Separating habit and recollection: memory slips, process dissociations, and probability matching

Semantic priming, not repetition priming, is to blame for false hearing

Contextual and sensory information are combined in speech perception. Conflict between the two can lead to false hearing, defined as a high-confidence misidentification of a spoken word. Rogers, Jacoby, and Sommers (Psychology and Aging, 27(1), 33-45, 2012) found that older adults are more susceptible to false hearing than are young adults, using a combination of semantic priming and repetition priming to create context. In this study, the type of context (repetition vs. sematic priming) responsible for false hearing was examined. Older and young adult participants read and listened to a list of paired associates (e.g., ROW-BOAT) and were told to remember the pairs for a later memory test. Following the memory test, participants identified words masked in noise that were preceded by a cue word in the clear. Targets were semantically associated to the cue (e.g., ROW-BOAT), unrelated to the cue (e.g., JAW-PASS), or phonologically related to a semantic associate of the cue (e.g., ROW-GOAT). How often each cue word and its paired associate were presented prior to the memory test was manipulated (0, 3, or 5 times) to test effects of repetition priming. Results showed repetitions had no effect on rates of context-based listening or false hearing. However, repetition did significantly increase sensory information as a basis for metacognitive judgments in young and older adults. This pattern suggests that semantic priming dominates as the basis for false hearing and highlights context and sensory information operating as qualitatively different bases for listening and metacognition.

The influence of recollection and familiarity in the formation and updating of associative representations

Prior representations affect future learning. Little is known, however, about the effects of recollective or familiarity-based representations on such learning. We investigate the ability to reuse or reassociate elements from recollection- and familiarity-based associations to form new associations. Past neuropsychological research suggests that hippocampal, and presumably recollective, representations are more flexible than extra-hippocampal, presumably familiarity-based, representations. We therefore hypothesize that the elements of recollective associations, as opposed to familiarity-based representations, may be more easily manipulated and decoupled from each other, and facilitate the formation of new associations. To investigate this hypothesis we used the AB/AC learning paradigm. Across two recall studies we observed an advantage in learning AC word pairs if AB word pairs were initially recollected. Furthermore, AB word pairs were more likely to intrude during a final AC test if those AB word pairs were initially familiarity-based. A third experiment using a recognition version of the AB/AC paradigm ruled out the possibility that our findings were due to memory strength. Our results support the idea that elements in recollective associative traces may be more discretely coded, leading to their flexible use, whereas elements in familiarity-based associative traces are less flexible.

Process dissociation analyses of memory changes in healthy aging, preclinical, and very mild Alzheimer disease: Evidence for isolated recollection deficits

OBJECTIVE

Recollection and familiarity are independent processes that contribute to memory performance. Recollection is dependent on attentional control, which has been shown to be disrupted in early stage Alzheimer's disease (AD), whereas familiarity is independent of attention. The present longitudinal study examines the sensitivity of recollection estimates based on Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to AD-related biomarkers in a large sample of well-characterized cognitively normal middle-aged and older adults (N = 519) and the extent to which recollection discriminates these individuals from individuals with very mild symptomatic AD (N = 64).

METHOD

Participants studied word pairs (e.g., knee bone), then completed a primed, explicit, cued fragment-completion memory task (e.g., knee b_n_). Primes were either congruent with the correct response (e.g., bone), incongruent (e.g., bend), or neutral (e.g., &&&). This design allowed for the estimation of independent contributions of recollection and familiarity processes, using the process dissociation procedure.

RESULTS

Recollection, but not familiarity, was impaired in healthy aging and in very mild AD. Recollection discriminated cognitively normal individuals from the earliest detectable stage of symptomatic AD above and beyond standard psychometric tests. In cognitively normal individuals, baseline CSF measures indicative of AD pathology were related to lower initial recollection and less practice-related improvement in recollection over time. Finally, presence of amyloid plaques, as imaged by PIB-PET, was also related to less improvement in recollection over time.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings suggest that attention-demanding memory processes, such as recollection, may be particularly sensitive to both symptomatic and preclinical AD pathology. (PsycINFO Database Record

Change in the relative contributions of habit and working memory facilitates serial reversal learning expertise in rhesus monkeys

Functionally distinct memory systems likely evolved in response to incompatible demands placed on learning by distinct environmental conditions. Working memory appears adapted, in part, for conditions that change frequently, making rapid acquisition and brief retention of information appropriate. In contrast, habits form gradually over many experiences, adapting organisms to contingencies of reinforcement that are stable over relatively long intervals. Serial reversal learning provides an opportunity to simultaneously examine the processes involved in adapting to rapidly changing and relatively stable contingencies. In serial reversal learning, selecting one of the two simultaneously presented stimuli is positively reinforced, while selection of the other is not. After a preference for the positive stimulus develops, the contingencies of reinforcement reverse. Naïve subjects adapt to such reversals gradually, perseverating in selection of the previously rewarded stimulus. Experts reverse rapidly according to a win-stay, lose-shift response pattern. We assessed whether a change in the relative control of choice by habit and working memory accounts for the development of serial reversal learning expertise. Across three experiments, we applied manipulations intended to attenuate the contribution of working memory but leave the contribution of habit intact. We contrasted performance following long and short intervals in Experiments 1 and 2, and we interposed a competing cognitive load between trials in Experiment 3. These manipulations slowed the acquisition of reversals in expert subjects, but not naïve subjects, indicating that serial reversal learning expertise is facilitated by a shift in the control of choice from passively acquired habit to actively maintained working memory.

The process-dissociation approach two decades later: convergence, boundary conditions, and new directions

The process-dissociation procedure was developed to separate the controlled and automatic contributions of memory. It has spawned the development of a host of new measurement approaches and has been applied across a broad range of fields in the behavioral sciences, ranging from studies of memory and perception to neuroscience and social psychology. Although it has not been without its shortcomings or critics, its growing influence attests to its utility. In the present article, we briefly review the factors motivating its development, describe some of the early applications of the general method, and review the literature examining its underlying assumptions and boundary conditions. We then highlight some of the specific issues that the methods have been applied to and discuss some of the more recent applications of the procedure, along with future directions.

One-trial memory and habit contribute independently to matching-to-sample performance in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Multiple memory systems often act together to generate behavior, preventing a simple one-to-one mapping between cognitive processes and performance in specific tests. Process dissociation procedures (PDPs) have been adopted in both humans and monkeys to quantify one-trial memory and habit, with the assumption that these two processes make independent contributions to performance. Violations of this independence assumption could produce artificial dissociations. Evidence for independence has been reported in humans, but similar tests have not been conducted with monkeys until now. In a within-subjects design using a matching-to-sample task, we manipulated one-trial memory strength and habit strength simultaneously. Memory delay intervals and encoding conditions affected one-trial memory scores without affecting habit scores. In contrast, biased reinforcement selectively changed habit scores but not one-trial memory scores. This behavioral double dissociation clearly shows that one-trial memory and habit can be manipulated independently, validating PDP as a valuable tool for cross-species studies of learning and memory and reinforcing the view that one-trial memory and habits are served by distinct brain systems.

Perirhinal cortex removal dissociates two memory systems in matching-to-sample performance in rhesus monkeys

Dissociations of memory systems are typically made using independent cognitive tests. For example, in monkeys habits have been inferred from performance in object discrimination tests, while non-matching-to-sample tests are thought to measure familiarity resulting from single exposures. Such tests cannot measure individual memory processes accurately when more than one memory process contributes to performance. In process dissociation procedures (PDPs), two memory processes cooperate and compete in the performance of a single cognitive task, allowing quantitative estimates of the contributions of each process. We used PDP to measure the contributions of habits and one-trial memory to visual matching-to-sample performance. Sets of test images were shown only once in each daily testing session but were repeated day after day. To produce habits, high-frequency images were correct more frequently than other images across days. Habits were manifest in the extent to which choices in the test phase of matching-to-sample trials were made to the high-frequency images, regardless of which image had been presented as the sample. One-trial memory was measured by the extent to which choices at test were made to the image that had appeared as the sample on that trial, regardless of habit. Perirhinal cortex removal reduced the contribution of one-trial memory to matching performance, but left both habits and the ability to discriminate images intact. PDP can be applied in monkeys in a way that parallels its use in humans, providing a new tool for investigating the neurobiology of memory in nonhuman animals and for comparing memory across species.

Reflections of distraction in memory: transfer of previous distraction improves recall in younger and older adults

Three studies explored whether younger and older adults' free recall performance can benefit from prior exposure to distraction that becomes relevant in a memory task. Participants initially read stories that included distracting text. Later, they studied a list of words for free recall, with half of the list consisting of previously distracting words. When the memory task was indirect in its use of distraction (Study 1), only older adults showed transfer, with better recall of previously distracting compared with new words, which increased their recall to match that of younger adults. However, younger adults showed transfer when cued about the relevance of previous distraction both before studying the words (Study 2) and before recalling the words (Study 3) in the memory test. Results suggest that both younger and older adults encode distraction, but younger adults require explicit cueing to use their knowledge of distraction. In contrast, older adults transfer knowledge of distraction in both explicitly cued and indirect memory tasks. Results are discussed in terms of age differences in inhibition and source-constrained retrieval.

Learning to diminish the effects of proactive interference: reducing false memory for young and older adults

Results from two experiments revealed that prior experience with proactive interference (PI) diminished PI's effects for both young and older adults. Participants were given two rounds of experience, with different materials, in a situation that produced PI. Comparisons with a control condition showed that the effects of PI on accuracy and on high-confidence intrusion errors (false memory) were reduced on the second round, as compared with those on the first. Also, the ability of confidence to diagnose accuracy of responding improved across rounds. Effects of prior experience with PI depended on feedback given at the time of test (Experiment 1). At least in part, the diminishment of PI resulted from participants' allocating more attention to interference items during study in the second round than in the first (Experiment 2). Implications of the results for interpreting age differences in PI and false memory are discussed.

Representational explanations of "process" dissociations in recognition: the DRYAD theory of aging and memory judgments

It is widely assumed that older adults suffer a deficit in the psychological processes that underlie remembering of contextual or source information. This conclusion is based in large part on empirical interactions, including disordinal ones, that reveal differential effects of manipulations of memory strength on recognition in young and old subjects. This article lays out an alternative theory that takes as a starting point the overwhelming evidence from the psychometric literature that the effects of age on memory share a single mediating influence. Thus, the theory assumes no differences between younger and older subjects other than a global difference in memory fidelity--that is, the older subjects are presumed to have less valid representations of events and objects than are young subjects. The theory is articulated through 3 major assumptions and implemented in a computational model, DRYAD, to simulate fundamental results in the literature on aging and recognition, including the very interactions taken to imply selective impairment in older people. The theoretical perspective presented here allows for a critical examination of the widely held belief that aging entails the selective disruption of particular memory processes.

Age effects on load-dependent brain activations in working memory for novel material

Three competing models of cognitive aging (neural compensation, capacity limitations, neural inefficiency) were examined in relation to working memory for novel non-verbal material. To accomplish this goal young (n=25) and old (n=25) participants performed a delayed item recognition (DIR) task while being scanned with bold fMRI. The stimuli in the DIR task consisted of computer-generated closed-curve shapes with each shape presented only once in the testing conditions of each participant. This ensured that both the novelty and appearance of the shapes maximized visual demands and limited the extent of phonologic processing. Behaviorally, as expected, the old participants were slower and less accurate compared to the young participants. Spatial patterns of brain activation that corresponded to load-dependent (stimulus set size ranged from 1 to 3) fMRI signal during the three phases of the DIR task (memory set presentation, retention delay, probe presentation) were evaluated in both age groups. Support for neural compensation and capacity limitation was evident in retention delay and the probe phase, respectively. Data were inconsistent with the neural inefficiency model. The process specific support for the theories we examined is consistent with a large corpus of research showing that the substrates underlying the encoding, retention and probe phases are different. That is, cognitive aging theories can be specific to the neural networks/regions underlying the different phases of working memory. Delineating how these theories work in concert can increase knowledge of age-related effects on working memory.

Which Route to Recovery?: Controlled Retrieval and Accessibility Bias in Retroactive Interference

New learning often interferes with the production of older, previously learned responses. However, the original responses usually appear to spontaneously recover and regain their dominance after a delay. This article takes a new approach to questions of interference and recovery by examining performance on immediate and delayed tests using direct or indirect instructions. Direct instructions asked participants to deliberately retrieve the original responses, and indirect instructions allowed them to respond on a more automatic basis, using whatever response came to mind first. Results suggest that interference and recovery may have their largest effects via relatively automatic influences on memory, such as the accessibility of new versus original information. This finding adds a new perspective to classic theories of interference and recovery, and may also inform current understanding of performance in populations (e.g., older adults) that often rely predominantly on automatic memory processing.

Effects of divided attention on perceptual and conceptual memory tests: an analysis using a process-dissociation approach

In two experiments, the nature of the relation between attention available at learning and subsequent automatic and controlled influences of memory was explored. Participants studied word lists in full and divided encoding conditions. Memory for the word lists was then tested with a perceptually driven task (stem completion) in Experiment 1 and with a conceptually driven task (category association) in Experiment 2. For recall cued with word stems, automatic influences of memory derived using the process-dissociation procedure remained invariant across a manipulation of attention that substantially reduced conscious recollection for the learning episode. In contrast, for recall cued with category names, dividing attention at learning significantly reduced the parameter estimates representing both controlled and automatic memory processes. These findings were similar to those obtained using indirect test instructions. The results suggest that, in contrast to perceptual priming, conceptual priming may be enhanced by semantic processing, and this effect is not an artifact of contamination from conscious retrieval processes.