When emotions improve reasoning: The possible roles of relevance and utility

Inducing emotionally negative nonbelieved memories using negative pictures

Memories that can be recalled but are no longer believed are termed nonbelieved memories. The current studies examined the creation of emotionally negative nonbelieved memories after viewing negatively valenced pictures. In both experiments, participants took part in two sessions. In Session 1, after being presented with a set of neutral and negative pictures, participants had to rate their emotional state. One week later, in Session 2, participants had to complete a recognition task to identify pictures that had appeared during the previous session. During this task, participants' memories for some pictures were challenged by telling them that their answers were incorrect in order to evoke nonbelieved memories. The experimental procedure was successful in creating nonbelieved memories in the participants. Specifically, in Experiment 1 (N = 35), we induced nonbelieved true memories for both negative and neutral pictures. We found a significant decrease in both belief and recollection after the challenge, with the change in belief being twice as large as the change in recollection. In Experiment 2 (N = 43), we successfully induced both nonbelieved true and false memories for negative pictures. Again, the reduction of belief was significantly greater than that of recollection. In general, participants evinced better memory for negative pictures, but following challenges people were just as likely to accept false social feedback and change their memories regarding other types of pictures. In both experiments, our challenges did not lead to notable changes in emotional state. In general, our findings show that emotionally negative nonbelieved memories can be successfully evoked in an experimental setting.

Accuracy and Response Time for Modus Ponens Syllogisms Vary by Controversial Topic and Categorical Emotion

Researchers have documented differential effects of emotion on cognitive processes, debating whether emotion may increase or decrease the response time and accuracy of logical thinking. The current study proposed that differences may be due to variability occurring across topic and categorical emotions, such that assessment of several basic emotional responses in the context of performing logical reasoning tasks may provide an initial indication of these differences. Utilizing modus ponens syllogisms composed of controversial statements, the current study evoked a variety of emotional responses and tested the accuracy of participants' basic logical thinking. Results indicated that logical skills were largely preserved despite the topic and emotion, nonetheless, accuracy varied across syllogism type (controversial vs. control), with increased accuracy on controversial syllogisms. Syllogisms rated as evoking no emotion were answered more accurately than those that evoked any emotion, with disgust and anger associated with less accuracy than no emotion and gladness associated with increased accuracy. Response times also differed across syllogism type, emotion, and emotion intensity.

Effects of Depressed Mood on Syllogistic Reasoning: The Buffering Role of High Working Memory Span

Previous research provided consistent evidence for the existence of the unique cognitive limitation in depressed mood: the impairment of the construction of mental models. In the current research, we applied the classical paradigm using categorical syllogisms to examine the relationship between depressed mood and integrative reasoning, aiming at gathering research evidence on the moderating role of the operation span of working memory. Specifically, we examine the hypothesis that high working memory capacity is a buffering variable and acts as a protective factor preventing the negative impact of depressed mood on syllogistic reasoning. A categorical syllogism, in the simpler evaluative form, consists of two premises (that are assumed to be true) and a conclusion that is to be evaluated as valid (when it follows logically from the premises) or invalid (when it does not follow from the premises). In the cover story, we informed participants that they would read about some observations carried out in a normal garden (believable conclusions) versus in a garden with radical genetic transformations (unbelievable conclusions) in order to stimulate the emergence of belief bias. The participants were 115 high school students who filled out the BDI scale and completed the OSPAN task. In line with predictions, there were main effects of depressed mood and operation span on the accuracy of performance (worse performance in the group with a high in comparison to a low level of depressed mood and much worse performance in low compared to high OSPAN participants). The analyses yielded a strong interaction effect of Depressed mood × OSPAN × Conflict. For participants with high levels of working memory capacity, there were no limitations related to a high level of depressed mood in syllogistic reasoning. On the other hand, a different pattern emerged for participants with low working memory span. In this group, participants with a high level of depressed mood in comparison to those with a low level of depressed mood showed much higher limitations in syllogistic reasoning, especially in reasoning concerning conflict syllogisms. We discuss the implications of this research for recent therapeutic programs using computerized cognitive tasks aimed at individuals with a high level of depressed mood.

When and Why Contexts Predict Unethical Behavior: Evidence From a Laboratory Bribery Game

In economic unethical decision-making experiments, one important methodological investigation is what types of contexts should be used to frame the instructions. Within the experimental economics community, using neutral-context instructions instead of loaded-context instructions is the mainstream practice. Because the loaded contexts may impact behavior in an unpredictable manner and therefore, put experimental control at risk. Nevertheless, using the loaded-context instructions could be advantageous in several ways. A properly framed context can help to facilitate learning and gain ecological validity. The challenge is whether we can identify when and why the loaded context may alter behavior. In this paper, we aim to test if being familiar with a loaded context can systematically influence unethical decisions in a bribery game. We conduct a laboratory bribery game experiment with three different treatments: the neutral-context treatment, the familiar-context treatment, and the unfamiliar-context treatment. Using the neutral-context treatment as a benchmark, we find that participants in the familiar-context treatment express stronger negative attitudes toward corruption. Attitudes toward unethical behavior are the same in the neutral-context treatment and the unfamiliar-context treatment. Behaviorally, the participants in the familiar-context treatment are much less likely to engage in corrupt activities. The neutral-context treatment and the unfamiliar-context treatment produce the same behavioral outcome.

The Double Framing Effect of Emotive Metaphors in Argumentation

In argumentation, metaphors are often considered as ambiguous or deceptive uses of language leading to fallacies of reasoning. However, they can also provide useful insights into creative argumentation, leading to genuinely new knowledge. Metaphors entail a framing effect that implicitly provides a specific perspective to interpret the world, guiding reasoning and evaluation of arguments. In the same vein, emotions could be in sharp contrast with proper reasoning, but they can also be cognitive processes of affective framing, influencing our reasoning and behavior in different meaningful ways. Thus, a double (metaphorical and affective) framing effect might influence argumentation in the case of emotive metaphors, such as “Poverty is a disease” or “Your boss is a dictator,” where specific “emotive words” (disease, dictator) are used as vehicles. We present and discuss the results of two experimental studies designed to explore the role of emotive metaphors in argumentation. The studies investigated whether and to what extent the detection of a fallacious argument is influenced by the presence of a conventional vs. novel emotive metaphor. Participants evaluated a series of verbal arguments containing either “non-emotive” or “emotive” (positive or negative) metaphors as middle terms that “bridge” the premises of the argument. The results show that the affective coherence of the metaphor's vehicle and topic plays a crucial role in participants' reasoning style, leading to global heuristic vs. local analytical interpretive processes in the interplay of the metaphorical and the affective framing effects.

Hidden talents in harsh conditions? A preregistered study of memory and reasoning about social dominance

Although growing up in stressful conditions can undermine mental abilities, people in harsh environments may develop intact, or even enhanced, social and cognitive abilities for solving problems in high-adversity contexts (i.e. 'hidden talents'). We examine whether childhood and current exposure to violence are associated with memory (number of learning rounds needed to memorize relations between items) and reasoning performance (accuracy in deducing a novel relation) on transitive inference tasks involving both violence-relevant and violence-neutral social information (social dominance vs. chronological age). We hypothesized that individuals who had more exposure to violence would perform better than individuals with less exposure on the social dominance task. We tested this hypothesis in a preregistered study in 100 Dutch college students and 99 Dutch community participants. We found that more exposure to violence was associated with lower overall memory performance, but not with reasoning performance. However, the main effects of current (but not childhood) exposure to violence on memory were qualified by significant interaction effects. More current exposure to neighborhood violence was associated with worse memory for age relations, but not with memory for dominance relations. By contrast, more current personal involvement in violence was associated with better memory for dominance relations, but not with memory for age relations. These results suggest incomplete transfer of learning and memory abilities across contents. This pattern of results, which supports a combination of deficits and 'hidden talents,' is striking in relation to the broader developmental literature, which has nearly exclusively reported deficits in people from harsh conditions. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/e4ePmSzZsuc.

How Emotions Modulate Arithmetic Performance

Abstract. The goal of the present study was to test whether and how emotions influence arithmetic performance. Participants had to verify arithmetic problems. True problems were either easier or harder problems. False problems were parity-match or parity-mismatch problems. The odd/even status of proposed and correct answers was the same in parity-match problems (e.g., 19 × 7 = 131) and different in parity-mismatch problems (e.g., 17 × 9 = 152). Before each problem, participants saw a positive (e.g., smiling baby), negative (e.g., mutilations), or neutral pictures (e.g., neutral face) selected from International Affective Picture System (IAPS). They had to decide whether each picture includes a person or not before verifying each arithmetic problem. Results showed different effects of emotion on true- and false problem verification. Participants’ performance on true problems showed decreased problem-difficulty after processing negative pictures and increased difficulty effects after processing positive pictures. On false problems, we found smaller parity-violation effects after negative pictures (i.e., decreased performance on parity-mismatch problems), together with larger parity-violation effects after positive pictures (i.e., decreased performance on parity-match problems). These findings suggest that emotions influence arithmetic performance via which strategy is used and how each strategy is executed on each problem. They have important implications for understanding the role of emotions on arithmetic performance, and more generally on how emotions influence cognition.

Differential roles of polar orbital prefrontal cortex and parietal lobes in logical reasoning with neutral and negative emotional content

To answer the question of how brain pathology affects reasoning about negative emotional content, we administered a disjunctive logical reasoning task involving arguments with neutral content (e.g. Either there are tigers or women in NYC, but not both; There are no tigers in NYC; There are women in NYC) and emotionally laden content (e.g. Either there are pedophiles or politicians in Texas, but not both; There are politicians in Texas; There are no pedophiles in Texas) to 92 neurological patients with focal lesions to various parts of the brain. A Voxel Lesion Symptom Mapping (VLSM) analysis identified 16 patients, all with lesions to the orbital polar prefrontal cortex (BA 10 & 11), as being selectively impaired in the emotional reasoning condition. Another 17 patients, all with lesions to the parietal cortex, were identified as being impaired in the neutral content condition. The reasoning scores of these two patient groups, along with 23 matched normal controls, underwent additional analysis to explore the effect of belief bias. This analysis revealed that the differences identified above were largely driven by trials where there was an incongruency between the believability of the conclusion and the validity of the argument (i.e. valid argument/false conclusion or invalid argument/true conclusion). Patients with lesions to polar orbital prefrontal cortex underperformed in incongruent emotional content trials and over performed in incongruent neutral content trials (compared to both normal controls and patients with parietal lobe lesions). Patients with lesions to parietal lobes underperformed normal controls (at a trend level) in neutral trials where there was a congruency between the believability of the conclusion and the validity of the argument (i.e. valid argument/true conclusion or invalid argument/false conclusion). We conclude that lesions to the polar orbital prefrontal cortex (i) prevent these patients from enjoying any emotionally induced cognitive boost, and (ii) block the belief bias processing route in the neutral condition. Lesions to parietal lobes result in a generalized impairment in logical reasoning with neutral content.

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Polar/orbital PFC lesions result in impaired reasoning in emotional content reasoning.

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Polar/orbital PFC lesion patients overperform in neutral content reasoning trials.

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These differences were driven by incongruent reasoning trials.

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Parietal lesions result in impaired reasoning with neutral but not emotional content.

Two Models of Moral Judgment

This paper compares two theories and their two corresponding computational models of human moral judgment. In order to better address psychological realism and generality of theories of moral judgment, more detailed and more psychologically nuanced models are needed. In particular, a motivationally based theory of moral judgment (and its corresponding computational model) is developed in this paper that provides a more accurate account of human moral judgment than an existing emotion-reason conflict theory. Simulations based on the theory capture and explain a range of relevant human data. They account not only for the original data that were used to support the emotion-reason conflict theory, but also for a wider range of data and phenomena.

Independent effects of relevance and arousal on deductive reasoning

Emotional content can have either a deleterious or a beneficial impact on logicality. Using standard deductive-reasoning tasks, we tested the hypothesis that the interplay of two factors - personal relevance and arousal - determines the nature of the effect of emotional content on logicality. Arousal was assessed using measures of skin conductance. Personal relevance was manipulated by asking participants to reason about semantic contents linked to an emotional event that they had experienced or not. Findings showed that (1) personal relevance exerts a positive effect on logicality while arousal exerts a negative effect, and that (2) these effects are independent of each other.