False Memory Researchers Misunderstand Repression, Dissociation and Freud

The False Memory Debate A Reply to Otgaar

The author replies to a critique of his paper about false memories in an effort to clarify issues on which there is disagreement. A key point made is that the validity of dissociation as a phenomenon, that is, as reported symptoms, does not depend on theories about the mechanisms of dissociation. There are no proven mechanisms for any mental health symptoms or DSM-5 diagnoses including anxiety, depression, psychosis and substance use disorders.

Oversimplifications and Misrepresentations in the Repressed Memory Debate: A Reply to Ross

Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory.