Answering Mermin's challenge with conservation per no preferred reference frame

No Preferred Reference Frame at the Foundation of Quantum Mechanics

Quantum information theorists have created axiomatic reconstructions of quantum mechanics (QM) that are very successful at identifying precisely what distinguishes quantum probability theory from classical and more general probability theories in terms of information-theoretic principles. Herein, we show how one such principle, Information Invariance and Continuity, at the foundation of those axiomatic reconstructions, maps to “no preferred reference frame” (NPRF, aka “the relativity principle”) as it pertains to the invariant measurement of Planck’s constant h for Stern-Gerlach (SG) spin measurements. This is in exact analogy to the relativity principle as it pertains to the invariant measurement of the speed of light c at the foundation of special relativity (SR). Essentially, quantum information theorists have extended Einstein’s use of NPRF from the boost invariance of measurements of c to include the SO(3) invariance of measurements of h between different reference frames of mutually complementary spin measurements via the principle of Information Invariance and Continuity. Consequently, the “mystery” of the Bell states is understood to result from conservation per Information Invariance and Continuity between different reference frames of mutually complementary qubit measurements, and this maps to conservation per NPRF in spacetime. If one falsely conflates the relativity principle with the classical theory of SR, then it may seem impossible that the relativity principle resides at the foundation of non-relativisitic QM. In fact, there is nothing inherently classical or quantum about NPRF. Thus, the axiomatic reconstructions of QM have succeeded in producing a principle account of QM that reveals as much about Nature as the postulates of SR.

Beyond Causal Explanation: Einstein's Principle Not Reichenbach's

Our account provides a local, realist and fully non-causal principle explanation for EPR correlations, contextuality, no-signalling, and the Tsirelson bound. Indeed, the account herein is fully consistent with the causal structure of Minkowski spacetime. We argue that retrocausal accounts of quantum mechanics are problematic precisely because they do not fully transcend the assumption that causal or constructive explanation must always be fundamental. Unlike retrocausal accounts, our principle explanation is a complete rejection of Reichenbach’s Principle. Furthermore, we will argue that the basis for our principle account of quantum mechanics is the physical principle sought by quantum information theorists for their reconstructions of quantum mechanics. Finally, we explain why our account is both fully realist and psi-epistemic.