Human preferences are biased towards associative information

Resource-rational account of sequential effects in human prediction

An abundant literature reports on 'sequential effects' observed when humans make predictions on the basis of stochastic sequences of stimuli. Such sequential effects represent departures from an optimal, Bayesian process. A prominent explanation posits that humans are adapted to changing environments, and erroneously assume non-stationarity of the environment, even if the latter is static. As a result, their predictions fluctuate over time. We propose a different explanation in which sub-optimal and fluctuating predictions result from cognitive constraints (or costs), under which humans however behave rationally. We devise a framework of costly inference, in which we develop two classes of models that differ by the nature of the constraints at play: in one case the precision of beliefs comes at a cost, resulting in an exponential forgetting of past observations, while in the other beliefs with high predictive power are favored. To compare model predictions to human behavior, we carry out a prediction task that uses binary random stimuli, with probabilities ranging from 0.05 to 0.95. Although in this task the environment is static and the Bayesian belief converges, subjects' predictions fluctuate and are biased toward the recent stimulus history. Both classes of models capture this 'attractive effect', but they depart in their characterization of higher-order effects. Only the precision-cost model reproduces a 'repulsive effect', observed in the data, in which predictions are biased away from stimuli presented in more distant trials. Our experimental results reveal systematic modulations in sequential effects, which our theoretical approach accounts for in terms of rationality under cognitive constraints.

Stress effects on memory retrieval of aversive and appetitive instrumental counterconditioning in men

Extinction training creates a second inhibitory memory trace and effectively reduces conditioned responding. However, acute stress inhibits the retrieval of this extinction memory trace. It is not known whether this also applies to other forms of associative learning such as instrumental counterconditioning, where previously learned associations are reversed and paired with the opposite valence. Therefore, the current preregistered study investigates whether stress decreases the retrieval of instrumental counterconditioning memories with aversive and appetitive consequences. Fifty-two healthy men were randomly assigned to either a stress or control group and took part in a two-day instrumental learning paradigm. During a first phase, participants learned that pressing specific buttons in response to the presentation of four neutral stimuli either leads to gaining or losing money. During a second phase, two stimuli reversed their contingencies (counterconditioning). One day later, participants were exposed to acute stress or a control condition prior to the same task, which no longer included feedback about gains or losses. Stressed participants showed more approach behavior towards appetitive and less avoidance behavior towards aversive stimuli as compared to non-stressed participants. Our findings indicate that stress effects on memory retrieval differ depending on the associative learning approach in men. These differences might be related to stress effects on decision making and different motivational systems involved.

Autism-friendly public bus transport: A personal experience–based perspective

Community participation and the formation of social networks are crucial for a qualitative life. To this end, transportation plays an essential role. Many autistic people rely on public transportation for their mobility needs. However, research shows that it is not always easy for them to use it. The issues they face when using public bus transport have not yet been thoroughly studied. The current case study in Flanders aimed to give autistic people the opportunity to express the issues they face while using public bus transportation. A qualitative hermeneutic phenomenological study was carried out. Semistructured interviews were conducted with 17 autistic individuals. The interviews were analyzed based on the interpretative phenomenological analysis method. Three main themes emerged: creating predictability, limiting stimuli, and open and accessible communication. In addition, various coping strategies were described, such as the use of noise-canceling headphones. The results of this study may lead to a more autism-friendly public transportation environment.

Lay Abstract

Transportation plays an essential role in daily life, allowing people to participate in the community and form social relationships. Many autistic people rely on public transportation to meet their mobility needs. However, research shows that it is not always easy for them to use it. The exact issues autistic individuals face when traveling with public transportation and how public transportation can be made more autism-friendly have yet to be researched. The current study allowed autistic individuals to express themselves regarding issues they face while traveling by public bus transportation, to raise awareness for making public transportation more autism-friendly. We interviewed 17 autistic individuals about their experiences riding the bus. Three main themes emerged from the results: creating predictability, limiting stimuli, and open and accessible communication. If transport companies take initiatives related to these themes, autistic people traveling by bus can have a more pleasant experience. Participants also described coping strategies for stressful or uncomfortable situations while using public bus transportation, such as using noise-cancelling headphones or digital applications for real-time route tracking, etc. These findings may lead to a more autism-friendly public transportation.

A link between age, affect, and predictions?

The prevalence of depressive symptoms decreases from late adolescence to middle age adulthood. Furthermore, despite significant losses in motor and cognitive functioning, overall emotional well-being tends to increase with age, and a bias to positive information has been observed multiple times. Several causes have been discussed for this age-related development, such as improvement in emotion regulation, less regret, and higher socioeconomic status. Here, we explore a further explanation. Our minds host mental models that generate predictions about forthcoming events to successfully interact with our physical and social environment. To keep these models faithful, the difference between the predicted and the actual event, that is, the prediction error, is computed. We argue that prediction errors are attenuated in the middle age and older mind, which, in turn, may translate to less negative affect, lower susceptibility to affective disorders, and possibly, to a bias to positive information. Our proposal is primarily linked to perceptual inferences, but may hold as well for higher-level, cognitive, and emotional forms of error processing.

The Price of Predictability: Estimating Inconsistency Premiums in Social Interactions

For financial decision-making, people trade off the expected value (return) and the variance (risk) of an option, preferring higher returns to lower ones and lower risks to higher ones. To make decision-makers indifferent between a risky and risk-free option, the expected value of the risky option must exceed the value of the risk-free option by a certain amount-the risk premium. Previous psychological research suggests that similar to risk aversion, people dislike inconsistency in an interaction partner's behavior. In eight experiments (total N = 2,412) we pitted this inconsistency aversion against the expected returns from interacting with an inconsistent partner. We identified the additional expected return of interacting with an inconsistent partner that must be granted to make decision-makers prefer a more profitable, but inconsistent partner to a consistent, but less profitable one. We locate this inconsistency premium at around 31% of the expected value of the risk-free option.

The Relation Between Preference for Predictability and Autistic Traits

A common idea about individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is that they have an above-average preference for predictability and sameness. However, surprisingly little research has gone toward this core symptom, and some studies suggest the preference for predictability in ASD might be less general than commonly assumed. Here, we investigated this important symptom of ASD using three different paradigms, which allowed us to measure preference for predictability under well-controlled experimental conditions. Specifically, we used a dimensional approach by investigating correlations between autistic traits (as measured with the Autism-Spectrum Quotient and Social Responsiveness Scale in a neurotypical population) and the scores on three different tasks. The "music preference" task assessed preferences for tone sequences that varied in predictability. The "perceptual fluency" task required participants to evaluate stimuli that were preceded by a similar versus dissimilar subliminally presented prime. The "gambling" task presented four decks of cards that had equal outcome probabilities but varied in predictability. We observed positive correlations between autistic traits and a preference for predictability in both the music preference and perceptual fluency task. We did not find our hypothesized correlation with gambling behavior but did observe a post hoc correlation showing that participants with more autistic traits were faster to choose the predictable deck. Together, these findings show that a relation between autistic traits and preference for predictability can be observed in a standardized lab environment, and should be considered an important first step toward a better, more mechanistic understanding of insistence on sameness in ASD. Autism Res 2020, 13: 1144-1154. © 2019 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: A core symptom of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a strong preference for predictability, but little research has gone toward it. We show that neurotypical adults with more autistic traits have stronger preferences for predictable tunes, evaluate images that can be predicted as more beautiful, and are faster in choosing a gambling option resulting in predictable reward. These results offer the first important evidence that insistence on sameness in ASD can be studied in controlled lab settings.

The sound of beauty: How complexity determines aesthetic preference

Stimulus complexity is an important determinant of aesthetic preference. An influential idea is that increases in stimulus complexity lead to increased preference up to an optimal point after which preference decreases (inverted-U pattern). However, whereas some studies indeed observed this pattern, most studies instead showed an increased preference for more complexity. One complicating issue is that it remains unclear how to define complexity. To address this, we approached complexity and its relation to aesthetic preference from a predictive coding perspective. Here, low- and high-complexity stimuli would correspond to low and high levels of prediction errors, respectively. We expected participants to prefer stimuli which are neither too easy to predict (low prediction error), nor too difficult (high prediction error). To test this, we presented two sequences of tones on each trial that varied in predictability from highly regular (low prediction error) to completely random (high prediction error), and participants had to indicate which of the two sequences they preferred in a two-interval forced-choice task. The complexity of each tone sequence (amount of prediction error) was estimated using entropy. Results showed that participants tended to choose stimuli with intermediate complexity over those of high or low complexity. This confirms the century-old idea that stimulus complexity has an inverted-U relationship to aesthetic preference.

Conflict modification: predictable production of congruent situations facilitates responding in a stroop task

Humans cope with cognitive conflict in various ways, such as focusing on task-relevant instead of task-irrelevant information or avoiding situations where conflict is likely. These adaptations to conflict resemble those used to cope with negative affect. We examined whether situation modification, a strategy derived from the extended process model of emotion regulation, may influence responding in cognitive conflict tasks. This should be evident by a facilitation of actions that consistently modify situations towards congruent (positive) situations rather than to incongruent (negative) situations. In four experiments, participants modified stimuli in a color-word Stroop task towards congruent or incongruent stimuli of (un)predictable identity. A modification effect emerged insofar as participants were faster when they foreseeably produced congruent stimuli of predictable identity than when they produced incongruent stimuli or stimuli of unpredictable identity. Our results add to the body of evidence connecting affect and cognitive conflict, and reveal a constraint when using situation modification as a means to regulate cognitive conflict.

Instructed fear stimuli bias visual attention

We investigated whether stimuli merely instructed to be fear-relevant can bias visual attention, even when the fear relation was never experienced before. Participants performed a dot-probe task with pictures of naturally fear-relevant (snake or spider) or -irrelevant (bird or butterfly) stimuli. Instructions indicated that two pictures (one naturally fear-relevant and one fear-irrelevant) could be followed by an electrical stimulation (i.e., instructed fear). In reality, no stimulation was administered. During the task, two pictures were presented on each side of the screen, after which participants had to determine as fast as possible on which side a black dot appeared. After a first phase, fear was reinstated by instructing participants that the device was not connected but now was (reinstatement phase). Participants were faster when the dot appeared on a location where an instructed fear picture was presented. This effect seemed independent of whether picture content was naturally fear-relevant, but was only found in the first half of each phase, suggesting rapid extinction due to the absence of stimulation, and rapid re-evaluation after reinstatement. A second experiment similarly showed that instructed fear biases attention, even when participants were explicitly instructed that no stimulation would be given during the dot-probe task. Together, these findings demonstrate that attention can be biased towards instructed fear stimuli, even when these fear relations were never experienced. Future studies should test whether this is specific to fear, or can be observed for all instructions that change the relevance of a given stimulus.

Pleasures of the Mind: What Makes Jokes and Insight Problems Enjoyable

In this paper, a parallel analysis of the enjoyment derived from humor and insight problem solving is presented with reference to a “general” Theory of the Pleasures of the Mind (TPM) (Kubovy, 1999) rather than to “local” theories regarding what makes humor and insight problem solving enjoyable. The similarity of these two cognitive activities has already been discussed in previous literature in terms of the cognitive mechanisms which underpin getting a joke or having an insight experience in a problem solving task. The paper explores whether we can learn something new about the similarities and differences between humor and problem solving by means of an investigation of what makes them pleasurable. In the first part of the paper, the framework for this joint analysis is set. Two descriptive studies are then presented in which the participants were asked to report on their experiences relating to solving visuo-spatial insight problems (Study 1) or understanding cartoons (Study 2) in terms of whether they were enjoyable or otherwise. In both studies, the responses were analyzed with reference to a set of categories inspired by the TPM. The results of Study 1 demonstrate that finding the solution to a problem is associated with a positive evaluation, and the most frequent explanations for this were reported as being Curiosity, Virtuosity and Violation of expectations. The results of Study 2 suggest that understanding a joke (Joy of verification) and being surprised by it (Feeling of surprise) were two essential conditions: when they were not present, the cartoons were perceived as not enjoyable. However, this was not enough to explain the motivations for the choice of the most enjoyable cartoons. Recognizing a Violation of expectations and experiencing a Diminishment in the cleverness or awareness initially attributed to the characters in the cartoon were the aspects which were most frequently indicated by the participants to explain why they enjoyed the joke. These findings are evaluated in the final discussion, together with their limitations and potential future developments.

Humans show a higher preference for stimuli that are predictive relative to those that are predictable

Recent studies suggest that humans prefer information that is linked to the process of prediction. Yet it remains to be specified whether preference judgments are biased to information that can be predicted, or information that enables to predict. We here use a serial reaction time task to disentangle these two options. In a first learning phase, participants were exposed to a continuous stream of arbitrary shapes while performing a go/no-go task. Embedded in this stream were hidden pairs of go-stimuli (e.g., shape A was always followed by shape B). Data show faster reaction times to predictable shapes (i.e., shape B) as compared to random and predictive shapes (i.e., shape A), indicating that participants learned the regularities and anticipated upcoming information. Importantly, in a subsequent, unannounced forced-choice preference task, the shapes that were predictive of others were significantly more preferred over random shapes than shapes that could be predicted. Because both the reaction time benefit in the learning phase and the effect in the preference phase could be considered rather small, we studied the relation between both. Interestingly, the preference correlated with the reaction time benefit from the learning phase. A closer look at this correlation further suggested that the difference in preference was only observed when participants picked up the contingencies between predictive and predictable shapes. This study adds evidence to the idea that prediction processes are not only fundamental for cognition, but contribute to the way we evaluate our external world.

Disadvantageous associations: Reversible spatial cueing effects in a discrimination task

Current theories describe learning in terms of cognitive or associative mechanisms. To assess whether cognitive mechanisms interact with automaticity of associative processes we devised a shape-discrimination task in which participants received both explicit instructions and implicit information. Instructions further allowed for the inference that a first event would precede the target. Albeit irrelevant to respond, this event acted as response prime and implicit spatial cue (i.e. it predicted target location). To modulate cognitive involvement, in three experiments we manipulated modality and salience of the spatial cue. Results always showed evidence for a priming effect, confirming that the first stimulus was never ignored. More importantly, although participants failed to consciously recognize the association, responses to spatially cued trials became either slower or faster depending on salience of the first event. These findings provide an empirical demonstration that cognitive and associative learning mechanisms functionally co-exist and interact to regulate behaviour.