Spatial evolutionary public goods game on complete graph and dense complex networks

Motivating data contributions via a distinct career currency

If collecting research data is perceived as poorly rewarded compared to data synthesis and analysis, this can slow overall research progress via two effects. People who have already collected data may be slow to make it openly accessible. Also, researchers may reallocate effort from collecting fresh data to synthesizing and analysing data already accessible. Here, we advocate for a second career currency in the form of data contributions statements embedded within applications for jobs, promotions and research grants. This workable step forward would provide for peer opinion to operate across thousands of selection and promotion committees and granting panels. In this way, fair valuation of data contributions relative to publications could emerge.

Research on an evolutionary game model and simulation of a cluster innovation network based on fairness preference

The cluster innovation network is an important part of regional economic development. In addition, the fairness preference of internal innovators in the processes of investment and benefit distribution are particularly important for curbing "free riding" and other speculative behaviors and for creating a good cooperation environment. Therefore, taking a cluster innovation network constructed by the weighted evolutionary BBV model as the research subject, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of a cluster innovation network based on a spatial public goods game and the theory of fairness preferences, which involves the processes of investment and payoff allocation. Using simulation analysis, this paper studies the evolution of innovators’ cooperative behaviors and benefits in cluster innovation network under the conditions of a fairness preference and a return intensity. The results show that an increase in the weight coefficient, gain coefficient and degree of differentiation between the previous income and current investment can effectively promote improvements in the level of enterprise cooperation. Indeed, the greater the weight coefficient, the gain coefficient and the degree of differentiation are, the more substantial the improvement in the level of enterprise cooperation will be. Moreover, an improvement in the differentiation of the breadth and depth of enterprise cooperation has an inhibitory effect on enterprise cooperation. Furthermore, whereas increases in regulation and gain coefficients can effectively promote enterprise cooperation. However, the increase in the weight coefficient has a different effect on enterprise benefit in terms of the breadth and depth of cooperation. Finally, we hope to improve the overall cooperation level and cooperation income of the network by deeply understanding the fair preferences of innovators in the processes of investment and benefit distribution, which is helpful for promoting the evolution and development of cluster innovation networks.

Reciprocity in spatial evolutionary public goods game on double-layered network

Spatial evolutionary games have mainly been studied on a single, isolated network. However, in real world systems, many interaction topologies are not isolated but many different types of networks are inter-connected to each other. In this study, we investigate the spatial evolutionary public goods game (SEPGG) on double-layered random networks (DRN). Based on the mean-field type arguments and numerical simulations, we find that SEPGG on DRN shows very rich interesting phenomena, especially, depending on the size of each layer, intra-connectivity, and inter-connected couplings, the network reciprocity of SEPGG on DRN can be drastically enhanced through the inter-connected coupling. Furthermore, SEPGG on DRN can provide a more general framework which includes the evolutionary dynamics on multiplex networks and inter-connected networks at the same time.

Fostering cooperation of selfish agents through public goods in relation to the loners

Altruistic behaviors in multiplayer groups have obtained great attention in the context of the public goods game, which poses a riddle from the evolutionary viewpoint. Here we focus on a particular type of public goods game model in which the benefits of cooperation are either discounted or synergistically enhanced at the appearance of multiple cooperators in a group. Moreover, we focus on the three-strategies profile by adding the role of loners, besides the often-used cooperation and defection. Using the replicator dynamic equations, we investigate a range of dynamical portraits that characterizes the properties of the steady state. Analysis results indicate that loners and cooperators both have chances to be the stable equilibrium points in the presence of perturbations, while defectors fail to do so in this three-strategy competition. Moreover, the coexistence state, in which all three strategies exist in equilibrium, can be led by suitable parameters and stabilized for perturbations. These results elucidate the interplay between the characteristics of the public goods game and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

Percolation in spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices

We study the spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with updates of imitation max on triangular, hexagonal, and square lattices. We use the weak prisoner's dilemma game with a single parameter b. Due to the competition between the temptation value b and the coordination number z of the base lattice, a greater variety of percolation properties is expected to occur on the lattice with the larger z. From the numerical analysis, we find six different regimes on the triangular lattice (z=6). Regardless of the initial densities of cooperators and defectors, cooperators always percolate in the steady state in two regimes for small b. In these two regimes, defectors do not percolate. In two regimes for the intermediate value of b, both cooperators and defectors undergo percolation transitions. The defector always percolates in two regimes for large b. On the hexagonal lattice (z=3), there exist two distinctive regimes. For small b, both the cooperators and the defectors undergo percolation transitions while only defectors always percolate for large b. On the square lattice (z=4), there exist three regimes. Combining with the finite-size scaling analyses, we show that all the observed percolation transitions belong to the universality class of the random percolation. We also show how the detailed growth mechanism of cooperator and defector clusters decides each regime.