Precedent Autonomy and Surrogate Decisionmaking After Severe Brain Injury

Family surrogate decision-makers' perspectives in decision-making of patients with disorders of consciousness

To explore and describe the experience of decision-making for patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) from the perspectives of family surrogate decision-makers. A total of 21 face-to-face interviews with family surrogate decision-makers from a tertiary hospital in Shanghai, China were conducted from January 2021 to February 2021. Thematic analysis was used for data analysis. Four main themes were identified and were included in this study: (1) a tough choice between life and dignity, (2) a major responsibility for patient's voice, (3) complex considerations between ethics and morals, and (4) the importance of realistic basis. The surrogate decision-making of DOC patients in China has been affected by the Chinese cultural context and several practical roots. And the family surrogate decision-makers shared their experiences of trade-offs during the decision-making process. Moreover, family surrogate decision-makers realized their serious responsibility to make a decision that would be in the best interest of DOC patients.

Treating addiction with deep brain stimulation: Ethical and legal considerations

BACKGROUND

The use of neuromodulation in the treatment of psychiatric conditions is controversial despite its lengthy history. This particularly applies to the use of invasive neuromodulation, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS), to treat substance use disorder (SUD) due to the considerable risks of the procedures. However, given the advances in DBS research and the shortcomings of current treatment modalities for addiction, off-label use and clinical trials are being implemented for the management of treatment-refractory patients.

METHODS

Here we conduct an ethical and legal analysis of DBS for SUD, referencing the four foundational principles of medical ethics and key legal concepts.

RESULTS

There are major concerns related to the capacity of a SUD patient to provide informed consent, as well as the risks and benefits of DBS compared to traditional treatment methods. In addition to ethical concerns, we explore potential legal issues that may arise from DBS in the treatment of addiction. These include the potential mandate of these procedures in the context of the criminalization of substance use, and the issue of familial consent in the decision-making process. Given the paucity of relevant clinical guidelines or legal cases, general medico-legal principles serve as the reference in making decisions about the responsible use of DBS as a treatment for addiction.

CONCLUSIONS

Given the rapidly increasing evidence for DBS as a treatment for SUD, it is an urgent imperative to consider the relevant key ethical and legal issues. Incorporating IDEAL (Idea, Development, Exploration, Assessment, Long-term follow-up) framework into future research in DBS is recommended to evaluate patient safety and ethical perspectives. With the broad criminalization of SUD across the globe, legal coercion of DBS is not impossible, especially if proven to be effective to treat SUD. It is advised for stakeholders to urgently consider incorporating DBS-related drug policies so that the potential benefits of DBS within the rights of people with SUD are not hindered by the lack of clinical guidance and legislations.

Prognostication, Ethical Issues, and Palliative Care in Disorders of Consciousness

Research advances in recent years have shown that some individuals with vegetative state or minimally conscious state can emerge to higher states of consciousness even years after injury. A minority of behaviorally unresponsive patients with vegetative state have also been shown to follow commands, or even communicate, using neuroimaging or electrophysiological techniques. These advances raise ethical questions that have important implications for clinical care. In this article, the authors argue that adopting a neuropalliative care approach can help clinicians provide ethical, compassionate care to these patients and their caregivers.

Well-Being After Severe Brain Injury: What Counts as Good Recovery?

Disorders of consciousness (DOC) continue to profoundly challenge both families and medical professionals. Once a brain-injured patient has been stabilized, questions turn to the prospect of recovery. However, what “recovery” means in the context of patients with prolonged DOC is not always clear. Failure to recognize potential differences of interpretation—and the assumptions about the relationship between health and well-being that underlie these differences—can inhibit communication between surrogate decisionmakers and a patient’s clinical team, and make it difficult to establish the goals of care. The authors examine the relationship between health and well-being as it pertains to patients with prolonged DOC. They argue that changes in awareness or other function should not be equated to changes in well-being, in the absence of a clear understanding of the constituents of well-being for that particular patient. The authors further maintain that a comprehensive conception of recovery for patients with prolonged DOC should incorporate aspects of both experienced well-being and evaluative well-being.

Further Reflections: Surrogate Decisionmaking When Significant Mental Capacities are Retained

Mackenzie Graham has made an important contribution to the literature on decisionmaking for patients with disorders of consciousness. He argues, and I agree, that decisions for unresponsive patients who are known to retain some degree of covert awareness ought to focus on current interests, since such patients likely retain the kinds of mental capacities that in ordinary life command our current respect and attention. If he is right, then it is not appropriate to make decisions for such patients by appealing to the values they had in the past, either the values expressed in an advance directive or the values recalled by a surrogate. There are two things I wish to add to the discussion. My first point is somewhat critical, for although I agree with his general conclusion about how, ideally, such decisions should be approached, I remain skeptical about whether his conclusion offers decisionmakers real practical help. The problem with these cases is that the evidence we have about the nature of the patient's current interests is minimal or nonexistent. However-and this is important-Graham's conclusion will be extremely relevant if in the future, our ability to communicate with such patients improves, as I hope it will. This leads to my second point. Graham's conclusion illustrates a more general problem with our standard framework for decisionmaking for previously competent patients, a problem that has not been adequately recognized. So, in what follows, I explain the problem I see and offer some brief thoughts about solutions.