Basic emotions: can conflicting criteria converge?

Different models of anthropomorphism across cultures and ontological limits in current frameworks the integrative framework of anthropomorphism

Anthropomorphism describes the tendency to ascribe human characteristics to nonhuman agents. Due to the increased interest in social robotics, anthropomorphism has become a core concept of human-robot interaction (HRI) studies. However, the wide use of this concept resulted in an interchangeability of its definition. In the present study, we propose an integrative framework of anthropomorphism (IFA) encompassing three levels: cultural, individual general tendencies, and direct attributions of human-like characteristics to robots. We also acknowledge the Western bias of the state-of-the-art view of anthropomorphism and develop a cross-cultural approach. In two studies, participants from various cultures completed tasks and questionnaires assessing their animism beliefs, individual tendencies to endow robots with mental properties, spirit, and consider them as more or less human. We also evaluated their attributions of mental anthropomorphic characteristics towards robots (i.e., cognition, emotion, intention). Our results demonstrate, in both experiments, that a three-level model (as hypothesized in the IFA) reliably explains the collected data. We found an overall influence of animism (cultural level) on the two lower levels, and an influence of the individual tendencies to mentalize, spiritualize and humanize (individual level) on the attribution of cognition, emotion and intention. In addition, in Experiment 2, the analyses show a more anthropocentric view of the mind for Western than East-Asian participants. As such, Western perception of robots depends more on humanization while East-Asian on mentalization. We further discuss these results in relation to the anthropomorphism literature and argue for the use of integrative cross-cultural model in HRI research.

Differential Hemispheric Lateralization of Emotions and Related Display Behaviors: Emotion-Type Hypothesis

There are two well-known hypotheses regarding hemispheric lateralization of emotions. The Right Hemisphere Hypothesis (RHH) postulates that emotions and associated display behaviors are a dominant and lateralized function of the right hemisphere. The Valence Hypothesis (VH) posits that negative emotions and related display behaviors are modulated by the right hemisphere and positive emotions and related display behaviors are modulated by the left hemisphere. Although both the RHH and VH are supported by extensive research data, they are mutually exclusive, suggesting that there may be a missing factor in play that may provide a more accurate description of how emotions are lateralization in the brain. Evidence will be presented that provides a much broader perspective of emotions by embracing the concept that emotions can be classified into primary and social types and that hemispheric lateralization is better explained by the Emotion-type Hypothesis (ETH). The ETH posits that primary emotions and related display behaviors are modulated by the right hemisphere and social emotions and related display behaviors are modulated by the left hemisphere.

Implicit Attitudes Towards Robots Predict Explicit Attitudes, Semantic Distance Between Robots and Humans, Anthropomorphism, and Prosocial Behavior: From Attitudes to Human–Robot Interaction

How people behave towards others relies, to a large extent, on the prior attitudes that they hold towards them. In Human–Robot Interactions, individual attitudes towards robots have mostly been investigated via explicit reports that can be biased by various conscious processes. In the present study, we introduce an implicit measure of attitudes towards robots. The task utilizes the measure of semantic priming to evaluate whether participants consider humans and robots as similar or different. Our results demonstrate a link between implicit semantic distance between humans and robots and explicit attitudes towards robots, explicit semantic distance between robots and humans, perceived robot anthropomorphism, and pro/anti-social behavior towards a robot in a real life, interactive scenario. Specifically, attenuated semantic distance between humans and robots in the implicit task predicted more positive explicit attitudes towards robots, attenuated explicit semantic distance between humans and robots, attribution of an anthropomorphic characteristic, and consequently a future prosocial behavior towards a robot. Crucially, the implicit measure of attitudes towards robots (implicit semantic distance) was a better predictor of a future behavior towards the robot than explicit measure of attitudes towards robots (self-reported attitudes). Cumulatively, the current results emphasize a new approach to measure implicit attitudes towards robots, and offer a starting point for further investigations of implicit processing of robots.

Neurophysiology of spontaneous facial expressions: II. Motor control of the right and left face is partially independent in adults

Facial expressions are described traditionally as monolithic or unitary entities. However, humans have the capacity to produce facial blends of emotion in which the upper and lower face simultaneously display different expressions. Recent neuroanatomical studies in monkeys have demonstrated that there are separate cortical motor areas for controlling the upper and lower face in each hemisphere that, presumably, also occur in humans. Using high-speed videography, we began measuring the movement dynamics of spontaneous facial expressions, including facial blends, to develop a more complete understanding of the neurophysiology underlying facial expressions. In our part 1 publication in Cortex (2016), we found that hemispheric motor control of the upper and lower face is overwhelmingly independent; 242 (99%) of the expressions were classified as demonstrating independent hemispheric motor control whereas only 3 (1%) were classified as demonstrating dependent hemispheric motor control. In this companion paper (part 2), 251 unitary facial expressions that occurred on either the upper or lower face were analyzed. 164 (65%) expressions demonstrated dependent hemispheric motor control whereas 87 (35%) expressions demonstrated independent or dual hemispheric motor control, indicating that some expressions represent facial blends of emotion that occur across the vertical facial axis. These findings also support the concepts that 1) spontaneous facial expressions are organized predominantly across the horizontal facial axis and secondarily across the vertical facial axis and 2) facial expressions are complex, multi-component, motoric events. Based on the Emotion-type hypothesis of cerebral lateralization, we propose that facial expressions modulated by a primary-emotional response to an environmental event are initiated by the right hemisphere on the left side of the face whereas facial expressions modulated by a social-emotional response to an environmental event are initiated by the left hemisphere on the right side of the face.

Emotion and Facial Expression: A Semantic Perspective

This paper addresses some basic conceptual issues which, as the author argues, must be clarified before the real controversies about the nature and universality of emotions and their expression can be clearly stated. To begin with, it argues that interpretative categories such as 'anger', 'fear', 'disgust', 'sadness' and 'enjoyment' are language-specific and culture-specific, and cannot identify any human universals in the area of emotions (even if such universals did exist). Furthermore, the paper shows how different emotions can be identified in terms of cognitive scenarios associated with them and how cognitive scenarios can be phrased in terms of universal human concepts. It also shows how clearly identifiable 'facial components' or configurations of 'components' (i.e. aspects of facial behaviour) can be linked with cognitive components (and with feelings identifiable through such components). Finally, it puts forward and illustrates a hypothesis about an iconic basis of the 'semantics of the human face'. Throughout the paper, the author tries to demonstrate that the use of conceptual primitives allows us to explore human emotions from a universal, language-independent perspective. Since every language imposes its own classification upon human emotional experience, English words such as anger or sadness are cultural artefacts of the English language, not culture-free analytical tools. On the other hand, conceptual primitives such as 'good' and 'bad', or 'want', 'know', 'say' and 'think' are not cultural artefacts of the English language but belong to the universal 'alphabet of human thoughts' apparently lexicalized in all languages of the world. The author argues that basing our analysis on lexical universals we can free ourselves from the bias of our own language and reach a universal, culture-independent perspective on human cognition in general and on human emotions in particular.

Are Emotions Natural Kinds?

Laypeople and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience)—that is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about that emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.

Neurologizing the Psychology of Affects: How Appraisal-Based Constructivism and Basic Emotion Theory Can Coexist

Abundant neurobehavioral data, not discussed by Lisa Feldman Barrett (2006) , support the existence of a variety of core emotional operating systems in ancient subneocortical regions of the brain ( Panksepp, 1998a , 2005a ). Such brain systems are the primary-process ancestral birthrights of all mammals. There may be as many genetically and neurochemically coded subcortical affect systems in emotionally rich medial regions of the brain as there are “natural” emotional action systems in the brain. When emotional primes are aroused directly, as with local electrical or chemical stimulation, the affective changes sustain conditioned place preferences and place aversions, which are the premier secondary-process indices of affective states in animals. Humans are not immune to such brain manipulations; they typically exhibit strong emotional feelings. Human emotion researchers should not ignore these systems and simply look at the complex and highly variable culturally molded manifestations of emotions in humans if they wish to determine what kinds of “natural” emotional processes exist within all mammalian brain. Basic emotion science has generated workable epistemological strategies for under-standing the primal sources of human emotional feelings by detailed study of emotional circuits in our fellow animals.

Emotions Emerge from More Basic Psychological Ingredients: A Modern Psychological Constructionist Model

Over a century ago, William James outlined the first psychological constructionist model of emotion, arguing that emotions are phenomena constructed of more basic psychological parts. In this article, I outline a modern psychological constructionist model of emotion. I first explore the history of psychological construction to demonstrate that psychological constructionist models have historically emerged in an attempt to explain variability in emotion that cannot be accounted for by other approaches. I next discuss the modern psychological constructionist model of emotion that I take in my own research, outlining its hypotheses, existing empirical support, and areas of future research. I conclude by arguing that psychological constructionist models can help scientists better understand the human mind.

Authors’ response: what are emotions and how are they created in the brain?

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.

Don’t Give Up on Basic Emotions

We argue that there are three coherent, nontrivial notions of basic-ness: conceptual basic-ness, biological basic-ness, and psychological basic-ness. There is considerable evidence for conceptually basic emotion categories (e.g., “anger,” “fear”). These categories do not designate biologically basic emotions, but some forms of anger, fear, and so on that are biologically basic in a sense we will specify. Finally, two notions of psychological basic-ness are distinguished, and the evidence for them is evaluated. The framework we offer acknowledges the force of some of the objections to basic emotion theory whilst demonstrating that the notion of a basic emotion, once properly reformulated, is still of scientific value.

The development of emotion

Given that they are responsible for much of the meaning that we attribute to our existence, emotions could be said to have a central role in the psychological life of humans. But given this fundamental level of significance, the construct of emotion remains poorly understood, with the field of emotion research being full of conflicting definitions and opposing theoretical perspectives. In this review, one particular aspect of research into emotion is considered: the development of emotion in infancy and early childhood. The development of the emotional life of the child has been the focus of a vast amount of research and theorizing, so in a brief review it is only possible to scratch the surface of this topic. Rather than any attempt at a comprehensive account, three perennial questions in theorizing and research on early emotional development will be considered. First, what develops in emotional development? Second, what is the relation of cognitive development to emotional development? Third, how has the study of early individual differences in emotion expression typically been approached? In relation to the first question, four theoretical approaches to emotional development are described. For the second question, the focus is on the relation of self-awareness to the development of emotion. Finally, for the third question, the use of temperament theory as a framework for understanding individual differences in emotion expression is examined. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Facial and vocal expressions of emotion

A flurry of theoretical and empirical work concerning the production of and response to facial and vocal expressions has occurred in the past decade. That emotional expressions express emotions is a tautology but may not be a fact. Debates have centered on universality, the nature of emotion, and the link between emotions and expressions. Modern evolutionary theory is informing more models, emphasizing that expressions are directed at a receiver, that the interests of sender and receiver can conflict, that there are many determinants of sending an expression in addition to emotion, that expressions influence the receiver in a variety of ways, and that the receiver's response is more than simply decoding a message.

Cellular and humoral immunity, mood and exam stress: the influences of self-hypnosis and personality predictors

The effects of self-hypnosis training on immune function and mood were examined in medical students at exam time. Hypnosis involved relaxation and imagery directed at improved immune function and increased energy, alertness and concentration. Hypotheses were made about activated and withdrawn personality differences. Eight high and eight low hypnotically susceptible participants were given 10 sessions of hypnosis, one live and nine tape-recorded, and were compared with control subjects (N=12). CD3, CD4, CD8, CD19 and CD56 NK cells and blood cortisol were assayed. Life-style, activated vs. withdrawn temperament, arousal and anxiety questionnaires were administered. Self-hypnosis buffered the decline found in controls in NK (P<0.002) and CD8 cells (P<0.0.07) and CD8/CD4% (P<0.06) (45-35% order of magnitude differences) while there was an increase in cortisol (P<0.05). The change in NK cell counts correlated positively with changes in both CD8 cells and cortisol. Results were independent of changes in life-style. Energy ratings were higher after hypnosis (P<0.01), and increased calmness with hypnosis correlated with an increase in CD4 counts (P<0.01). The activated temperament, notably the cognitive subscale (speaking and thinking quickly), was predictive of exam levels of T and B lymphocytes (P&z.Lt;0.08-P<0.02), and reaching r=0.72 (P<0.001) in the non-intervention control group. The sizeable influences on cell-mediated immunity achieved by a relatively brief, low cost psychological intervention in the face of a compelling, but routine, stress in young, healthy adults have implications for illness prevention and for patients with compromised immunity.

Typicality range deficit in schizophrenics' recognition of emotion in faces

Severity of thought disorder in schizophrenics was assessed by a task that involved recognition of joy and shame expression, with the expressions varied for typicality of the emotion category. Accuracy, typicality rating, and reaction time were measured in schizophrenic patients who were high or low on Whitaker's Index of Schizophrenic Thinking (WIST) and in depressive and normal controls. All groups had significant variation of typicality ratings for joy (normal typicality range), but the clinical groups had smaller typicality ranges for shame recognition and higher mean typicality ratings than did normals. High WIST schizophrenics were least accurate on low typical shame expressions. Results imply that, for shame recognition, schizophrenic and depressive groups used common categorization (no typicality variation in category members) rather than resemblance categorization.