1
|
Ben-Artzi I, Kessler Y, Nicenboim B, Shahar N. Computational mechanisms underlying latent value updating of unchosen actions. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2023; 9:eadi2704. [PMID: 37862419 PMCID: PMC10588947 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.adi2704] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/16/2023] [Accepted: 09/20/2023] [Indexed: 10/22/2023]
Abstract
Current studies suggest that individuals estimate the value of their choices based on observed feedback. Here, we ask whether individuals also update the value of their unchosen actions, even when the associated feedback remains unknown. One hundred seventy-eight individuals completed a multi-armed bandit task, making choices to gain rewards. We found robust evidence suggesting latent value updating of unchosen actions based on the chosen action's outcome. Computational modeling results suggested that this effect is mainly explained by a value updating mechanism whereby individuals integrate the outcome history for choosing an option with that of rejecting the alternative. Properties of the deliberation (i.e., duration/difficulty) did not moderate the latent value updating of unchosen actions, suggesting that memory traces generated during deliberation might take a smaller role in this specific phenomenon than previously thought. We discuss the mechanisms facilitating credit assignment to unchosen actions and their implications for human decision-making.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Ido Ben-Artzi
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
- Minducate Science of Learning Research and Innovation Center of the Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Yoav Kessler
- Department of Psychology and School of Brain Sciences and Cognition, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, Israel
| | - Bruno Nicenboim
- Department of Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
| | - Nitzan Shahar
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Value certainty and choice confidence are multidimensional constructs that guide decision-making. COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2023:10.3758/s13415-022-01054-4. [PMID: 36631708 PMCID: PMC10390628 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-022-01054-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/12/2022] [Indexed: 01/13/2023]
Abstract
The degree of certainty that decision-makers have about their evaluations of available choice alternatives and their confidence about selecting the subjectively best alternative are important factors that affect current and future value-based choices. Assessments of the alternatives in a given choice set are rarely unidimensional; their values are usually derived from a combination of multiple distinct attributes. For example, the taste, texture, quantity, and nutritional content of a snack food may all be considered when determining whether to consume it. We examined how certainty about the levels of individual attributes of an option relates to certainty about the overall value of that option as a whole and/or to confidence in having chosen the subjectively best available option. We found that certainty and confidence are derived from unequally weighted combinations of attribute certainties rather than simple, equal combinations of all sources of uncertainty. Attributes that matter more in determining choice outcomes also are weighted more in metacognitive evaluations of certainty or confidence. Moreover, we found that the process of deciding between two alternatives leads to refinements in both attribute estimations and the degree of certainty in those estimates. Attributes that are more important in determining choice outcomes are refined more during the decision process in terms of both estimates and certainty. Although certainty and confidence are typically treated as unidimensional, our results indicate that they, like value estimates, are subjective, multidimensional constructs.
Collapse
|
3
|
Biderman N, Shohamy D. Memory and decision making interact to shape the value of unchosen options. Nat Commun 2021; 12:4648. [PMID: 34330909 PMCID: PMC8324852 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-021-24907-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/22/2021] [Accepted: 07/08/2021] [Indexed: 02/07/2023] Open
Abstract
The goal of deliberation is to separate between options so that we can commit to one and leave the other behind. However, deliberation can, paradoxically, also form an association in memory between the chosen and unchosen options. Here, we consider this possibility and examine its consequences for how outcomes affect not only the value of the options we chose, but also, by association, the value of options we did not choose. In five experiments (total n = 612), including a preregistered experiment (n = 235), we found that the value assigned to unchosen options is inversely related to their chosen counterparts. Moreover, this inverse relationship was associated with participants' memory of the pairs they chose between. Our findings suggest that deciding between options does not end the competition between them. Deliberation binds choice options together in memory such that the learned value of one can affect the inferred value of the other.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Natalie Biderman
- Department of Psychology and Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind, Brain, Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA.
| | - Daphna Shohamy
- Department of Psychology and Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind, Brain, Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA.
- The Kavli Institute for Brain Science, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Jiwa M, Cooper PS, Chong TTJ, Bode S. Choosing increases the value of non-instrumental information. Sci Rep 2021; 11:8780. [PMID: 33888764 PMCID: PMC8062497 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-88031-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2021] [Accepted: 04/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Curiosity pervades all aspects of human behaviour and decision-making. Recent research indicates that the value of information is determined by its propensity to reduce uncertainty, and the hedonic value of the outcomes it predicts. Previous findings also indicate a preference for options that are freely chosen, compared to equivalently valued alternatives that are externally assigned. Here, we asked whether the value of information also varies as a function of self- or externally-imposed choices. Participants rated their preference for information that followed either a self-chosen decision, or an externally imposed condition. Our results showed that choosing a lottery significantly increased the subjective value of information about the outcome. Computational modelling indicated that this change in information-seeking behaviour was not due to changes in the subjective probability of winning, but instead reflected an independent effect of choosing on the value of resolving uncertainty. These results demonstrate that agency over a prospect is an important source of information value.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Matthew Jiwa
- School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 3010, Australia.
| | - Patrick S Cooper
- School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 3010, Australia
- Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, Melbourne, 3800, Australia
| | - Trevor T-J Chong
- Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, Melbourne, 3800, Australia
- Alfred Health, Department of Neurology, Melbourne, 3004, Australia
- Department of Clinical Neurosciences, St Vincent's Hospital, Melbourne, 3065, Australia
| | - Stefan Bode
- School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 3010, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Moral judgements of fairness-related actions are flexibly updated to account for contextual information. Sci Rep 2020; 10:17828. [PMID: 33082488 PMCID: PMC7576593 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-74975-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/24/2020] [Accepted: 10/08/2020] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
In everyday life we are constantly updating our moral judgements as we learn new information. However, this judgement updating process has not been systematically studied. We investigated how people update their moral judgements of fairness-related actions of others after receiving contextual information regarding the deservingness of the action recipient. Participants (N = 313) observed a virtual ‘Decision-maker’ share a portion of $10 with a virtual ‘Receiver’. Participants were aware that the Decision-maker made these choices knowing the Receiver’s previous offer to another person. Participants first made a context-absent judgement of the Decision-maker’s offer to the Receiver, and then a subsequent context-present judgement of the same offer after learning the Receiver’s previous offer. This sequence was repeated for varying dollar values of Decision-makers’ and Receivers’ offers. Patterns of judgements varied across individuals and were interpretable in relation to moral norms. Most participants flexibly switched from relying on context-independent norms (generosity, equality) to related, context-dependent norms (relative generosity, indirect reciprocity) as they integrated contextual information. Judgement of low offers varied across individuals, with a substantial minority of participants withholding their context-absent judgements of selfishness, and another minority that was lenient towards selfishness across both judgements. Our paradigm provides a novel framework for investigating how moral judgements evolve in real time as people learn more information about a given situation.
Collapse
|
6
|
Wang C, Huang J, Liao J, Wan X. Food Sharing With Choice: Influence on Social Evaluation. Front Psychol 2020; 11:2070. [PMID: 32982856 PMCID: PMC7477305 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.02070] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/23/2020] [Accepted: 07/27/2020] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
We conducted two studies to investigate the influence of food sharing on people’s social evaluation. In Study 1, the results of an online survey revealed that Chinese adults expected voluntary food sharing to influence the recipient’s social evaluation of the sharer. In Study 2, we ran a laboratory-based experiment in which each participant broke bread with one of two unacquainted individuals. When the participants could choose whom to share food with, they rated the selected person as being more prosocial than the person they did not choose. These results demonstrate the influence of voluntary food sharing with choice on people’s social evaluation of unacquainted individuals, and shed some light on the influence of eating behavior on social perception.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Chujun Wang
- Department of Psychology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
| | - Jianping Huang
- Department of Psychology, Soochow University, Suzhou, China
| | - Jiangqun Liao
- Department of Psychology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
| | - Xiaoang Wan
- Department of Psychology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Voigt K, Murawski C, Speer S, Bode S. Effective brain connectivity at rest is associated with choice-induced preference formation. Hum Brain Mapp 2020; 41:3077-3088. [PMID: 32243689 PMCID: PMC7336152 DOI: 10.1002/hbm.24999] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2019] [Revised: 03/13/2020] [Accepted: 03/14/2020] [Indexed: 11/10/2022] Open
Abstract
Preferences can change as a consequence of making hard decisions whereby the value of chosen options increases and the value of rejected options decreases. Such choice-induced preference changes have been associated with brain areas detecting choice conflict (anterior cingulate cortex, ACC), updating stimulus value (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dlPFC) and supporting memory of stimulus value (hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, vmPFC). Here we investigated whether resting-state neuronal activity within these regions is associated with the magnitude of individuals' preference updates. We fitted a dynamic causal model (DCM) to resting-state neuronal activity in the spectral domain (spDCM) and estimated the causal connectivity among core regions involved in preference formation following hard choices. The extent of individuals' choice-induced preference changes were found to be associated with a diminished resting-state excitation between the left dlPFC and the vmPFC, whereas preference consistency was related to a higher resting-state excitation from the ACC to the left hippocampus and vmPFC. Our results point to a model of preference formation during which the dynamic network configurations between left dlPFC, ACC, vmPFC and left hippocampus at rest are linked to preference change or stability.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Katharina Voigt
- Melbourne School of Psychological SciencesThe University of MelbourneCarltonVictoriaAustralia
- School of Psychological Sciences and Turner Institute for Brain and Mental HealthMonash UniversityClaytonVictoriaAustralia
| | - Carsten Murawski
- Department of FinanceThe University of MelbourneCarltonVictoriaAustralia
| | - Sebastian Speer
- Melbourne School of Psychological SciencesThe University of MelbourneCarltonVictoriaAustralia
- Rotterdam School of ManagementErasmus UniversityRotterdamThe Netherlands
| | - Stefan Bode
- Melbourne School of Psychological SciencesThe University of MelbourneCarltonVictoriaAustralia
- Department of PsychologyUniversity of CologneCologneGermany
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Schonberg T, Katz LN. A Neural Pathway for Nonreinforced Preference Change. Trends Cogn Sci 2020; 24:504-514. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2020.04.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/04/2020] [Revised: 04/16/2020] [Accepted: 04/16/2020] [Indexed: 01/12/2023]
|
9
|
Hornsby AN, Love BC. How decisions and the desire for coherency shape subjective preferences over time. Cognition 2020; 200:104244. [PMID: 32222615 PMCID: PMC7315129 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104244] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/06/2019] [Revised: 02/18/2020] [Accepted: 02/21/2020] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Recent findings suggest a bidirectional relationship between preferences and choices such that what is chosen can become preferred. Yet, it is still commonly held that preferences for individual items are maintained, such as caching a separate value estimate for each experienced option. Instead, we propose that all possible choice options and preferences are represented in a shared, continuous, multidimensional space that supports generalization. Decision making is cast as a learning process that seeks to align choices and preferences to maintain coherency. We formalized an error-driven learning model that updates preferences to align with past choices, which makes repeating those and related choices more likely in the future. The model correctly predicts that making a free choice increases preferences along related attributes. For example, after choosing a political candidate based on trivial information (e.g., they like cats), voters' views on abortion, immigration, and trade subsequently shifted to match their chosen candidate.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Adam N Hornsby
- Dunnhumby, 184 Shepherds Bush Road, London W6 7NL, United Kingdom; Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London WC1H 0AP, United Kingdom.
| | - Bradley C Love
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London WC1H 0AP, United Kingdom; The Alan Turing Institute, United Kingdom
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Makarina N, Hübner R, Florack A. Increased Preference and Value of Consumer Products by Attentional Selection. Front Psychol 2019; 10:2086. [PMID: 31607976 PMCID: PMC6773872 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02086] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/12/2019] [Accepted: 08/27/2019] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
It is usually assumed that individuals base their preferences for products or other items on the utility or value associated with the items. However, there is evidence that the attentional selection of an item alone already modulates the preference for that item. This has been shown, for instance, in preference choice tasks with unknown consumer products. Products that served as targets in a preceding visual search task were preferred to former distractor products. However, it is unclear whether such effects can also be observed when individuals have pre-existing attitudes toward products and whether attentional selection can change the perceived value of products. Hence, the aim of the present research was to replicate the attentional-selection effect on choice with known products and examine whether selective attention affects the perceived value of products beyond choosing the items. In two experiments, we replicated the attentional-selection effect on item preference in a choice task. Items that had served as targets in the search task were preferred to previous distractors. Introducing a response deadline in the preference-choice task in Experiment 2 did not further increase this effect. However, the value of former targets was rated higher than that of former distractors. Hence, the present results indicate that attentional selection not only affects preference choices but can also increase the value of attended and selected items.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Nadiia Makarina
- Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany.,Graduate School of Decision Sciences, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
| | - Ronald Hübner
- Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany.,Graduate School of Decision Sciences, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
| | - Arnd Florack
- Department of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Bakkour A, Palombo DJ, Zylberberg A, Kang YH, Reid A, Verfaellie M, Shadlen MN, Shohamy D. The hippocampus supports deliberation during value-based decisions. eLife 2019; 8:46080. [PMID: 31268419 PMCID: PMC6693920 DOI: 10.7554/elife.46080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 55] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/25/2019] [Accepted: 06/29/2019] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Choosing between two items involves deliberation and comparison of the features of each item and its value. Such decisions take more time when choosing between options of similar value, possibly because these decisions require more evidence, but the mechanisms involved are not clear. We propose that the hippocampus supports deliberation about value, given its well-known role in prospection and relational cognition. We assessed the role of the hippocampus in deliberation in two experiments. First, using fMRI in healthy participants, we found that BOLD activity in the hippocampus increased as a function of deliberation time. Second, we found that patients with hippocampal damage exhibited more stochastic choices and longer reaction times than controls, possibly due to their failure to construct value-based or internal evidence during deliberation. Both sets of results were stronger in value-based decisions compared to perceptual decisions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Akram Bakkour
- Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, United States
| | - Daniela J Palombo
- Memory Disorders Research Center, VA Boston Healthcare System and Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, United States
| | - Ariel Zylberberg
- Department of Neuroscience, Columbia University, New York, United States.,Mortimer B Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, United States.,Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Chevy Chase, United States
| | - Yul Hr Kang
- Department of Neuroscience, Columbia University, New York, United States
| | - Allison Reid
- Memory Disorders Research Center, VA Boston Healthcare System and Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, United States
| | - Mieke Verfaellie
- Memory Disorders Research Center, VA Boston Healthcare System and Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, United States
| | - Michael N Shadlen
- Department of Neuroscience, Columbia University, New York, United States.,Mortimer B Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, United States.,Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Chevy Chase, United States.,The Kavli Institute for Brain Science, Columbia University, New York, United States
| | - Daphna Shohamy
- Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, United States.,Mortimer B Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, United States.,The Kavli Institute for Brain Science, Columbia University, New York, United States
| |
Collapse
|
12
|
Hard Decisions Shape the Neural Coding of Preferences. J Neurosci 2018; 39:718-726. [PMID: 30530856 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.1681-18.2018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/04/2018] [Revised: 10/22/2018] [Accepted: 11/08/2018] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Hard decisions between equally valued alternatives can result in preference changes, meaning that subsequent valuations for chosen items increase and decrease for rejected items. Previous research suggests that this phenomenon is a consequence of cognitive dissonance reduction after the decision, induced by the mismatch between initial preferences and decision outcomes. In contrast, this functional magnetic resonance imaging and eye-tracking study with male and female human participants found that preferences are already updated online during the process of decision-making. Preference changes were predicted from activity in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and precuneus while making hard decisions. Fixation durations during this phase predicted both choice outcomes and subsequent preference changes. These preference adjustments became behaviorally relevant only for choices that were remembered and were in turn associated with hippocampus activity. Our results suggest that preferences evolve dynamically as decisions arise, potentially as a mechanism to prevent stalemate situations in underdetermined decision scenarios.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Most theories of decision-making assume that we always choose the best option available, based on a set of stable preferences. However, what happens for hard decisions when the available options are preferred equally? We show that in such stalemate situations, decision-makers adjust their preferences dynamically during the process of decision-making, and these preference adjustments are predicted by a left prefrontal-parietal network. We also show that eye movements during decision-making are predictive of the magnitude of the upcoming value change. Our results suggest that preferences are dynamic, adjusted every time a hard decision is made, prompting a re-evaluation of existing frameworks of decision-making.
Collapse
|
13
|
Belchev Z, Bodner GE, Fawcett JM. Inducing preference reversals in aesthetic choices for paintings: Introducing the contrast paradigm. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0196246. [PMID: 29672641 PMCID: PMC5908093 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0196246] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2017] [Accepted: 04/09/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Understanding what leads people to reverse their choices is important in many domains. We introduce a contrast paradigm for studying reversals in choices—here between pairs of abstract paintings—implemented in both within-subject (Experiment 1; N = 320) and between-subject (Experiment 2; N = 384) designs. On each trial, participants chose between a pair of paintings. A critical pair of average-beauty paintings was presented before and after either a reversal or control block. In the reversal block, we made efforts to bias preference away from the chosen average-beauty painting (by pairing it with more-beautiful paintings) and toward the non-chosen average-beauty painting (by pairing it with less-beautiful paintings). Meta-analysis revealed more reversals after reversal blocks than after control blocks, though only when the biasing manipulations succeeded. A second meta-analysis revealed that reversals were generally more likely for participants who later misidentified their initial choice, demonstrating that memory for initial choices influences later choices. Thus, the contrast paradigm has utility both for inducing choice reversals and identifying their causes.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Zorry Belchev
- Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada
| | - Glen E. Bodner
- Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada
- * E-mail:
| | - Jonathan M. Fawcett
- Department of Psychology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada
| |
Collapse
|
14
|
Heycke T, Aust F, Stahl C. Subliminal influence on preferences? A test of evaluative conditioning for brief visual conditioned stimuli using auditory unconditioned stimuli. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2017; 4:160935. [PMID: 28989730 PMCID: PMC5627070 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160935] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/18/2016] [Accepted: 08/21/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
In the field of evaluative conditioning (EC), two opposing theories-propositional single-process theory versus dual-process theory-are currently being discussed in the literature. The present set of experiments test a crucial prediction to adjudicate between these two theories: Dual-process theory postulates that evaluative conditioning can occur without awareness of the contingency between conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US); in contrast, single-process propositional theory postulates that EC requires CS-US contingency awareness. In a set of three studies, we experimentally manipulate contingency awareness by presenting the CSs very briefly, thereby rendering it unlikely to be processed consciously. We address potential issues with previous studies on EC with subliminal or near-threshold CSs that limited their interpretation. Across two experiments, we consistently found an EC effect for CSs presented for 1000 ms and consistently failed to find an EC effect for briefly presented CSs. In a third pre-registered experiment, we again found evidence for an EC effect with CSs presented for 1000 ms, and we found some indication for an EC effect for CSs presented for 20 ms.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Tobias Heycke
- Department of Psychology, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
| | | | | |
Collapse
|