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Kean D, Renner E, Atkinson M, Caldwell CA. Capuchin monkeys learn to use information equally well from individual exploration and social demonstration. Anim Cogn 2023; 26:435-450. [PMID: 36064832 PMCID: PMC9950169 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-022-01654-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/19/2021] [Revised: 05/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/02/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
The limited evidence of complex culture in non-human primates contrasts strikingly with human behaviour. This may be because non-human primates fail to use information acquired socially as effectively as they use information acquired individually. Here, monkeys were trained on a stimulus discrimination task with a win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS) reward structure. In a social learning condition, the experimenter performed an information trial by choosing between the available stimuli; in an individual condition, monkeys made this choice themselves. The monkeys' subsequent test trials displayed the same stimulus array. They were rewarded for repetition of rewarded ('win-stay') and avoidance of unrewarded ('lose-shift') information trial selections. Nine monkeys reached our pre-determined performance criterion on the initial two-stimulus stage. Their ability to generalise the WSLS strategy was then evaluated by transfer to a three-stimulus stage. Minimal differences were found in information use between the social and individual conditions on two-stimuli. However, a bias was found towards repetition of the information trial, regardless of information source condition or whether the information trial selection was rewarded. Proficient subjects were found to generalise the strategy to three-stimuli following rewarded information trials, but performed at chance on unrewarded. Again, this was not found to vary by source condition. Overall, results suggest no fundamental barrier to non-human primates' use of information from a social source. However, the apparent struggle to learn from the absence of rewards hints at a difficulty with using information acquired from unsuccessful attempts; this could be linked to the limited evidence for cumulative culture in non-human primates.
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Affiliation(s)
- Donna Kean
- Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK.
- Anti-Persoonsmijnen Ontmijnende Product Ontwikkeling (APOPO), Sokoine University of Agriculture, PO Box 3078, Morogoro, Tanzania.
| | - Elizabeth Renner
- Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK
- Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, DH1 3LE, UK
| | - Mark Atkinson
- Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK
- School of Management and School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, KY16 9AJ, UK
| | - Christine A Caldwell
- Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK
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Blakey KH, Atkinson M, Rafetseder E, Renner E, Caldwell CA. Taking account of others' goals in social information use: Developmental changes in 3- to 7-year-old children. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 215:105325. [PMID: 34896763 PMCID: PMC8784822 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105325] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2020] [Revised: 11/08/2021] [Accepted: 11/08/2021] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Social information use improved with age but only for exploration of alternatives. Children were able to account for others’ conflicting motivations from 4 years. Alignment of the demonstrator’s and children’s goals did not influence performance. From 6 years children could infer the outcome of others’ behaviour. Rates of copying were low at all ages, even when it was the appropriate response.
The ability to take mental states such as goals into account when interpreting others’ behavior has been proposed to be what sets human use of social information apart from that of other animals. If so, children’s social information use would be expected to change as their understanding of others’ mental states develops. We explored age-related changes in 3- to 7-year-old children’s ability to strategically use social information by taking into account another’s goal when it was, or was not, aligned with their own. Children observed as a puppet demonstrator selected a capsule, peeked inside, and chose to accept or reject it, following which children made their own selection. Children were able to account for others’ conflicting motivations from around 4 years of age and reliably inferred the outcome of others’ behavior from 6 years. However, using social information based on such inferences appeared to be challenging regardless of whether the demonstrator’s goal was, or was not. aligned to that of the participant. We found that social information use improved with age; however, this improvement was restricted to cases in which the appropriate response was to avoid copying the demonstrator’s selection. In contrast to previous research, appropriate copying responses remained at chance. Possible explanations for this unexpected pattern of results are discussed. The cognitive challenge associated with the ability to account for others’ goals could offer humans a significant advantage over that of other animals in their ability to use social information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kirsten H Blakey
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK.
| | - Mark Atkinson
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK
| | - Eva Rafetseder
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK
| | - Elizabeth Renner
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK
| | - Christine A Caldwell
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK
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Dunstone J, Atkinson M, Grainger C, Renner E, Caldwell CA. Limited evidence for executive function load impairing selective copying in a win-stay lose-shift task. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0247183. [PMID: 33661937 PMCID: PMC7932141 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0247183] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2020] [Accepted: 02/02/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
The use of ‘explicitly metacognitive’ learning strategies has been proposed as an explanation for uniquely human capacities for cumulative culture. Such strategies are proposed to rely on explicit, system-2 cognitive processes, to enable advantageous selective copying. To investigate the plausibility of this theory, we investigated participants’ ability to make flexible learning decisions, and their metacognitive monitoring efficiency, under executive function (EF) load. Adult participants completed a simple win-stay lose-shift (WSLS) paradigm task, intended to model a situation where presented information can be used to inform response choice, by copying rewarded responses and avoiding those that are unrewarded. This was completed alongside a concurrent switching task. Participants were split into three conditions: those that needed to use a selective copying, WSLS strategy, those that should always copy observed information, and those that should always do the opposite (Expt 1). Participants also completed a metacognitive monitoring task alongside the concurrent switching task (Expt 2). Conditions demanding selective strategies were more challenging than those requiring the use of one rule consistently. In addition, consistently copying was less challenging than consistently avoiding observed stimuli. Differences between selectively copying and always copying were hypothesised to stem from working memory requirements rather than the concurrent EF load. No impact of EF load was found on participants’ metacognitive monitoring ability. These results suggest that copying decisions are underpinned by the use of executive functions even at a very basic level, and that selective copying strategies are more challenging than a combination of their component parts. We found minimal evidence that selective copying strategies relied on executive functions any more than consistent copying or deviation. However, task experience effects suggested that ceiling effects could have been masking differences between conditions which might be apparent in other contexts, such as when observed information must be retained in memory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Juliet Dunstone
- Psychology Division, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
- RATCHETCOG Research Group, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Mark Atkinson
- Psychology Division, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
- RATCHETCOG Research Group, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
| | | | - Elizabeth Renner
- Psychology Division, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
- RATCHETCOG Research Group, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
| | - Christine A. Caldwell
- Psychology Division, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
- RATCHETCOG Research Group, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
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The use of individual, social, and animated cue information by capuchin monkeys and children in a touchscreen task. Sci Rep 2021; 11:1043. [PMID: 33441782 PMCID: PMC7806602 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-80221-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2020] [Accepted: 12/15/2020] [Indexed: 12/03/2022] Open
Abstract
The distinctiveness of human cumulative culture raises the question of whether humans respond differently to information originating from social sources, compared with information from other sources. Further, does any such differential responding set humans apart from other species? We studied how capuchin monkeys and 2- to 5-year-old children used information originating from their own actions, those of a human demonstrator, or an animated cue. This information, presented via a touchscreen, always revealed in the first trial (T1) the reward value (rewarded or unrewarded) of one stimulus from a 2- or 3-item array, and could be used in a follow-up trial (T2) involving the same stimulus array. Two monkeys achieved a level of proficiency indicating their appreciation of the T1–T2 relationship, i.e., reliably repeating rewarded (“win”) selections and actively avoiding repetition of unrewarded (“lose”) selections well above chance levels. Neither the two task-proficient monkeys nor the children showed overall performance differences between the three source conditions. Non-task-proficient monkeys, by contrast, did show effects of source, performing best with individually-acquired information. The overall pattern of results hints at an alternative perspective on evidence typically interpreted as showing a human advantage for social information use.
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Wilks CEH, Rafetseder E, Renner E, Atkinson M, Caldwell CA. Cognitive prerequisites for cumulative culture are context-dependent: Children's potential for ratcheting depends on cue longevity. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 204:105031. [PMID: 33422738 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.105031] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2020] [Revised: 09/03/2020] [Accepted: 10/08/2020] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Human cumulative culture has been suggested to depend on human-unique cognitive mechanisms, explaining its apparent absence in other species. We show that the potential for exhibiting cumulative culture depends on the cognitive abilities of the agents and the demands associated with using information generated by others' activity. 154 children aged 3-6 years played a searching game ("Find the Treasure"), taking their turn after a puppet demonstrator. The puppet's attempt revealed information about the contents of the locations searched, which could be exploited to target rewarded locations, and avoid unrewarded ones. Two conditions were presented, intended to capture realistic variation in the transience of the cues generated by another individual's activity. In one condition, the puppet's demonstration provided transient information - boxes were opened, seen to be rewarded or not, and then closed. In the other condition the puppet's chosen boxes remained partially open, providing an enduring visible cue as to whether that location was rewarded. Children undertook three trials of varying demonstration success, and we used patterns of performance to infer the potential for improvement over multiple generations of transmission. In the Enduring Cues condition, children's performance demonstrated the potential for cumulative culture. In contrast, in the Transient Information condition, only older children showed improved performances following higher success demonstrations and overall performance was not compatible with the possibility of improvements over generations of social transmission. We conclude that under certain conditions cumulative culture could occur in many species, but in a broader range of contexts in humans.
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Affiliation(s)
- Charlotte E H Wilks
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK.
| | - Eva Rafetseder
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
| | - Elizabeth Renner
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
| | - Mark Atkinson
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
| | - Christine A Caldwell
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
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