Journey to the center of the category: the dissociation in amnesia between categorization and recognition

Premise typicality as feature inference decision-making in perceptual categories

Making property inferences for category instances is important and has been studied in two largely separate areas—categorical induction and perceptual categorization. Categorical induction has a corpus of well-established effects using complex, real-world categories; however, the representational basis of these effects is unclear. In contrast, the perceptual categorization paradigm has fostered the assessment of well-specified representation models due to its controlled stimuli and categories. In categorical induction, evaluations of premise typicality effects, stronger attribute generalization from typical category instances than from atypical, have tried to control the similarity between instances to be distinct from premise–conclusion similarity effects, stronger generalization from greater similarity. However, the extent to which similarity has been controlled is unclear for these complex stimuli. Our research embedded analogues of categorical induction effects in perceptual categories, notably premise typicality and premise conclusion similarity, in an attempt to clarify the category representation underlying feature inference. These experiments controlled similarity between instances using overlap of a small number of constrained features. Participants made inferences for test cases using displayed sets of category instances. The results showed typicality effects, premise–conclusion similarity effects, but no evidence of premise typicality effects (i.e., no preference for generalizing features from typical over atypical category instances when similarity was controlled for), with significant Bayesian support for the null. As typicality effects occurred and occur widely in the perceptual categorization paradigm, why was premise typicality absent? We discuss possible reasons. For attribute inference, is premise typicality distinct from instance similarity? These initial results suggest not.

Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) learn two-choice discriminations under displaced reinforcement

To explain animal learning, researchers invoke a dominant associative construct. In contrast, researchers freely acknowledge humans' explicit-declarative learning capacity. Here, we stretched animals' learning performance toward the explicit pole of cognition. We tested four macaques (Macaca mulatta) in new discrimination-learning paradigms. Monkeys learned a series of two-choice discrimination tasks. But immediate reinforcement was denied. Instead, reinforcement was lagged-monkeys received feedback for trial N only after seeing and responding to the N + 1-trial stimulus. Theory suggests that lagged reinforcement will eliminate a dominant form of implicit discrimination learning. Yet monkeys still learned successfully. Thus, monkeys may have alternative learning algorithms usable when reinforcement is displaced and reinforcement learning undermined. This learning may, as in humans, take a more explicit form. This and related methods that disable associative learning-fostering a possible transition to explicit cognition-could have empirical utility and theoretical significance within comparative psychology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Breaking the perceptual-conceptual barrier: Relational matching and working memory

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been interested in humans' and animals' ability to respond to abstract relations, as this ability may underlie important capacities like analogical reasoning. Cross-species research has used relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which participants try to find stimulus pairs that "match" because they both express the same abstract relation (same or different). Researchers seek to understand the cognitive processes that underlie successful matching performance. In the present RMTS paradigm, the abstract-relational cue was made redundant with a first-order perceptual cue. Then the perceptual cue faded, requiring participants to transition from a perceptual to a conceptual approach by realizing the task's abstract-relational affordance. We studied participants' ability to make this transition with and without a working-memory load. The concurrent load caused participants to fail to break the perceptual-conceptual barrier unless the load was abandoned. We conclude that finding the conceptual solution depends on reconstruing the task using cognitive processes that are especially reliant on working memory. Our data provide the closest existing look at this cognitive reorganization. They raise important theoretical issues for cross-species comparisons of relational cognition, especially regarding animals' limitations in this domain.

Formal models in animal-metacognition research: the problem of interpreting animals' behavior

Ongoing research explores whether animals have precursors to metacognition-that is, the capacity to monitor mental states or cognitive processes. Comparative psychologists have tested apes, monkeys, rats, pigeons, and a dolphin using perceptual, memory, foraging, and information-seeking paradigms. The consensus is that some species have a functional analog to human metacognition. Recently, though, associative modelers have used formal-mathematical models hoping to describe animals' "metacognitive" performances in associative-behaviorist ways. We evaluate these attempts to reify formal models as proof of particular explanations of animal cognition. These attempts misunderstand the content and proper application of models. They embody mistakes of scientific reasoning. They blur fundamental distinctions in understanding animal cognition. They impede theoretical development. In contrast, an energetic empirical enterprise is achieving strong success in describing the psychology underlying animals' metacognitive performances. We argue that this careful empirical work is the clear path to useful theoretical development. The issues raised here about formal modeling-in the domain of animal metacognition-potentially extend to biobehavioral research more broadly.

Occipitotemporal Category Representations Are Sensitive to Abstract Category Boundaries Defined by Generalization Demands

Categorization involves organizing perceptual information so as to maximize differences along dimensions that predict class membership while minimizing differences along dimensions that do not. In the current experiment, we investigated how neural representations reflecting learned category structure vary according to generalization demands. We asked male and female human participants to switch between two rules when determining whether stimuli should be considered members of a single known category. When categorizing according to the "strict" rule, participants were required to limit generalization to make fine-grained distinctions between stimuli and the category prototype. When categorizing according to the "lax" rule, participants were required to generalize category knowledge to highly atypical category members. As expected, frontoparietal regions were primarily sensitive to decisional demands (i.e., the distance of each stimulus from the active category boundary), whereas occipitotemporal representations were primarily sensitive to stimulus typicality (i.e., the similarity between each exemplar and the category prototype). Interestingly, occipitotemporal representations of stimulus typicality differed between rules. While decoding models were able to predict unseen data when trained and tested on the same rule, they were unable to do so when trained and tested on different rules. We additionally found that the discriminability of the multivariate signal negatively covaried with distance from the active category boundary. Thus, whereas many accounts of occipitotemporal cortex emphasize its important role in transforming visual information to accentuate learned category structure, our results highlight the flexible nature of these representations with regards to transient decisional demands.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Occipitotemporal representations are known to reflect category structure and are often assumed to be largely invariant with regards to transient decisional demands. We found that representations of equivalent stimuli differed between strict and lax generalization rules, and that the discriminability of these representations increased as distance from abstract category boundaries decreased. Our results therefore indicate that occipitotemporal representations are flexibly modulated by abstract decisional factors.

Ecology, Fitness, Evolution: New Perspectives on Categorization

Categorization's great debate has weighed single-system exemplar theory against the possibility of alternative processing systems. We take an evolutionary perspective toward this debate to illuminate it in a new way. Animals are crucial behavioral ambassadors to this area. They reveal the roots of human categorization, the basic assumptions of vertebrates entering category tasks, and the surprising weakness of exemplar memory as a category-learning strategy. These results have joined neuroscience results to prompt important changes in categorization theory. Categorization's great debate is ending. Categorization is served by multiple systems of process and representation.

Generalization in category learning: the roles of representational and decisional uncertainty

Effective generalization in a multiple-category situation involves both assessing potential membership in individual categories and resolving conflict between categories while implementing a decision bound. We separated generalization from decision bound implementation using an information integration task in which category exemplars varied over two incommensurable feature dimensions. Human subjects first learned to categorize stimuli within limited training regions, and then, during fMRI scanning, they also categorized transfer stimuli from new regions of perceptual space. Transfer stimuli differed both in distance from the training region prototype and distance from the decision bound, allowing us to independently assess neural systems sensitive to each. Across all stimulus regions, categorization was associated with activity in the extrastriate visual cortex, basal ganglia, and the bilateral intraparietal sulcus. Categorizing stimuli near the decision bound was associated with recruitment of the frontoinsular cortex and medial frontal cortex, regions often associated with conflict and which commonly coactivate within the salience network. Generalization was measured in terms of greater distance from the decision bound and greater distance from the category prototype (average training region stimulus). Distance from the decision bound was associated with activity in the superior parietal lobe, lingual gyri, and anterior hippocampus, whereas distance from the prototype was associated with left intraparietal sulcus activity. The results are interpreted as supporting the existence of different uncertainty resolution mechanisms for uncertainty about category membership (representational uncertainty) and uncertainty about decision bound (decisional uncertainty).

Animal metacognition: a tale of two comparative psychologies

A growing literature considers whether animals have capacities that are akin to human metacognition (i.e., humans' capacity to monitor their states of uncertainty and knowing). Comparative psychologists have approached this question by testing a dolphin, pigeons, rats, monkeys, and apes using perception, memory, and food-concealment paradigms. As part of this consideration, some associative modelers have attempted to describe animals' "metacognitive" performances in low-level, associative terms-an important goal if achievable. The authors summarize the empirical and theoretical situation regarding these associative descriptions. The associative descriptions in the animal-metacognition literature fail to encompass important phenomena. The sharp focus on abstract, mathematical associative models creates serious interpretative problems. The authors compare these failed associative descriptions with an alternative theoretical approach within contemporary comparative psychology. The alternative approach has the potential to strengthen comparative psychology as an empirical science and integrate it more fully within the mainstream of experimental psychology and cognitive science.

Prototypes, exemplars, and the natural history of categorization

The article explores-from a utility/adaptation perspective-the role of prototype and exemplar processes in categorization. The author surveys important category tasks within the categorization literature from the perspective of the optimality of applying prototype and exemplar processes. Formal simulations reveal that organisms will often (not always!) receive more useful signals about category belongingness if they average their exemplar experience into a prototype and use this as the comparative standard for categorization. This survey then provides the theoretical context for considering the evolution of cognitive systems for categorization. In the article's final sections, the author reviews recent research on the performance of nonhuman primates and humans in the tasks analyzed in the article. Diverse species share operating principles, default commitments, and processing weaknesses in categorization. From these commonalities, it may be possible to infer some properties of the categorization ecology these species generally experienced during cognitive evolution.

Fading perceptual resemblance: a path for rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) to conceptual matching?

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been intrigued by humans' and animals' capacity to respond to abstract relations like sameness and difference, because this capacity may underlie crucial aspects of cognition like analogical reasoning. Recently, this capacity has been explored in higher-order, relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which humans and animals try to complete analogies of sameness and difference between disparate groups of items. The authors introduced a new paradigm to this area, by yoking the relational-matching cue to a perceptual-matching cue. Then, using established algorithms for shape distortion, the perceptual cue was weakened and eliminated. Humans' RMTS performance easily transcended the elimination of perceptual support. In contrast, RMTS performance by six macaques faltered as they were weaned from perceptual support. No macaque showed evidence of mature RMTS performance, even given more than 260,000 training trials during which we tried to coax a relational-matching performance from them. It is an important species difference that macaques show so hesitant a response to conceptual relations when humans respond to them so effortlessly. It raises theoretical questions about the emergence of this crucial capacity during humans' cognitive evolution and during humans' cognitive development.

Refining the visual-cortical hypothesis in category learning

Participants produce steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects in dot-distortion category tasks, showing that in these tasks to-be-categorized items are compared to a prototypical representation that is the central tendency of the participant's exemplar experience. These prototype-abstraction processes have been ascribed to low-level mechanisms in primary visual cortex. Here we asked whether higher-level mechanisms in visual cortex can also sometimes support prototype abstraction. To do so, we compared dot-distortion performance when the stimuli were size constant (allowing some low-level repetition-familiarity to develop for similar shapes) or size variable (defeating repetition-familiarity effects). If prototype formation is only mediated by low-level mechanisms, stimulus-size variability should lessen prototype effects and flatten typicality gradients. Yet prototype effects and typicality gradients were the same under both conditions, whether participants learned the categories explicitly or implicitly and whether they received trial-by-trial reinforcement during transfer tests. These results broaden out the visual-cortical hypothesis because low-level visual areas, featuring retinotopic perceptual representations, would not support robust category learning or prototype-enhancement effects in an environment of pronounced variability in stimulus size. Therefore, higher-level cortical mechanisms evidently can also support prototype formation during categorization.