Flexible categorization in perceptual decision making

Noise correlations and neuronal diversity may limit the utility of winner-take-all readout in a pop out visual search task

Visual search involves active scanning of the environment to locate objects of interest against a background of irrelevant distractors. One widely accepted theory posits that pop out visual search is computed by a winner-take-all (WTA) competition between contextually modulated cells that form a saliency map. However, previous studies have shown that the ability of WTA mechanisms to accumulate information from large populations of neurons is limited, thus raising the question of whether WTA can underlie pop out visual search. To address this question, we conducted a modeling study to investigate how accurately the WTA mechanism can detect the deviant stimulus in a pop out task. We analyzed two types of WTA readout mechanisms: single-best-cell WTA, where the decision is made based on a single winning cell, and a generalized population-based WTA, where the decision is based on the winning population of similarly tuned cells. Our results show that neither WTA mechanism can account for the high accuracy found in behavioral experiments. The inherent neuronal heterogeneity prevents the single-best-cell WTA from accumulating information even from large populations, whereas the accuracy of the generalized population-based WTA algorithm is negatively affected by the widely reported noise correlations. These findings underscore the need to revisit the key assumptions explored in our theoretical analysis, particularly concerning the decoding mechanism and the statistical properties of neuronal population responses to pop out stimuli. The analysis identifies specific response statistics that require further empirical characterization to accurately predict WTA performance in biologically plausible models of visual pop out detection.

Disentangling sources of variability in decision-making

Even the most highly-trained observers presented with identical choice-relevant stimuli will reliably exhibit substantial trial-to-trial variability in the timing and accuracy of their choices. Despite being a pervasive feature of choice behaviour and a prominent phenotype for numerous clinical disorders, the capability to disentangle the sources of such intra-individual variability (IIV) remains limited. In principle, computational models of decision-making offer a means of parsing and estimating these sources, but methodological limitations have prevented this potential from being fully realized in practice. In this Review, we first discuss current limitations of algorithmic models for understanding variability in decision-making behaviour. We then highlight recent advances in behavioural paradigm design, novel analyses of cross-trial behavioural and neural dynamics, and the development of neurally grounded computational models that are now making it possible to link distinct components of IIV to well-defined neural processes. Taken together, we demonstrate how these methods are opening up new avenues for systematically analysing the neural origins of IIV, paving the way for a more refined, holistic understanding of decision-making in health and disease.

Dissociable Effects of Urgency and Evidence Accumulation during Reaching Revealed by Dynamic Multisensory Integration

When making perceptual decisions, humans combine information across sensory modalities dependent on their respective uncertainties. However, it remains unknown how the brain integrates multisensory feedback during movement and which factors besides sensory uncertainty influence sensory contributions. We performed two reaching experiments on healthy adults to investigate whether movement corrections to combined visual and mechanical perturbations scale with visual uncertainty. To describe the dynamics of multimodal feedback responses, we further varied movement time and visual feedback duration during the movement. The results of our first experiment show that the contribution of visual feedback decreased with uncertainty. Additionally, we observed a transient phase during which visual feedback responses were stronger during faster movements. In a follow-up experiment, we found that the contribution of vision increased more quickly during slow movements when we presented the visual feedback for a longer time. Muscle activity corresponding to these visual responses exhibited modulations with sensory uncertainty and movement speed ca. 100 ms following the onset of the visual feedback. Using an optimal feedback control model, we show that the increased response to visual feedback during fast movements can be explained by an urgency-dependent increase in control gains. Further, the fact that a longer viewing duration increased the visual contributions suggests that the brain accumulates sensory information over time to estimate the state of the arm during reaching. Our results provide additional evidence concerning the link between reaching control and decision-making, both of which appear to be influenced by sensory evidence accumulation and response urgency.

Attractor dynamics reflect decision confidence in macaque prefrontal cortex

Decisions are made with different degrees of consistency, and this consistency can be linked to the confidence that the best choice has been made. Theoretical work suggests that attractor dynamics in networks can account for choice consistency, but how this is implemented in the brain remains unclear. Here we provide evidence that the energy landscape around attractor basins in population neural activity in the prefrontal cortex reflects choice consistency. We trained two rhesus monkeys to make accept/reject decisions based on pretrained visual cues that signaled reward offers with different magnitudes and delays to reward. Monkeys made consistent decisions for very good and very bad offers, but decisions were less consistent for intermediate offers. Analysis of neural data showed that the attractor basins around patterns of activity reflecting decisions had steeper landscapes for offers that led to consistent decisions. Therefore, we provide neural evidence that energy landscapes predict decision consistency, which reflects decision confidence.

Attractor dynamics reflect decision confidence in macaque prefrontal cortex

Decisions are made with different degrees of consistency, and this consistency can be linked to the confidence that the best choice has been made. Theoretical work suggests that attractor dynamics in networks can account for choice consistency, but how this is implemented in the brain remains unclear. Here, we provide evidence that the energy landscape around attractor basins in population neural activity in prefrontal cortex reflects choice consistency. We trained two rhesus monkeys to make accept/reject decisions based on pretrained visual cues that signaled reward offers with different magnitudes and delays-to-reward. Monkeys made consistent decisions for very good and very bad offers, but decisions were less consistent for intermediate offers. Analysis of neural data showed that the attractor basins around patterns of activity reflecting decisions had steeper landscapes for offers that led to consistent decisions. Therefore, we provide neural evidence that energy landscapes predict decision consistency, which reflects decision confidence.

Accounting for endogenous effects in decision-making with a non-linear diffusion decision model

The Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM) is widely accepted for two-alternative forced-choice decision paradigms thanks to its simple formalism and close fit to behavioral and neurophysiological data. However, this formalism presents strong limitations in capturing inter-trial dynamics at the single-trial level and endogenous influences. We propose a novel model, the non-linear Drift-Diffusion Model (nl-DDM), that addresses these issues by allowing the existence of several trajectories to the decision boundary. We show that the non-linear model performs better than the drift-diffusion model for an equivalent complexity. To give better intuition on the meaning of nl-DDM parameters, we compare the DDM and the nl-DDM through correlation analysis. This paper provides evidence of the functioning of our model as an extension of the DDM. Moreover, we show that the nl-DDM captures time effects better than the DDM. Our model paves the way toward more accurately analyzing across-trial variability for perceptual decisions and accounts for peri-stimulus influences.

Explaining Integration of Evidence Separated by Temporal Gaps with Frontoparietal Circuit Models

Perceptual decisions rely on accumulating sensory evidence over time. However, the accumulation process is complicated in real life when evidence resulted from separated cues over time. Previous studies demonstrate that participants are able to integrate information from two separated cues to improve their performance invariant to an interval between the cues. However, there is no neural model that can account for accuracy and confidence in decisions when there is a time interval in evidence. We used behavioral and EEG datasets from a visual choice task -Random dot motion- with separated evidence to investigate three candid distributed neural networks. We showed that decisions based on evidence accumulation by separated cues over time are best explained by the interplay of recurrent cortical dynamics of centro-parietal and frontal brain areas while an uncertainty-monitoring module included in the model.

Flexible integration of continuous sensory evidence in perceptual estimation tasks

Temporal accumulation of evidence is crucial for making accurate judgments based on noisy or ambiguous sensory input. The integration process leading to categorical decisions is thought to rely on competition between neural populations, each encoding a discrete categorical choice. How recurrent neural circuits integrate evidence for continuous perceptual judgments is unknown. Here, we show that a continuous bump attractor network can integrate a circular feature, such as stimulus direction, nearly optimally. As required by optimal integration, the population activity of the network unfolds on a two-dimensional manifold, in which the position of the network's activity bump tracks the stimulus average, and, simultaneously, the bump amplitude tracks stimulus uncertainty. Moreover, the temporal weighting of sensory evidence by the network depends on the relative strength of the stimulus compared to the internally generated bump dynamics, yielding either early (primacy), uniform, or late (recency) weighting. The model can flexibly switch between these regimes by changing a single control parameter, the global excitatory drive. We show that this mechanism can quantitatively explain individual temporal weighting profiles of human observers, and we validate the model prediction that temporal weighting impacts reaction times. Our findings point to continuous attractor dynamics as a plausible neural mechanism underlying stimulus integration in perceptual estimation tasks.

Stable choice coding in rat frontal orienting fields across model-predicted changes of mind

During decision making in a changing environment, evidence that may guide the decision accumulates until the point of action. In the rat, provisional choice is thought to be represented in frontal orienting fields (FOF), but this has only been tested in static environments where provisional and final decisions are not easily dissociated. Here, we characterize the representation of accumulated evidence in the FOF of rats performing a recently developed dynamic evidence accumulation task, which induces changes in the provisional decision, referred to as “changes of mind”. We find that FOF encodes evidence throughout decision formation with a temporal gain modulation that rises until the period when the animal may need to act. Furthermore, reversals in FOF firing rates can be accounted for by changes of mind predicted using a model of the decision process fit only to behavioral data. Our results suggest that the FOF represents provisional decisions even in dynamic, uncertain environments, allowing for rapid motor execution when it is time to act.

A leaky accumulation model can predict rats’ changes of mind during decision making in a dynamic environment explaining reversals in frontal cortical activity and demonstrating a stable choice code despite environmental uncertainty.

Proactive and reactive accumulation-to-bound processes compete during perceptual decisions

Standard models of perceptual decision-making postulate that a response is triggered in reaction to stimulus presentation when the accumulated stimulus evidence reaches a decision threshold. This framework excludes however the possibility that informed responses are generated proactively at a time independent of stimulus. Here, we find that, in a free reaction time auditory task in rats, reactive and proactive responses coexist, suggesting that choice selection and motor initiation, commonly viewed as serial processes, are decoupled in general. We capture this behavior by a novel model in which proactive and reactive responses are triggered whenever either of two competing processes, respectively Action Initiation or Evidence Accumulation, reaches a bound. In both types of response, the choice is ultimately informed by the Evidence Accumulation process. The Action Initiation process readily explains premature responses, contributes to urgency effects at long reaction times and mediates the slowing of the responses as animals get satiated and tired during sessions. Moreover, it successfully predicts reaction time distributions when the stimulus was either delayed, advanced or omitted. Overall, these results fundamentally extend standard models of evidence accumulation in decision making by showing that proactive and reactive processes compete for the generation of responses.

A confirmation bias in perceptual decision-making due to hierarchical approximate inference

Making good decisions requires updating beliefs according to new evidence. This is a dynamical process that is prone to biases: in some cases, beliefs become entrenched and resistant to new evidence (leading to primacy effects), while in other cases, beliefs fade over time and rely primarily on later evidence (leading to recency effects). How and why either type of bias dominates in a given context is an important open question. Here, we study this question in classic perceptual decision-making tasks, where, puzzlingly, previous empirical studies differ in the kinds of biases they observe, ranging from primacy to recency, despite seemingly equivalent tasks. We present a new model, based on hierarchical approximate inference and derived from normative principles, that not only explains both primacy and recency effects in existing studies, but also predicts how the type of bias should depend on the statistics of stimuli in a given task. We verify this prediction in a novel visual discrimination task with human observers, finding that each observer's temporal bias changed as the result of changing the key stimulus statistics identified by our model. The key dynamic that leads to a primacy bias in our model is an overweighting of new sensory information that agrees with the observer's existing belief-a type of 'confirmation bias'. By fitting an extended drift-diffusion model to our data we rule out an alternative explanation for primacy effects due to bounded integration. Taken together, our results resolve a major discrepancy among existing perceptual decision-making studies, and suggest that a key source of bias in human decision-making is approximate hierarchical inference.

Adaptive circuit dynamics across human cortex during evidence accumulation in changing environments

Many decisions under uncertainty entail the temporal accumulation of evidence that informs about the state of the environment. When environments are subject to hidden changes in their state, maximizing accuracy and reward requires non-linear accumulation of evidence. How this adaptive, non-linear computation is realized in the brain is unknown. We analyzed human behavior and cortical population activity (measured with magnetoencephalography) recorded during visual evidence accumulation in a changing environment. Behavior and decision-related activity in cortical regions involved in action planning exhibited hallmarks of adaptive evidence accumulation, which could also be implemented by a recurrent cortical microcircuit. Decision dynamics in action-encoding parietal and frontal regions were mirrored in a frequency-specific modulation of the state of the visual cortex that depended on pupil-linked arousal and the expected probability of change. These findings link normative decision computations to recurrent cortical circuit dynamics and highlight the adaptive nature of decision-related feedback to the sensory cortex.