Selective impairment of reasoning about social exchange in a patient with bilateral limbic system damage

Moral Judgments of Human vs. AI Agents in Moral Dilemmas

Artificial intelligence has quickly integrated into human society and its moral decision-making has also begun to slowly seep into our lives. The significance of moral judgment research on artificial intelligence behavior is becoming increasingly prominent. The present research aims at examining how people make moral judgments about the behavior of artificial intelligence agents in a trolley dilemma where people are usually driven by controlled cognitive processes, and in a footbridge dilemma where people are usually driven by automatic emotional responses. Through three experiments (n = 626), we found that in the trolley dilemma (Experiment 1), the agent type rather than the actual action influenced people's moral judgments. Specifically, participants rated AI agents' behavior as more immoral and deserving of more blame than humans' behavior. Conversely, in the footbridge dilemma (Experiment 2), the actual action rather than the agent type influenced people's moral judgments. Specifically, participants rated action (a utilitarian act) as less moral and permissible and more morally wrong and blameworthy than inaction (a deontological act). A mixed-design experiment provided a pattern of results consistent with Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (Experiment 3). This suggests that in different types of moral dilemmas, people adapt different modes of moral judgment to artificial intelligence, this may be explained by that when people make moral judgments in different types of moral dilemmas, they are engaging different processing systems.

Entering into a self-regulated learning mode prevents detrimental effects of feedback removal on memory

Incentives can decrease performance by undermining intrinsic motivation. How such an interplay of external reinforcers and internal self-regulation influences memory processes, however, is less known. Here, we investigated their interaction on memory performance while learning the meaning of new-words from their context. Specifically, participants inferred congruent meanings of new-words from semantic context (congruent trials) or lack of congruence (incongruent trials), while receiving external feedback in the first or second half of trials only. Removing feedback during learning of congruent word meanings lowered subsequent recognition rates a day later, whereas recognition remained high in the group, which received feedback only in the second half. In contrast, feedback did not substantially alter recognition rates for learning that new-words had no congruent meanings. Our findings suggest that external reinforcers can selectively impair memories if internal self-regulated processes are not already established, but whether they do so depends on what is being learned (specific word-meanings vs. unspecific incongruence). This highlights the relevance of self-regulated learning in education to support stable memory formation.

Learning under social versus nonsocial uncertainty: A meta-analytic approach

Much of the uncertainty that clouds our understanding of the world springs from the covert values and intentions held by other people. Thus, it is plausible that specialized mechanisms that compute learning signals under uncertainty of exclusively social origin operate in the brain. To test this hypothesis, we scoured academic databases for neuroimaging studies involving learning under uncertainty, and performed a meta‐analysis of brain activation maps that compared learning in the face of social versus nonsocial uncertainty. Although most of the brain activations associated with learning error signals were shared between social and nonsocial conditions, we found some evidence for functional segregation of error signals of exclusively social origin during learning in limited regions of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and insula. This suggests that most behavioral adaptations to navigate social environments are reused from frontal and subcortical areas processing generic value representation and learning, but that a specialized circuitry might have evolved in prefrontal regions to deal with social context representation and strategic action.

Causal connection between dissociation and ongoing interpersonal violence: A systematic review

OBJECTIVE

To identify evidence for dissociation as a cause of ongoing interpersonal violence.

METHOD

A systematic review of the literature retrieved from ten databases.

RESULTS

Fifteen studies yielded from our search strategy have been included in the review; eleven of these were longitudinal and four were experimental. The evidence indicates that pathological dissociation may contribute towards enduring interpersonal violence. Thus, dissociation may account for instances of repeated victimisation. There are similar indications concerning offenders, but study designs in this area allow one to draw fewer causal conclusions. There is some evidence that dissociation decreases information processing from the limbic system, which may be one underlying neurofunctional mechanism of persistent violence.

CONCLUSION

There is growing evidence for dissociation as a cause of interpersonal violence. However, the available evidence is still limited, and our review rather reveals an important research gap. Future longitudinal and experimental studies aimed at clarifying the role of dissociation in the context of violence should take into account the theoretical and empirical complexity around the concept of dissociation.

The role of the right temporo-parietal junction in social decision-making

Identifying someone else's noncooperative intentions can prevent exploitation in social interactions. Hence, the inference of another person's mental state might be most pronounced in order to improve social decision-making. Here, we tested the hypothesis that brain regions associated with Theory of Mind (ToM), particularly the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), show higher neural responses when interacting with a selfish person and that the rTPJ-activity as well as cooperative tendencies will change over time. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a modified prisoner's dilemma game in which 20 participants interacted with three fictive playing partners who behaved according to stable strategies either competitively, cooperatively or randomly during seven interaction blocks. The rTPJ and the posterior-medial prefrontal cortex showed higher activity during the interaction with a competitive compared with a cooperative playing partner. Only the rTPJ showed a high response during an early interaction phase, which preceded participants increase in defective decisions. Enhanced functional connectivity between the rTPJ and the left hippocampus suggests that social cognition and learning processes co-occur when behavioral adaptation seems beneficial.

Domains of deontic reasoning: Resolving the discrepancy between the cognitive and moral reasoning literatures

Deontic reasoning has been studied in two subfields of psychology: the cognitive and moral reasoning literatures. These literatures have drawn different conclusions about the nature of deontic reasoning. The consensus within the cognitive reasoning literature is that deontic reasoning is a unitary phenomenon, whereas the consensus within the moral reasoning literature is that there are different subdomains of deontic reasoning. We present evidence from a series of experiments employing the methods of both literatures suggesting that people make a systematic distinction between two types of deontic rule: social contracts and precautions. The results call into question the prevailing opinion in the cognitive reasoning literature and provide further support for both an evolutionary view of deontic reasoning and the more domain-specific perspective found in the moral reasoning literature.

Your perspective and my benefit: multiple lesion models of self-other integration strategies during social bargaining

Recursive social decision-making requires the use of flexible, context-sensitive long-term strategies for negotiation. To succeed in social bargaining, participants' own perspectives must be dynamically integrated with those of interactors to maximize self-benefits and adapt to the other's preferences, respectively. This is a prerequisite to develop a successful long-term self-other integration strategy. While such form of strategic interaction is critical to social decision-making, little is known about its neurocognitive correlates. To bridge this gap, we analysed social bargaining behaviour in relation to its structural neural correlates, ongoing brain dynamics (oscillations and related source space), and functional connectivity signatures in healthy subjects and patients offering contrastive lesion models of neurodegeneration and focal stroke: behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer's disease, and frontal lesions. All groups showed preserved basic bargaining indexes. However, impaired self-other integration strategy was found in patients with behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia and frontal lesions, suggesting that social bargaining critically depends on the integrity of prefrontal regions. Also, associations between behavioural performance and data from voxel-based morphometry and voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping revealed a critical role of prefrontal regions in value integration and strategic decisions for self-other integration strategy. Furthermore, as shown by measures of brain dynamics and related sources during the task, the self-other integration strategy was predicted by brain anticipatory activity (alpha/beta oscillations with sources in frontotemporal regions) associated with expectations about others' decisions. This pattern was reduced in all clinical groups, with greater impairments in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia and frontal lesions than Alzheimer's disease. Finally, connectivity analysis from functional magnetic resonance imaging evidenced a fronto-temporo-parietal network involved in successful self-other integration strategy, with selective compromise of long-distance connections in frontal disorders. In sum, this work provides unprecedented evidence of convergent behavioural and neurocognitive signatures of strategic social bargaining in different lesion models. Our findings offer new insights into the critical roles of prefrontal hubs and associated temporo-parietal networks for strategic social negotiation.

Conditional Reasoning in Schizophrenic Patients

Conditional reasoning (if p then q) is used very frequently in everyday situations. Conditional reasoning is impaired in brain-lesion patients, psychopathy, alcoholism, and polydrug dependence. Many neurocognitive deficits have also been described in schizophrenia. We assessed conditional reasoning in 25 patients with schizophrenia, 25 depressive patients, and 25 controls, using the Wason selection task in three different domains: social contracts, precautionary rules, and descriptive rules. Control measures included depression, anxiety, and severity of schizophrenia measures as a Verbal Intelligence Scale. Patients with schizophrenia were significantly impaired on all conditional reasoning tasks compared to depressives and controls. However, the social contract and precautions tasks yielded better results than the descriptive tasks. Differences between groups disappeared for social contract but remained for precautions and descriptive tasks when verbal intelligence was used as a covariate. These results suggest that domain-specific reasoning mechanisms, proposed by evolutionary psychologists, are relatively resilient in the face of brain network disruptions that impair more general reasoning abilities. Nevertheless, patients with schizophrenia could encounter difficulties understanding precaution rules and social contracts in real-life situations resulting in unwise risk-taking and misunderstandings in the social world.

Value-based HR practices, i-deals and clinical error control with CSR as a moderator

Purpose Notwithstanding the rising magnitude of system factors in patient safety improvement, "human factors" such as idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) which also contribute to the adjustment of system deficiencies should not be neglected. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of value-based HR practices in catalyzing i-deals, which then influence clinical error control. The research further examines the moderating role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the effect of value-based HR practices on i-deals. Design/methodology/approach The data were collected from middle-level clinicians from hospitals in the Vietnam context. Findings The research results confirmed the effect chain from value-based HR practices through i-deals to clinical error control with CSR as a moderator. Originality/value The HRM literature is expanded through enlisting i-deals and clinical error control as the outcomes of HR practices.

Discrepancy between social and nonsocial decision-making under uncertainty following prefrontal lobe damage: the impact of an interactionist approach

Deficits in decision-making are thought to contribute significantly to socio-behavioral impairments of patients with frontal lobe damage. The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis of whether the inappropriate social behavior of patients with frontal lesions can be viewed as the product of a general failure of decision-making ability or as the result of socio-cognitive impairment. We studied a group of patients with prefrontal lesions (FL patients, n = 15) and a group of matched healthy controls (n = 30) on the Iowa Gambling task (IGT) of nonsocial decision-making, environmental dependency phenomena (EDP) during social interaction, and the "reading the mind in the eyes" and "character intention task" of theory of mind (TOM) tasks. The FL patients were impaired in both TOM and EDP protocols but, surprisingly, they behaved appropriately in the IGT. In addition, FL patients with EDP did not differ in executive functioning, IGT and TOM measures from those who did not demonstrate these behavioral disorders. The right orbitofrontal cortex was associated with social decision-making deficits. By adopting an interactionist approach, this study raises the possibility of identifying components of social and nonsocial decision-making, which could be helpful in understanding the behavioral disorders of FL patients.

White matter structures associated with loneliness in young adults

Lonely individuals may exhibit dysfunction, particularly with respect to social empathy and self-efficacy. White matter (WM) structures related to loneliness have not yet been identified. We investigated the association between regional WM density (rWMD) using the UCLA Loneliness Scale in 776 healthy young students aged 18-27 years old. Loneliness scores were negatively correlated with rWMD in eight clusters: the bilateral inferior parietal lobule (IPL), right anterior insula (AI), posterior temporoparietal junction (pTPJ), left posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), and rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC). The bilateral IPL, right AI, left pSTS, pTPJ, and RLPFC were strongly associated with Empathy Quotient (EQ), whereas the bilateral IPL, right AI, left pTPJ, and dmPFC were associated with General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSES) score. The neural correlates of loneliness comprise widespread reduction in WMD in areas related to self- and social cognition as well as areas associated with empathy and self-efficacy.

Accounting for reciprocity in negotiation and social exchange

People generally adhere to the norm of reciprocity during both tacit and negotiated exchange. Emotional responses generated from profitable and unprofitable exchange facilitate the formation of motives to settle scores with others. In two studies we examine how exchange incidents trigger positive and negative emotional responses, bargaining behavior, and process. In Study 1, we developed measures of emotional response toward the counterpart that can index the state of relational accounts between parties. In a complex, multi-issue negotiation, The measures show that prior profitable or unprofitable exchange experiences shifted affect and individual social motives, as well as initial bargaining positions. In Study 2, shifts in relational accounts altered the bargaining process and subsequent implementation of agreements. The relational accounting concept represents an important link for understanding how negotiation functions as a sub-process in the wider stream of social exchange.

Differential serotonergic innervation of the amygdala in bonobos and chimpanzees

Humans' closest living relatives are bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), yet these great ape species differ considerably from each other in terms of social behavior. Bonobos are more tolerant of conspecifics in competitive contexts and often use sexual behavior to mediate social interactions. Chimpanzees more frequently employ aggression during conflicts and actively patrol territories between communities. Regulation of emotional responses is facilitated by the amygdala, which also modulates social decision-making, memory and attention. Amygdala responsiveness is further regulated by the neurotransmitter serotonin. We hypothesized that the amygdala of bonobos and chimpanzees would differ in its neuroanatomical organization and serotonergic innervation. We measured volumes of regions and the length density of serotonin transporter-containing axons in the whole amygdala and its lateral, basal, accessory basal and central nuclei. Results showed that accessory basal nucleus volume was larger in chimpanzees than in bonobos. Of particular note, the amygdala of bonobos had more than twice the density of serotonergic axons than chimpanzees, with the most pronounced differences in the basal and central nuclei. These findings suggest that variation in serotonergic innervation of the amygdala may contribute to mediating the remarkable differences in social behavior exhibited by bonobos and chimpanzees.

Reading the Mind in the Eyes or reading between the lines? Theory of Mind predicts collective intelligence equally well online and face-to-face

Recent research with face-to-face groups found that a measure of general group effectiveness (called “collective intelligence”) predicted a group’s performance on a wide range of different tasks. The same research also found that collective intelligence was correlated with the individual group members’ ability to reason about the mental states of others (an ability called “Theory of Mind” or “ToM”). Since ToM was measured in this work by a test that requires participants to “read” the mental states of others from looking at their eyes (the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test), it is uncertain whether the same results would emerge in online groups where these visual cues are not available. Here we find that: (1) a collective intelligence factor characterizes group performance approximately as well for online groups as for face-to-face groups; and (2) surprisingly, the ToM measure is equally predictive of collective intelligence in both face-to-face and online groups, even though the online groups communicate only via text and never see each other at all. This provides strong evidence that ToM abilities are just as important to group performance in online environments with limited nonverbal cues as they are face-to-face. It also suggests that the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test measures a deeper, domain-independent aspect of social reasoning, not merely the ability to recognize facial expressions of mental states.

The amygdala as a hub in brain networks that support social life

A growing body of evidence suggests that the amygdala is central to handling the demands of complex social life in primates. In this paper, we synthesize extant anatomical and functional data from rodents, monkeys, and humans to describe the topography of three partially distinct large-scale brain networks anchored in the amygdala that each support unique functions for effectively managing social interactions and maintaining social relationships. These findings provide a powerful componential framework for parsing social behavior into partially distinct neural underpinnings that differ among healthy people and disintegrate or fail to develop in neuropsychiatric populations marked by social impairment, such as autism, antisocial personality disorder, and frontotemporal dementia.

The impact of egocentric vs. allocentric agency attributions on the neural bases of reasoning about social rules

We used the "standard" and "switched" social contract versions of the Wason Selection-task to investigate the neural bases of human reasoning about social rules. Both these versions typically elicit the deontically correct answer, i.e. the proper identification of the violations of a conditional obligation. Only in the standard version of the task, however, this response corresponds to the logically correct one. We took advantage of this differential adherence to logical vs. deontical accuracy to test the different predictions of logic rule-based vs. visuospatial accounts of inferential abilities in 14 participants who solved the standard and switched versions of the Selection-task during functional-Magnetic-Resonance-Imaging. Both versions activated the well known left fronto-parietal network of deductive reasoning. The standard version additionally recruited the medial parietal and right inferior parietal cortex, previously associated with mental imagery and with the adoption of egocentric vs. allocentric spatial reference frames. These results suggest that visuospatial processes encoding one's own subjective experience in social interactions may support and shape the interpretation of deductive arguments and/or the resulting inferences, thus contributing to elicit content effects in human reasoning.

Modularity and mental architecture

Debates about the modularity of cognitive architecture have been ongoing for at least the past three decades, since the publication of Fodor's landmark book The Modularity of Mind. According to Fodor, modularity is essentially tied to informational encapsulation, and as such is only found in the relatively low-level cognitive systems responsible for perception and language. According to Fodor's critics in the evolutionary psychology camp, modularity simply reflects the fine-grained functional specialization dictated by natural selection, and it characterizes virtually all aspects of cognitive architecture, including high-level systems for judgment, decision making, and reasoning. Though both of these perspectives on modularity have garnered support, the current state of evidence and argument suggests that a broader skepticism about modularity may be warranted. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:641-649. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1255 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: The author has declared no conflicts of interest for this article. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Detecting cheaters without thinking: testing the automaticity of the cheater detection module

Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that our brain is composed of evolved mechanisms. One extensively studied mechanism is the cheater detection module. This module would make people very good at detecting cheaters in a social exchange. A vast amount of research has illustrated performance facilitation on social contract selection tasks. This facilitation is attributed to the alleged automatic and isolated operation of the module (i.e., independent of general cognitive capacity). This study, using the selection task, tested the critical automaticity assumption in three experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 established that performance on social contract versions did not depend on cognitive capacity or age. Experiment 3 showed that experimentally burdening cognitive resources with a secondary task had no impact on performance on the social contract version. However, in all experiments, performance on a non-social contract version did depend on available cognitive capacity. Overall, findings validate the automatic and effortless nature of social exchange reasoning.

What are punishment and reputation for?

Why did punishment and the use of reputation evolve in humans? According to one family of theories, they evolved to support the maintenance of cooperative group norms; according to another, they evolved to enhance personal gains from cooperation. Current behavioral data are consistent with both hypotheses (and both selection pressures could have shaped human cooperative psychology). However, these hypotheses lead to sharply divergent behavioral predictions in circumstances that have not yet been tested. Here we report results testing these rival predictions. In every test where social exchange theory and group norm maintenance theory made different predictions, subject behavior violated the predictions of group norm maintenance theory and matched those of social exchange theory. Subjects do not direct punishment toward those with reputations for norm violation per se; instead, they use reputation self-beneficially, as a cue to lower the risk that they personally will experience losses from defection. More tellingly, subjects direct their cooperative efforts preferentially towards defectors they have punished and away from those they haven’t punished; they avoid expending punitive effort on reforming defectors who only pose a risk to others. These results are not consistent with the hypothesis that the psychology of punishment evolved to uphold group norms. The circumstances in which punishment is deployed and withheld–its circuit logic–support the hypothesis that it is generated by psychological mechanisms that evolved to benefit the punisher, by allowing him to bargain for better treatment.

Who Deserves Help? Evolutionary Psychology, Social Emotions, and Public Opinion about Welfare

Evidence suggests that our foraging ancestors engaged in the small-scale equivalent of social insurance as an essential tool of survival and evolved a sophisticated psychology of social exchange (involving the social emotions of compassion and anger) to regulate mutual assistance. Here, we hypothesize that political support for modern welfare policies are shaped by these evolved mental programs. In particular, the compassionate motivation to share with needy nonfamily could not have evolved without defenses against opportunists inclined to take without contributing. Cognitively, such parasitic strategies can be identified by the intentional avoidance of productive effort. When detected, this pattern should trigger anger and down-regulate support for assistance. We tested predictions derived from these hypotheses in four studies in two cultures, showing that subjects' perceptions of recipients' effort to find work drive welfare opinions; that such perceptions (and not related perceptions) regulate compassion and anger (and not related emotions); that the effects of perceptions of recipients' effort on opinions about welfare are mediated by anger and compassion, independently of political ideology; and that these emotions not only influence the content of welfare opinions but also how easily they are formed.

Neural bases of falsification in conditional proposition testing: evidence from an fMRI study

The ability of testing the validity of a conditional statement is important in our everyday life. However, the brain mechanisms underlying this process, especially falsification process which is important in daily life, but especially crucial to scientific reasoning and research is not as yet completely clear. Therefore, in the present study, we used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural bases of the falsification process in testing the validity of a conditional statement as used in Wason's (1966) selection task. Our fMRI results showed that: (1) compared with the baseline condition, both Falsification (by using Modus Ponens, and Modus Tollens) and Non-Falsification conditions (affirming the consequent, and denying the antecedent) activated the left frontal areas (BA44/45, or BA6), and basal ganglia, the areas previously found in the rule-guided conditional reasoning operations; the parietal area (BA40, BA7) for recruiting cognitive resources to represent and maintain the different evidential information in working memory. (2) The left middle frontal gyrus (BA9) and cerebellum were shown to be activated in the contrast of Falsification condition versus Non-Falsification condition and in the contrast of MT versus Non-Falsification condition. These results indicated that the left middle frontal gyrus (BA9) might be the key brain region involved in the falsification process of conditional statement for which abstracting and integrating logical relationships, and inhibiting the distraction of the irrelevant information were the essential processes. Moreover, the cerebellum was found to be responsible for constructing an internal working model. In addition, our brain imaging results might support the dual-process theory of reasoning.

The psychosemantics of free riding: dissecting the architecture of a moral concept

For collective action to evolve and be maintained by selection, the mind must be equipped with mechanisms designed to identify free riders--individuals who do not contribute to a collective project but still benefit from it. Once identified, free riders must be either punished or excluded from future collective actions. But what criteria does the mind use to categorize someone as a free rider? An evolutionary analysis suggests that failure to contribute is not sufficient. Failure to contribute can occur by intention or accident, but the adaptive threat is posed by those who are motivated to benefit themselves at the expense of cooperators. In 6 experiments, we show that only individuals with exploitive intentions were categorized as free riders, even when holding their actual level of contribution constant (Studies 1 and 2). In contrast to an evolutionary model, rational choice and reinforcement theory suggest that different contribution levels (leading to different payoffs for their cooperative partners) should be key. When intentions were held constant, however, differences in contribution level were not used to categorize individuals as free riders, although some categorization occurred along a competence dimension (Study 3). Free rider categorization was not due to general tendencies to categorize (Study 4) or to mechanisms that track a broader class of intentional moral violations (Studies 5A and 5B). The results reveal the operation of an evolved concept with features tailored for solving the collective action problems faced by ancestral hunter-gatherers.

The psychopath magnetized: insights from brain imaging

Psychopaths commit a disproportionate amount of violent crime, and this places a substantial economic and emotional burden on society. Elucidation of the neural correlates of psychopathy may lead to improved management and treatment of the condition. Although some methodological issues remain, the neuroimaging literature is generally converging on a set of brain regions and circuits that are consistently implicated in the condition: the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, and the anterior and posterior cingulate and adjacent (para)limbic structures. We discuss these findings in the context of extant theories of psychopathy and highlight the potential legal and policy implications of this body of work.

Social welfare as small-scale help: evolutionary psychology and the deservingness heuristic

Public opinion concerning social welfare is largely driven by perceptions of recipient deservingness. Extant research has argued that this heuristic is learned from a variety of cultural, institutional, and ideological sources. The present article provides evidence supporting a different view: that the deservingness heuristic is rooted in psychological categories that evolved over the course of human evolution to regulate small-scale exchanges of help. To test predictions made on the basis of this view, a method designed to measure social categorization is embedded in nationally representative surveys conducted in different countries. Across the national- and individual-level differences that extant research has used to explain the heuristic, people categorize welfare recipients on the basis of whether they are lazy or unlucky. This mode of categorization furthermore induces people to think about large-scale welfare politics as its presumed ancestral equivalent: small-scale help giving. The general implications for research on heuristics are discussed.

White matter structures associated with emotional intelligence: evidence from diffusion tensor imaging

Previous studies of brain lesions, functional activity, and gray matter structures have suggested that emotional intelligence (EI) is associated with regions involved in the network of social cognition (SCN) and in somatic marker circuitry (SMC). Our new study is the first to investigate the association between white matter (WM) integrity and EI. We examined this relationship in the brain of healthy young adult men [n = 74, mean age = 21.5 years, standard deviation (SD) = 1.6] and women (n = 44, mean age = 21.9 years, SD = 1.4). We performed a voxel-based analysis of fractional anisotropy, which is an indicator of WM integrity, using diffusion tensor imaging and used a questionnaire (EI Scale) for measuring EI to identify the correlation of WM integrity with individual EI factor (intrapersonal, interpersonal, and situation management factors). Our results showed that (a) the intrapersonal factor of EI was positively correlated with WM integrity in the right anterior insula, and (b) the interpersonal factor of EI was associated with WM integrity in a part of the right inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF). The right anterior insula is one of the important nodes of the SMC, whereas the ILF connects the visual cortex and areas related to SCN, and thus, is a part of the SCN. Our findings further support the notion that the brain regions involved in the SCN and in the SMC are associated with EI.

Architecture of explanatory inference in the human prefrontal cortex

Causal reasoning is a ubiquitous feature of human cognition. We continuously seek to understand, at least implicitly and often explicitly, the causal scenarios in which we live, so that we may anticipate what will come next, plan a potential response and envision its outcome, decide among possible courses of action in light of their probable outcomes, make midstream adjustments in our goal-related activities as our situation changes, and so on. A considerable body of research shows that the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) is crucial for causal reasoning, but also that there are significant differences in the manner in which ventrolateral PFC, dorsolateral PFC, and anterolateral PFC support causal reasoning. We propose, on the basis of research on the evolution, architecture, and functional organization of the lateral PFC, a general framework for understanding its roles in the many and varied sorts of causal reasoning carried out by human beings. Specifically, the ventrolateral PFC supports the generation of basic causal explanations and inferences; dorsolateral PFC supports the evaluation of these scenarios in light of some given normative standard (e.g., of plausibility or correctness in light of real or imagined causal interventions); and anterolateral PFC supports explanation and inference at an even higher level of complexity, coordinating the processes of generation and evaluation with further cognitive processes, and especially with computations of hedonic value and emotional implications of possible behavioral scenarios – considerations that are often critical both for understanding situations causally and for deciding about our own courses of action.

Evolution of direct reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot encounters

Are humans too generous? The discovery that subjects choose to incur costs to allocate benefits to others in anonymous, one-shot economic games has posed an unsolved challenge to models of economic and evolutionary rationality. Using agent-based simulations, we show that such generosity is the necessary byproduct of selection on decision systems for regulating dyadic reciprocity under conditions of uncertainty. In deciding whether to engage in dyadic reciprocity, these systems must balance (i) the costs of mistaking a one-shot interaction for a repeated interaction (hence, risking a single chance of being exploited) with (ii) the far greater costs of mistaking a repeated interaction for a one-shot interaction (thereby precluding benefits from multiple future cooperative interactions). This asymmetry builds organisms naturally selected to cooperate even when exposed to cues that they are in one-shot interactions.

Impaired conditional reasoning in alcoholics: a negative impact on social interactions and risky behaviors?

AIMS

To study the 'social brain' in alcoholics by investigating social contract reasoning, theory of mind and emotional intelligence.

DESIGN

A behavioral study comparing recently detoxified alcoholics with normal, healthy controls.

SETTING

Emotional intelligence and decoding of emotional non-verbal cues have been shown to be impaired in alcoholics. This study explores whether these deficits extend to conditional reasoning about social contracts.

PARTICIPANTS

Twenty-five recently detoxified alcoholics (17 men and eight women) were compared with 25 normal controls (17 men and eight women) matched for sex, age and education level.

MEASUREMENTS

Wason selection task investigating conditional reasoning on three different rule types (social contract, precautionary and descriptive), revised Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (modified version) and additional control measures.

FINDINGS

Conditional reasoning was impaired in alcoholics. Performance on descriptive rules was not above chance. Reasoning performance was markedly better on social contract and precautionary rules, but this performance was still significantly lower than in controls. Several emotional intelligence measures were lower in alcoholics compared to controls, but these were not correlated with reasoning performance.

CONCLUSIONS

Conditional reasoning, including reasoning about social contracts and emotional intelligence appear to be impaired in alcoholics. Impairment seems to be particularly severe on descriptive rules. Impairment in social contract reasoning might lead to misunderstandings and frustration in social interactions, and reasoning difficulties about precautionary rules might contribute to risky behaviors in this population.

Hemispheric Asymmetries during Processing of Immoral Stimuli

Evolutionary approaches to dissecting our psychological architecture underscore the importance of both function and structure. Here we focus on both the function and structure of our neural circuitry and report a functional bilateral asymmetry associated with the processing of immoral stimuli. Many processes in the human brain are associated with functional specialization unique to one hemisphere. With respect to emotions, most research points to right-hemispheric lateralization. Here we provide evidence that not all emotional stimuli share right-hemispheric lateralization. Across three studies employing different paradigms, the processing of negative morally laden stimuli was found to be highly left-lateralized. Regions of engagement common to the three studies include the left medial prefrontal cortex, left temporoparietal junction, and left posterior cingulate. These data support the hypothesis that processing of immoral stimuli preferentially engages left hemispheric processes and sheds light on our evolved neural architecture.

There is more than the amygdala: potential threat assessment in the cingulate cortex

Fear conditioning with its neurological basis in the amygdala and associated structures provides an important model of anxiety disorders. However, this review will argue for a distinction between fear-provoking immediate and anxiety-provoking potential threats, with the amygdala processing immediate threats and the cingulate cortex (and insular) processing potential threats. Four independent but related literatures are reviewed to bolster this argument: (1) rodent remote contextual fear conditioning, (2) symptom provocation in obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), (3) fMRI investigations of risk assessment, and (4) behavioural and neurological studies of precautionary reasoning. These four literatures converge in suggesting that the cingulate cortex (and in more specific instances the insula) underlie potential threat assessment, providing support for a number of recent models posting the existence of a separate potential threat system that is dysfunctional in obsessive compulsive disorder (e.g., Szechtman and Woody, 2004; Woody and Szechtman, 2011).

Psychopaths are impaired in social exchange and precautionary reasoning

Psychopaths show a profound lack of morality and behavioral controls in the presence of intact general intellectual functioning. Two hallmarks of psychopathy are the persistent violation of social contracts (i.e., cheating) and chronic, impulsive risky behavior. These behaviors present a puzzle: Can psychopaths understand and reason about what counts as cheating or risky behavior in a particular situation? We tested incarcerated psychopaths' and incarcerated nonpsychopaths' reasoning about social contract rules, precautionary rules, and descriptive rules using the Wason selection task. Results were consistent with our hypotheses: Psychopaths (compared with matched nonpsychopaths) showed significant impairment on social contract rules and precautionary rules, but not on descriptive rules. These results cannot be accounted for by differences in intelligence, motivation, or general antisocial tendency. These findings suggest that examination of evolutionarily identified reasoning processes can be a fruitful research approach for identifying which specific mechanisms are impaired in psychopathy.

Exploitation in older adults: personal competence correlates of social vulnerability

Clinical assessment of older people at heightened risk of financial exploitation (also termed social vulnerability) is a difficult task. There are a number of previously untested domains of personal competence which could influence social vulnerability in later life. In this study, intellectual, cognitive, and social-cognitive functioning was assessed in a combined sample of dementia patients (n=31) and neurologically healthy individuals (n=68) aged 50 years or over. Informants provided assessments of participants' social functioning, personality, and social vulnerability. In the combined sample, multiple regression analyses revealed significant relationships between each personal competence domain and (lower) social vulnerability, apart from personality which was non-significant. General cognitive functioning and, in particular, executive functioning showed significant overlap with social vulnerability after controlling for memory and age. Social measures were also important correlates of vulnerability, indicating that both neurocognitive and social cognitive deficits may contribute to financial exploitation in later life.

Regional gray matter density associated with emotional intelligence: evidence from voxel-based morphometry

Emotional Intelligence (EI) is the ability to monitor one's own and others' emotions and the ability to use the gathered information to guide one's thinking and action. EI is thought to be important for social life making it a popular subject of research. However, despite the existence of previous functional imaging studies on EI, the relationship between regional gray matter morphology and EI has never been investigated. We used voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and a questionnaire (Emotional Intelligence Scale) to measure EI to identify the gray matter correlates of each factor of individual EI (Intrapersonal factor, Interpersonal factor, Situation Management factor). We found significant negative relationships between the Intrapersonal factor and regional gray matter density (rGMD) (1-a) in an anatomical cluster that included the right anterior insula, (1-b) in the right cerebellum, (1-c) in an anatomical cluster that extends from the cuneus to the precuneus, (1-d) and in an anatomical cluster that extends from the medial prefrontal cortex to the left lateral fronto-polar cortex. We also found significant positive correlations between the Interpersonal factor and rGMD in the right superior temporal sulcus, and significant negative correlations between the Situation Management factor and rGMD in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest that each factor of EI in healthy young people is related to the specific brain regions known to be involved in the networks of social cognition and self-related recognition, and in the somatic marker circuitry.

An integrative cognitive neuroscience theory of social reasoning and moral judgment

Cognitive neuroscience has made considerable progress in understanding the involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in social cognition and moral judgment. Accumulating evidence suggests that representations within the lateral PFC enable people to orchestrate their thoughts and actions in concert with their intentions to support goal-directed social behavior. Despite the pivotal role of this region in guiding social interactions, remarkably little is known about the functional organization and forms of social knowledge mediated by the lateral PFC. Here, we review recent theoretical developments in evolutionary psychology and emerging evidence from the social and decision neuroscience literatures demonstrating the importance of the lateral PFC for orchestrating behavior on the basis of evolutionarily adaptive social norms for obligatory, prohibited, and permissible courses of action. WIREs Cogn Sci 2011 2 55-67 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.84 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Colloquium paper: adaptive specializations, social exchange, and the evolution of human intelligence

Blank-slate theories of human intelligence propose that reasoning is carried out by general-purpose operations applied uniformly across contents. An evolutionary approach implies a radically different model of human intelligence. The task demands of different adaptive problems select for functionally specialized problem-solving strategies, unleashing massive increases in problem-solving power for ancestrally recurrent adaptive problems. Because exchange can evolve only if cooperators can detect cheaters, we hypothesized that the human mind would be equipped with a neurocognitive system specialized for reasoning about social exchange. Whereas humans perform poorly when asked to detect violations of most conditional rules, we predicted and found a dramatic spike in performance when the rule specifies an exchange and violations correspond to cheating. According to critics, people's uncanny accuracy at detecting violations of social exchange rules does not reflect a cheater detection mechanism, but extends instead to all rules regulating when actions are permitted (deontic conditionals). Here we report experimental tests that falsify these theories by demonstrating that deontic rules as a class do not elicit the search for violations. We show that the cheater detection system functions with pinpoint accuracy, searching for violations of social exchange rules only when these are likely to reveal the presence of someone who intends to cheat. It does not search for violations of social exchange rules when these are accidental, when they do not benefit the violator, or when the situation would make cheating difficult.