The perils of losing control: Why self-control is not just another value-based decision

Believe in your self-control: Lay theories of self-control and their downstream effects

Self-control is the ability to inhibit temptations and persist in one's decisions about what to do. In this article, we review recent evidence that suggests implicit beliefs about the process of self-control influence how the process operates. While earlier work focused on the moderating influence of willpower beliefs on depletion effects, we survey new directions in the field that emphasize how beliefs about the nature of self-control, self-control strategies, and their effectiveness have effects on downstream regulation and judgment. These new directions highlight the need to better understand the role of self-control beliefs in naturalistic decision-making.

Goal-Dependent Hippocampal Representations Facilitate Self-Control

Hippocampal activity linking past experiences and simulations of the future with current goals can play an important role in decision-making. The representation of information within the hippocampus may be especially critical in situations where one needs to overcome past rewarding experiences and exert self-control. Self-control success or failure may depend on how information is represented in the hippocampus and how effectively the representation process can be modified to achieve a specific goal. We test this hypothesis using representational similarity analyses of human (female/male) neuroimaging data during a dietary self-control task in which individuals must overcome taste temptations to choose healthy foods. We find that self-control is indeed associated with the way individuals represent taste information (valance) in the hippocampus and how taste representations there adapt to align with different goals/contexts. Importantly, individuals who were able to shift their hippocampal representations to a larger degree to align with the current motivation were better able to exert self-control when facing a dietary challenge. These results suggest an alternative or complementary neurobiological pathway leading to self-control success and indicate the need to update the classical view of self-control to continue to advance our understanding of its behavioral and neural underpinnings.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The paper provides a new perspective on what leads to successful self-control at the behavioral and neurobiological levels. Our data suggest that self-control is enhanced when individuals adjust hippocampal processing to align with current goals.

The Willpower Paradox: Possible and Impossible Conceptions of Self-Control

Self-control denotes the ability to override current desires to render behavior consistent with long-term goals. A key assumption is that self-control is required when short-term desires are transiently stronger (more preferred) than long-term goals and people would yield to temptation without exerting self-control. We argue that this widely shared conception of self-control raises a fundamental yet rarely discussed conceptual paradox: How is it possible that a person most strongly desires to perform a behavior (e.g., eat chocolate) and at the same time desires to recruit self-control to prevent themselves from doing it? A detailed analysis reveals that three common assumptions about self-control cannot be true simultaneously. To avoid the paradox, any coherent theory of self-control must abandon either the assumption (a) that recruitment of self-control is an intentional process, or (b) that humans are unitary agents, or (c) that self-control consists in overriding the currently strongest desire. We propose a taxonomy of different kinds of self-control processes that helps organize current theories according to which of these assumptions they abandon. We conclude by outlining unresolved questions and future research perspectives raised by different conceptions of self-control and discuss implications for the question of whether self-control can be considered rational.

Learning how to reason and deciding when to decide

Research on human reasoning has both popularized and struggled with the idea that intuitive and deliberate thoughts stem from two different systems, raising the question how people switch between them. Inspired by research on cognitive control and conflict monitoring, we argue that detecting the need for further thought relies on an intuitive, context-sensitive process that is learned in itself.

What’s inside is all that counts? The contours of everyday thinking about self-control

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery.

Integrating Models of Self-Regulation

Self-regulation is a core aspect of human functioning that helps facilitate the successful pursuit of personal goals. There has been a proliferation of theories and models describing different aspects of self-regulation both within and outside of psychology. All of these models provide insights about self-regulation, but sometimes they talk past each other, make only shallow contributions, or make contributions that are underappreciated by scholars working in adjacent areas. The purpose of this article is to integrate across the many different models in order to refine the vast literature on self-regulation. To achieve this objective, we first review some of the more prominent models of self-regulation coming from social psychology, personality psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. We then integrate across these models based on four key elements—level of analysis, conflict, emotion, and cognitive functioning—specifically identifying points of convergence but also points of insufficient emphasis. We close with prescriptions for future research.

Monetary and non-monetary rewards reduce attentional capture by emotional distractors

Irrelevant emotional stimuli often capture attention, disrupting ongoing cognitive processes. In two experiments, we examined whether availability of rewards (monetary and non-monetary) can prevent this attentional capture. Participants completed a central letter identification task while attempting to ignore negative, positive, and neutral distractor images that appeared above or below the targets on 25% of trials. Distraction was indexed by slowing on distractor-present trials. Half the participants completed the task with no performance-contingent reward, while the other half earned points for fast and accurate performance. In Experiment 1, points translated into monetary reward, but in Experiment 2, points had no monetary value. In both experiments, reward reduced capture by emotional distractors, showing that even non-monetary reward can aid attentional control. These findings suggest that motivation encourages use of effective cognitive control mechanisms that effectively prevent attentional capture, even when distractors are emotional.

Regulating food craving: From mechanisms to interventions

Craving, defined here as a strong desire to eat, is a common experience that drives behavior. Here we discuss the concept of craving from historical, physiological, and clinical perspectives, and review work investigating the effects of cue reactivity and cue-induced craving on eating and weight outcomes, as well as underlying neural mechanisms. We also highlight the significance of cue reactivity and craving in the context of our "toxic food environment" and the obesity epidemic. We then summarize our work developing the Regulation of Craving (ROC) task, used to test the causal effects of cognitive strategies on craving for food and drugs as well as the underlying neural mechanisms of such regulation. Next, we review our recent development of a novel ROC-based intervention that trains individuals to use cognitive strategies to regulate craving, with promising effects on subsequent food choice and caloric consumption. We end by discussing future directions for this important line of work.

Modernizing conceptions of valuation and cognitive control deployment in adolescent risk taking

Heightened risk taking in adolescence has long been attributed to valuation systems overwhelming the deployment of cognitive control. However, this explanation of why adolescents engage in risk taking is insufficient given increasing evidence that risk-taking behavior can be strategic and involve elevated cognitive control. We argue that applying the Expected Value of Control (EVC; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013) computational model to adolescent risk taking can clarify under what conditions control is elevated or diminished during risky decision making. Through this lens, we review research examining when adolescent risk taking might be due to-rather than a failure of-effective cognitive control and suggest compelling ways to test such hypotheses. This effort can not only resolve when risk taking arises from an immaturity of the control system itself versus differences in what adolescents value relative to adults, but also identify promising avenues for channeling cognitive control towards adaptive outcomes in adolescence.

Activity in orbitofrontal neuronal ensembles reflects inhibitory control

Stopping, or inhibition, is a form of self-control that is a core element of flexible and adaptive behavior. Its neural origins remain unclear. Some views hold that inhibition decisions reflect the aggregation of widespread and diverse pieces of information, including information arising in ostensible core reward regions (i.e., outside the canonical executive system). We recorded activity of single neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) of macaques, a region associated with economic decisions, and whose role in inhibition is debated. Subjects performed a classic inhibition task known as the stop signal task. Ensemble decoding analyses reveal a clear firing rate pattern that distinguishes successful from failed inhibition and that begins after the stop signal and before the stop signal reaction time (SSRT). We also found a different and orthogonal ensemble pattern that distinguishes successful from failed stopping before the beginning of the trial. These signals were distinct from, and orthogonal to, value encoding, which was also observed in these neurons. The timing of the early and late signals was, respectively, consistent with the idea that neuronal activity in OFC encodes inhibition both proactively and reactively.

Comparing two neurocognitive models of self-control during dietary decisions

Self-control is the process of favoring abstract, distal goals over concrete, proximal goals during decision-making and is an important factor in health and well-being. We directly compare two prominent neurocognitive models of human self-control with the goal of identifying which, if either, best describes behavioral and neural data of dietary decisions in a large sample of overweight and obese adults motivated to eat more healthfully. We extracted trial-by-trial estimates of neural activity during incentive-compatible choice from three brain regions implicated in self-control, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex and assessed evidence for the dual-process and value-based choice models of self-control using multilevel modeling. Model comparison tests revealed that the value-based choice model outperformed the dual-process model and best fit the observed data. These results advance scientific knowledge of the neurobiological mechanisms underlying self-control-relevant decision-making and are consistent with a value-based choice model of self-control.

Resolving uncertainty in a social world

Consider the range of social behaviours we engage in every day. In each case, there are a multitude of unknowns, reflecting the many sources of uncertainty inherent to social inference. We describe how uncertainty manifests in social environments (the thoughts and intentions of others are largely hidden, making it difficult to predict a person's behaviour) and why people are motivated to reduce the aversive feelings generated by uncertainty. We propose a three-part model whereby social uncertainty is initially reduced through automatic modes of inference (such as impression formation) before more control-demanding modes of inference (such as perspective-taking) are deployed to narrow one's predictions even more. Finally, social uncertainty is attenuated further through learning processes that update these predictions based on new information. Our framework integrates research across fields to offer an account of the mechanisms motivating social cognition and action, laying the groundwork for future experiments that can illuminate the impact of uncertainty on social cognition.

Why has evolution not selected for perfect self-control?

Self-control refers to the ability to deliberately reject tempting options and instead select ones that produce greater long-term benefits. Although some apparent failures of self-control are, on closer inspection, reward maximizing, at least some self-control failures are clearly disadvantageous and non-strategic. The existence of poor self-control presents an important evolutionary puzzle because there is no obvious reason why good self-control should be more costly than poor self-control. After all, a rock is infinitely patient. I propose that self-control failures result from cases in which well-learned (and thus routinized) decision-making strategies yield suboptimal choices. These mappings persist in the decision-makers' repertoire because they result from learning processes that are adaptive in the broader context, either on the timescale of learning or of evolution. Self-control, then, is a form of cognitive control and the subjective feeling of effort likely reflects the true costs of cognitive control. Poor self-control, in this view, is ultimately a result of bounded optimality. This article is part of the theme issue 'Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications.

Training in cognitive strategies reduces eating and improves food choice

Obesity rates continue to rise alarmingly, with dire health implications. One contributing factor is that individuals frequently forgo healthy foods in favor of inexpensive, high-calorie, unhealthy foods. One important mechanism underlying these choices is food craving: Craving increases with exposure to unhealthy foods (and food cues, such as advertisements) and prospectively predicts eating and weight. Prior work has shown that cognitive regulation strategies that emphasize the negative consequences of unhealthy foods reduce craving. In Studies 1 and 2, we show that cognitive strategies also increase craving for healthy foods by emphasizing their positive benefits, and change food valuation (willingness to pay) for both healthy and unhealthy foods. In Studies 3 and 4, we demonstrate that brief training in cognitive strategies ("Regulation of Craving Training"; ROC-T) increases subsequent healthy (vs. unhealthy) food choices. This was striking because this change in food choices generalized to nontrained items. Importantly, in Study 5, we show that brief training in cognitive strategies also reduces food consumption by 93-121 calories. Consumed calories correlated with changes in food choice. Finally, in Study 6, we show that the training component of ROC-T is necessary, above and beyond any effect of framing. Across all studies (NTOTAL = 1,528), we find that cognitive strategies substantially change craving and food valuation, and that training in cognitive strategies improves food choices by 5.4-11.2% and reduces unhealthy eating, including in obese individuals. Thus, these findings have important theoretical, public health, and clinical implications for obesity prevention and treatment.

Neuroimaging, neuromodulation, and population health: the neuroscience of chronic disease prevention

Preventable chronic diseases are the leading cause of death in the majority of countries throughout the world, and this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. The potential to offset the social, economic, and personal burdens associated with such conditions depends on our ability to influence people's thought processes, decisions, and behaviors, all of which can be understood with reference to the brain itself. Within the health neuroscience framework, the brain can be viewed as a predictor, mediator, moderator, or outcome in relation to health-related phenomena. This review explores examples of each of these, with specific reference to the primary prevention (i.e., prevention of initial onset) of chronic diseases. Within the topic of primary prevention, we touch on several cross-cutting themes (persuasive communications, delay discounting of rewards, and self-control), and place a special focus on obesity as a disorder influenced by both eating behavior and exercise habits.

Cognitive Science: Persistent Apes Are Intelligent Apes

In humans, self-control is correlated with general intelligence; a new study finds that this correlation extends to chimpanzees as well. The new results highlight the cognitive bases of self-control and suggest a common evolutionary history for human and primate self-control.