Focused on the negative: emotions and visuospatial attention in generalized anxiety disorder

Global-local visuospatial attention is a core mechanism which highly affects the way we process our visuospatial environment. The current study aimed to examine the effect of negative emotions on global-local visuospatial processing in participants with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and in healthy controls (HCs). Participants performed two versions of the global-local-arrow task: they were asked to determine the direction (left or right) of the global arrow or of the local arrows that composed it, with or without emotional prime-cues. In the non-emotional task and in the neutral-valence condition of the emotional task, the GAD group did not differ from that of HCs - both groups exhibited a classic global processing bias (reactions to the global dimension were faster and less affected by the local dimension). In the negative-valence condition, global processing bias was only slightly reduced in HCs and almost completely eliminated in the GAD group. The results of the current study suggest that, in non-emotional conditions, global processing bias does not differ significantly between individuals with GAD and HCs. However, task-irrelevant negative cues were found to have a greater impact in reducing global bias for individuals with GAD compared to HCs. Potential implications are discussed.

The influence of positive affect on sensitivity to important omissions

It is surprisingly difficult to notice when important information is missing (omission neglect) and yet, social media, advertisements, and other forms of communication typically only include one-sided information or positive attributes and omit opposing views or negative attributes. Even though it is surprisingly difficult to overcome this natural tendency, there are circumstances when decision makers are more sensitive to omissions. Understanding how and when decision makers can overcome this omission neglect tendency can be helpful to improve decision making in many situations. This paper investigates positive affect as a potential factor that can elicit sensitivity to omissions and alert decision makers to the need for additional information when important information is, in fact, missing. Four experiments use a consumer product choice situation to show that when decision makers are making an important decision, positive affect increases the likelihood that they will report a greater desire for additional product information (experiments 3 and 4) and temper their purchase interest in the target product. These results are shown using inference (experiments 1, 2, and 3) and by explicitly comparing a product choice with full and partial information (experiment 4). The results are discussed in terms of omission neglect literature as well as implications of the results for understanding the role of positive affect in information processing, judgment, and decision-making. These findings have implications for policy makers, marketers and others who are interested in message processing.

No Correlation Between Mood or Motivation and the Processing of Global and Local Information

Mood has been argued to impact the breadth of human attention, but the empirical evidence supporting this claim remains shaky. Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008) have attributed previous empirical inconsistencies regarding the effect of mood on attentional breath to a critical role of approach/avoidance motivation. They demonstrated that the combination of positive affect with high, but not with low, motivational intensity improves performance during processing local information and impairs performance during processing global information. The latter, but not the former, was replicated by Domachowska et al. (2016). Since we were interested in the modulation of attention by valence and motivation, and considering the inconsistencies in the findings, we replicated the critical experiments of both studies in four online experiments but found no significant effect of either valence or motivational intensity on attention. Taken together, our evidence casts doubt on a systematic relationship between mood or motivation on the one hand and global/local processing on the other.

The flexible impact of member affect in groups performing complex decision-making tasks

Positive and negative affect are often thought to influence the quality of group decision-making by prompting different cognitive processing styles: a less effortful heuristic style in the case of positive affect, and a more detail-oriented systematic style in the case of negative affect, with the latter yielding better group decisions than the former. By contrast, we argue that rather than prompting a specific cognitive processing style, positive affect encourages the maintenance of whatever style is currently in use, while negative affect encourages a change in style. Consequently, both positive and negative affect can result in either better or worse group decisions, depending on which cognitive processing style was at play just prior to the affect’s arousal. To test this idea, we conducted three experiments, and found that when heuristic processing was initially primed, subsequently inducing a sad mood resulted in better decisions by both individuals and groups than did subsequently inducing a happy mood. The reverse occurred when systematic processing was initially primed. In groups, these effects were mediated by the relative focus, during group discussion, on critical decision-relevant information. Implications of these findings and future directions for research are discussed.

That's me in the spotlight: Self-relevance modulates attentional breadth

A core prediction of models of social-cognitive functioning is that attention is preferentially tuned to self-relevant material. Surprisingly, however, evidence in support of this viewpoint is scant. Remedying this situation, here we demonstrated that self-relevance influences the distribution of attentional resources during decisional processing. In a flanker task (N = 60), participants reported if to-be-judged stimuli either denoted, or were owned by, the self or a friend. A consistent pattern of results emerged across both judgment tasks. Whereas the identification of friend-related targets was speeded when the items were flanked by compatible compared with incompatible flankers, responses to self-related targets were resistant to flanker interference. Probing the origin of these effects, a further computational analysis (i.e., Shrinking Spotlight Diffusion Model analysis) confirmed that self-relevance impacted the focusing of attention during decision-making. These findings highlight how self-relevance modulates attentional processing.

Shifts in attentional scope modulate event-related potentials evoked by reward

Emotions broaden or narrow the scope of attention in order to facilitate adaptive responses in threatening and rewarding contexts. In the current study, rather than asking how emotions influence attentional scope, we considered the possibility that the relationship between attentional breadth and emotion is bidirectional by asking whether shifts in attentional scope alter emotional processes using an event-related potential (ERP) paradigm. Participants (N = 30) completed a modified version of a Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task, wherein their attention was either narrowed or broadened as they attempted to win rewards. Behaviorally, narrowing attention improved task performance in the form of reduced errors and increased monetary winnings. During cue processing, narrowing (compared to broadening) attention reduced the Cue-P3 (irrespective of cue type). During feedback processing, narrowing (compared to broadening) attention reduced the Feedback-P3 to monetary wins and increased the Feedback-P2 and the Feedback-P3 to monetary non-wins. Results highlight complexity and bidirectionality in the relationship between attentional scope and affective processes.

Losses tune differently than gains: how gains and losses shape attentional scope and influence goal pursuit

Research on the asymmetric effect of negative versus positive affective states (induced by gains or losses) on scope of attention, both at a perceptual and a conceptual level, is abundant. However, little is known about the moderating effect of anticipating gains or losses versus actually experiencing them and about any downstream consequences of these effects on goal-directed behaviour. In two studies, we show that gains versus losses induce qualitatively different processes. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that the anticipation of monetary gains results in a narrowing of attentional scope, while experiencing gains broadens the scope of attention. We find the reverse pattern concerning monetary losses - while anticipation of monetary losses results in broadening of attentional scope, the actual experience of losses results in narrowing of attentional scope. Additionally, Experiment 2 replicates these findings and shows how differential attentional tuning as a function of the anticipation versus experience of gains versus losses modulates priming-induced goal-directed behaviour.

Looming fear stimuli broadens attention in a local-global letter task

This chapter provides an overview of the literature on emotion and global/local processing and presents an empirical study exploring how the combination of motion and emotion influences the focus of attention. In two experiments, fear-related pictures either loomed toward the observer or were stationary, and in one of these experiments the emotional content was masked (i.e., scrambled pictures). In the context of fearful pictures, it was expected that the additional element of looming motion would further focus attention based on looming motion's behaviorally urgent properties. However, the combination of a fearful image and looming motion was shown to broaden as opposed to narrow attention. This effect did not occur with simply neutral/looming or fearful/static images. Further, the separation of the emotional content from looming motion (scrambled pictures) revealed no effect on attentional breadth. This suggests that it is the unique combination of the fear-related content and the looming motion, which is broadening attention.

Quantitative Analysis of Situation Awareness (QASA): modelling and measuring situation awareness using signal detection theory

This paper presents a model of situation awareness (SA) that emphasises that SA is necessarily built using a subset of available information. A technique (Quantitative Analysis of Situation Awareness - QASA), based around signal detection theory, has been developed from this model that provides separate measures of actual SA (ASA) and perceived SA (PSA), together with a feature unique to QASA, a measure of bias (information acceptance). These measures allow the exploration of the relationship between actual SA, perceived SA and information acceptance. QASA can also be used for the measurement of dynamic ASA, PSA and bias. Example studies are presented and full details of the implementation of the QASA technique are provided. Practitioner Summary: This paper presents a new model of situation awareness (SA) together with an associated tool (Quantitative Analysis of Situation Awareness - QASA) that employs signal detection theory to measure several aspects of SA, including actual and perceived SA and information acceptance. Full details are given of the implementation of the tool.

Mood As Cumulative Expectation Mismatch: A Test of Theory Based on Data from Non-verbal Cognitive Bias Tests

Affective states are known to influence behavior and cognitive processes. To assess mood (moderately long-term affective states), the cognitive judgment bias test was developed and has been widely used in various animal species. However, little is known about how mood changes, how mood can be experimentally manipulated, and how mood then feeds back into cognitive judgment. A recent theory argues that mood reflects the cumulative impact of differences between obtained outcomes and expectations. Here expectations refer to an established context. Situations in which an established context fails to match an outcome are then perceived as mismatches of expectation and outcome. We take advantage of the large number of studies published on non-verbal cognitive bias tests in recent years (95 studies with a total of 162 independent tests) to test whether cumulative mismatch could indeed have led to the observed mood changes. Based on a criteria list, we assessed whether mismatch had occurred with the experimental procedure used to induce mood (mood induction mismatch), or in the context of the non-verbal cognitive bias procedure (testing mismatch). For the mood induction mismatch, we scored the mismatch between the subjects’ potential expectations and the manipulations conducted for inducing mood whereas, for the testing mismatch, we scored mismatches that may have occurred during the actual testing. We then investigated whether these two types of mismatch can predict the actual outcome of the cognitive bias study. The present evaluation shows that mood induction mismatch cannot well predict the success of a cognitive bias test. On the other hand, testing mismatch can modulate or even inverse the expected outcome. We think, cognitive bias studies should more specifically aim at creating expectation mismatch while inducing mood states to test the cumulative mismatch theory more properly. Furthermore, testing mismatch should be avoided as much as possible because it can reverse the affective state of animals as measured in a cognitive judgment bias paradigm.

Emotional cue validity effects: The role of neurocognitive responses to emotion

The beneficial effect of valid compared to invalid cues on attention performance is a basic attentional mechanism, but the impact of emotional content on cue validity is poorly understood. We tested whether the effect of cue validity on attention performance differed when cues were angry, happy, or neutral faces. Moreover, we used scalp-recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) reflecting the capture of early visual attention (P1, N170) to test whether effects were strengthened when neurocognitive responses to angry or happy cues were enhanced (larger P1 and N170 amplitudes). Twenty-five participants completed a modified flanker task using emotional face cues to measure the effects of emotion on conflict interference. Attention performance was enhanced following valid versus invalid cues, but effects did not differ by emotion cue type. However, for participants showing relatively larger N170 amplitudes to angry face cues, attention performance was specifically disrupted on those trials. Conversely, participants with relatively larger N170 amplitudes to happy face cues showed facilitated performance across all valid trials. These findings suggest that individual neurocognitive sensitivities to emotion predict the impact of emotional content on the basic attentional phenomenon of cue validity.

Happy heart, smiling eyes: A systematic review of positive mood effects on broadening of visuospatial attention

Positive mood contributes to mental and physical wellbeing. The broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2001) proposed that the beneficial effects of positive mood on life quality result from attentional broadening. In this article, we systematically review (following PRISMA guidelines; Moher et al., 2009), a host of studies investigating the nature and extent of attentional changes triggered by the experience of positive mood, with a focus on vision. While several studies reported a broadening of attention, others found that positive mood led to a more diffuse information processing style. Positive mood appears to lessen attention selectivity in a way that is context-specific and bound to limitations. We propose a new framework in which we postulate that positive mood impacts the balance between internally and externally directed attention, through modulations of cognitive control processes, instead of broadening attention per se. This novel model is able to accommodate discrepant findings, seeks to translate the phenomenon of the so-called broadening of attention with positive mood into functional terms, and provides plausible neurobiological mechanisms underlying this effect, suggesting a crucial role of the anterior and posterior cingulate cortex in this interaction.

The Impact of Affect on Out-Group Judgments Depends on Dominant Information-Processing Styles: Evidence From Incidental and Integral Affect Paradigms

Two studies tested the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model, in which positive and negative affective states are not uniquely associated with particular processing styles, but rather serve as feedback about currently accessible processing styles. The studies extend existing work by investigating (a) both incidental and integral affect, (b) out-group judgments, and (c) downstream consequences. We manipulated processing styles and either incidental (Study 1) or integral (Study 2) affect and measured perceptions of out-group homogeneity. Positive (relative to negative) affect increased out-group homogeneity judgments when global processing was primed, but under local priming, the effect reversed (Studies 1 and 2). A similar interactive effect emerged on attributions, which had downstream consequences for behavioral intentions (Study 2). These results demonstrate that both incidental and integral affect do not directly produce specific processing styles, but rather influence thinking by providing feedback about currently accessible processing styles.

Mood as Representation of Momentum

Experiences affect mood, which in turn affects subsequent experiences. Recent studies suggest two specific principles. First, mood depends on how recent reward outcomes differ from expectations. Second, mood biases the way we perceive outcomes (e.g., rewards), and this bias affects learning about those outcomes. We propose that this two-way interaction serves to mitigate inefficiencies in the application of reinforcement learning to real-world problems. Specifically, we propose that mood represents the overall momentum of recent outcomes, and its biasing influence on the perception of outcomes ‘corrects’ learning to account for environmental dependencies. We describe potential dysfunctions of this adaptive mechanism that might contribute to the symptoms of mood disorders.

With increasing use of computational models to understand human behavior, scientists have begun to model the dynamics of subjective states such as mood.

Recent data suggest that mood reflects the cumulative impact of differences between reward outcomes and expectations.

Behavioral and neural findings suggest that mood biases the perception of reward outcomes such that outcomes are perceived as better when one is in a good mood relative to when one is in a bad mood.

These two lines of research establish a bidirectional interaction between mood and reinforcement learning, which may play an important adaptive role in healthy behavior, and whose dysfunction might contribute to psychiatric disorders.

Which Passenger Emotions Mediate the Relationship Between Type of Pilot Configuration and Willingness to Fly in Commercial Aviation?

Abstract. There have been a few studies that have examined how different pilot configurations affect aviation consumer perceptions about trust, comfort, and willingness to fly (e.g., Rice et al., 2014, Int J Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, 1, 1–12; Winter et al., in press , J Air Transp Management); however, to date, no study was found that has examined how the relationship between pilot configuration and willingness to fly might be mediated by different emotions. The purpose of this study was to fill this gap by examining how affect (emotion) mediates this relationship, and more specifically, which emotion(s) mediate. In two studies, participants were presented with different pilot configurations and asked to rate how they felt about them and how willing they would be to fly under those circumstances. Both studies revealed strong evidence that affect was a mediator in this relationship, and that anger, fear, and happiness were the significant emotions in play. The findings from this study provide information on how consumers view modifying the number of pilots that may be on board the aircraft compared with controlling the aircraft remotely. It also identifies that emotions play a significant role in these relationships.

Zooming into creativity: individual differences in attentional global-local biases are linked to creative thinking

While recent studies have investigated how processes underlying human creativity are affected by particular visual-attentional states, we tested the impact of more stable attention-related preferences. These were assessed by means of Navon’s global-local task, in which participants respond to the global or local features of large letters constructed from smaller letters. Three standard measures were derived from this task: the sizes of the global precedence effect, the global interference effect (i.e., the impact of incongruent letters at the global level on local processing), and the local interference effect (i.e., the impact of incongruent letters at the local level on global processing). These measures were correlated with performance in a convergent-thinking creativity task (the Remote Associates Task), a divergent-thinking creativity task (the Alternate Uses Task), and a measure of fluid intelligence (Raven’s matrices). Flexibility in divergent thinking was predicted by the local interference effect while convergent thinking was predicted by intelligence only. We conclude that a stronger attentional bias to visual information about the “bigger picture” promotes cognitive flexibility in searching for multiple solutions.

What is in the feedback? Effect of induced happiness vs. sadness on probabilistic learning with vs. without exploration

According to dominant neuropsychological theories of affect, emotions signal salience of events and in turn facilitate a wide spectrum of response options or action tendencies. Valence of an emotional experience is pivotal here, as it alters reward and punishment processing, as well as the balance between safety and risk taking, which can be translated into changes in the exploration-exploitation trade-off during reinforcement learning (RL). To test this idea, we compared the behavioral performance of three groups of participants that all completed a variant of a standard probabilistic learning task, but who differed regarding which mood state was actually induced and maintained (happy, sad or neutral). To foster a change from an exploration to an exploitation-based mode, we removed feedback information once learning was reliably established. Although changes in mood were successful, learning performance was balanced between the three groups. Critically, when focusing on exploitation-driven learning only, they did not differ either. Moreover, mood valence did not alter the learning rate or exploration per se, when titrated using complementing computational modeling. By comparing systematically these results to our previous study (Bakic et al., 2014), we found that arousal levels did differ between studies, which might account for limited modulatory effects of (positive) mood on RL in the present case. These results challenge the assumption that mood valence alone is enough to create strong shifts in the way exploitation or exploration is eventually carried out during (probabilistic) learning. In this context, we discuss the possibility that both valence and arousal are actually necessary components of the emotional mood state to yield changes in the use and exploration of incentives cues during RL.

Effects of positive mood on attentional breadth for emotional stimuli

Although earlier studies have related positive emotions to attentional broadening, recent findings point out the complexity of this relation and show that these broadening effects interact with factors such as characteristics of the information that is presented. Besides stimuli characteristics, individual characteristics such as the presence of depressive symptoms could also influence the broadening effects as depressive symptoms have previously been related to a more narrow attentional scope. Therefore, the aim of this study was to further investigate the attentional broadening effects of positive emotions, testing whether this is influenced by the emotional valence of the information presented and secondly, how the presence of depressive symptoms might interact with this relationship. We used a performance-based measure to assess fluctuations in attentional broadening for positive, neutral, and negative stimuli. We assessed the presence and severity of depressive symptoms in an unselected study sample and tested whether these symptoms moderate the relationship between induced positive mood and attentional breadth for emotional information. Results showed no direct relation between positive mood and attentional breadth, regardless of the emotional valence of the stimuli. However, the presence of depressive symptoms moderated this relationship in such a way that among low levels of depressive symptoms, positive mood was related to attentional broadening specifically when positive information was presented, while at high levels of depressive symptoms this relation was reversed. The current findings suggest that both stimuli characteristics, individual characteristics and their interplay should be taken into account when investigating the broadening effects of positive emotions.

Recognizing the bank robber and spotting the difference: emotional state and global vs. local attentional set

In two experiments (161 participants in total), we investigated how current mood influences processing styles (global vs. local). Participants watched a video of a bank robbery before receiving a positive, negative or neutral induction, and they performed two tasks: a face-recognition task about the bank robber as global processing measure, and a spot-the-difference task using neutral pictures (Experiment-1) or emotional scenes (Experiment-2) as local processing measure. Results showed that positive mood induction favoured a global processing style, enhancing participants' ability to correctly identify a face even when they watched the video before the mood-induction. This shows that, besides influencing encoding processes, mood state can be also related to retrieval processes. On the contrary, negative mood induction enhanced a local processing style, making easier and faster the detection of differences between nearly identical pictures, independently of their valence. This dissociation supports the hypothesis that current mood modulates processing through activation of different cognitive styles.

A meta-analysis and review of holistic face processing

The concept of holistic processing is a cornerstone of face recognition research, yet central questions related to holistic processing remain unanswered, and debates have thus far failed to reach a resolution despite accumulating empirical evidence. We argue that a considerable source of confusion in this literature stems from a methodological problem. Specifically, 2 measures of holistic processing based on the composite paradigm (complete design and partial design) are used in the literature, but they often lead to qualitatively different results. First, we present a comprehensive review of the work that directly compares the 2 designs, and which clearly favors the complete design over the partial design. Second, we report a meta-analysis of holistic face processing according to both designs and use this as further evidence for one design over the other. The meta-analysis effect size of holistic processing in the complete design is nearly 3 times that of the partial design. Effect sizes were not correlated between measures, consistent with the suggestion that they do not measure the same thing. Our meta-analysis also examines the correlation between conditions in the complete design of the composite task, and suggests that in an individual differences context, little is gained by including a misaligned baseline. Finally, we offer a comprehensive review of the state of knowledge about holistic processing based on evidence gathered from the measure we favor based on the 1st sections of our review-the complete design-and outline outstanding research questions in that new context.

Attentional flexibility during approach and avoidance motivational states: the role of context in shifts of attentional breadth

In the present studies, we aimed to understand how approach and avoidance states affect attentional flexibility by examining attentional shifts on a trial-by-trial basis. We also examined how a novel construct in this area, task context, might interact with motivation to influence attentional flexibility. Participants completed a modified composite letter task in which the ratio of global to local targets was varied by block, making different levels of attentional focus beneficial to performance on different blocks. Study 1 demonstrated that, in the absence of a motivation manipulation, switch costs were lowest on blocks with an even ratio of global and local trials and were higher on blocks with an uneven ratio. Other participants completed the task while viewing pictures (Studies 2 and 3) and assuming arm positions (Studies 2 and 4) to induce approach, avoidance, and neutral motivational states. Avoidance motivation reduced switch costs in evenly proportioned contexts, whereas approach motivation reduced switch costs in mostly global contexts. Additionally, approach motivation imparted a similar switch cost magnitude across different contexts, whereas avoidance and neutral states led to variable switch costs depending on the context. Subsequent analyses revealed that these effects were driven largely by faster switching to local targets on mostly global blocks in the approach condition. These findings suggest that avoidance facilitates attentional shifts when switches are frequent, whereas approach facilitates responding to rare or unexpected local stimuli. The main implication of these results is that motivation has different effects on attentional shifts depending on the context.

Happy with a difference, unhappy with an identity: observers' mood determines processing depth in visual search

Visual search for feature targets was employed to investigate whether the mechanisms underlying visual selective attention are modulated by observers' mood. The effects of induced mood on overall mean reaction times and on changes and repetitions of target-defining features and dimensions across consecutive trials were measured. The results showed that reaction times were significantly slower in the negative than in the positive and neutral mood groups. Furthermore, the results demonstrated that the processing stage that is activated to select visual information in a feature search task is modulated by the observer's mood. In participants with positive or neutral moods, dimension-specific, but no feature-specific, intertrial transition effects were found, suggesting that these observers based their responses on a salience signal coding the most conspicuous display location. Conversely, intertrial effects in observers in a negative mood were feature-specific in nature, suggesting that these participants accessed the feature identity level before responding.

A Flexible Impact of Affective Feelings on Priming Effects

Four experiments found that positive and negative affect dictated whether primed social categories and trait concepts led to assimilation or contrast. This influence was further found to be flexibly responsive to the momentary activation of a global or local focus. When a global focus was dominant, positive affect resulted in assimilation to primed traits and social categories, and negative affect resulted in contrast. But, when a local focus was dominant, the opposite pattern of assimilation and contrast as a consequence of positive and negative affect was observed. These results are consistent with the more general view that positive and negative affect signal the value of currently accessible response tendencies and are, therefore, flexibly responsive in their influence cognition to changing situations and mental contexts.

Asymmetries of influence: differential effects of body postures on perceptions of emotional facial expressions

The accuracy and speed with which emotional facial expressions are identified is influenced by body postures. Two influential models predict that these congruency effects will be largest when the emotion displayed in the face is similar to that displayed in the body: the emotional seed model and the dimensional model. These models differ in whether similarity is based on physical characteristics or underlying dimensions of valence and arousal. Using a 3-alternative forced-choice task in which stimuli were presented briefly (Exp 1a) or for an unlimited time (Exp 1b) we provide evidence that congruency effects are more complex than either model predicts; the effects are asymmetrical and cannot be accounted for by similarity alone. Fearful postures are especially influential when paired with facial expressions, but not when presented in a flanker task (Exp 2). We suggest refinements to each model that may account for our results and suggest that additional studies be conducted prior to drawing strong theoretical conclusions.

Does Emotion Directly Tune the Scope of Attention?

Considerable research supports a fixed link between affect and attentional scope, with positive affect producing a focus on the forest, so to speak, and negative affect producing a focus on the trees. New research, however, reveals greater flexibility in this link than is commonly assumed. Research consistent with the idea that affective feelings merely influence whether people act on briefly dominant tendencies to focus broadly or narrowly is presented. Implications of these new findings for research on affect and attention are discussed.

The relation between cognitive-perceptual schizotypal traits and the Ebbinghaus size-illusion is mediated by judgment time

In the Ebbinghaus illusion, a circle surrounded by smaller circles is perceived as larger than an identical one surrounded by larger circles. The illusion is reportedly weaker in individuals with (disorganized) schizophrenia or schizotypy than in controls, a finding that has been interpreted as evidence that both schizophrenia and schizotypy involve reduced contextual integration. In support of this view, we show that the Ebbinghaus illusion also decreases, in the general population, with cognitive-perceptual schizotypal traits (measured with both the cognitive-perceptual subscale of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire-Brief and the Magical Ideation scale). Our results were strong and separately replicable in different within-subjects and between-subjects conditions. However, a mediation analysis revealed that the reduction of the Ebbinghaus illusion was (statistically, hence without implying a causal relationship) entirely due to increased judgment time, i.e., the time subjects took to complete size comparisons. Judgment time increased with the strength of cognitive-perceptual schizotypal traits, but subjects with longer judgment times had smaller illusions regardless of these traits. We argue that there are at least two possible accounts of our results. Reduced contextual integration might be due to a reduced ability to integrate context, as previously suggested; alternatively, it could be due to a reduced tendency to integrate context—that is, to a detail-oriented processing style. We offer predictions for future research, testable with a deadline experiment that pits these two accounts against one another. Regardless of which account proves to be best, our results show that contextual integration decreases with cognitive-perceptual schizotypal traits, and that this relationship is mediated by judgment time. Future studies should thus consider either manipulating or measuring this time.

Intuitive (in)coherence judgments are guided by processing fluency, mood and affect

Recently proposed accounts of intuitive judgments of semantic coherence assume that processing fluency results in a positive affective response leading to successful assessment of semantic coherence. The present paper investigates whether processing fluency may indicate semantic incoherence as well. In two studies, we employ a new paradigm in which participants have to detect an incoherent item among semantically coherent words. In Study 1, we show participants accurately indicating an incoherent item despite not being able to provide an accurate solution to coherent words. Further, this effect is modified by affective valence of solution words that are not retrieved from memory. Study 2 replicates those results and extend them by showing that mood moderates incoherence judgments independently of affective valence of solutions. The results support processing fluency account of intuitive semantic coherence judgments and show that it is not fluency per se but fluency variations that drive judgments.