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Erceg N, Galić Z, Bubić A, Jelić D. Who detects and why: how do individual differences in cognitive characteristics underpin different types of responses to reasoning tasks? THINKING & REASONING 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2108897] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/15/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Nikola Erceg
- Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
| | - Zvonimir Galić
- Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
| | - Andreja Bubić
- Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Split, Split, Croatia
| | - Dino Jelić
- Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
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2
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Hashemi SFS, Khosrowabadi R, Karimi M. Set-shifting and inhibition interplay affect the rule-matching bias occurrence during conditional reasoning task. J Med Life 2022; 15:828-834. [PMID: 35928360 PMCID: PMC9321491 DOI: 10.25122/jml-2021-0215] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/05/2021] [Accepted: 09/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
The rule-matching bias is a common error during conditional reasoning tasks, which refers to a tendency to match responses with the lexical context in the conditional rule and leads to incorrect responses. Conditional reasoning is one of the higher-level cognitive abilities affected by many cognitive skills. We aimed to determine whether inhibition and set-shifting skills with rule-matching bias occurrence could be related and, if so, to what quantitative, at a statistically significant level. A total of 30 healthy university students aged 18 to 30 participated in this study. We used the Wason's Selection Task (WST) to measure conditional reasoning and investigated their inhibition and set-shifting skills with the Stroop and Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, respectively. Results showed a significant positive correlation between the number of correct responses to the Stroop test and the Wason Selection Card Test (p=0.614). There was a positive correlation between the number of correct responses to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Wason Selection Card Test (p=0.423). Participants with higher inhibition and set-shifting abilities showed better performance in the conditional reasoning test and lower rule-matching bias errors.
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Affiliation(s)
- Seyyedeh Fatemeh Seyyed Hashemi
- Department of Cognitive Psychology, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies, Tehran, Iran,Corresponding Author: Seyyedeh Fatemeh Seyyed Hashemi, Department of Cognitive Psychology, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies, Tehran, Iran. E-mail:
| | - Reza Khosrowabadi
- Department of Cognitive Modeling, Institute for Cognitive and Brain Science, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
| | - Mohsen Karimi
- Department of Computer Engineering, Institute for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
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3
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Voudouri A, Białek M, Domurat A, Kowal M, De Neys W. Conflict detection predicts the temporal stability of intuitive and deliberate reasoning. THINKING & REASONING 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2077439] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Michał Białek
- Institute of Psychology, University of Wrocław, Wrocław, Poland
| | - Artur Domurat
- Center for Economic Psychology and Decision Sciences, Kozminski University, Warszawa, Poland
| | - Marta Kowal
- Institute of Psychology, University of Wrocław, Wrocław, Poland
| | - Wim De Neys
- Université Paris Cité, LaPsyDÉ, CNRS, Paris, France
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Janssen EM, Velinga SB, de Neys W, van Gog T. Recognizing biased reasoning: Conflict detection during decision-making and decision-evaluation. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2021; 217:103322. [PMID: 33989834 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2021.103322] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2020] [Revised: 04/20/2021] [Accepted: 04/26/2021] [Indexed: 10/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Although it is well established that our thinking can often be biased, the precise cognitive mechanisms underlying these biases are still debated. The present study builds on recent research showing that biased reasoners often seem aware that their reasoning is incorrect; they show signs of conflict detection. One important shortcoming in this research is that the conflict detection effect has only been studied with classic problem-solving tasks, requiring people to make a decision themselves. However, in many reasoning situations people are confronted with decisions already made by others. Therefore, the present study (N = 159) investigated whether conflict detection occurs not only during reasoning on problem-solving tasks (i.e., decision-making), but also on vignette tasks, requiring participants to evaluate decisions made by others. We analyzed participants' conflict detection sensitivity on confidence and response time measures. Results showed that conflict detection occurred during both decision-making and decision-evaluation, as indicated by a decreased confidence. The response time index appeared to be a less reliable measure of conflict detection on the novel tasks. These findings are very relevant for studying reasoning in contexts in which recognizing reasoning errors is important; for instance, in education where teachers have to give feedback on students' reasoning.
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Comparing fast thinking and slow thinking: The relative benefits of interventions, individual differences, and inferential rules. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2020. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500007865] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
AbstractResearch on judgment and decision making has suggested that the System 2 process of slow thinking can help people to improve their decision making by reducing well-established statistical decision biases (including base rate neglect, probability matching, and the conjunction fallacy). In a large pre-registered study with 1,706 participants and 23,292 unique observations, we compare the effects of individual differences and behavioral interventions to test the relative benefits of slow thinking on performance in canonical judgment and decision-making problems, compared to a control condition, a fast thinking condition, an incentive condition, and a condition that combines fast and slow thinking. We also draw on the rule-based reasoning literature to examine the benefits of having access to a simple form of the rule needed to solve a specific focal problem. Overall, we find equivocal evidence of a small benefit from slow thinking, evidence for a small benefit to accuracy incentives, and clear evidence of a larger cost from fast thinking. The difference in performance between fast-thinking and slow-thinking interventions is comparable to a one-scale point difference on the 4-point Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Inferential rules contribute unique explanatory power and interact with individual differences to support the idea that System 2 benefits from a combination of slower processes and knowledge appropriate to the problem.
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6
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Šrol J, De Neys W. Predicting individual differences in conflict detection and bias susceptibility during reasoning. THINKING & REASONING 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1708793] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Jakub Šrol
- Institute of Experimental Psychology, Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia
| | - Wim De Neys
- Paris Descartes University, LaPsyDE (UMR CNRS 8240), Paris, France
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7
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Not all who ponder count costs: Arithmetic reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies. Cognition 2019; 192:103995. [PMID: 31301587 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.06.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2018] [Revised: 05/30/2019] [Accepted: 06/05/2019] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas propose directly causing some harm to prevent greater harm. Theory suggests that accepting such actions (consistent with utilitarian philosophy) involves more reflective reasoning than rejecting such actions (consistent with deontological philosophy). However, past findings do not always replicate, confound different kinds of reflection, and employ conventional sacrificial dilemmas that treat utilitarian and deontological considerations as opposite. In two studies, we examined whether past findings would replicate when employing process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations independently. Findings suggested two categorically different impacts of reflection: measures of arithmetic reflection, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test, predicted only utilitarian, not deontological, response tendencies. However, measures of logical reflection, such as performance on logical syllogisms, positively predicted both utilitarian and deontological tendencies. These studies replicate some findings, clarify others, and reveal opportunity for additional nuance in dual process theorist's claims about the link between reflection and dilemma judgments.
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Anodal transcranial direct current stimulation over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex enhances reflective judgment and decision-making. Brain Stimul 2019; 12:652-658. [DOI: 10.1016/j.brs.2018.12.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/09/2018] [Revised: 12/03/2018] [Accepted: 12/05/2018] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
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Carriedo N, Corral A, Montoro PR, Herrero L. A developmental study of the bat/ball problem of CRT: How to override the bias and its relation to executive functioning. Br J Psychol 2019; 111:335-356. [PMID: 30993675 DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12400] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/06/2018] [Revised: 03/27/2019] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
In two experiments, we explored the nature of the bias observed in the bat/ball problem of the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005, J. Econ. Perspect., 19, 25), how to override it, and its relation to executive functioning. Based on the original bat/ball problem, we designed two additional isomorphic items. In Experiment 1, for four age groups, including 7-, 11-, and 15-year-olds and adults, we determined that the bias is related to the System 1 intervention; the performance in this item was not a matter of mathematical ability and it could be facilitated by changing the order in which the problems were presented. In Experiment 2, we determined that for 15-year-olds, good and bad performances in the item were related to executive functioning, particularly response-distractor inhibition, updating information in working memory, and the regulation of attention; however, subtle differences were identified when the problem was performed in a facilitative context compared with a non-facilitative context. The results indicated that cognitive abilities are a necessary but non-sufficient condition to resolve the problem.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nuria Carriedo
- National Distance Education University (UNED), Madrid, Spain
| | - Antonio Corral
- National Distance Education University (UNED), Madrid, Spain
| | - Pedro R Montoro
- National Distance Education University (UNED), Madrid, Spain
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Bago B, De Neys W. Advancing the specification of dual process models of higher cognition: a critical test of the hybrid model view. THINKING & REASONING 2019. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2018.1552194] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Bence Bago
- UMR 8240 LaPsyDÉ, Paris Descartes University, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France
| | - Wim De Neys
- UMR 8240 LaPsyDÉ, Paris Descartes University, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France
- UMR 8240, LaPsyDÉ, CNRS, Paris, France
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11
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Bajšanski I, Žauhar V, Valerjev P. Confidence judgments in syllogistic reasoning: the role of consistency and response cardinality. THINKING & REASONING 2019. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2018.1464506] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Igor Bajšanski
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia
| | - Valnea Žauhar
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia
| | - Pavle Valerjev
- Department of Psychology, University of Zadar, Zadar, Croatia
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ALQahtani DA, Rotgans JI, Mamede S, Mahzari MM, Al-Ghamdi GA, Schmidt HG. Factors underlying suboptimal diagnostic performance in physicians under time pressure. MEDICAL EDUCATION 2018; 52:1288-1298. [PMID: 30302783 DOI: 10.1111/medu.13686] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/25/2018] [Revised: 05/08/2018] [Accepted: 07/04/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
CONTEXT Time pressure has been implicated in the suboptimal diagnostic performance of doctors and in increases in diagnostic errors. However, the reasons underlying these effects are not clear. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of time pressure on physicians' diagnostic accuracy and to explore the mediating effects of perceived stress (emotional pathway) and number of plausible diagnostic hypotheses (cognitive pathway) on the proposed relationship. METHODS We conducted a randomised controlled experiment. A total of 75 senior internal medicine residents completed eight written clinical cases under conditions with (n = 40) or without (n = 35) time pressure. They were then asked to: (i) rate the overall stress experienced, and (ii) write down any alternative hypotheses they had thought of when diagnosing the cases. In a post hoc analysis, a mediation path analysis was performed to test the causal relationships between time pressure, perceived stress and number of alternative diagnoses. RESULTS Participants who were under time pressure spent less time diagnosing the cases (85.54 seconds versus 181.81 seconds; p< 0.001) and had a lower mean diagnostic accuracy score (0.44 versus 0.53; p = 0.01). In addition, they reported more stress (5.80 versus 4.69; p = 0.01) and generated fewer plausible tentative hypotheses (0.37 versus 0.51; p = 0.01). Two path coefficients were found to be statistically significant; the first path coefficient referred to the relationship between time pressure and perceived stress (standardised β = 0.25, p = 0.029), and the second negative path coefficient referred to the relationship between time pressure and number of plausible alternative hypotheses (standardised β = -0.32, p< 0.01). CONCLUSIONS Time pressure adversely influences physicians' diagnostic accuracy by increasing their stress response and reducing the number of plausible hypotheses as mediators.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dalal A ALQahtani
- Department of Oral Medicine and Diagnostic Sciences, College of Dentistry, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
| | - Jerome I Rotgans
- Medical Education Research and Scholarship Unit, Lee Kong Chian School of Medicine, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
| | - Silvia Mamede
- Department of Psychology, Erasmus Medical Centre, Institute of Medical Education Research Rotterdam, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Moeber M Mahzari
- Department of Medicine, College of Medicine, King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
| | - Ghassan A Al-Ghamdi
- Department of Medicine, College of Medicine, King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
| | - Henk G Schmidt
- Department of Psychology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
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Yin Y, Yu T, Wang S, Zhou S, Tang X, Stupple EJ, Luo J. Event-related potentials support a dual process account of the Embedded Chinese Character Task. Neuropsychologia 2018; 121:186-192. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2018.10.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2018] [Revised: 10/24/2018] [Accepted: 10/25/2018] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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14
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Vartanian O, Beatty EL, Smith I, Blackler K, Lam Q, Forbes S, De Neys W. The Reflective Mind: Examining Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Base Rate Neglect with fMRI. J Cogn Neurosci 2018; 30:1011-1022. [DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_01264] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/04/2022]
Abstract
Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC's possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.
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Affiliation(s)
- Oshin Vartanian
- Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto Research Centre
- University of Toronto
| | - Erin L. Beatty
- Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto Research Centre
- University of Southern Denmark
| | - Ingrid Smith
- Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto Research Centre
| | - Kristen Blackler
- Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto Research Centre
| | - Quan Lam
- Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto Research Centre
| | - Sarah Forbes
- Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto Research Centre
- University of Waterloo
| | - Wim De Neys
- Paris Descartes University
- Caen Basse-Normandie University
- CNRS, UMR 8240, LaPsyDÉ, France
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15
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Melnikoff DE, Bargh JA. The Mythical Number Two. Trends Cogn Sci 2018; 22:280-293. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2018.02.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 116] [Impact Index Per Article: 19.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/24/2017] [Revised: 01/31/2018] [Accepted: 02/01/2018] [Indexed: 01/12/2023]
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16
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Mata A, Ferreira MB. Response: Commentary: Seeing the conflict: an attentional account of reasoning errors. Front Psychol 2018; 9:24. [PMID: 29434561 PMCID: PMC5791427 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/27/2017] [Accepted: 01/09/2018] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- André Mata
- Faculdade de Psicologia, CICPSI, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
| | - Mário B Ferreira
- Faculdade de Psicologia, CICPSI, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
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17
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Frey D, Johnson ED, De Neys W. Individual differences in conflict detection during reasoning. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2018; 71:1188-1208. [DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2017.1313283] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
Decades of reasoning and decision-making research have established that human judgment is often biased by intuitive heuristics. Recent “error” or bias detection studies have focused on reasoners’ abilities to detect whether their heuristic answer conflicts with logical or probabilistic principles. A key open question is whether there are individual differences in this bias detection efficiency. Here we present three studies in which co-registration of different error detection measures (confidence, response time and confidence response time) allowed us to assess bias detection sensitivity at the individual participant level in a range of reasoning tasks. The results indicate that although most individuals show robust bias detection, as indexed by increased latencies and decreased confidence, there is a subgroup of reasoners who consistently fail to do so. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for the field.
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Affiliation(s)
- Darren Frey
- LaPsyDÉ, UMR 8240, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris Descartes University, Paris, France
- LaPsyDÉ, UMR 8240, Caen Basse-Normandie University, Paris, France
| | - Eric D Johnson
- Department of Basic Psychology and IR3C, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Wim De Neys
- LaPsyDÉ, UMR 8240, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris Descartes University, Paris, France
- LaPsyDÉ, UMR 8240, Caen Basse-Normandie University, Paris, France
- LaPsyDÉ, UMR 8240, CNRS, Paris, France
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Stupple EJN, Pitchford M, Ball LJ, Hunt TE, Steel R. Slower is not always better: Response-time evidence clarifies the limited role of miserly information processing in the Cognitive Reflection Test. PLoS One 2017; 12:e0186404. [PMID: 29099840 PMCID: PMC5669478 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0186404] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2017] [Accepted: 08/16/2017] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
We report a study examining the role of ‘cognitive miserliness’ as a determinant of poor performance on the standard three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The cognitive miserliness hypothesis proposes that people often respond incorrectly on CRT items because of an unwillingness to go beyond default, heuristic processing and invest time and effort in analytic, reflective processing. Our analysis (N = 391) focused on people’s response times to CRT items to determine whether predicted associations are evident between miserly thinking and the generation of incorrect, intuitive answers. Evidence indicated only a weak correlation between CRT response times and accuracy. Item-level analyses also failed to demonstrate predicted response-time differences between correct analytic and incorrect intuitive answers for two of the three CRT items. We question whether participants who give incorrect intuitive answers on the CRT can legitimately be termed cognitive misers and whether the three CRT items measure the same general construct.
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Affiliation(s)
- Edward J. N. Stupple
- Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby, Derby, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Melanie Pitchford
- Department of Psychology, University of Bedfordshire, Luton, United Kingdom
| | - Linden J. Ball
- School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom
| | - Thomas E. Hunt
- Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby, Derby, United Kingdom
| | - Richard Steel
- School of Sport, Exercise & Health Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom
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Lanoë C, Lubin A, Houdé O, Borst G, De Neys W. GRAMMATICAL ATTRACTION ERROR DETECTION IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2017. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.09.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
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20
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Ackerman R, Beller Y. Shared and distinct cue utilization for metacognitive judgements during reasoning and memorisation. THINKING & REASONING 2017. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2017.1328373] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Rakefet Ackerman
- Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel
| | - Yael Beller
- Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel
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Szaszi B, Szollosi A, Palfi B, Aczel B. The cognitive reflection test revisited: exploring the ways individuals solve the test. THINKING & REASONING 2017. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2017.1292954] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- B. Szaszi
- Doctoral School of Psychology, Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary
- Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
| | - A. Szollosi
- Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| | - B. Palfi
- Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
| | - B. Aczel
- Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
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22
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Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivity. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2017. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500005696] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
AbstractThe prominent dual process model of moral cognition suggests that reasoners intuitively detect that harming others is wrong (deontological System-1 morality) but have to engage in demanding deliberation to realize that harm can be acceptable depending on the consequences (utilitarian System-2 morality). But the nature of the interaction between the processes is not clear. To address this key issue we tested whether deontological reasoners also intuitively grasp the utilitarian dimensions of classic moral dilemmas. In three studies subjects solved moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions while performing a demanding concurrent load task. Results show that reasoners’ sensitivity to conflicting moral perspectives, as reflected in decreased decision confidence and increased experienced processing difficulty, was unaffected by cognitive load. We discuss how these findings argue for a hybrid dual process model interpretation in which System-1 cues both a deontological and utilitarian intuition.
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Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory. Cognition 2017; 158:90-109. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 129] [Impact Index Per Article: 18.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/04/2016] [Revised: 10/12/2016] [Accepted: 10/25/2016] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
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24
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Białek M, De Neys W. Conflict detection during moral decision-making: evidence for deontic reasoners’ utilitarian sensitivity. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2016. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2016.1156118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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25
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Johnson ED, Tubau E, De Neys W. The Doubting System 1: Evidence for automatic substitution sensitivity. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2016; 164:56-64. [PMID: 26722837 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.12.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 47] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/19/2015] [Revised: 12/02/2015] [Accepted: 12/14/2015] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
A long prevailing view of human reasoning suggests severe limits on our ability to adhere to simple logical or mathematical prescriptions. A key position assumes these failures arise from insufficient monitoring of rapidly produced intuitions. These faulty intuitions are thought to arise from a proposed substitution process, by which reasoners unknowingly interpret more difficult questions as easier ones. Recent work, however, suggests that reasoners are not blind to this substitution process, but in fact detect that their erroneous responses are not warranted. Using the popular bat-and-ball problem, we investigated whether this substitution sensitivity arises out of an automatic System 1 process or whether it depends on the operation of an executive resource demanding System 2 process. Results showed that accuracy on the bat-and-ball problem clearly declined under cognitive load. However, both reduced response confidence and increased response latencies indicated that biased reasoners remained sensitive to their faulty responses under load. Results suggest that a crucial substitution monitoring process is not only successfully engaged, but that it automatically operates as an autonomous System 1 process. By signaling its doubt along with a biased intuition, it appears System 1 is "smarter" than traditionally assumed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eric D Johnson
- Department of Basic Psychology and IR3C, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.
| | - Elisabet Tubau
- Department of Basic Psychology and IR3C, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Wim De Neys
- CNRS, LaPsyDE (CNRS Unit 8042), Paris Descartes University, Paris, France
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Johnson ED, Tubau E. Comprehension and computation in Bayesian problem solving. Front Psychol 2015; 6:938. [PMID: 26283976 PMCID: PMC4515557 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00938] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2015] [Accepted: 06/22/2015] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans have long been characterized as poor probabilistic reasoners when presented with explicit numerical information. Bayesian word problems provide a well-known example of this, where even highly educated and cognitively skilled individuals fail to adhere to mathematical norms. It is widely agreed that natural frequencies can facilitate Bayesian inferences relative to normalized formats (e.g., probabilities, percentages), both by clarifying logical set-subset relations and by simplifying numerical calculations. Nevertheless, between-study performance on “transparent” Bayesian problems varies widely, and generally remains rather unimpressive. We suggest there has been an over-focus on this representational facilitator (i.e., transparent problem structures) at the expense of the specific logical and numerical processing requirements and the corresponding individual abilities and skills necessary for providing Bayesian-like output given specific verbal and numerical input. We further suggest that understanding this task-individual pair could benefit from considerations from the literature on mathematical cognition, which emphasizes text comprehension and problem solving, along with contributions of online executive working memory, metacognitive regulation, and relevant stored knowledge and skills. We conclude by offering avenues for future research aimed at identifying the stages in problem solving at which correct vs. incorrect reasoners depart, and how individual differences might influence this time point.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eric D Johnson
- Department of Basic Psychology, University of Barcelona Barcelona, Spain ; Research Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behavior (IR3C) Barcelona, Spain
| | - Elisabet Tubau
- Department of Basic Psychology, University of Barcelona Barcelona, Spain ; Research Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behavior (IR3C) Barcelona, Spain
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Pennycook G, Fugelsang JA, Koehler DJ. What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement. Cogn Psychol 2015; 80:34-72. [PMID: 26091582 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 173] [Impact Index Per Article: 19.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/12/2014] [Revised: 04/10/2015] [Accepted: 05/15/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
The distinction between intuitive and analytic thinking is common in psychology. However, while often being quite clear on the characteristics of the two processes ('Type 1' processes are fast, autonomous, intuitive, etc. and 'Type 2' processes are slow, deliberative, analytic, etc.), dual-process theorists have been heavily criticized for being unclear on the factors that determine when an individual will think analytically or rely on their intuition. We address this issue by introducing a three-stage model that elucidates the bottom-up factors that cause individuals to engage Type 2 processing. According to the model, multiple Type 1 processes may be cued by a stimulus (Stage 1), leading to the potential for conflict detection (Stage 2). If successful, conflict detection leads to Type 2 processing (Stage 3), which may take the form of rationalization (i.e., the Type 1 output is verified post hoc) or decoupling (i.e., the Type 1 output is falsified). We tested key aspects of the model using a novel base-rate task where stereotypes and base-rate probabilities cued the same (non-conflict problems) or different (conflict problems) responses about group membership. Our results support two key predictions derived from the model: (1) conflict detection and decoupling are dissociable sources of Type 2 processing and (2) conflict detection sometimes fails. We argue that considering the potential stages of reasoning allows us to distinguish early (conflict detection) and late (decoupling) sources of analytic thought. Errors may occur at both stages and, as a consequence, bias arises from both conflict monitoring and decoupling failures.
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Mevel K, Poirel N, Rossi S, Cassotti M, Simon G, Houdé O, De Neys W. Bias detection: Response confidence evidence for conflict sensitivity in the ratio bias task. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2014. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2014.986487] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
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The neural correlates of belief-bias inhibition: The impact of logic training. Biol Psychol 2014; 103:276-82. [DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2014.09.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/06/2014] [Revised: 09/17/2014] [Accepted: 09/18/2014] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
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Stupple EJN, Ball LJ. The intersection between Descriptivism and Meliorism in reasoning research: further proposals in support of 'soft normativism'. Front Psychol 2014; 5:1269. [PMID: 25414687 PMCID: PMC4220629 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01269] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/27/2014] [Accepted: 10/19/2014] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
The rationality paradox centers on the observation that people are highly intelligent, yet show evidence of errors and biases in their thinking when measured against normative standards. Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) reject normative standards in the psychological study of thinking, reasoning and deciding in favor of a ‘value-free’ descriptive approach to studying high-level cognition. In reviewing Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) position, we defend an alternative to descriptivism in the form of ‘soft normativism,’ which allows for normative evaluations alongside the pursuit of descriptive research goals. We propose that normative theories have considerable value provided that researchers: (1) are alert to the philosophical quagmire of strong relativism; (2) are mindful of the biases that can arise from utilizing normative benchmarks; and (3) engage in a focused analysis of the processing approach adopted by individual reasoners. We address the controversial ‘is–ought’ inference in this context and appeal to a ‘bridging solution’ to this contested inference that is based on the concept of ‘informal reflective equilibrium.’ Furthermore, we draw on Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) recognition of a role for normative benchmarks in research programs that are devised to enhance reasoning performance and we argue that such Meliorist research programs have a valuable reciprocal relationship with descriptivist accounts of reasoning. In sum, we believe that descriptions of reasoning processes are fundamentally enriched by evaluations of reasoning quality, and argue that if such standards are discarded altogether then our explanations and descriptions of reasoning processes are severely undermined.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Linden J Ball
- School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire Preston, UK
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Macbeth G, Razumiejczyk E, Crivello MDC, Bolzán C, Girardi CIP, Campitelli G. Mental Models for the Negation of Conjunctions and Disjunctions. EUROPES JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 2014. [DOI: 10.5964/ejop.v10i1.696] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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Ball LJ. Microgenetic evidence for the beneficial effects of feedback and practice on belief bias. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2013. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2013.765856] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
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