Dissociation, duality, and demand characteristics in hypnosis

Mirrored-self misidentification in the hypnosis laboratory: recreating the delusion from its component factors

INTRODUCTION

Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that one's reflection in the mirror is a stranger. According to Langdon and Coltheart's (2000) "two-factor" theory of monothematic delusions, the delusion can arise from deficits in face processing (Factor 1) and belief evaluation (Factor 2). This study gave participants separate hypnotic suggestions for these two factors to create a hypnotic analogue of the delusion.

METHOD

Forty-six high hypnotisable participants received a hypnotic suggestion for either Factor 1 alone or for Factors 1 and 2, either with hypnosis (hypnosis condition) or without (wake condition). Participants were asked to look into a mirror and to describe what they saw. Participants who reported seeing a stranger in the mirror also received a series of challenges.

RESULTS

Overall, 70% of participants in the hypnosis condition passed the delusion; only 22% of participants in the wake condition passed. Importantly, in hypnosis, the Factor 1 alone suggestion was just as effective in creating the delusion as the combined Factor 1 and Factor 2 suggestion.

CONCLUSION

These results suggest that hypnotic suggestion can recreate the mirrored-self misidentification delusion from its component factors. Notably, the hypnotic context, itself known to disrupt belief evaluation, can act as Factor 2.

Is human information processing conscious?

Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) Where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence, and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing? Input analysis is thought to be initially “preconscious” and “pre-attentive” - fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by “conscious,” “focal-attentive” analysis, which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity.

The present target article reviews evidence that consciousness performs none of these functions. Consciousness nearly alwaysresultsfrom focal-attentive processing (as a form of output) but does not itselfenter intothis or any other form of human information processing. This suggests that the term “conscious process” needs reexamination. Consciousnessappearsto be necessary in a variety of tasks because they require focal-attentive processing; if consciousness is absent, focal-attentive processing is absent. From afirst-person perspective, however, conscious statesarecausally effective. First-person accounts arecomplementaryto third-person accounts. Although they can be translated into third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them.

Hypnotic behavior: A social-psychological interpretation of amnesia, analgesia, and “trance logic”

This paper examines research on three hypnotic phenomena: suggested amnesia, suggested analgesia, and “trance logic.” For each case a social-psychological interpretation of hypnotic behavior as a voluntary response strategy is compared with the traditional special-process view that “good” hypnotic subjects have lost conscious control over suggestion-induced behavior. I conclude that it is inaccurate to describe hypnotically amnesic subjects as unable to recall the material they have been instructed to forget. Although amnesics present themselves as unable to remember, they in fact retain control over retrieval processes and accommodate their recall (or lack of it) to the social demands of the test situation. Hypnotic suggestions of analgesia do not produce a dissociation of pain from phenomenal awareness. Nonhypnotic suggestions of analgesia and distractor tasks that deflect attention from the'noxious stimuli are as effective as hypnotic suggestions in producing reductions in reported pain. Moreover, when appropriately motivated, subjects low in hypnotic suggestibility report pain reductions as large as those reported by highly suggestible hypnotically analgesic subjects. Finally, the data fail to support the view that a tolerance for logical incongruity (i.e., trance logic) uniquely characterizes hypnotic responding. So-called trance-logic-governed responding appears to reflect the attempts of “good” subjects to meet implicit demands to report accurately what they experience.