Aligning the Criterion and Tests for Brain Death

The Uniform Determination of Death Act is Not Changing. Will Physicians Continue to Misdiagnose Brain Death?

Efforts to revise the Uniform Determination of Death Act in order to align law with medical practice have failed. Medical practice must now align with the law. People who are not dead under the law that defines death should not be declared dead. There is no compelling reason to continue the practice of declaring legally living persons to be dead.

The Unified Brain-Based Determination of Death Conceptually Justifies Death Determination in DCDD and NRP Protocols

Organ donation after the circulatory determination of death requires the permanent cessation of circulation while organ donation after the brain determination of death requires the irreversible cessation of brain functions. The unified brain-based determination of death connects the brain and circulatory death criteria for circulatory death determination in organ donation as follows: permanent cessation of systemic circulation causes permanent cessation of brain circulation which causes permanent cessation of brain perfusion which causes permanent cessation of brain function. The relevant circulation that must cease in circulatory death determination is that to the brain. Eliminating brain circulation from the donor ECMO organ perfusion circuit in thoracoabdominal NRP protocols satisfies the unified brain-based determination of death but only if the complete cessation of brain circulation can be proved. Despite its medical and physiologic rationale, the unified brain-based determination of death remains inconsistent with the Uniform Determination of Death Act.

Potential Threats and Impediments to the Clinical Practice of Brain Death Determination: The UDDA Revision Series

The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) revision series in Neurology® originated in response to the plan of the Uniform Law Commission to create a revised Uniform Determination of Death Act (rUDDA) to address contemporary controversies associated with brain death/death by neurologic criteria (BD/DNC) determination. This article contextualizes these, and other, controversies and reviews the extent to which they represent potential threats and impediments to the clinical practice of BD/DNC determination. It also explains the reasons that our rapidly evolving understanding of the brain's ability to recover from injury should not influence the clinical practice of BD/DNC determination. Finally, it explores the myriad ways in which the American Academy of Neurology has addressed potential threats and impediments to the clinical practice of BD/DNC determination and the implications potential changes to the UDDA may have on the future of the clinical practice of BD/DNC determination.

Frequent Preservation of Neurologic Function in Brain Death and Brainstem Death Entails False-Positive Misdiagnosis and Cerebral Perfusion

Some patients who have been diagnosed as "dead by neurologic criteria" continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. This preservation of neurologic function after the diagnosis of "brain death" or "brainstem death" is an ongoing source of controversy and concern in the medical, bioethics, and legal literatures. Most obviously, if some brain function persists, then it is not the case that all functions of the entire brain have ceased and hence, declaring such a patient to be "dead" would be a false positive, in any nation with so-called "whole brain death" laws. Furthermore, and perhaps more concerning, the preservation of any brain function necessarily entails the preservation of some amount of brain perfusion, thereby raising the concern as to whether additional areas of neural tissue may remain viable, including areas in the brainstem. These and other considerations cast significant doubt on the reliability of diagnosing either "brain death" or "brainstem death."

Brain death debates: from bioethics to epistemology

50 years after its introduction, brain death remains controversial among scholars. The debates focus on one question: is brain death a good criterion for determining death? This question has been answered from various perspectives: medical, metaphysical, ethical, and legal or political. Most authors either defend the criterion as it is, propose some minor or major revisions, or advocate abandoning it and finding better solutions to the problems that brain death was intended to solve when it was introduced. In short, debates about brain death have been characterized by partisanship, for or against. Here I plead for a non-partisan approach that has been overlooked in the literature: the epistemological or philosophy of science approach. Some scholars claim that human death is a matter of fact, a biological phenomenon whose occurrence can be determined empirically, based on science. We should take this claim seriously, whether we agree with it or not. The question is: how do we know that human death is a scientific matter of fact? Taking the epistemological approach means, among other things, examining how the determination of human death became an object of scientific inquiry, exploring the nature of the brain death criterion itself, and analysing the meaning of its core concepts such as "irreversibility" and "functions".

Brain death debates: from bioethics to philosophy of science

50 years after its introduction, brain death remains controversial among scholars. The debates focus on one question: is brain death a good criterion for determining death? This question has been answered from various perspectives: medical, metaphysical, ethical, and legal or political. Most authors either defend the criterion as it is, propose some minor or major revisions, or advocate abandoning it and finding better solutions to the problems that brain death was intended to solve when it was introduced. Here I plead for a different approach that has been overlooked in the literature: the philosophy of science approach. Some scholars claim that human death is a matter of fact, a biological phenomenon whose occurrence can be determined empirically, based on science. We should take this claim seriously, whether we agree with it or not. The question is: how do we know that human death is a scientific matter of fact? Taking the philosophy of science approach means, among other things, examining how the determination of human death became an object of scientific inquiry, exploring the nature of the brain death criterion itself, and analysing the meaning of its core concepts such as "irreversibility" and "functions".

Revise the UDDA to Align the Law with Practice through Neuro-Respiratory Criteria

Although the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) has served as a model statute for 40 years, there is a growing recognition that the law must be updated. One issue being considered by the Uniform Law Commission's Drafting Committee to revise the UDDA is whether the text “all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem” should be changed. Some argue that the absence of diabetes insipidus indicates that some brain functioning continues in many individuals who otherwise meet the “accepted medical standards” like the American Academy of Neurology's. The concern is that the legal criteria and the medical standards used to determine death by neurologic criteria are not aligned. We argue for the revision of the UDDA to more accurately specify legal criteria that align with the medical standards: brain injury leading to permanent loss of the capacity for consciousness, the ability to breathe spontaneously, and brainstem reflexes. We term these criteria neurorespiratory criteria and show that they are well-supported in the literature for physiologic and social reasons justifying their use in the law.

The intractable problems with brain death and possible solutions

Brain death has been accepted worldwide medically and legally as the biological state of death of the organism. Nevertheless, the literature has described persistent problems with this acceptance ever since brain death was described. Many of these problems are not widely known or properly understood by much of the medical community. Here we aim to clarify these issues, based on the two intractable problems in the brain death debates. First, the metaphysical problem: there is no reason that withstands critical scrutiny to believe that BD is the state of biological death of the human organism. Second, the epistemic problem: there is no way currently to diagnose the state of BD, the irreversible loss of all brain functions, using clinical tests and ancillary tests, given potential confounders to testing. We discuss these problems and their main objections and conclude that these problems are intractable in that there has been no acceptable solution offered other than bare assertions of an 'operational definition' of death. We present possible ways to move forward that accept both the metaphysical problem - that BD is not biological death of the human organism - and the epistemic problem - that as currently diagnosed, BD is a devastating neurological state where recovery of sentience is very unlikely, but not a confirmed state of irreversible loss of all [critical] brain functions. We argue that the best solution is to abandon the dead donor rule, thus allowing vital organ donation from patients currently diagnosed as BD, assuming appropriate changes are made to the consent process and to laws about killing.

It Is Time to Abandon the Dogma That Brain Death Is Biological Death

Drawing on a recent case report of a pregnant, brain-dead woman who gave birth to a healthy child after over seven months of intensive care treatment, this essay rejects the established doctrine in medicine that brain death constitutes the biological death of the human being. The essay describes three policy options with respect to determination of death and vital organ transplantation in the case of patients who are irreversibly comatose but remain biologically alive.

Evaluating the translational value of postmortem brain reperfusion technology

A novel pulsatile-perfusion technology, dubbed BrainEx, has been shown to restore microcirculation and cellular functions in the pig brain, 4 h postmortem. This technology has generated enthusiasm for its translational value for human neuroresuscitation. I offer a critical analysis of the study and its methodology, providing several reasons for skepticism. This includes: all phenomena were observed at different degrees of hypothermia; the physiological and biochemical milieu of the experimental preparation is radically different than the clinical setting of hypoxic-ischemic brain injury; and the study is confounded by uncontrolled traumatic brain injury and lifelong stress in all the animals.

Statement in Support of Revising the Uniform Determination of Death Act and in Opposition to a Proposed Revision

Discrepancies between the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the adult and pediatric diagnostic guidelines for brain death (BD) (the "Guidelines") have motivated proposals to revise the UDDA. A revision proposed by Lewis, Bonnie and Pope (the RUDDA), has received particular attention, the three novelties of which would be: (1) to specify the Guidelines as the legally recognized "medical standard," (2) to exclude hypothalamic function from the category of "brain function," and (3) to authorize physicians to conduct an apnea test without consent and even over a proxy's objection. One hundred seven experts in medicine, bioethics, philosophy, and law, spanning a wide variety of perspectives, have come together in agreement that while the UDDA needs revision, the RUDDA is not the way to do it. Specifically, (1) the Guidelines have a non-negligible risk of false-positive error, (2) hypothalamic function is more relevant to the organism as a whole than any brainstem reflex, and (3) the apnea test carries a risk of precipitating BD in a non-BD patient, provides no benefit to the patient, does not reliably accomplish its intended purpose, and is not even absolutely necessary for diagnosing BD according to the internal logic of the Guidelines; it should at the very least require informed consent, as do many procedures that are much more beneficial and less risky. Finally, objections to a neurologic criterion of death are not based only on religious belief or ignorance. People have a right to not have a concept of death that experts vigorously debate imposed upon them against their judgment and conscience; any revision of the UDDA should therefore contain an opt-out clause for those who accept only a circulatory-respiratory criterion.

Hypothalamic function in patients diagnosed as brain dead and its practical consequences

Some patients who have been diagnosed as "dead by neurologic criteria" continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. In this chapter, we review the pathophysiology of brain death that can lead either to neuroendocrine failure or to preserved neuroendocrine functioning. We review the evidence on continued hypothalamic functioning in patients who have been declared "brain dead," examine potential mechanisms that would explain these findings, and discuss how these findings create additional confounds for brain death testing. We conclude by reviewing the evidence for the management of hypothalamic-pituitary failure in the setting of brain death and organ transplantation.

Current Practice Diagnosing Brain Death Is Not Consistent With Legal Statutes Requiring the Absence of All Brain Function

The legal standard for the determination of death by neurologic criteria in the United States is laid out in the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which requires the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain. Most other nations endorse a “whole-brain” standard as well. However, current practice in the determination of death by neurologic criteria is not consistent with this legal standard, because some patients who are diagnosed as brain-dead, in fact retain some brain function, or retain the capacity for the return of some brain function. In response, the American Academy of Neurology published updated guidelines, which assert that hypothalamic function is consistent with the neurological standard enshrined in the UDDA. Others have suggested that it is an open question whether the hypothalamus and pituitary are part of “the entire brain,” as delineated in the UDDA. While we agree that determination of death practices are worthy of continued dialogue and refinement in practice that dialogue must adhere to reasonable standards of logic and scientific accuracy.

Refinements in the Organism as a Whole Rationale for Brain Death

Death can be defined as the permanent cessation of the organism as a whole. Although the organism as a whole is a century-old concept, it remains better intuited than analyzed. Recent concepts in theoretical biology including hierarchies of organization, emergent functions, and mereology have informed the idea that the organism as a whole is the organism's critical emergent functions. Because the brain conducts the critical emergent functions including conscious awareness and control of respiration and circulation, the cessation of brain functions is death of the organism. A newer concept, the brain as a whole, may offer a superior criterion of death to the whole-brain criterion, because it more closely matches accepted clinical brain death tests and confirms the cessation of the organism's emergent functions. Although the concepts of organism as a whole and brain as a whole remain vague and in need of rigorous biophilosophical analysis, their future precision will be restricted by the categorical limitations intrinsic to theoretical biological models.