Emotion and conflict adaptation: the role of phasic arousal and self-relevance

Phasic affective signals by themselves do not regulate cognitive control

Cognitive control is a set of mechanisms that help us process conflicting stimuli and maintain goal-relevant behaviour. According to the Affective Signalling Hypothesis, conflicting stimuli are aversive and thus elicit (negative) affect, moreover - to avoid aversive signals - affective and cognitive systems work together by increasing control and thus, drive conflict adaptation. Several studies have found that affective stimuli can indeed modulate conflict adaptation, however, there is currently no evidence that phasic affective states not triggered by conflict also trigger improved cognitive control. To investigate this possibility, we intermixed trials of a conflict task and trials involving the passive viewing of emotional words. We tested whether affective states induced by affective words in a given trial trigger improved cognitive control in a subsequent conflict trial. Applying Bayesian analysis, the results of four experiments supported the lack of adaptation to aversive signals, both in terms of valence and arousal. These results suggest that phasic affective states by themselves are not sufficient to elicit an increase in control.

The role of arousal and motivation in emotional conflict resolution: Implications for spinal cord injury

Under many conditions, emotional information is processed with priority and it may lead to cognitive conflict when it competes with task-relevant information. Accordingly, being able to ignore emotional information relies on cognitive control. The present perspective offers an integrative account of the mechanism that may underlie emotional conflict resolution in tasks involving response activation. We point to the contribution of emotional arousal and primed approach or avoidance motivation in accounting for emotional conflict resolution. We discuss the role of arousal in individuals with impairments in visceral pathways to the brain due to spinal cord lesions, as it may offer important insights into the “typical” mechanisms of emotional conflict control. We argue that a better understanding of emotional conflict control could be critical for adaptive and flexible behavior and has potential implications for the selection of appropriate therapeutic interventions.

Visible skin disease symptoms of another person reduce automatic imitation of their hand movements

Imitation is an important mechanism for social interaction and learning, and humans tend to imitate others automatically. While imitating others is often useful, it can backfire when imitation is incongruent with one's goals. For example, in forced-choice reaction time tasks, this tendency results in a reliable slowing of reactions if the observed and self-initiated actions are incompatible (compatibility effect). While imitation is commonly explained as a social phenomenon, previous results on the compatibility effect's dependence on social cues are inconsistent. However, in many previous studies, the associated social cues were easy to ignore by the participants. To make the social modifier more salient, the current study manipulated emotionally relevant aspects of the model hand itself in an imitation inhibition task by using models displaying skin disease symptoms which we expected to elicit (1) perceptions of dissimilarity and (2) disgust in participants. As predicted, participants' (n = 63) reaction times were influenced more by the incompatible actions of the symptom-free than the symptomatic model hand. However, both levels of self-reported disgust toward and self-other overlap with symptomatic hands were low and did not account for the observed effect on automatic imitation. Our findings show that automatic imitation depends on social factors if these are an integral part of the model and processed quickly, presumably due to their affective salience or the salience of the self-other distinction. Whether this effect is driven by emotional reactions to the model remains an open question.

Reward Modulates Unconsciously Triggered Adaptive Control Processes

Adaptive control (e.g., conflict adaptation) refers to dynamic adjustments of cognitive control processes in goal-directed behavior, which can be influenced by incentive rewards. Recently, accumulating evidence has shown that adaptive control processes can operate in the absence of conscious awareness, raising the question as to whether reward can affect unconsciously triggered adaptive control processes. Two experiments were conducted to address the question. In Experiment 1, participants performed a masked flanker-like priming task manipulated with high- and low-value performance-contingent rewards presented at the block level. In this experiment conflict awareness was manipulated by masking the conflict-inducing stimulus, and high- or low-value rewards were presented at the beginning of each block, and participants earned the reward contingent upon their responses in each trial. We observed a great conflict adaptation for high-value rewards in both conscious and unconscious conflict tasks, indicating reward-induced enhancements of consciously and unconsciously triggered adaptive control processes. Crucially, this effect still existed when controlling the stimulus-response repetitions in a rewarded masked Stroop-like priming task in Experiment 2. The results endorse the proposition that reward modulates unconsciously triggered adaptive control to conflict, suggesting that individuals may enable rewarding stimuli to dynamically regulate concurrent control processes based on previous conflict experience, regardless of whether the previous conflict was experienced consciously.

Self-related objects increase alertness and orient attention through top-down saliency

Attention is influenced by information about relationships between ourselves and the objects around us. Self-related objects can either facilitate or disrupt task performance, creating a challenge for identifying the precise nature of the influence of self-relatedness on attention. To address this challenge, we measured different components of attention (alertness and orienting) in the presence of self-related objects using a revised attention network task (ANT). In a self-association task, participants first learned colour-person associations and then carried out a colour-person matching task. This was followed by the ANT, in which these coloured boxes associated with self or friend were displayed as peripheral cues; participants had to judge the direction of an arrow flanked by congruent (low-conflict) or incongruent (high-conflict) distractors presented within one coloured box. The results showed faster and more accurate responses to targets appearing within the self-colour than friend-colour cues in the association task. In the ANT, the analysis of alertness revealed that self-related cues facilitated task performance compared with friend-related cues. The analysis of orienting demonstrated that relative to friend cues, self-cues hampered task performance in invalid trials. Critically, the effects of self-cues on both orienting and alertness were observed only in high conflict situations. These results indicated that self-related objects are powerful cues that enhance attention intensity, which either facilitates task performance when the upcoming target falls within their location or disrupts performance when the target falls outside their location. The data suggest that attentional functions can be tuned by self-saliency in high-demand contexts.

Emotional salience but not valence impacts anterior cingulate cortex conflict processing

Stimuli that evoke emotions are salient, draw attentional resources, and facilitate situationally appropriate behavior in complex or conflicting environments. However, negative and positive emotions may motivate different response strategies. For example, a threatening stimulus might evoke avoidant behavior, whereas a positive stimulus may prompt approaching behavior. Therefore, emotional stimuli might either elicit differential behavioral responses when a conflict arises or simply mark salience. The present study used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate valence-specific emotion effects on attentional control in conflict processing by employing an adapted flanker task with neutral, negative, and positive stimuli. Slower responses were observed for incongruent than congruent trials. Neural activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex was associated with conflict processing regardless of emotional stimulus quality. These findings confirm that both negative and positive emotional stimuli mark salience in both low (congruent) and high (incongruent) conflict scenarios. Regardless of the conflict level, emotional stimuli deployed greater attentional resources in goal directed behavior.

Electrophysiological correlates of interference control in the modified emotional Stroop task with emotional stimuli differing in valence, arousal, and subjective significance

The role of emotional factors in maintaining cognitive control is one of the most intriguing issues in understanding emotion-cognition interactions. In the current experiment, we assessed the role of emotional factors (valence, arousal, and subjective significance) in perceptual and conceptual inhibition processes. We operationalised both processes with the classical cognitive paradigms, i.e., the flanker task and the emotional Stroop task merged into a single experimental procedure. The procedure was based on the presentation of emotional words displayed in four different font colours flanked by the same emotional word printed with the same or different font colour. We expected to find distinct effects of both types of interference: earlier for perceptual and later for emotional interference. We also predicted an increased arousal level to disturb inhibitory control effectiveness, while increasing the subjective significance level should improve this process. As we used orthogonal manipulations of emotional factors, our study allowed us for the first time to assess interactions within emotional factors and between types of interference. We found on the behavioural level the main effects of flanker congruency as well as effects of emotionality. On the electrophysiological level, we found effects for EPN, P2, and N450 components of ERPs. The exploratory analysis revealed that effects due to perceptual interference appeared earlier than the effects of emotional interference, but they lasted for an extended period of processing, causing perceptual and emotional interference to partially overlap. Finally, in terms of emotional interference, we showed the effect of subjective significance: the reduction of interference cost in N450 for highly subjective significant stimuli. This study is the first one allowing for the investigation of two different types of interference in a single experiment, and provides insight into the role of emotion in cognitive control.

Happy is easy: the influence of affective states on cognitive control and metacognitive reports

In many situations, engaging cognitive control is required to override automatic responses and to behave in an adaptive manner. However, cognitive control is also effortful and costly which makes it aversive. A fundamental question is how individuals decide to engage or not in cognitive control based on the costs of this effort and the motivation to achieve the goals. In the present study, we explored the hypothesis that affective states can influence this decision by changing participants' subjective experiences during the task. Participants performed a conflict task (arrow priming) and judged their feeling of difficulty after each trial. Affective states were induced by presenting emotional faces (happy, fearful or neutral) at the beginning of each trial. We found that participants subjectively judged happy trials as easier even though they objectively made more errors in this condition. Follow-up analyses revealed that participants engaged less cognitive control with happy than with neutral or fearful faces. We conclude that affective states influence the recruitment of cognitive control and associated metacognitive experiences.