Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment

AI contextual information shapes moral and aesthetic judgments of AI-generated visual art

Throughout history, art creation has been regarded as a uniquely human means to express original ideas, emotions, and experiences. However, as Generative Artificial Intelligence reshapes visual, aesthetic, legal, and economic culture, critical questions arise about the moral and aesthetic implications of AI-generated art. Despite the growing use of AI tools in art, the moral impact of AI involvement in the art creation process remains underexplored. Understanding moral judgments of AI-generated art is essential for assessing AI's impact on art and its alignment with ethical norms. Across three pre-registered experiments combining explicit and implicit paradigms with Bayesian modelling, we examined how information about AI systems influences moral and aesthetic judgments and whether human art is implicitly associated with positive attributes compared to AI-generated art. Experiment 1 revealed that factual information about AI backend processes reduced moral acceptability and aesthetic appeal in certain contexts, such as gaining financial incentives and art status. Experiment 2 showed that additional information about AI art's success had no clear impact on moral judgments. Experiment 3 demonstrated that an implicit association task did not reliably link human art with positive attributes and AI art with negative ones. These findings show that factual information about AI systems shapes judgments, while different information doses about AI art's success have limited moral impact. Additionally, implicit associations between human-made and AI-generated art are similar. This work enhances understanding of moral and aesthetic perceptions of AI-generated art, emphasizing the importance of examining human-AI interactions in an arts context, and their current and evolving societal implications.

Moral trade-offs reveal foundational representations that predict unique variance in political attitudes

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains variation in moral judgements on the basis of multiple innate, intuitive foundations and has been subject to criticism over recent years. Prior research has tended to rely on explicit self-report in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). In contrast, we seek to capture intuitive choices between foundations in a novel task - the Moral Foundations Conflict Task (MFCT). Across four studies, responses on this task reflect foundations measured by the MFQ (study 1), are not altered under cognitive load or reduced cognitive control (studies 2a and 2b); and explain unique variance in political orientation and related constructs (study 3). Furthermore, using responses and response times generated on the MFCT, we present a computationally explicit model of foundation-related intuitive judgements and show that these patterns are consistent with the theoretical claims of MFT. These findings show that the MFCT outperforms the MFQ and can contribute to the understanding of moral value conflicts, furthering debate on the nature of moral values.

What Can we Learn About Human Nature from Interacting with Strangers? Relationship Type Determines Behavior in the Dictator Game

Behavioral decision-making research has been exceptionally useful in the quest of the social sciences to understand human nature. A frequent assumption of this research is that using strangers as anonymous interaction partners allows for the clearest demonstration of basic human nature. But a diverse array of literature - from social and clinical psychology to ethology - suggests that a stranger is far from a "baseline partner." We argue against the overreliance on strangers in economic games and that instead of one baseline partner, typical relationships should fall into basic types of partners, all eliciting different behaviors. Two high-powered experiments (Ns = 848 and 2400) in which participants played a hypothetical dictator game with one of sixteen partners (e.g., mother, friend, stranger) found particular clusters of interaction partners in which the possible partners were grouped into different and intuitively meaningful relationship types (i.e., loved ones, intimate partners, companions, contractual partners, infrahumanized others). The clusters suggest a typology of basic human relationships and predict behavior even when controlling for relationship distance. The findings help to calibrate the outcomes of past dictator games utilizing strangers and offer an interpretative context with a system of relationship types.

The effect of relational status on perceptions of gay disparaging humor

A lot of popular comedians are known for their transgressive humor towards social groups, but disparagement humor is not just restricted to stages or media performances. We encounter it everywhere or perhaps use it ourselves. In this paper, we were interested in how people react to disparaging jokes (i.e., homophobic jokes) across different relational settings. Adapting Fiske’s relational models theory, we examined how status differences in relationships affect the perception of and cognition about socially disparaging jokes. In Study 1 (N = 77), we piloted seven potentially disparaging jokes about gay men in relation to how they are perceived. In Study 2 (N = 288), using one joke from Study 1, we constructed vignettes manipulating the sexual orientation of the source of the joke in the dyad (i.e., heterosexual, gay, both heterosexual) and their status differences across relational models (i.e., high, equal, and low status). We found that the joke was perceived to be less funny, more offensive, and more morally wrong, and to contain more harm intent if it came from a heterosexual person rather than a gay person. Study 3 (N = 197) used concrete status differences in relationships in terms of existing intergroup dimensions. Results showed that the joke was perceived as more offensive, less acceptable and more morally wrong when it came from a high authority source (e.g., professor rather than a student). Overall, these findings bring the first evidence to link disparagement humor with relational models and show the importance status differences in the perception of disparagement humor.

Cognitive processes in imaginative moral shifts: How judgments of morally unacceptable actions change

How do people come to consider a morally unacceptable action, such as “a passenger in an airplane does not want to sit next to a Muslim passenger and so he tells the stewardess the passenger must be moved to another seat”, to be less unacceptable? We propose they tend to imagine counterfactual alternatives about how things could have been different that transform the unacceptable action to be less unacceptable. Five experiments identify the cognitive processes underlying this imaginative moral shift: an action is judged less unacceptable when people imagine circumstances in which it would have been moral. The effect occurs for immediate counterfactuals and reflective ones, but is greater when participants create an immediate counterfactual first, and diminished when they create a reflective one first. The effect also occurs for unreasonable actions. We discuss the implications for alternative theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes underlying moral judgments.

Being on the same page about social rules and norms: Effects of shared relational models on cooperation in work teams

In working teams, each member has an individual understanding of the social rules and norms that underlie social relationships in the team, as well as about what behavior is appropriate and what behavior can be expected from others. What happens if the members of a team are not “on the same page” with respect to these social rules and norms? Drawing on relational models theory, which posits four elemental relational models that people use to coordinate their social interactions, we examined the effects of a common understanding of relational models in teams (i.e., “shared relational models”) on various aspects of cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. We hypothesized that a shared understanding of relational models in a team is positively related to justice perception and negatively related to relationship conflict, which are in turn related to helping behavior and knowledge hiding. We conducted a field study, collecting data from 46 work teams ( N = 189 total participants) in various organizations, and found support for all proposed hypotheses. Our findings emphasize the importance of a shared understanding of relational models for (un)cooperative behavior in teams, thereby opening a new door for research on relational models in organizations.

How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

Judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and the nature of their relationship. But how, when, and why social relationships shape moral judgments is not well understood. We provide evidence to address these questions, measuring cooperative expectations and moral wrongness judgments in the context of common social relationships such as romantic partners, housemates, and siblings. In a pre-registered study of 423 U.S. participants nationally representative for age, race, and gender, we show that people normatively expect different relationships to serve cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, reciprocity, and mating to varying degrees. In a second pre-registered study of 1,320 U.S. participants, these relationship-specific cooperative expectations (i.e., relational norms) enable highly precise out-of-sample predictions about the perceived moral wrongness of actions in the context of particular relationships. In this work, we show that this 'relational norms' model better predicts patterns of moral wrongness judgments across relationships than alternative models based on genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence, demonstrating how the perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on the relational context in which those actions occur.

How Do Basic Personality Traits Map Onto Moral Judgments of Fairness-Related Actions?

Reliance on fairness norms is a core feature of moral behavior and judgment, and is conceptually and empirically linked with basic personality dimensions. However, the specific nature of these links is poorly understood. In this study ( N = 313, 68% female), we employed a novel third-party judgment paradigm, in which participants made moral judgments of various sharing actions of virtual others. This allowed us to capture individual variation in the relative importance of several fairness norms. We correlated these norm profiles with Big Five personality traits. We observed distinct associations between agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and extraversion and estimates of the importance of generosity, selfishness, relative generosity, and relative selfishness norms. Comparisons of these associations at the domain- versus facet-level of personality traits suggested these relations are specific to domain-level traits. These findings are an important step toward unraveling the complex links between fairness norms and basic personality traits.

Binding moral values gain importance in the presence of close others

A key function of morality is to regulate social behavior. Research suggests moral values may be divided into two types: binding values, which govern behavior in groups, and individualizing values, which promote personal rights and freedoms. Because people tend to mentally activate concepts in situations in which they may prove useful, the importance they afford moral values may vary according to whom they are with in the moment. In particular, because binding values help regulate communal behavior, people may afford these values more importance when in the presence of close (versus distant) others. Five studies test and support this hypothesis. First, we use a custom smartphone application to repeatedly record participants' (n = 1166) current social context and the importance they afforded moral values. Results show people rate moral values as more important when in the presence of close others, and this effect is stronger for binding than individualizing values-an effect that replicates in a large preregistered online sample (n = 2016). A lab study (n = 390) and two preregistered online experiments (n = 580 and n = 752) provide convergent evidence that people afford binding, but not individualizing, values more importance when in the real or imagined presence of close others. Our results suggest people selectively activate different moral values according to the demands of the situation, and show how the mere presence of others can affect moral thinking.

Trolley dilemma in the sky: Context matters when civilians and cadets make remotely piloted aircraft decisions

Crews operating remotely piloted aircrafts (RPAs) in military operations may be among the few that truly experience tragic dilemmas similar to the famous Trolley Problem. In order to analyze decision-making and emotional conflict of RPA operators within Trolley-Problem-like dilemma situations, we created an RPA simulation that varied mission contexts (firefighter, military and surveillance as a control condition) and the social “value” of a potential victim. We found that participants (Air Force cadets and civilian students) were less likely to make the common utilitarian choice (sacrificing one to save five), when the value of the one increased, especially in the military context. However, in the firefighter context, this decision pattern was much less pronounced. The results demonstrate behavioral and justification differences when people are more invested in a particular context despite ostensibly similar dilemmas.

"You're still worth it": The moral and relational context of politically motivated unfriending decisions in online networks

Political disagreements in social media can result in removing (i.e., “unfriending”) a person from one’s online network. Given that such actions could lead to the (ideological) homogenization of networks, it is pivotal to understand the psychological processes intertwined in unfriending decisions. This requires not only addressing different types of disagreements but also analyzing them in the relational context they occur. This article proposes that political disagreements leading to drastic measures such as unfriending are attributable to more deeply rooted moral dissents. Based on moral foundations theory and relationship regulation research, this work presents empirical evidence from two experiments. In both studies, subjects rated political statements (that violated different moral foundations) with regard to perceived reprehensibility and the likelihood of unfriending the source. Study 1 (N = 721) revealed that moral judgments of a political statement are moderately related to the unfriending decision. Study 2 (N = 822) replicated this finding but indicated that unfriending is less likely when the source of the morally reprehensible statement is relationally close to the unfriender and provides emotional support. This research extends unfriending literature by pointing to morality as a new dimension of analysis and offers initial evidence uncovering the psychological trade-off behind the decision of terminating digital ties. Drawing on this, our findings inform research on the homogenization of online networks by indicating that selective avoidance (in the form of politically motivated unfriending) is conditional upon the relational context and the interpersonal benefits individuals receive therein.

Question framing and sensitivity to consequences in sacrificial moral dilemmas

In sacrificial dilemmas, participants judge the morality of killing one person to save several others. For five sacrificial dilemmas, participants rated on separate unidimensional scales how "morally right" and how "morally wrong" they felt such actions would be under six combinations of beneficiaries (strangers, cousins, one's children) and targets (firefighter, bank robber). Framing a survey question in terms of "morally right" potentially primes prescriptive moral norms, directing attention to the beneficiaries; framing it in terms of "morally wrong" potentially primes proscriptive moral norms, directing attention to the targets. Selective attention induced by a question should heighten sensitivity to changes in levels of the corresponding independent variable. Accordingly, ratings of right changed more than ratings of wrong across beneficiaries; ratings of wrong changed more than ratings of right across targets. Question framing can bias moral appraisal by heightening or attenuating attentiveness to individuals who would benefit or suffer from sacrificial action.

Moral judgements of fairness-related actions are flexibly updated to account for contextual information

In everyday life we are constantly updating our moral judgements as we learn new information. However, this judgement updating process has not been systematically studied. We investigated how people update their moral judgements of fairness-related actions of others after receiving contextual information regarding the deservingness of the action recipient. Participants (N = 313) observed a virtual ‘Decision-maker’ share a portion of $10 with a virtual ‘Receiver’. Participants were aware that the Decision-maker made these choices knowing the Receiver’s previous offer to another person. Participants first made a context-absent judgement of the Decision-maker’s offer to the Receiver, and then a subsequent context-present judgement of the same offer after learning the Receiver’s previous offer. This sequence was repeated for varying dollar values of Decision-makers’ and Receivers’ offers. Patterns of judgements varied across individuals and were interpretable in relation to moral norms. Most participants flexibly switched from relying on context-independent norms (generosity, equality) to related, context-dependent norms (relative generosity, indirect reciprocity) as they integrated contextual information. Judgement of low offers varied across individuals, with a substantial minority of participants withholding their context-absent judgements of selfishness, and another minority that was lenient towards selfishness across both judgements. Our paradigm provides a novel framework for investigating how moral judgements evolve in real time as people learn more information about a given situation.

Who are “we” and why are we cooperating? Insights from social psychology

Tomasello argues in the target article that a sense of moral obligation emerges from the creation of a collaborative “we” motivating us to fulfill our cooperative duties. We suggest that “we” takes many forms, entailing different obligations, depending on the type (and underlying functions) of the relationship(s) in question. We sketch a framework of such types, functions, and obligations to guide future research in our commentary.

The Importance of Context in Moral Judgments

There is a gap between morality as experienced and morality as studied. In our personal and professional lives, moral judgments are embedded within a specific context. We know the who, what, where, and when and often can infer the why; we know the broader context of actions; and we may have a specific relationship with the actors. However, scholarly theorizing is often built on inferences from participants’ responses to decontextualized, impoverished stimuli. In our quest for uncovering general psychological truths, moral psychologists have examined evaluations of poorly guarded trolleys, strangers with odd sexual proclivities, and endorsement of abstract principles. The four articles included in this section demonstrate the power of contextualizing morality. In the current article, I place these papers within a broader framework for how scholars can contextualize morality research. I then argue why contextualizing morality matters: not only do contextualized questions better reflect the nuances of reality but also contextualized judgments might be key for improving predictions of moral behavior and understanding moral change.

The Morality of War: A Review and Research Agenda

What is judged as morally right and wrong in war? I argue that despite many decades of research on moral psychology and the psychology of intergroup conflict, social psychology does not yet have a good answer to this question. However, it is a question of great importance because its answer has implications for decision-making in war, public policy, and international law. I therefore suggest a new way for psychology researchers to study the morality of war that combines the strengths of philosophical just-war theory with experimental techniques and theories developed for the psychological study of morality more generally. This novel approach has already begun to elucidate the moral judgments third-party observers make in war, and I demonstrate that these early findings have important implications for moral psychology, just-war theory, and the understanding of the morality of war.

Twentieth century morality: The rise and fall of moral concepts from 1900 to 2007

Trends in the cultural salience of morality across the 20^th century in the Anglophone world, as reflected in changing use of moral language, were explored using the Google Books (English language) database. Relative frequencies of 304 moral terms, organized into six validated sets corresponding to general morality and the five moral domains proposed by moral foundations theory, were charted for the years 1900 to 2007. Each moral language set displayed unique, often nonlinear historical trajectories. Words conveying general morality (e.g., good, bad, moral, evil), and those representing Purity-based morality, implicating sanctity and contagion, declined steeply in frequency from 1900 to around 1980, when they rebounded sharply. Ingroup-based morality, emphasizing group loyalty, rose steadily over the 20^th century. Harm-based morality, focused on suffering and care, rose sharply after 1980. Authority-based morality, which emphasizes respect for hierarchy and tradition, rose to a peak around the social convulsions of the late 1960s. There were no consistent tendencies for moral language to become more individualist or less grounded in concern for social order and cohesion. These differing time series suggest that the changing moral landscape of the 20^th century can be divided into five distinct periods and illuminate the re-moralization and moral polarization of the last three decades.

The principle of discrimination: Investigating perceptions of soldiers

The principle of discrimination states that soldiers are legitimate targets of violence in war, whereas civilians are not. Is this prescriptive rule reflected in the descriptive judgments of laypeople? In two studies ( Ns = 300, 229), U.S. Mechanical Turk workers were asked to evaluate the character traits of either a soldier or a civilian. Participants also made moral judgments about scenarios in which the target individual (soldier or civilian) killed or was killed by the enemy in war. Soldiers were consistently viewed as more dangerous and more courageous than civilians (Study 1). Participants also viewed killing by (and of) soldiers as more permissible than killing by (and of) civilians, in line with the principle of discrimination (Study 1). Altering the war context to involve a clearly just and unjust side (in Study 2) did not appear to moderate the principle of discrimination in moral judgment, although soldiers and civilians on the just side were evaluated more positively overall. However, the soldiers on the unjust side of the war were not attributed greater courage than were civilians on the unjust side. Theoretical and practical implications of these descriptive findings are discussed.

The Socio-Moral Image Database (SMID): A novel stimulus set for the study of social, moral and affective processes

A major obstacle for the design of rigorous, reproducible studies in moral psychology is the lack of suitable stimulus sets. Here, we present the Socio-Moral Image Database (SMID), the largest standardized moral stimulus set assembled to date, containing 2,941 freely available photographic images, representing a wide range of morally (and affectively) positive, negative and neutral content. The SMID was validated with over 820,525 individual judgments from 2,716 participants, with normative ratings currently available for all images on affective valence and arousal, moral wrongness, and relevance to each of the five moral values posited by Moral Foundations Theory. We present a thorough analysis of the SMID regarding (1) inter-rater consensus, (2) rating precision, and (3) breadth and variability of moral content. Additionally, we provide recommendations for use aimed at efficient study design and reproducibility, and outline planned extensions to the database. We anticipate that the SMID will serve as a useful resource for psychological, neuroscientific and computational (e.g., natural language processing or computer vision) investigations of social, moral and affective processes. The SMID images, along with associated normative data and additional resources are available at https://osf.io/2rqad/.