Neural mechanisms of deception in a social context: an fMRI replication study

Neural dynamics of deception: insights from fMRI studies of brain states

Deception is a complex behavior that requires greater cognitive effort than truth-telling, with brain states dynamically adapting to external stimuli and cognitive demands. Investigating these brain states provides valuable insights into the brain's temporal and spatial dynamics. In this study, we designed an experiment paradigm to efficiently simulate lying and constructed a temporal network of brain states. We applied the Louvain community clustering algorithm to identify characteristic brain states associated with lie-telling, inverse-telling, and truth-telling. Our analysis revealed six representative brain states with unique spatial characteristics. Notably, two distinct states-termed truth-preferred and lie-preferred-exhibited significant differences in fractional occupancy and average dwelling time. The truth-preferred state showed higher occupancy and dwelling time during truth-telling, while the lie-preferred state demonstrated these characteristics during lie-telling. Using the average z-score BOLD signals of these two states, we applied generalized linear models with elastic net regularization, achieving a classification accuracy of 88.46%, with a sensitivity of 92.31% and a specificity of 84.62% in distinguishing deception from truth-telling. These findings revealed representative brain states for lie-telling, inverse-telling, and truth-telling, highlighting two states specifically associated with truthful and deceptive behaviors. The spatial characteristics and dynamic attributes of these brain states indicate their potential as biomarkers of cognitive engagement in deception.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11571-025-10222-4.

Fast & furious: Rejecting the hypothesis that secondary psychopathy improves reaction time-based concealed information detection

Deception, a complex aspect of human behavior, is inherently difficult to detect directly. A valid alternative involves memory detection, particularly through methods such as the Reaction-Time based Concealed Information Test (RT-CIT). The RT-CIT assesses whether an individual possesses specific knowledge by presenting various probe (familiar) items amidst irrelevant (unfamiliar) items. The task-required "unfamiliar" response to probes may induce a response conflict. Resolving this conflict, by inhibiting the automatic "familiar" response, takes time and slows probe RTs-a phenomenon known as the RT-CIT effect. Notably, secondary psychopathy is characterized by disinhibition and impulsivity, traits which may hinder the ability to effectively manage experienced conflict. Therefore, we hypothesized that secondary psychopathy would be associated with an elevated RT-CIT effect. To investigate this hypothesized relation, we conducted a pre-registered study (n = 86, student sample), employing a novel CIT paradigm that incorporates no-go trials to assess response inhibition capacity. Psychopathic traits were measured using the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy (LSRP) scale, while the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) assessed impulsivity. The novel CIT paradigm revealed impressive detection efficiency. However, contrary to our expectations, we observed no significant correlation between the RT-CIT effect and secondary psychopathic traits (BF01 = 6.98). This cautiously suggests that while secondary psychopathic tendencies do not improve RT-CIT validity, they also do not compromise it. Although future investigations should explore more diverse contexts and populations, this tentative finding is reassuring and underscores the robustness of the CIT paradigm.

To lie or to tell the truth? The influence of processing the opponent's feedback on the forthcoming choice

Introduction

The brain mechanisms of deceptive behavior are relatively well studied, and the key brain regions involved in its processing were established. At the same time, the brain mechanisms underlying the processes of preparation for deception are less known.

Methods

We studied BOLD-signal changes during the presentation of the opponent's feedback to a previous deceptive or honest action during the computer game. The goal of the game was to mislead the opponent either by means of deception or by means of telling the truth.

Results

As a result, it was shown that several brain regions that were previously demonstrated as involved in deception execution, such as the left anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula, also underlie processes related to deception preparation.

Discussion

The results obtained also allowed us to suggest that brain regions responsible for performance monitoring, intention assessment, suppression of non-selected solutions, and reward processing could be involved in shaping future action selection and preparation for deception. By shedding light on the brain mechanisms underlying deception, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of this complex cognitive process. Furthermore, it emphasizes the significance of exploring brain mechanisms governing the choice between deception and truth at various stages of decision-making.

Truthful yet misleading: Elementary second-order deception in school-age children and its sociocognitive correlates

In highly competitive contexts, deceptive intentions might be transparent, so conveying only false information to the opponent can become a predictable strategy. In such situations, alternating between truths and lies (second-order lying behavior) represents a less foreseeable option. The current study investigated the development of 8- to 10-year-old children's elementary second-order deception in relation to their attribution of ignorance (first- and second-order ignorance) and executive functions (inhibitory control, shifting ability, and verbal working memory). An adapted version of the hide-and-seek paradigm was used to assess children's second-order lie-telling, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either of their hands. Unlike the standard paradigm, the opponent did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children, so children needed to switch between telling simple lies and truths (elementary second-order lies about the coin location) to successfully deceive the recipient. The results showed that older children were less likely to tell elementary second-order lies. However, across the sample, when children decided to lie, this ability was positively related to their second-order ignorance attribution and their verbal working memory. Moreover, we obtained preliminary evidence for the presence of a habituation effect in second-order lying, with children being more accurate and having less variability in their truthful-to-deceive responses (this being the more frequently elicited response) than when telling lies to deceive. Our findings could have implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying children's ability to alternate between truths and lies to deceive.

Socio-cognitive correlates of primary school children's deceptive behavior toward peers in competitive settings

Competing for limited resources with peers is common among children from an early age, illustrating their propensity to use deceptive strategies to win. We focused on how primary school-age (6-8 years old) children's strategic deception toward peers is associated with their socio-cognitive development (theory of mind and executive functions). In a novel computerized competitive hide-and-seek game, we manipulated the peer opponents' familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) and actions (following vs. not following children's indications), as well as the stimuli likability (liked vs. disliked cards). Our findings demonstrated that children deceived the familiar opponent less than the unfamiliar one, indicating their determination to preserve positive peer interactions. We showed that theory of mind and executive functions significantly predicted children's willingness to deceive. Notably, second-order false belief understanding and visuospatial working memory positively predicted children's use of truths to deceive, whereas inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility efficacy scores were negatively related to their deceptive performance when using the same strategy. Implications for children's competitive behavior toward peers involving lie-telling are discussed.

Reputation risk during dishonest social decision-making modulates anterior insular and cingulate cortex activity and connectivity

To explore the neural underpinnings of (dis)honest decision making under quasi-ecological conditions, we used an fMRI adapted version of a card game in which deceptive or truthful decisions are made to an opponent, with or without the risk of getting caught by them. Dishonest decisions were associated to increased activity in a cortico-subcortical circuit including the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, supplementary motor area, and right caudate. Crucially, deceptive immoral decisions under reputation risk enhanced activity of - and functional connectivity between - the bilateral ACC and left AI, suggesting the need for heightened emotional processing and cognitive control when making immoral decisions under reputation risk. Tellingly, more manipulative individuals required less involvement of the ACC during risky self-gain lies but more involvement during other-gain truths, pointing to the need of cognitive control only when going against one's own moral code.

Detecting spontaneous deception in the brain

Deception detection can be of great value during the juristic investigation. Although the neural signatures of deception have been widely documented, most prior studies were biased by difficulty levels. That is, deceptive behavior typically required more effort, making deception detection possibly effort detection. Furthermore, no study has examined the generalizability across instructed and spontaneous responses and across participants. To explore these issues, we used a dual‐task paradigm, where the difficulty level was balanced between truth‐telling and lying, and the instructed and spontaneous truth‐telling and lying were collected independently. Using Multivoxel pattern analysis, we were able to decode truth‐telling versus lying with a balanced difficulty level. Results showed that the angular gyrus (AG), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and postcentral gyrus could differentiate lying from truth‐telling. Critically, linear classifiers trained to distinguish instructed truthful and deceptive responses could correctly differentiate spontaneous truthful and deceptive responses in AG and IFG with above‐chance accuracy. In addition, with a leave‐one‐participant‐out analysis, multivoxel neural patterns from AG could classify if the left‐out participant was lying or not in a trial. These results indicate the commonality of neural responses subserved instructed and spontaneous deceptive behavior as well as the feasibility of cross‐participant deception validation.

The Interaction Between Caudate Nucleus and Regions Within the Theory of Mind Network as a Neural Basis for Social Intelligence

The organization of socio-cognitive processes is a multifaceted problem for which many sophisticated concepts have been proposed. One of these concepts is social intelligence (SI), i.e., the set of abilities that allow successful interaction with other people. The theory of mind (ToM) human brain network is a good candidate for the neural substrate underlying SI since it is involved in inferring the mental states of others and ourselves and predicting or explaining others’ actions. However, the relationship of ToM to SI remains poorly explored. Our recent research revealed an association between the gray matter volume of the caudate nucleus and the degree of SI as measured by the Guilford-Sullivan test. It led us to question whether this structural peculiarity is reflected in changes to the integration of the caudate with other areas of the brain associated with socio-cognitive processes, including the ToM system. We conducted seed-based functional connectivity (FC) analysis of resting-state fMRI data for 42 subjects with the caudate as a region of interest. We found that the scores of the Guilford-Sullivan test were positively correlated with the FC between seeds in the right caudate head and two clusters located within the right superior temporal gyrus and bilateral precuneus. Both regions are known to be nodes of the ToM network. Thus, the current study demonstrates that the SI level is associated with the degree of functional integration between the ToM network and the caudate nuclei.

Functional Interactions Between Neural Substrates of Socio-cognitive Mechanisms Involved in Simple Deception and Manipulative Truth

Introduction: Deceptive intentions may be realized by imparting false (simple deception) or true (manipulative truth) information. Both forms of deception require inferring others' thoughts and are underpinned by the theory of mind (TOM) neural system. Manipulative truth is thought to more strongly recruit these processes. However, the organization of functional interactions underlying simple deception and manipulative truth remains unclear. Materials and Methods: We performed psychophysiological interaction analysis for a key node in the TOM system, the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), using functional MRI data obtained from 23 volunteers (14 men and 9 women, age range 18-45 years) during the sender-receiver game. During the game, participants sent true, simple deceptive, or manipulative truthful messages to another player according to their own choice. A Bayesian approach to statistics was employed to perform statistical inference and define voxels with significant changes in functional interactions. Results: We observed functional interactions between nodes of the TOM system (bilateral TPJ, left precuneus, left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and right superior temporal sulcus) characterizing both forms of deception. We identified an increment in functional interactions of the rTPJ with the left TPJ (lTPJ) and right precuneus associated with manipulative truth. Furthermore, we demonstrated that a higher rate of manipulative truthful actions was associated with weaker functional interactions between the rTPJ and lTPJ, left precuneus, and left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Discussion: Compared with simple deception, manipulative truth is associated with a higher demand for socio-cognitive processes that contributes to the cognitive load of this form of deception.

What Deception Tasks Used in the Lab Really Do: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Ecological Validity of fMRI Deception Tasks

Interpretation of the neural findings of deception without considering the ecological validity of the experimental tasks could lead to biased conclusions. In this study we classified the experimental tasks according to their inclusion of three essential components required for ecological validity: intention to lie, social interaction and motivation. First, we carried out a systematic review to categorize fMRI deception tasks and to weigh the degree of ecological validity of each one. Second, we performed a meta-analysis to identify if each type of task involves a different neural substrate and to distinguish the neurocognitive contribution of each component of ecological validity essential to deception. We detected six categories of deception tasks. Intention to lie was the component least frequently included, followed by social interaction. Monetary reward was the most frequent motivator. The results of the meta-analysis, including 59 contrasts, revealed that intention to lie is associated with activation in the left lateral occipital cortex (superior division) whereas the left angular gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) are engaged during lying under instructions. Additionally, the right IFG appears to participate in the social aspect of lying including simulated and real interactions. We found no effect of monetary reward in our analysis. Finally, tasks with high ecological validity recruited fewer brain areas (right insular cortex and bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) compared to less ecological tasks, perhaps because they are more natural and realistic, and engage a wide network of brain mechanisms, as opposed to specific tasks that demand more centralized processes.