Fast mappers, slow learners: Word learning without hippocampus is slow and sparse irrespective of methodology

Rapid acquisition through fast mapping: stable memory over time and role of prior knowledge

In recent years, there have been intensive debates on whether healthy adults acquire new word knowledge through fast mapping (FM) by a different mechanism from explicit encoding (EE). In this study, we focused on this issue and investigated to what extent retention interval, prior knowledge (PK), and lure type modulated memory after FM and EE. Healthy young participants were asked to learn novel word-picture associations through both FM and EE. Half of the pictures were from familiar categories (i.e., high PK) and the other half were from unfamiliar categories (i.e., low PK). After 10 min and 1 wk, the participants were tested by forced-choice (FC) tasks, with lures from different categories (Experiment 1) or from the same categories of the target pictures (Experiment 2). Pseudowords were used to denote names of the novel pictures and baseline performance was controlled for each task. The results showed that in both Experiments 1 and 2, memory performance remained stable after FM, while it declined after EE from 10 min to 1 wk. Moreover, the effect of PK appeared at 10 min after FM while at 1 wk after EE in Experiment 2. PK enhanced memory of word-picture associations when the lures were from the same categories (Experiment 2), rather than from different categories (Experiment 1). These results were largely confirmed in Experiment 3 when encoding condition was manipulated as a between-subjects factor, while lure type as a within-subjects factor. The findings suggest that different from EE, FM facilitates rapid acquisition and consolidation of word-picture knowledge, and highlight that PK plays an important role in this process by enhancing access to detailed information.

Semantic Memory and the Hippocampus: Revisiting, Reaffirming, and Extending the Reach of Their Critical Relationship

Since Tulving proposed a distinction in memory between semantic and episodic memory, considerable effort has been directed towards understanding their similar and unique features. Of particular interest has been the extent to which semantic and episodic memory have a shared dependence on the hippocampus. In contrast to the definitive evidence for the link between hippocampus and episodic memory, the role of the hippocampus in semantic memory has been a topic of considerable debate. This debate stems, in part, from highly variable reports of new semantic memory learning in amnesia ranging from profound impairment to full preservation, and various degrees of deficit and ability in between. More recently, a number of significant advances in experimental methods have occurred, alongside new provocative data on the role of the hippocampus in semantic memory, making this an ideal moment to revisit this debate, to re-evaluate data, methods, and theories, and to synthesize new findings. In line with these advances, this review has two primary goals. First, we provide a historical lens with which to reevaluate and contextualize the literature on semantic memory and the hippocampus. The second goal of this review is to provide a synthesis of new findings on the role of the hippocampus and semantic memory. With the perspective of time and this critical review, we arrive at the interpretation that the hippocampus does indeed make necessary contributions to semantic memory. We argue that semantic memory, like episodic memory, is a highly flexible, (re)constructive, relational and multimodal system, and that there is value in developing methods and materials that fully capture this depth and richness to facilitate comparisons to episodic memory. Such efforts will be critical in addressing questions regarding the cognitive and neural (inter)dependencies among forms of memory, and the role that these forms of memory play in support of cognition more broadly. Such efforts also promise to advance our understanding of how words, concepts, and meaning, as well as episodes and events, are instantiated and maintained in memory and will yield new insights into our two most quintessentially human abilities: memory and language.

Language, Memory, and Mental Time Travel: An Evolutionary Perspective

Language could not exist without memory, in all its forms: working memory for sequential production and understanding, implicit memory for grammatical rules, semantic memory for knowledge, and episodic memory for communicating personal experience. Episodic memory is part of a more general capacity for mental travel both forward and backward in time, and extending even into fantasy and stories. I argue that the generativity of mental time travel underlies the generativity of language itself, and could be the basis of what Chomsky calls I-language, or universal grammar (UG), a capacity for recursive thought independent of communicative language itself. Whereas Chomsky proposed that I-language evolved in a single step well after the emergence of Homo sapiens, I suggest that generative imagination, extended in space and time, has a long evolutionary history, and that it was the capacity to share internal thoughts, rather than the nature of the thoughts themselves, that more clearly distinguishes humans from other species.