Subjective experience and causes of affect in high-functioning children and adolescents with autism

Proof of Concept: A Brief Psycho-Educational Training Program to Increase the Use of Positive Emotion Regulation Strategies in Individuals With Autism Spectrum Disorder

Attenuated positive emotions and difficulties in regulating emotions are frequently observed in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and are linked to increased risk of affective disorders, problematic behaviors, and impaired socio-emotional functioning. As such, interventions specifically focused on positive emotion regulation (ER) skills could be very valuable for individuals with ASD, their caregivers, and therapists. However, the field of positive ER in ASD is under-researched. The present study aimed at testing the practical potential and the preliminary effects of a brief novel psycho-educational training program on positive ER for individuals with ASD. Thirty male participants with ASD (aged 10-35years; N _training=14, N _waitlist=16) underwent a three-session program on the use of adaptive positive ER strategies (i.e., attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation). Participants rated the program as easy to understand, interesting, pleasant, and likable. No dropouts or adverse effects were observed. The training group showed a significant increase in the self-reported use of the ER strategies compared to the waitlist group. The increase in the use of ER strategies maintained up to 7 weeks in the overall sample. Having reached high satisfaction rates and the intended effects in this proof of concept study, this novel program represents a promising tool to support ER. Future research should next investigate the efficacy of the intervention on day-to-day emotional experience and wellbeing. Clinical Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov # NCT02898298.

The Interpretation of E-Motions in Faces and Bodies Derived from Static Artworks by Individuals with High Functioning Autistic Spectrum

E-motions are defined as those affective states the expressions of which-conveyed either by static faces or body posture-embody a dynamic component and, consequently, convey a higher sense of dynamicity than other emotional expressions. An experiment is presented, aimed at testing whether e-motions are perceived as such also by individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), which have been associated with impairments in emotion recognition and in motion perception. To this aim we replicate with ASD individuals a study, originally conducted with typically developed individuals (TDs), in which we showed to both ASD and TD participants 14 bodiless heads and 14 headless bodies taken from eleven static artworks and four drawings. The Experiment was divided into two sessions. In Session 1 participants were asked to freely associate each stimulus to an emotion or an affective state (Task 1, option A); if they were unable to find a specific emotion, the experimenter showed them a list of eight possible emotions (words) and asked them to choose one from such list, that best described the affective state portrayed in the image (Task 1, option B). After their choice, they were asked to rate the intensity of the perceived emotion on a seven point Likert scale (Task 2). In Session 2 participants were requested to evaluate the degree of dynamicity conveyed by each stimulus on a 7 point Likert scale. Results showed that ASDs and TDs shared a similar range of verbal expressions defining emotions; however, ASDs (i) showed an impairment in the ability to spontaneously assign an emotion to a headless body, and (ii) they more frequently used terms denoting negative emotions (for both faces and bodies) as compared to neutral emotions, which in turn were more frequently used by TDs. No difference emerged between the two groups for positive emotions, with happiness being the emotion better recognized in both faces and in bodies. Although overall there are no significant differences between the two groups with respect to the emotions assigned to the images and the degree of perceived dynamicity, the interaction Artwork x Group showed that for some images ASDs assigned a different value than TDs to perceived dynamicity. Moreover, two images were interpreted by ASDs as conveying completely different emotions than those perceived by TDs. Results are discussed in light of the ability of ASDs to resolve ambiguity, and of possible different cognitive styles characterizing the aesthetical/emotional experience.

Do children with autism acknowledge the influence of mood on behaviour?

We tested whether children with and without high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASD) differ in their understanding of the influence of mood states on behaviour. A total of 122 children with HFASD or typical development were asked to predict and explain the behaviour of story characters during hypothetical social interactions. HFASD and typically developing children predicted at equal rates that mood states likely result in similar valenced behaviour. `Explicit' descriptions were used to explain predictions more often by children with HFASD than by typically developing children. However, `implicit' and `irrelevant' descriptions elicited fewer mood references among HFASD children. Furthermore, they less often referred to the uncertainty of the influence of mood on behaviour, and less often used mood-related explanations, in particular when they had to rely on implicit information. This may indicate a rote- rather than self-generated understanding of emotions in children with HFASD.

Listeners prefer the laughs of children with autism to those of typically developing children

The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of laugh sounds produced by 8- to 10-year-old children with and without autism on naïve listeners, and to evaluate if listeners could distinguish between the laughs of the two groups. Results showed that listeners rated the laughs of children with autism more positively than the laughs of typically developing children, and that they were slightly above chance levels at judging which group produced the laugh. A subset of participants who reported listening for “uncontrolled” or “longer” laughs were significantly better at discriminating between the laughs of the two groups. Our results suggest that the laughs of children with autism have the potential to promote the formation of relationships.

Second person intentional relations and the evolution of social understanding

Second person intentional relations, involving intentional activities directed at the perceptor, are qualitatively different from first and third person relations. They generate a peculiar, bidirectional kind of intentionality, especially in the realm of visual perception. Systems specialized in dealing with this have been selected by evolution. These systems can be considered to be the evolutionary precursors to the human theory of mind.

Four-year-old humans are different: Why?

The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.

Omitting the second person in social understanding

Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.

Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists

The data reviewed in Barresi & Moore's treatment of social understanding is recast in terms of a model of social intelligence that was advanced some time ago (Gallup 1982). When it comes to their analysis of the behavior of other individuals, most primates (and humans younger than 18 months of age) appear to function as radical behaviorists, whereas chimpanzees and older infants show evidence of becoming primitive cognitive psychologists.

Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology

Barresi & Moore assume an equivalence between ontogenetic and evolutionaiy transformations of social understanding. The mechanisms of evolution allow for novel structures to arise, both through terminal addition and through the onset of novel pathways at time points that precede the end points of ancestral pathways. Terminal addition may not be the appropriate model for the evolution of human object-directed imitation, intermodal equivalence, or joint attention.

Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?

Barresi & Moore's account predicts that infants deprived of visual input will be delayed in achieving social understanding, a hypothesis that receives some support from studies of language use. by blind children. It is proposed that recently developed false belief and appearance/reality tasks be used to explore this issue further. Three possibly distracting conceptual issues are also discussed.

Intentional relations and social understanding

Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations (or third person information). However, through the integration of these two sources of information, it is possible to generate representations of intentional relations that are uniformly applicable to the activities of both self and other. The four levels of the framework differ in the extent to which such integration occurs and in the degree to which imagination is involved in generating these representations. Most animals exist at the lowest level, at which integration of first and third person sources of information does not occur. Of nonhuman species, only great apes exhibit social understanding at intermediate levels, at which integration of these sources of information provides uniform representations of intentional relations. Only humans attain the highest level, at which it is possible to represent intentional relations with mental objects. We propose that with the development of the imagination, children progress through three stages, equivalent to the later three levels of the framework. The abnormalities in social understanding of autistic individuals are hypothesized to result from a failure to develop integrated representations of intentional relations.

Understanding self and other

We consider the various criticisms and requests for clarification made by the commentators of our framework for understanding intentional relations. Our response is organized according to the main themes in the target article: general theory, phylogeny, development, and autism. We also add some discussion of further issues, such as simulation and moral theory, that were not addressed in the target article.

Awareness of single and multiple emotions in high-functioning children with autism

This study examined emotional awareness in children with autism. Twenty-two high functioning children with autism (mean age 10 years and 2 months) and 22 typically developing children, matched for age and gender, were presented with the four basic emotions (happiness, anger, sadness and fear) in single and multiple emotion tasks. Findings suggest that children with autism have difficulties identifying their own emotions and less developed emotion concepts (which causes an impaired capacity to differentiate between one's emotions within the negative spectrum). The outcome seems to point more to a single emotion perspective within the negative domain, with a more prominent position of fear in children with autism than in typically developing children.

But what is the intentional schema?

The intentional schema may not be sufficiently characterized to make questions about its role in individual and species development intelligible. The idea of metarepresentation may perhaps give it enough content. The importance of metarepresentation itself, however, can be called into question.

Understanding minds and selves

Barresi & Moore provide a welcome focus on children's abilities to integrate first and third person information about intentional relations but they pay insufficient attention to the origins of children's understanding of the nature of subjective orientations vis-à-vis a shared world and the potential significance of such understanding as a source (rather than an outcome) of domain-general information-processing capacities.

First person representations need a methodology based on simulation or theory

Although their thesis is generally sound, Barresi & Moore give insufficient attention to the need for a methodology, whether simulation based or theory-based, for choosing among alternative possible matches of first person and third person information. This choice must be sensitive to contextual information, including past behavior. Moreover, apart from simulation or theory, first person information would not help predict future behavior.

Social relations and understanding the intentional self

Although Barresi & Moore could have grounded their framework more explicitly in existing models, they offer a provocative testbed for the assumptions of symbolic interactionism and further thinking about self-regulation, especially in autistics.

Comparative cognitive studies, not folk phylogeny, please

Barresi & Moore (B&M) provide a useful tool for the comparative study of social cognition that could, however, be improved by more subtle analysis of first person information about intentional relations. Knowledge of misrepresentation also needs to be better handled within the theory. I urge skepticism about B&M's sweeping phylogenetic claims.

Imagination and imitation: Input, acid test, or alchemy?

Immediate imitation is likely to be a major, direct input to Barresi & Moore's level 2 competence, but deferred imitation is unlikely to play a key role in the transition to level 3, because (1) the attribution of first person knowledge is neither a necessary cause nor an obvious consequence of deferred imitation, and (2) deferred imitation does not correlate phylogenetically with capacities that more plausibly either yield or reflect a concept of intentional agency.

Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular

Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.

Language and its role in understanding intentional relations: Research tool or mechanism of development?

In our commentary we elaborate on Barresi & Moore's use of language as a tool. In particular, we highlight the importance of cognitive linguistic research with its emphasis on the relation between morpnosyntax and intentional schemes. We also speculate about how language itself might play a role in children's integration of first and third person knowledge.

On the dangers of oversimulation

Barresi & Moore fail to provide a satisfactory account for the development of social understanding because of (1) their ambiguous characterization of the relationship between the intentional schema and shared intentional activities, (2) their underestimation of the representational capacities of infants, and (3) their overreliance on the simulationist assumption that understanding others is tantamount to sharing their experience.

Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind

Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.

Self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and kinesthetic-visual matching

The “intentional schema” seems identical to or dependent upon kinesthetic–visual matching, both of which account for similar empirical findings. The intentional schema, however, fails to account for variability in children's understanding of false belief and differences in children's understanding of self and other in pretense.

An ambiguity

The difference between first and third person information may be thought of as a difference in either informationalcontentor informationalmodality. Each option faces some problems. I try to sort out some of these issues and raise a question about the explanatory force of the notion of a schema.

Development of social emotions and constructive agents

The psychology of emotions illuminates the questions of intentional capacities raised by Barresi & Moore (B&M). Complex emotions require the development of a sense of self and are based on social comparisons between mainly imagined objects. The fourth level in B&M's framework requires something like a constructive agent rather than a mental agent.

Understanding that looking causes knowing

Barresi & Moore provide an impressive account of how the coordination of first and third person information about the self and other could produce an account of intentional relations. They are less explicit as to how the child comes to understand the basic epistemic relation between experience and knowledge, that is, how informational access causes belief. We suggest one route.

Can children with autism integrate first and third person representations?

Barresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: (1) in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information (of any kind), and (2) in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.