Limited evidence of number-space mapping in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella)

May the force be with you: exploring force discrimination in chimpanzees using the force-feedback device

While force-feedback devices have been developed in areas such as virtual reality, there have been very few comparative cognitive studies in nonhuman animals using these devices. In addition, although cross-modal perception between vision and touch has been actively studied in nonhuman primates for several decades, there have been no studies of their active haptic perception. In this study, we attempted to train force discrimination in chimpanzees using a force-feedback device modified from a trackball. Chimpanzees were given different levels of force feedback (8.0 vs. 0.5 N) when moving the on-screen cursor to the target area by manipulating the trackball and were required to select one of two choice stimuli based on the force cue. The experiment was conducted using a trial-block procedure in which the same force stimulus was presented for a fixed number of trials, and the force stimulus was changed between blocks. The block size was progressively reduced from ten trials. Four chimpanzees were trained, but none reached the learning criterion (80% or more correct responses under the condition that the force stimuli were presented randomly). However, a detailed analysis of the chimpanzees' performance before and after the trial-block switching revealed that their choice behavior could not be explained by a simple win-stay/lose-shift strategy, suggesting that the switching of the force stimuli affected the chimpanzees' choice behavior. It was also found that the chimpanzees performed better when switching from small to large force stimuli than when switching from large to small force stimuli. Although none of the chimpanzees in this study acquired force discrimination, future studies using such force-feedback devices will provide new insights for understanding haptic cognition in nonhuman primates from a comparative cognitive perspective.

Magnitude shifts spatial attention from left to right in rhesus monkeys as in the human mental number line

Humans typically represent numbers and quantities along a left-to-right continuum. Early perspectives attributed number-space association to culture; however, recent evidence in newborns and animals challenges this hypothesis. We investigate whether the length of an array of dots influences spatial bias in rhesus macaques. We designed a touch-screen task that required monkeys to remember the location of a target. At test, monkeys maintained high performance with arrays of 2, 4, 6, or 10 dots, regardless of changes in the array's location, spacing, and length. Monkeys remembered better left targets with 2-dot arrays and right targets with 6- or 10-dot arrays. Replacing the 10-dot array with a long bar, yielded more accurate performance with rightward locations, consistent with an underlying left-to-right oriented magnitude code. Our study supports the hypothesis of a spatially oriented mental magnitude line common to humans and animals, countering the idea that this code arises from uniquely human cultural learning.

Thinking about order: a review of common processing of magnitude and learned orders in animals

Rich behavioral and neurobiological evidence suggests cognitive and neural overlap in how quantitatively comparable dimensions such as quantity, time, and space are processed in humans and animals. While magnitude domains such as physical magnitude, time, and space represent information that can be quantitatively compared (4 "is half of" 8), they also represent information that can be organized ordinally (1→2→3→4). Recent evidence suggests that the common representations seen across physical magnitude, time, and space domains in humans may be due to their common ordinal features rather than their common quantitative features, as these common representations appear to extend beyond magnitude domains to include learned orders. In this review, we bring together separate lines of research on multiple ordinal domains including magnitude-based and learned orders in animals to explore the extent to which there is support for a common cognitive process underlying ordinal processing. Animals show similarities in performance patterns across natural quantitatively comparable ordered domains (physical magnitude, time, space, dominance) and learned orders (acquired through transitive inference or simultaneous chaining). Additionally, they show transfer and interference across tasks within and between ordinal domains that support the theory of a common ordinal representation across domains. This review provides some support for the development of a unified theory of ordinality and suggests areas for future research to better characterize the extent to which there are commonalities in cognitive processing of ordinal information generally.

Reporting and interpreting non-significant results in animal cognition research

How statistically non-significant results are reported and interpreted following null hypothesis significance testing is often criticized. This issue is important for animal cognition research because studies in the field are often underpowered to detect theoretically meaningful effect sizes, i.e., often produce non-significant p-values even when the null hypothesis is incorrect. Thus, we manually extracted and classified how researchers report and interpret non-significant p-values and examined the p-value distribution of these non-significant results across published articles in animal cognition and related fields. We found a large amount of heterogeneity in how researchers report statistically non-significant p-values in the result sections of articles, and how they interpret them in the titles and abstracts. Reporting of the non-significant results as "No Effect" was common in the titles (84%), abstracts (64%), and results sections (41%) of papers, whereas reporting of the results as "Non-Significant" was less common in the titles (0%) and abstracts (26%), but was present in the results (52%). Discussions of effect sizes were rare (<5% of articles). A p-value distribution analysis was consistent with research being performed with low power of statistical tests to detect effect sizes of interest. These findings suggest that researchers in animal cognition should pay close attention to the evidence used to support claims of absence of effects in the literature, and-in their own work-report statistically non-significant results clearly and formally correct, as well as use more formal methods of assessing evidence against theoretical predictions.

Perceiving numerosity does not cause automatic shifts of spatial attention

It is debated whether the representation of numbers is endowed with a directional-spatial component so that perceiving small-magnitude numbers triggers leftward shifts of attention and perceiving large-magnitude numbers rightward shifts. Contrary to initial findings, recent investigations have demonstrated that centrally presented small-magnitude and large-magnitude Arabic numbers do not cause leftward and rightward shifts of attention, respectively. Here we verified whether perceiving small or large non-symbolic numerosities (i.e., clouds of dots) drives attention to the left or the right side of space, respectively. In experiment 1, participants were presented with central small (1, 2) vs large-numerosity (8, 9) clouds of dots followed by an imperative target in the left or right side of space. In experiment 2, a central cloud of dots (i.e., five dots) was followed by the simultaneous presentation of two identical dot-clouds, one on the left and one on the right side of space. Lateral clouds were both lower (1, 2) or higher in numerosity (8, 9) than the central cloud. After a variable delay, one of the two lateral clouds turned red and participants had to signal the colour change through a unimanual response. We found that (a) in Experiment 1, the small vs large numerosity of the central cloud of dots did not speed up the detection of left vs right targets, respectively, (b) in Experiment 2, the detection of colour change was not faster in the left side of space when lateral clouds were smaller in numerosity than the central reference and in the right side when clouds were larger in numerosity. These findings show that perceiving non-symbolic numerosity does not cause automatic shifts of spatial attention and suggests no inherent association between the representation of numerosity and that of directional space.

How to trigger and keep stable directional Space-Number Associations (SNAs)

Humans are prone to mentally organise the ascending series of integers according to reading habits so that in western cultures small numbers are positioned to the left of larger ones on a mental number line. Despite 140 years since seminal observations by Sir Francis Galton (Galton, 1880a, b), the functional mechanisms that give rise to directional Space-Number Associations (SNAs) remain elusive. Here, we contrasted three different experimental conditions, each including a different version of a Go/No-Go task with intermixed numerical and arrow-targets (Shaki and Fischer, 2018; Pinto et al., 2019a). We show that directional SNAs are not "all or none" phenomena. We demonstrate that SNAs get progressively less noisy and more stable the more contrasting small/large magnitude-codes and contrasting left/right spatial-codes are explicitly and fully combined in the task set. The analyses of the time-course of space-number congruency effects showed that both the absence and presence of the SNA were independent of the speed of reaction times. In agreement with our original proposal (Aiello et al., 2012), these findings show that conceptualising the ascending series of integers in spatial terms depends on the use of spatial codes in the numerical task at hand rather than on the presence of an inherent spatial dimension in the semantic representation of numbers. This evidence suggests that directional SNAs, like the SNARC effect, are secondary to the primary transfer of spatial response codes to number stimuli, rather than deriving from a primary congruency or incongruence between independent spatial-response and spatial-number codes.

Numerical magnitude, rather than individual bias, explains spatial numerical association in newborn chicks

We associate small numbers with the left and large numbers with the right side of space. Recent evidence from human newborns and non-human animals has challenged the primary role assigned to culture, in determining this spatial numerical association (SNA). Nevertheless, the effect of individual spatial biases has not been considered in previous research. Here, we tested the effect of numerical magnitude in SNA and we controlled for itablendividual biases. We trained 3-day-old chicks (Gallus gallus) on a given numerical magnitude (5). Then chicks could choose between two identical, left or right, stimuli both representing either 2, 8, or 5 elements. We computed the percentage of Left-sided Choice (LC). Numerical magnitude, but not individual lateral bias, explained LC: LC2 vs. 2>LC5 vs. 5>LC8 vs. 8. These findings suggest that SNA originates from pre-linguistic precursors, and pave the way to the investigation of the neural correlates of the number space association.

Hemispheric specialization in spatial versus ordinal processing in the day-old domestic chick (Gallus gallus)

Different species show an intriguing similarity in representing numerosity in space, starting from left to right. This bias has been attributed to a right hemisphere dominance in processing spatial information. Here, to disentangle the role of each hemisphere in dealing with spatial versus ordinal-numerical information, we tested domestic chicks during monocular versus binocular vision. In the avian brain, the contralateral hemisphere mainly processes the visual input from each eye. Four-day-old chicks learned to peck at the fourth element in a sagittal series of 10 identical elements. At testing, chicks faced a left-to-right-oriented series where the interelement distance was manipulated so that the third element was where the fourth had been at training; this compelled chicks to use either spatial or ordinal cues. Chicks tested binocularly selected both the fourth left and (to a lesser extent) right elements. Chicks tested monocularly chose the third and fourth elements on the seeing side equally. Interhemispheric cooperation resulted in the use of ordinal-numerical information, while each single hemisphere could rely on spatial or ordinal-numerical cue. Both hemispheres can process spatial and ordinal-numerical information, but their interaction results in the supremacy of processing the ordinal-numerical cue.