood sexual abuse were the most central nodes in the network. A history of childhood sexual abuse was the only category of childhood trauma that was directly connected to the characteristics of NSSI (i.e., longer lifetime duration of NSSI). The shortest pathways from other categories of childhood trauma (emotional abuse, emotional neglect and bullying) were connected to the lifetime characteristics through the effects of sexual abuse. However, other pathways were also possible and converged on nodes representing persecutory thoughts, déjàvu experiences, psychomotor retardation/agitation and suicidal ideation. These psychopathological symptoms were the only nodes directly connected to the characteristics of NSSI (i.e., lifetime duration and a history of severe NSSI).

LIMITATIONS

The main limitations include the use of a non-clinical sample and cross-sectional design.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings do not support the hypothesis that PLEs and NSSI might be associated due to shared correlates. In other words, the associations of childhood trauma and PLEs with NSSI might be independent.