Conscious perception can be both graded and discrete

A multidimensional approach to the self in non-human animals through the Pattern Theory of Self

In the last decades, research on animal consciousness has advanced significantly, fueled by interdisciplinary contributions. However, a critical dimension of animal experience remains underexplored: the self. While traditionally linked to human studies, research focused on the self in animals has often been framed dichotomously, distinguishing low-level, bodily, and affective aspects from high-level, cognitive, and conceptual dimensions. Emerging evidence suggests a broader spectrum of self-related features across species, yet current theoretical approaches often reduce the self to a derivative aspect of consciousness or prioritize narrow high-level dimensions, such as self-recognition or metacognition. To address this gap, we propose an integrated framework grounded in the Pattern Theory of Self (PTS). PTS conceptualizes the self as a dynamic, multidimensional construct arising from a matrix of dimensions, ranging from bodily and affective to intersubjective and normative aspects. We propose adopting this multidimensional perspective for the study of the self in animals, by emphasizing the graded nature of the self within each dimension and the non-hierarchical organization across dimensions. In this sense, PTS may accommodate both inter- and intra-species variability, enabling researchers to investigate the self across diverse organisms without relying on anthropocentric biases. We propose that, by integrating this framework with insights from comparative psychology, neuroscience, and ethology, the application of PTS to animals can show how the self emerges in varying degrees and forms, shaped by ecological niches and adaptive demands.

Confidence for intrusion errors during the attentional blink depends on target-defining features

Research surrounding the attentional blink phenomenon - a deficit in responding to the second of two temporally proximal stimuli when presented 150-500 ms after the first - has used a wide variety of target-defining and response features of stimuli. The typical U-shape curve for absolute performance is robust, surviving across most stimulus features, and therefore changes in performance are discussed as dynamics in an attentional system that are nonspecific a stimulus type. However, the patterns of errors participants make might not show the same robustness, and participants' confidences in these errors might differ - potentially suggesting the involvement of different attentional or perceptual mechanisms. The present research is a comparison of error patterns and confidence in those errors when letter target stimuli are defined by either the color of the letter, the presence of a surrounding annulus, or the color of the annulus. Across three experiments, we show that participants erroneously report stimuli that are further away from T2 and they are similarly confident in specifically their post-target errors as their correct responses when annuli define targets, but not when color of the letter defines targets. Experiment 3 provides some evidence to suggest that this error pattern and associated confidence is time-dependent when the color of the annulus defines the target, but not when the color of the letter defines the target. These results raise questions concerning the nature of the errors and possibly the mechanisms of the attentional blink phenomenon itself.

Attentional blur and blink: Effects of adaptive attentional scaling on visual awareness

Attentional scaling is a crucial mechanism that enables us to flexibly allocate our attention to larger or smaller regions in the visual field. Although previous studies have demonstrated the critical role of attentional scaling in visual processing, its impact on modulating visual awareness is not yet fully understood. This study investigates the adaptive control of attentional scaling and its influence on visual awareness in an attentional blink paradigm. Participants were required to attend to the first target's location, which was manipulated either session-wise, trial-wise, or such that it could be learned across a block of trials. Discrete, all-or-none, awareness was expected when attention was allocated to a narrow area, while gradual awareness was expected when attention was allocated to a larger area. We used mixture modeling to assess second target awareness across these different attentional scales. The results revealed that participants could adaptively control their attentional scale both across stable sessions, and through (implicit) statistical learning in blocks of successive trials. This produced gradual perceptual awareness when the participants adopted a broad attentional scale, causing an attentional "blur". However, trial-wise cues did not allow for attentional scaling, resulting in more discrete target perception overall, and an attentional "blink". We conclude that the attentional scale is to some extent under adaptive control during the attentional blink/blur, where it can produce qualitatively different modes of perceptual awareness.

Perceptual Awareness Occurs Along a Graded Continuum: No Evidence of All-or-None Failures in Continuous Reproduction Tasks

Does sensory information reach conscious awareness in a discrete, all-or-nothing manner or a gradual, continuous manner? To answer this question, we examined behavioral performance across four different paradigms that manipulate visual awareness: the attentional blink, backward masking, the Sperling iconic memory paradigm, and retro-cuing. We then asked how well we could account for participants' (N = 112 adults) behavior using a signal detection framework that factors in psychophysical scaling to model participants' responses along a single continuum. We found that this model easily accounted for the data from each of these diverse paradigms. Moreover, we reanalyzed the data from prior studies that had posited a discrete view of perceptual awareness and found that our continuous signal detection model outperformed the models that had been used to support an all-or-nothing view of consciousness. This set of data is consistent with the idea that conscious awareness occurs along a graded continuum.

Repetition enhances the effects of activated long-term memory

Recent research indicates that visual long-term memory (vLTM) representations directly interface with perception and guide attention. This may be accomplished through a state known as activated LTM, however, little is known about the nature of activated LTM. Is it possible to enhance the attentional effects of these activated representations? And furthermore, is activated LTM discrete (i.e., a representation is either active or not active, but only active representations interact with perception) or continuous (i.e., there are different levels within the active state that all interact with perception)? To answer these questions, in the present study, we measured intrusion effects during a modified Sternberg task. Participants saw two lists of three complex visual objects, were cued that only one list was relevant for the current trial (the other list was, thus, irrelevant), and then their memory for the cued list was probed. Critically, half of the trials contained repeat objects (shown 10 times each), and half of the trials contained non-repeat objects (shown only once each). Results indicated that repetition enhanced activated LTM, as the intrusion effect (i.e., longer reaction times to irrelevant list objects than novel objects) was larger for repeat trials compared with non-repeat trials. These initial findings provide preliminary support that LTM activation is continuous, as the intrusion effect was not the same size for repeat and non-repeat trials. We conclude that researchers should repeat stimuli to increase the size of their effects and enhance how LTM representations interact with perception.

Consciousness as a Memory System

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system-prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system-quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system.