Unveiling the invisible: receivers use object weight cues for grip force planning in handover actions

Handover actions are part of our daily lives. Whether it is the milk carton at the breakfast table or tickets at the box office, we usually perform these joint actions without much conscious attention. The individual actions involved in handovers, that have already been studied intensively at the level of individual actions, are grasping, lifting, and transporting objects. Depending on the object's properties, actors must plan their execution in order to ensure smooth and efficient object transfer. Therefore, anticipatory grip force scaling is crucial. Grip forces are planned in anticipation using weight estimates based on experience or visual cues. This study aimed to investigate whether receivers are able to correctly estimate object weight by observing the giver's kinematics. For this purpose, handover actions were performed with 20 dyads, manipulating the participant role (giver/receiver) and varying the size and weight of the object. Due to the random presentation of the object weight and the absence of visual cues, the participants were unaware of the object weight from trial to trial. Kinematics were recorded with a motion tracking system and grip forces were recorded with customized test objects. Peak grip force rates were used as a measure of anticipated object weight. Results showed that receiver kinematics are significantly affected by object weight. The peak grip force rates showed that receivers anticipate object weight, but givers not. This supports the hypothesis that receivers obtain information about the object weight by observing giver's kinematics and integrating this information into their own action execution.

Flexible Cultural Learning Through Action Coordination

The cultural transmission of technical know-how has proven vital to the success of our species. The broad diversity of learning contexts and social configurations, as well as the various kinds of coordinated interactions they involve, speaks to our capacity to flexibly adapt to and succeed in transmitting vital knowledge in various learning contexts. Although often recognized by ethnographers, the flexibility of cultural learning has so far received little attention in terms of cognitive mechanisms. We argue that a key feature of the flexibility of cultural learning is that both the models and learners recruit cognitive mechanisms of action coordination to modulate their behavior contingently on the behavior of their partner, generating a process of mutual adaptation supporting the successful transmission of technical skills in diverse and fluctuating learning environments. We propose that the study of cultural learning would benefit from the experimental methods, results, and insights of joint-action research and, complementarily, that the field of joint-action research could expand its scope by integrating a learning and cultural dimension. Bringing these two fields of research together promises to enrich our understanding of cultural learning, its contextual flexibility, and joint action coordination.

Short-term evidence of partner-induced performance biases in simultaneous and alternating dyad practice in golf

Actions in social settings are often adapted based on co-actors. This adaptation can occur because one actor "co-represents" the actions and plans of another. Co-representation can result in motor contagion errors, whereby another's actions unintentionally interfere with (negatively impact) the actor. In sports, practice often takes place simultaneously or alternating with a partner. Co-representation of another's task could either harm or benefit skill retention and transfer, with benefits due to variable experiences and effortful processes in practice. Here, dyad groups that either alternated or simultaneously practiced golf putting to different (near vs. far) targets were compared to alone groups (n = 30/group). We focused on errors in distance from the target and expected overshooting for near-target partners paired with far-target partners (and undershooting for far-target partners paired with near-target partners), when compared to alone groups. There was evidence of co-representation for near-target partners paired with far-target partners. We also saw trial-to-trial error-based adjustments based on a partner's outcome in alternating dyads. Despite differences in practice between dyad and alone groups, these did not lead to costs or benefits at retention or transfer. We conclude that the social-context of motor learning impacts behaviours of co-actors, but not to the detriment of overall learning.

A systematic review of handover actions in human dyads

Introduction

Handover actions are joint actions in which an object is passed from one actor to another. In order to carry out a smooth handover action, precise coordination of both actors' movements is of critical importance. This requires the synchronization of both the kinematics of the reaching movement and the grip forces of the two actors during the interaction. Psychologists, for example, may be interested in studying handover actions in order to identify the cognitive mechanisms underlying the interaction of two partners. In addition, robotic engineers may utilize insights from sensorimotor information processing in human handover as models for the design controllers in robots in hybrid (human-robot) interaction scenarios. To date, there is little knowledge transfer between researchers in different disciplines and no common framework or language for the study of handover actions.

Methods

For this reason, we systematically reviewed the literature on human-human handover actions in which at least one of the two types of behavioral data, kinematics or grip force, was measured.

Results

Nine relevant studies were identified. The different methodologies and results of the individual studies are here described and contextualized.

Discussion

Based on these results, a common framework is suggested that, provides a distinct and straightforward language and systematics for use in future studies. We suggest to term the actors as giver and receiver, as well as to subdivide the whole action into four phases: (1) Reach and grasp, (2) object transport, (3) object transfer, and (4) end of handover to comprehensively and clearly describe the handover action. The framework aims to foster the necessary exchange between different scientific disciplines to promote research on handover actions. Overall, the results support the assumption that givers adapt their executions according to the receiver's intentions, that the start of the release of the object is processed feedforward and that the release process is feedback-controlled in the transfer phase. We identified the action planning of the receiver as a research gap.

Emergent and planned interpersonal synchronization are both sensitive to 'tempo aftereffect contagion'

Interpersonal synchronization is fundamental for motor coordination during social interactions. Discerning emergent (entrainment) from planned synchronization represents a non-trivial issue in visually bonded individuals acting together, as well as assessing whether inter-individual differences, e.g., in autistic traits, modulate both types of synchronization. In a visuomotor finger-tapping task, two participants replicated a target tempo either synchronizing ('joint' condition) or not ('non-interactive' condition, 'non-int') with each other. One participant was exposed ('induced') to tempo aftereffect (a medium tempo seems faster or slower after exposure to slower or faster inducing tempi), but not the other participant ('not induced'); thus they had different timing perceptions of the same target. We assessed to what degree emergent and/or planned synchronization affected dyads by analyzing inter-tap-intervals, synchronization indexes, and cross-correlation coefficients. Results revealed a 'tempo aftereffect contagion': inter-tap-intervals of both induced and not-induced participants showed aftereffect in both the joint and non-int conditions. Moreover, aftereffects did not correlate across conditions suggesting they might be due to (at least in part) different processes, but the propensity for tempo aftereffect contagion correlated with individuals' autistic traits only in the non-int condition. Finally, participants co-adjusted their tapping more in the joint condition than in the non-int one, as confirmed by higher synchronization indexes and the mutual adaptation pattern of cross-correlation coefficients. Altogether, these results show the subtle interplay between emergent and planned interpersonal synchronization mechanisms that act on a millisecond timescale independently from synching or not with the partner.

Distinct neural couplings to shared goal and action coordination in joint action: evidence based on fNIRS hyperscanning

Joint action is central to human nature, enabling individuals to coordinate in time and space to achieve a joint outcome. Such interaction typically involves two key elements: shared goal and action coordination. Yet, the substrates entrained to these two components in joint action remained unclear. In the current study, dyads performed two tasks involving both sharing goal and action coordination, i.e. complementary joint action and imitative joint action, a task only involving shared goal and a task only involving action coordination, while their brain activities were recorded by the functional near-infrared spectroscopy hyperscanning technique. The results showed that both complementary and imitative joint action (i.e. involving shared goal and action coordination) elicited better behavioral performance than the task only involving shared goal/action coordination. We observed that the interbrain synchronization (IBS) at the right inferior frontal cortex (IFC) entrained more to shared goal, while left-IFC IBS entrained more to action coordination. We also observed that the right-IFC IBS was greater during completing a complementary action than an imitative action. Our results suggest that IFC plays an important role in joint action, with distinct lateralization for the sub-components of joint action.

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task

It is currently debated whether simple forms of social perspective-taking that are in place by late infancy are performed automatically. We conducted two experiments (N = 124) to test whether 3-year-olds show automatic perspective-taking during object searches, and whether automatic perspective-taking is facilitated by joint attention. Children were asked to retrieve an object immediately after it was moved from one (L1) to another (L2) location within a container, e.g. a sandbox. In Experiment 1, a between-subjects design was used, with children being randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: one in which child and other jointly attended to the object in L1 (joint attention condition); one in which the other was present but unengaged with the child when the object was placed in L1 (other present condition) and a baseline condition in which only the child was present (no other condition). Automatic perspective-taking should manifest in biased searches toward L1 in the other present and joint attention conditions, but not in the no other condition. No automatic perspective-taking was observed in either experiment, regardless of whether the other person left and remained absent (Experiment 1) or returned after the object was relocated (Experiment 2). The findings contribute to a growing body of empirical data that questions the existence of automatic perspective-taking.

Individual differences in co-representation in three monkey species (Callithrix jacchus, Sapajus apella and Macaca tonkeana) in the joint Simon task: the role of social factors and inhibitory control

Behavioral coordination is involved in many forms of primate interactions. Co-representation is the simultaneous mental representation of one’s own and the partner’s task and actions. It often underlies behavioral coordination and cooperation success. In humans, the dyadic social context can modulate co-representation. Here, we first investigated whether individual differences in co-representation in the joint Simon task in capuchin monkeys and Tonkean macaques can be explained by social factors, namely dyadic grooming and sociality index, rank difference and eigenvector centrality. These factors did not predict variation in co-representation. However, in this specific task, co-representation reduces rather than facilitates joint performance. Automatic co-representation therefore needs to be inhibited or suppressed to maximize cooperation success. We therefore also investigated whether general inhibitory control (detour-reaching) would predict co-representation in the joint Simon task in Tonkean macaques, brown capuchin and marmoset monkeys. Inhibitory control did neither explain individual differences nor species differences, since marmosets were most successful in their joint performance despite scoring lowest on inhibitory control. These results suggest that the animals’ ability to resolve conflicts between self and other representation to increase cooperation success in this task is gradually learned due to frequent exposure during shared infant care, rather than determined by strong general inhibitory control. Further, we conclude that the joint Simon task, while useful to detect co-representation non-invasively, is less suitable for identifying the factors explaining individual differences and thus a more fruitful approach to identify these factors is to design tasks in which co-representation favors, rather than hinders cooperation success.

EXPRESS: Representation of others' synchronous and asynchronous sentences interferes with sentence production

In dialogue, people represent each other's utterances in order to take turns and communicate successfully. In previous work [Gambi, C., Van de Cavey, J., & Pickering, M. J. (2015). Interference in joint picture naming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(1), 1-21.], speakers who were naming single pictures or picture pairs represented whether another speaker was engaged in the same task (versus a different or no task) concurrently, but did not represent in detail the content of the other speaker's utterance. Here, we investigate co-representation of whole sentences. In three experiments, pairs of speakers imagined each other producing active or passive descriptions of transitive events. Speakers took longer to begin speaking when they believed their partner was also preparing to speak, compared to when they did not. Interference occurred when speakers believed their partners were preparing to speak at the same time as them (synchronous production and co-representation; Experiment 1), and also when speakers believed that their partner would speak only after them (asynchronous production and co-representation; Experiments 2a and 2b). However, interference was generally no greater when speakers believed their partner was preparing a different compared to a similar utterance, providing no consistent evidence that speakers represented what their partners were preparing to say. Taken together, these findings indicate that speakers can represent another's intention to speak even as they are themselves preparing to speak, but that such representation tends to lack detail.

Your action does matter to me: Examining the role of the co-actor's action-effects in resolving the self-other discrimination problem

Sharing a task with another person can introduce the need to discriminate representations that refer to our own action from that of the other person's. The current understanding is that information about the stimulus event drives the self-other discrimination process, as it promotes (via the reactivation of feature codes) the representation that encodes the corresponding action. However, this mechanistic explanation relies on experimental situations in which stimulus event information (e.g., spatial location) is always and directly available. Thus, it remains unclear whether and how we could successfully discriminate between self- and other related action representations in the absence of such information. The present study addressed this unanswered question using a novel joint Simon task-based paradigm. We report the results of three experiments in which we manipulated the availability of stimulus event information into the contralateral space. Our findings demonstrate that participants are able to compensate for the absence of stimulus event information by relying on temporal features of their co-actor's action-effects (Experiment 1). Even more surprising was that participants continued to monitor the temporal features of their co-actor's actions even when given a verbal signal by their co-actor (Experiments 2a), or full access to the common workspace (Experiment 2b). Our results are strong evidence that the representation of actions is not purely stimulus driven. They suggest that the temporal dimension of the other person's actions is able to drive the self-other discrimination process, in the same way as other perceptual dimensions and feature codes that are shared with the stimulus event.

Computing Joint Action Costs: Co-Actors Minimize the Aggregate Individual Costs in an Action Sequence

Successful performance in cooperative activities relies on efficient task distribution between co-actors. Previous research found that people often forgo individual efficiency in favor of co-efficiency (i.e., joint-cost minimization) when planning a joint action. The present study investigated the cost computations underlying co-efficient decisions. We report a series of experiments that tested the hypothesis that people compute the joint costs of a cooperative action sequence by summing the individual action costs of their co-actor and themselves. We independently manipulated the parameters quantifying individual and joint action costs and tested their effects on decision making by fitting and comparing Bayesian logistic regression models. Our hypothesis was confirmed: people weighed their own and their partner’s costs similarly to estimate the joint action costs as the sum of the two individual parameters. Participants minimized the aggregate cost to ensure co-efficiency. The results provide empirical support for behavioral economics and computational approaches that formalize cooperation as joint utility maximization based on a weighted sum of individual action costs.

The impact of joint attention on the sound-induced flash illusions

Humans coordinate their focus of attention with others, either by gaze following or prior agreement. Though the effects of joint attention on perceptual and cognitive processing tend to be examined in purely visual environments, they should also show in multisensory settings. According to a prevalent hypothesis, joint attention enhances visual information encoding and processing, over and above individual attention. If two individuals jointly attend to the visual components of an audiovisual event, this should affect the weighing of visual information during multisensory integration. We tested this prediction in this preregistered study, using the well-documented sound-induced flash illusions, where the integration of an incongruent number of visual flashes and auditory beeps results in a single flash being seen as two (fission illusion) and two flashes as one (fusion illusion). Participants were asked to count flashes either alone or together, and expected to be less prone to both fission and fusion illusions when they jointly attended to the visual targets. However, illusions were as frequent when people attended to the flashes alone or with someone else, even though they responded faster during joint attention. Our results reveal the limitations of the theory that joint attention enhances visual processing as it does not affect temporal audiovisual integration.

Crossmodal correspondences as common ground for joint action

When performing joint actions, people rely on common ground - shared information that provides the required basis for mutual understanding. Common ground can be based on people's interaction history or on knowledge and expectations people share, e.g., because they belong to the same culture or social class. Here, we suggest that people rely on yet another form of common ground, one that originates in their similarities in multisensory processing. Specifically, we focus on 'crossmodal correspondences' - nonarbitrary associations that people make between stimulus features in different sensory modalities, e.g., between stimuli in the auditory and the visual modality such as high-pitched sounds and small objects. Going beyond previous research that focused on investigating crossmodal correspondences in individuals, we propose that people can use these correspondences for communicating and coordinating with others. Initial support for our proposal comes from a communication game played in a public space (an art gallery) by pairs of visitors. We observed that pairs created nonverbal communication systems by spontaneously relying on 'crossmodal common ground'. Based on these results, we conclude that crossmodal correspondences not only occur within individuals but that they can also be actively used in joint action to facilitate the coordination between individuals.

The influence of prior intention on joint action: an fNIRS-based hyperscanning study

Motor performances of the same action are affected by prior intentions to move unintentionally, cooperatively or competitively. Here, a back-and-forth movement task combined with a motion capture system and functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)-based hyperscanning technology was utilized to record both the behavioral and neural data of 18 dyads of participants acting in pairs [joint conditions: no-intention, cooperative (Coop) and competitive (Comp)] or alone (single conditions: self-paced and fast-speed). The results revealed that Coop or Comp intentions in the joint conditions significantly sped up motor performance compared with similar single conditions, e.g. shorter movement times (MTs) in the Coop/Comp condition than the self-paced/fast-speed condition. Hemodynamic response analysis demonstrated that stronger activities for all joint conditions than the single conditions in the premotor and the supplementary motor cortex (Brodmann area 6) were independent of variations of MTs, indicating that they might reflect more complex aspects of action planning rather than simple execution-based processes. The comparisons of joint conditions across distinct prior intentions before acting yielded significant results for both behavioral and neural measures, with the highest activation of the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the shortest MTs in the Comp condition considered to be implications for the top-down influence of prior intentions on joint performance.

Co-actors Exhibit Similarity in Their Structure of Behavioural Variation That Remains Stable Across Range of Naturalistic Activities

Human behaviour, along with any natural/biological behaviour, has varying degrees of intrinsic 'noise' or variability. Many studies have shown that the structure or patterning of this variability is sensitive to changes in task and constraint. Furthermore, two or more humans interacting together often begin to exhibit similar structures of behavioural variability (i.e., the patterning of their behavioural fluctuations becomes aligned or matched) independent of any moment-to-moment synchronization (termed complexity matching). However, much of the previous work has focused on a subset of simple or contrived behaviours within the context of highly controlled laboratory tasks. In the current study, individuals and pairs performed five self-paced (unsupervised), semi-structured activities around a university campus. Empatica E4 wristbands and iPhones were used to record the participants' behavioural activity via accelerometers and GPS. The results revealed that the structure of variability in naturalistic human behaviour co-varies with the task-goal constraints, and that the patterning of the behavioural fluctuations exhibited by co-acting individuals does become aligned during the performance of everyday activities. The results also revealed that the degree of complexity matching that occurred between pairs remained invariant across activity type, indicating that this measure could be employed as a robust, task-independent index of interpersonal behaviour.

Raising the bar: Can dual scanning improve our understanding of joint action?

Two-person neuroscience (2 ​PN) is a recently introduced conceptual and methodological framework used to investigate the neural basis of human social interaction from simultaneous neuroimaging of two or more subjects (hyperscanning). In this study, we adopted a 2 ​PN approach and a multiple-brain connectivity model to investigate the neural basis of a form of cooperation called joint action. We hypothesized different intra-brain and inter-brain connectivity patterns when comparing the interpersonal properties of joint action with non-interpersonal conditions, with a focus on co-representation, a core ability at the basis of cooperation. 32 subjects were enrolled in dual-EEG recordings during a computerized joint action task including three conditions: one in which the dyad jointly acted to pursue a common goal (joint), one in which each subject interacted with the PC (PC), and one in which each subject performed the task individually (Solo). A combination of multiple-brain connectivity estimation and specific indices derived from graph theory allowed to compare interpersonal with non-interpersonal conditions in four different frequency bands. Our results indicate that all the indices were modulated by the interaction, and returned a significantly stronger integration of multiple-subject networks in the joint vs. PC and Solo conditions. A subsequent classification analysis showed that features based on multiple-brain indices led to a better discrimination between social and non-social conditions with respect to single-subject indices. Taken together, our results suggest that multiple-brain connectivity can provide a deeper insight into the understanding of the neural basis of cooperation in humans.

Developmental Differences in Cortical Activation During Action Observation, Action Execution and Interpersonal Synchrony: An fNIRS Study

Interpersonal synchrony (IPS) is an important everyday behavior influencing social cognitive development; however, few studies have investigated the developmental differences and underlying neural mechanisms of IPS. functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a novel neuroimaging tool that allows the study of cortical activation in the presence of natural movements. Using fNIRS, we compared cortical activation patterns between children and adults during action observation, execution, and IPS. Seventeen school-age children and 15 adults completed a reach to cleanup task while we obtained cortical activation data from bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), superior temporal sulcus (STS), and inferior parietal lobes (IPL). Children showed lower spatial and temporal accuracy during IPS compared to adults (i.e., spatial synchrony scores (Mean ± SE) in children: 2.67 ± 0.08 and adults: 2.85 ± 0.06; temporal synchrony scores (Mean ± SE) in children: 2.74 ± 0.06 and adults: 2.88 ± 0.05). For both groups, the STS regions were more activated during action observation, while the IFG and STS were more activated during action execution and IPS. The IPS condition involved more right-sided activation compared to action execution suggesting that IPS is a higher-order process involving more bilateral cortical activation. In addition, adults showed more left lateralization compared to the children during movement conditions (execution and IPS); which indicated greater inhibition of ipsilateral cortices in the adults compared to children. These findings provide a neuroimaging framework to study imitation and IPS impairments in special populations such as children with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

The Multimodal Go-Nogo Simon Effect: Signifying the Relevance of Stimulus Features in the Go-Nogo Simon Paradigm Impacts Event Representations and Task Performance

Numerous studies have shown that stimulus-response-compatibility (SRC) effects in the go-nogo version of the Simon task can be elicited as a result of performing the task together with another human or non-human agent (e.g., a Japanese-waving-cat, a working-clock, or a ticking-metronome). A parsimonious explanation for both social and non-social SRC effects is that highlighting the spatial significance of alternative (non-/social) action events makes action selection more difficult. This holds even when action events are task-irrelevant. Recent findings, however, suggest that this explanation holds only for cases of a modality correspondence between the Simon task as such (i.e., auditory or visual) and the alternative (non-/social) action event that needs to be discriminated. However, based on the fact that perception and action are represented by the same kind of codes, an event that makes the go-nogo decision more challenging should impact go-nogo Simon task performance. To tackle this issue, the present study tested if alternative stimulus events that come from a different sensory modality do impact SRC effects in the go-nogo version of the Simon task. This was tested in the presence and absence of alternative action events of a human co-actor. In a multimodal (auditory–visual) go-nogo Simon paradigm, participants responded to their assigned stimulus – e.g., a single auditory stimulus while ignoring the alternative visual stimulus or vice versa – in the presence or absence of a human co-actor (i.e., joint and single go-nogo condition). Results showed reliable SRCs in both, single and joint go-nogo Simon task conditions independent of the modality participants had to respond to. Although a correspondence between stimulus material and attention-grabbing event might be an efficient condition for SRCs to emerge, the driving force underlying the emergence of SRCs rather appears to be whether the attentional focus prevents or facilitates alternative events to be integrated. Thus, under task conditions in which the attentional focus is sufficiently broad to enable the integration and thus cognitive representation of alternative events, go-nogo decisions become more difficult, resulting in reliable SRCs in single and joint go-nogo Simon tasks.

Co-actors represent the order of each other's actions

Previous research has shown that people represent each other’s tasks and actions when acting together. However, less is known about how co-actors represent each other’s action sequences. Here, we asked whether co-actors represent the order of each other’s actions within an action sequence, or whether they merely represent the intended end state of a joint action together with their own contribution. In the present study, two co-actors concurrently performed action sequences composed of two actions. We predicted that if co-actors represent the order of each other’s actions, they should experience interference when the order of their actions differs. Supporting this prediction, the results of six experiments consistently showed that co-actors moved more slowly when performing the same actions in a different order compared to performing the same actions in the same order. In line with findings from bimanual movement tasks, our results indicate that interference can arise due to differences in movement parameters and due to differences in the perceptual characteristics of movement goals. The present findings extend previous research on co-representation, providing evidence that people represent not only the elements of another’s task, but also their temporal structure.

Cortical Activation during Action Observation, Action Execution, and Interpersonal Synchrony in Adults: A functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) Study

Introduction: Humans engage in Interpersonal Synchrony (IPS) as they synchronize their own actions with that of a social partner over time. When humans engage in imitation/IPS behaviors, multiple regions in the frontal, temporal, and parietal cortices are activated including the putative Mirror Neuron Systems (Iacoboni, 2005; Buxbaum et al., 2014). In the present study, we compared fNIRS-based cortical activation patterns across three conditions of action observation (“Watch” partner), action execution (“Do” on your own), and IPS (move “Together”).

Methods: Fifteen typically developing adults completed a reach and cleanup task with the right arm while cortical activation was examined using a 24-channel, Hitachi fNIRS system. Each adult completed 8 trials across three conditions (Watch, Do, and Together). For each fNIRS channel, we obtained oxy hemoglobin (HbO₂) and deoxy hemoglobin (HHb) profiles. Spatial registration methods were applied to localize the cortical regions underneath each channel and to define six regions of interest (ROIs), right and left supero-anterior (SA or pre/post-central gyri), infero-posterior (IP or angular/supramarginal gyri), and infero-anterior (IA or superior/middle temporal gyri) regions.

Results: In terms of task-related differences, the majority of the ROIs were more active during Do and Together compared to Watch. Only the right/ipsilateral fronto-parietal and inferior parietal cortices had greater activation during Together compared to Do.

Conclusions: The similarities in cortical activation between action execution and IPS suggest that neural control of IPS is more similar to its execution than observational aspects. To be clear, the more complex the actions performed, the more difficult the IPS behaviors. Secondly, IPS behaviors required slightly more right-sided activation (vs. execution/observation) suggesting that IPS is a higher-order process involving more bilateral activation compared to its sub-components. These findings provide a neuroimaging framework to study imitation and IPS impairments in special populations such as infants at risk for and children with ASD.