The effects of source trustworthiness and inference type on human belief revision

New Paradigms in the Psychology of Reasoning

The psychology of verbal reasoning initially compared performance with classical logic. In the last 25 years, a new paradigm has arisen, which focuses on knowledge-rich reasoning for communication and persuasion and is typically modeled using Bayesian probability theory rather than logic. This paradigm provides a new perspective on argumentation, explaining the rational persuasiveness of arguments that are logical fallacies. It also helps explain how and why people stray from logic when given deductive reasoning tasks. What appear to be erroneous responses, when compared against logic, often turn out to be rationally justified when seen in the richer rational framework of the new paradigm. Moreover, the same approach extends naturally to inductive reasoning tasks, in which people extrapolate beyond the data they are given and logic does not readily apply. We outline links between social and individual reasoning and set recent developments in the psychology of reasoning in the wider context of Bayesian cognitive science.

Sequential Revision of Belief, Trust Type, and the Order Effect

Objective To investigate how people's sequential adjustments to their position are impacted by the source of the information. Background There is an extensive body of research on how the order in which new information is received affects people's final views and decisions as well as research on how they adjust their views in light of new information. Method Seventy college-aged students, 60% of whom were women, completed one of eight different randomly distributed booklets prepared to create the eight different between-subjects treatment conditions created by crossing the two levels of information source with the four level of order conditions. Based on the information provided, participants estimated the probability of an attack, the dependent measure. Results Confirming information from an expert intelligence officer significantly increased the attack probability from the initial position more than confirming information from a longtime friend. Conversely, disconfirming information from a longtime friend decreased the attack probability significantly more than the same information from an intelligence officer. Conclusion It was confirmed that confirming and disconfirming evidence were differentially affected depending on information source, either an expert or a close friend. The difference appears to be due to the existence of two kinds of trust: cognitive-based imbued to an expert and affective-based imbued to a close friend. Application Purveyors of information need to understand that it is not only the content of a message that counts but that other forces are at work such as the order in which information is received and characteristics of the information source.

Grounded spatial belief revision

Beliefs frequently undergo revisions, especially when new pieces of information are true but inconsistent with current beliefs. In previous studies, we showed that linguistic asymmetries provided by relational statements, play a crucial role in spatial belief revision. Located objects (LO) are preferably revised compared to reference objects (RO), known as the LO-principle. Here we establish a connection between spatial belief revision and grounded cognition. In three experiments, we explored whether imagined physical object properties influence which object is relocated and which remains at its initial position. Participants mentally revised beliefs about the arrangements of objects which could be envisaged as light and heavy (Experiment 1), small and large (Experiment 2), or movable and immovable (Experiment 3). The results show that intrinsic object properties are differently taken into account during spatial belief revision. Object weight did not alter the LO-principle (Experiment 1), whereas object size was found to influence which object was preferably relocated (Experiment 2). Object movability did not affect relocation preferences but had an effect on relocation durations (Experiment 3). The findings support the simulation hypothesis within the grounded cognition approach and create new connections between the spatial mental model theory of reasoning and the idea of grounded cognition.

Belief revision and way-finding

Belief revision is required when veridical information surfaces that contradicts what was previously thought to be the case. In way-finding, belief revision frequently occurs, for example, when the travelled route has led one astray, instead of to one's chosen destination. In past cognitive research, the topics of belief revision and way-finding have been treated in isolation. Here, we introduce an approach for linking the two fields and assess belief revision as it occurs in the process of way-finding. We report the results of two experiments that put participants in (virtual) situations where elements of a previously learned route description do not match the actual environment (thereby requiring the revision of a previously held belief). Experiment 1 puts participants in a highly artificial virtual environment where the landmarks to be used in navigation have a low degree of semantic salience (houses of various color). Experiment 2 puts subjects in a photorealistic environment where the objects to be used in navigation are well-known landmarks (such as the Eiffel Tower) and thus have a high degree of semantic salience. In both experiments, participants are confronted with T-junctions, where a landmark that was expected to indicate the correct route is discovered to be in an unexpected location. The results of the experiments show that a participant's choice of route, in such cases, is affected by differences in the structure of the relevant initial instruction. More precisely, the route chosen by participants is affected by whether the relevant landmark was described as being on the same side of the path as they were instructed to turn (congruent case) or as located on the opposite side of the path as they were instructed to turn (incongruent case).